Bombay High Court
Navjeevan Shikshan Sanstha ... vs Ajay S/O Kesharvrao Charde And ... on 14 October, 2021
Bench: Avinash G. Gharote
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1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH AT NAGPUR
WRIT PETITION NO.8314/2019
PETITIONERS: 1. Navjevan Shikshan Sanstha,
(Orig. Respondents Bhisnur, Office 419/201,
1 to 3) Sanjivani Complex, Hanuman Nagar,
Nagpur -9, through its Secretary.
2. Rani Chitralekha Devi Raje
Bhosle Secondary Vidyalaya,
Kanhalgaon, Tah. Hingna, Post
Ridhora (Satgaon), Pin - 441 108,
Dist - Nagpur, through its
Head Master.
3. Rani Chitralekha Devi Raje
Bhosle Secondary Vidyalaya
through its President/Secretary,
School Committee, Post Ridhora
(Satgaon), Pin - 441 108, Tah.
Hingna, Dist. Nagpur.
...VERSUS...
RESPONDENTS 1. Ajay s/o Keshavrao Charde,
(Orig. Appellant) Aged about 33 years, Occ. Nil,
R/o 114, Narmada Colony, Katol
Road, Nagpur, Tah. & Distt - Nagpur.
(Orig. Respondent 2. Yeshwant s/o Sheshrao Chafle
no.4) Aged 31 years, Occup : Service,
R/o C/o Rani Chitralekha Raje,
Bhonsale School, Kanhalgaon
Post Ridhora (Satgaon),
Pin - 441 108, Tah. Hingna,
District - Nagpur.
::: Uploaded on - 14/10/2021 ::: Downloaded on - 15/10/2021 08:35:40 :::
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2
(Orig. Respondent 3. The Education Officer (Secondary)
no.5) Zilla Parishad, Nagpur.
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Shri A. Shelat, Advocate for petitioner
Shri A.D. Mohgaonkar, Advocate for respondent no.1
Shri A.D. Bhate, Advocate for respondent no.2
Mrs. M.A. Barbde, AGP for respondent no.3
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CORAM : AVINASH G. GHAROTE, J.
Judgment reserved on : 24/09/2021
Judgment pronounced on : 14/10/2021
1. Heard Shri A. Shelat, learned Counsel for the
petitioners, Shri A.D. Mohgaonkar, learned Counsel for the
respondent no.1, Shri A.D. Bhate, learned Counsel for the
respondent no.2 and Mrs. M.A. Barbde, learned Assistant
Government Pleader for the respondent no.3.
2. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard finally
with the consent of the learned Counsel for the rival parties.
3. The judgment dated 7/10/2019 passed by the learned
School Tribunal, whereby the communication dated 14/8/2015
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issued by the petitioners claiming to have accepted the resignation
dated 22/6/2015 by the respondent no.1, has been set aside,
terming it to be otherwise termination of services, is challenged in
the present petition.
4. Shri Shelat, learned Counsel for the petitioners, by
inviting my attention to the letter dated 22/6/2015, issued by the
respondent no.1, submits, that since there is no dispute, that the said
letter is in the handwriting of the respondent no.1, neither is there
any dispute about the contents therein, effect has to be given
thereto, which would be the resignation of the respondent no.1 and
not otherwise. He submits, that the said resignation was not a
resignation simpliciter, but was for compensation received by the
respondent no.1 to the tune of Rs.10,00,000/- out of which an
amount of Rs.9,00,000/-, at the instructions, of the respondent no.1
was paid to his brother by name Satish by way of three postdated
cheques dated 3/2/2014 which were encashed on 2/7/2015 and a
sum of Rs.1,00,000/- was paid to the respondent no.1, by cheque
which also came to be encashed on 25/7/2015. He submits that
these payments, are admitted by the respondent no.1, in his
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rejoinder. He further submits that the resignation of the respondent
no.1 was accepted by the School Committee on 26/6/2016 on which
date itself, the respondent no.1 was relieved. That apart, on
5/8/2015 the respondent no.1 had himself informed the Education
Officer, Zilla Parishad, Nagpur about the resignation tendered by
him, which was indicated from the entry No.4278 dated 5/8/2015
in the inward register of the said office. The complaint made by the
respondent no.1 to the Education officer on 12/8/2015, that the
resignation was forcibly obtained, according to learned Counsel was
an after thought, which was also the position, in respect of the
complaint dated 20/8/2015. The termination was challenged by the
respondent no.1 by way of Writ Petition No.706/2016, which was
withdrawn on 8/2/2016 with liberty to pursue the remedy available
under law, in pursuance to which the appeal before the learned
School Tribunal came to be filed. Further inviting my attention to the
communications dated 12/8/2015, 20/8/2015 and 22/8/2015
made by the respondent no.1, it is contented that there is no
mention that after 22/6/2015, the respondent no.1 had ever
approached to attend the school and was not allowed to do so,
which according to him, falsifies the stand of the respondent no.1. It
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is therefore submitted that the resignation is supported by
documents and the finding recorded that the resignation was not
voluntary by the learned School Tribunal was perverse.
4.1. It is further contended, that the School Committee was
clearly empowered to accept the resignation, and that contrary
allegations are clearly without any pleadings. He further submits
that under Rule 40 (3) of the Maharashtra Employees of Private
Schools (Conditions of Service) Rules, 1981 ["the MEPS Rules" for
short hereinafter] the obligation is upon the employee to give a
notice and failure thereof would not obligate the Management in
any manner whatsoever, as it is not necessary for the Management to
give any notice under Rule 40 of the MEPS Rules.
4.2. It is further submitted that the mother of the respondent
no.1 is running a School in the name of the father of the respondent
no.1 wherein the Headmaster had retired, creating vacancy, in which
the respondent no.1 might have been interested, which may be the
reason for tendering the resignation.
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4.3. He further submits that since the payment was
admitted, the findings recorded by the learned School Tribunal that
there was no approval to the same under the provisions of the
Bombay Public Trusts Act were without any merits whatsoever as
such an approval was neither required or even if required, was
immaterial, in view of the admission.
4.4. Reliance for the above submissions is placed on Bahujan
Vikas Mandal, Akola and another Vs. Manda Vithalrao Parsutkar and
another, 2011 (2) Mh.L.J. 203; Sayyed Maksood Ali Sayyed Roshid
Ali Vs. Uruj-E-Urdu Education Society, Kalamb and another, 2011
(4) Mh.L.J. 952 ; Atul Nathuram Naiknawade Vs. Secretary, Smt.
Bhagiratibai Late High School and others, 2015 (6) Mh.L.J. 258 ;
Kushappa Mahadeo Kamble Vs. State of Maharashtra and others ,
2010 (4) Mh.L.J. 313; Progressive Education Society and another
Vs. Mohammad Ali Gulam Dastagir Dafedar and others, 2017 (5)
Mh.L.J. 242; Juned Khuram Roufuddin Vs. President, Jamiat Ul
Muslimeen Social and Education Society, Jalna and others, 2015 (4)
Mh.L.J. 450.
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4.5. It is submitted that the judgment in the case of
Chandrakant Damodar Lone Vs. Chhatrapati Shivaji Education
Society & Ors., 1 (1988) CLR HC 175 has not been followed by the
learned Tribunal, which vitiates the impugned judgment. It is further
contended that the learned Tribunal has only considered Rule 40 of
the MEPS Rules and the other factors relevant namely, that the
resignation was voluntary, was in the handwriting of the respondent
no.1, was for compensation and intimation thereof was given to the
Education Officer have been ignored. He therefore submits that the
judgment is required to be quashed and set aside and the appeal be
dismissed as the resignation was voluntary.
5. Shri Mohgaonkar, learned Counsel for the respondent
no.1 submits that in the present case the Headmaster and the
Secretary of the Institution running the School are one and the
same. He submits that even prior to the aforesaid so-called
resignation, an earlier attempt was also made, to terminate the
employment of the respondent no.1 by the communication dated
17/4/2015, which indicates that the Management anyhow intended
to terminate the services of the respondent no.1, who was a
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confirmed employee. He submits that on earlier occasion also, the
Management had removed 8 to 10 employees, which position was
not denied by the petitioners, which indicated the mala fide
intentions of the petitioners to anyhow remove its employees
including the respondent no.1. He further invites my attention to the
so-called resignation dated 22/6/2015, to indicate that it bears two
dates one 22/6/2013, which has been scored off and the date
22/6/2015 inserted underneath, which according to him, indicates,
that the document was not voluntary.
5.1. Further placing reliance upon Section 7 of the
Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service)
Regulation Act, 1977 ["the MEPS Act" for short hereinafter], he
submits that such a resignation has to be sent by registered post, the
intent and purpose behind the same, being to indicate its voluntary
nature, which is absent in the present matter. Relying upon Rule 40
of the MEPS Rules, he submits that it is for the petitioners to indicate
and demonstrate that there was an acceptance which could be
demonstrated, only by producing on record the Resolution of the
Managing Committee including the notice calling the meeting, the
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agenda and the minutes of the meeting, which are absent in the
present matter, as no original Resolution has been placed on record.
He further submits that there is even no relieving order, relieving the
respondent no.1 from the post held by him, as what has been placed
on record, is only a chit of paper signed by the Secretary, who is also
the Headmaster.
5.2. He further submits that, the academic session during
the concerned period started on 15/7/2015 and therefore, the
provisions of Rule 40 (3) of the MEPS Rules are also attracted, which
prevents the employee from tendering his resignation in the
vacation. He further submits that the respondent no.1 had tried to
attend the school after the reopening consequent to the summer
vacations of 2015, however, he was not allowed to do so. He submits
that there is an attempt by the Management, to fill in the post
illegally, for which an objection was raised by the petitioner.
5.3. In so far as the receipt of the amount is concerned, he
submits, that it was a private transaction having nothing to do with
the employment of the respondent no.1. He submits that the sum of
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Rs.9,00,000/- claimed to be paid by the Management to the brother
of the petitioner is clearly false, as the said cheques have not been
issued by the petitioner no.1-Society, but by individuals and had no
concern with the Management. He submits that there is no
document of compromise filed by the Management and it is
inconceivable that a huge amount of Rs.10,00,000/- would be paid
as compensation, without there being anything on record to show on
what account it was so paid. He further submits that the so-called
resignation is dated 22/6/2015, whereas the deposit of the amount,
in the account of the brother of the respondent no.1 was on
22/7/2015 and on 25/7/2015 in the account of the respondent no.1
and it is inconceivable that without a document linking the said
payment, to any compensation offered to the respondent no.1, any
person, would tender any resignation more than a month earlier in
point of time, on the presumption that the cheques would be
honoured.
5.4. Even otherwise he submits that it was for the petitioner
to have explained and demonstrated by bringing material on record
to link the said payment, with the claim by the petitioner that it was
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being paid on account of compensation for the resignation tendered,
which is clearly absent in the instant matter.
5.5. He further submits, by inviting my attention to Section 5
of the MEPS Act, that the appointment is done by the Management
under Section 5 (1) of the MEPS Act and the mere issuance of the
appointment order by the School Committee, is only a formality, and
does not vest the School Committee with any powers, to accept any
resignation, which could only be done by the Management under
Rule 40 of the MEPS Rules, which position, according to him, is
clearly absent in the present matter. He submits that the resignation
was created only with an intention, to create a vacancy in which the
nephew of the President of the petitioner no.1, namely, the
respondent no.2 herein, could be adjusted. He therefore submits,
that the impugned order, is required to be sustained, as it is based
upon a correct logical reasoning and applicability of the relevant
provisions.
6. Though the impugned judgment in paras 22 and 25
refers to a Resolution No.66 dated 26/6/2015, passed by the
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Managing Committee, however, even the petitioners in their reply
before the learned School Tribunal, have not made any such
averment, nor any document to that effect has been placed on
record in the present petition nor any arguments have been
advanced by Shri Shelat, learned Counsel for the petitioners in this
regard. What finds place on record is the communication dated
14/8/2015, filed by the petitioners which speaks of a Resolution by
the School Committee dated 26/6/2015 and nothing else. The
petition therefore is being decided on this premise.
7. To consider whether the resignation was voluntary, it is
material to have a look at the resignation dated 22/6/2015. A
perusal of the said document would indicate, that it is addressed to
the Chairman (Secretary) of the petitioner no.1. No doubt the
language therein, indicates that a resignation is being tendered, it is
however material to note, that there is no acknowledgment or
endorsement of anyone having received the same. That apart, the
said document bears two dates, the first being 22/6/2013, which has
been scored off with the countersign of the respondent no.1 and the
date 22/6/2015 written underneath. These two factors itself lead to
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a doubt about the genuineness regarding the voluntary tendering of
the document.
8. It is necessary to point out that this is not the case of a
resignation simpliciter, but one for compensation. The said
resignation, is claimed by the petitioners, to be in lieu of
compensation of Rs.10,00,000/-, paid to the respondent no.1, by the
petitioners. There is no such provision permitting the same in the
MEPS Act, and thus this could only be under an agreement between
the parties concerned. There is no dispute that an amount of
Rs.9,00,000/- by way of three postdated cheques, has been received
by the brother of the respondent no.1 on 22/7/2015 and the sum of
Rs.1,00,000/- has been received by the respondent no.1 on
25/7/2015, by way of encashment of the said cheques of the above
dates. It was however necessary for the petitioners to demonstrate
that this payment was on account of compensation, being paid to the
respondent no.1 on account of the said resignation. Once this plea
was raised by the petitioner/Management, the burden to discharge
the same was upon the petitioner no.1/Management. To discharge
such burden, it was necessary for the petitioner no.1 to have placed
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on record, documents indicating linking of the said payment with
the resignation of the respondent no.1, which could either have been
a document of settlement, the Resolution by the Managing
Committee of the petitioner no.1 in this regard, the payment of this
amount from the account of the petitioner no.1 -Society, the
authorization/consent of the respondent no.1 to pay 90% of this
amount, not to the respondent no.1, but to his elder brother, all of
which are conspicuously absent in the present matter. Thus, having
raised a plea that the resignation was on account of compensation
paid to the respondent no.1, the said burden, has not been
discharged at all by the petitioners.
9. As against this, it is not denied by the petitioners that
the said cheques in the sum of Rs.10,00,000/- were not issued from
the account of the petitioner no.1/Society, but were issued by
individuals from their personal account, in view of which admission,
the plea put forth that the resignation was on account of
compensation received by the respondent no.1, has rightly not been
accepted by the learned School Tribunal. That an employee, who
admittedly is confirmed in the service and has a long way to go,
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considering that in the memo of the writ petition filed in 2019 itself,
the age of the respondent no.1 is shown as 33 years, would suddenly
tender his resignation, does not appear to be reasonable or logical,
in absence of anything to the contrary. It may be a case that such
resignation, could be for compensation to be received, however, in
absence of any linkage established the same, does not appear to be
plausible.
10. In Bahujan Vikas Mandal (supra) and Sayyed Maksood
Ali Sayyed Roshid Ali (supra), relied upon by Shri Shelat, learned
Counsel for the petitioners, three requirements, of a resignation,
have been enunciated (i) drawing up a letter of resignation in
duplicate; (ii) signing both the copies of that letter and (iii) putting
the date thereon. No doubt, that it is not in dispute that the
resignation is in the handwriting of the respondent no.1 and the
date thereupon, has been put by him, and therefore, two of the
conditions are satisfied, however the peculiarity of the present
matter, requires yet another condition to be satisfied, regarding
linking of the compensation to this resignation, as it is a specific case
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put forth by the petitioners that the resignation was for
compensation, which is absent in the present matter.
10.1. Atul Nathuram Naiknawade (supra) was a case in which
the employee had given a notice of resignation on 3/8/2010 and
thereafter had submitted his resignation on 3/11/2010, which was
accepted by the Management on 20/11/2010, after which, the
employee on 16/12/2010 had called upon the Management not to
accept his resignation and raised a plea regarding non-compliance of
Rule 40 of the MEPS Rules, which was turned down considering that
the period between 3/8/2010 and 3/11/2010, complied with the
requirement of Rule 40 (1) of the MEPS Rules and therefore is not
attracted in the present matter. It is however material to note that
this was a case in which by a Resolution dated 20/11/2010, the
resignation was accepted by the Management, and therefore on facts
is inapplicable.
10.2. Kushappa Mahadeo Kamble (supra) was a case in which
the resignation was tendered personally, and therefore it was held,
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that it was not mandatory, to be sent by post, which not being the
matter in issue here, it has no application.
10.3. In Chandrakant Damodar Lone (supra), the plea put
forth, that the resignation was not voluntary was accepted by the
Court, who also found that the requirement of Rule 40 of the MEPS
Rules was also not complied with and therefore the judgment of the
Tribunal was quashed and set aside and the order of termination was
set aside, which is a case, which supports the respondent no.1.
10.4. In Juned Khuram Roufuddin (supra), the resignation
was linked to the compensation, which linkage is absent in the
present matter and therefore, is not of any assistance to the case put
forth by the petitioners.
11. It is further material to note, that in support of the
contention, that the intimation about resignation, was sent to the
Education Officer, the said communication has not been produced on
record, rather what has been produced is merely an entry in the
inward register of the concerned Education Officer, regarding receipt
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of such a letter. That by itself, without the letter actually being
brought on record, cannot lead to any presumption, that such a
communication was indeed sent by the respondent no.1, to the
Education Officer.
12. The further contention by Shri Shelat, learned Counsel
for the petitioners that the School Committee was empowered to
accept the resignation said to have been tendered by the respondent
no.1, has to be looked into, in the background of Rule 2 (i) of the
MEPS Rules, which defines the School Committee to be a Committee
constituted in accordance with the provisions of Schedule-A.
Schedule-A requires the constitution of a School Committee, which is
responsible to the Government for management of the school, which
has the composition as indicated in Clause - 2 of Schedule-A. The
functions of the School Committee are indicated in Clause-3 of
Schedule-A, which for the sake of ready reference, are reproduced as
under :-
" Schedule 'A' Clause -3. Functions of the School
Committee shall be as follows, namely :-
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(a) management and regulation of the finance
of school, keeping of accounts and making investments of
the funds of the school;
(b) preparation of budget estimates;
(c) appointment of employees (other than the
Head of the School);
(d) institution of new teaching courses;
(e) confirmation, promotion of and minor
punishment to the employees other than Head subject to
the provisions of the Act and these rules.
(f) grant of leave other than casual leave, to
the staff other than the Head of the school whose leave
will be granted by the Management."
A perusal of the above would indicate that the School
Committee has not been conferred any power, to accept the
resignation of any employee. That is the sole jurisdiction of the
Management, under Section 7 of the MEPS Act and Rule 40 of the
MEPS Rules. The communication dated 14/8/2015 placed on record
by the respondent no.1, which is not disputed by the petitioners,
indicates that the resignation was placed not before the Managing
Committee of the petitioner no.1 but before the School Committee,
which is claimed to have been accepted by the School Committee in
its meeting dated 26/6/2015, vide Resolution no.6 in the 48th
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Meeting of the said School Committee. It also indicates that the
respondent no.1 was relieved on 26/6/2015. Since the School
Committee, as indicated above, does not have the authority to
accept any resignation, Resolution no.6, as claimed to have been
passed in its meeting dated 26/6/2015, accepting the resignation of
the respondent no.1, does not carry any meaning whatsoever and is
ineffectual, in absence of any power or authority in that regard,
which would indicate that there is no acceptance of any resignation
by the authority, which is empowered to do so, which obviously
would be the Managing Committee of the petitioner no.1. It is also
necessary to note that there is no relieving order, relieving the
respondent no.1, placed on record.
13. As against this a perusal of Rule 40 of the MEPS Rules,
indicates, that a permanent employee has to give a notice of three
calendar months of his resignation, which is to be given to the
Management. Once such a notice is given to the Management and in
case the Management, desires that such an employee has to be
relieved immediately or earlier, without waiting for the period of
three calendar months to expire, it is then for the Management to
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make payment of the pay for three months, to such employee, in lieu
of such notice, so that, such an employee, can be relieved forthwith
or from such date the Management indicates. Admittedly, in the
instant matter the resignation of the respondent no.1 was never
placed before the Managing Committee of the petitioner no.1, at any
point of time whatsoever, nor is there any Resolution passed by the
Managing Committee, indicating the allowing of the respondent
no.1 to leave service earlier, by agreeing to pay the salary for three
months, in lieu of permitting the employee, to leave earlier, than the
period as contemplated by Rule 40 (1) of the MEPS Rules.
Mohammad Ali Gulam Dastagir Dafedar (supra) relied upon by
Shri Shelat, learned Counsel for the petitioners, which holds that a
School Committee has power to accept resignation, in my considered
opinion, does not consider the language and import of Section 7 of
the MEPS Act, read with the functions of the School Committee, as
contained in Clause-3 (a) to (g) of Schedule-A under Rule 2 (1) (i)
and Rule 40 of the MEPS Rules and therefore is per incuriam the
above provisions of the Statute and Rules framed thereunder.
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14. The very purpose of Section 7 of MEPS Act and Rule 40
of the MEPS Rules, appears to be to protect the interest of the
employee. It is trite position of law, that when a resignation is
tendered, it has to be tendered to the appropriate authority, who is
capable of accepting the same. Mere tendering of resignation, by its
own, would be of no significance, for the reason, that the
Management, may in a given case, refuse to accept the same, for
reasons to be recorded, which may include the pendency or an
intention to proceed with an enquiry against the employee. Then
again Rule 40 (1) of the MEPS Rules categorically provides a period
of three months from the date of notice, till the time the resignation
comes into effect, and in case, the Management, wants to bring it
into effect immediately, then it would be for the Management to
have complied with the requirements of payment of pay for the
requisite duration as contemplated in Rule 40 (1) of the MEPS Rules.
The expression "allow an employee to leave service earlier", in Rule
40 (1) and (2) of the MEPS Rules, clearly indicates, that once the
Management claims that the resignation has been tendered by an
employee, the burden would shift upon the Management, to
demonstrate compliance with the requirement of Rule 40 (1) of the
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MEPS Rules, in case the employer is being allowed to leave service
earlier. The "acceptance" therefore forms an integral part of the
responsibility of the Management in a case when resignation is
tendered by an employee, as by communicating the acceptance, the
employee stands informed of his position vis-a-vis the Management.
Such an acceptance, has to be demonstrated by placing on record,
the minutes of the meeting of the Managing Committee of the
Management, which would suffice the acceptance of the resignation.
15. It may also be construed that the period of three
months, contemplated in Rule 40 (1) of the MEPS Rules, could be a
cooling off period, for the employee, to rethink about the resignation
tendered, which before its acceptance, may be possible to be
withdrawn by such employee. Contrary thereto, if the Management
does not want to continue with the employee, it is open, to
immediately accept the resignation by performing the action as
provided for in Rule 40 (1) of the MEPS Rules of accepting the same
and tendering pay in lieu of notice period.
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16. Even Rule 40 (3) of the MEPS Rules, puts an embargo
upon an employee, who is entitled to vacation not to give notice of
resignation, during the vacation or which may cover any part of the
vacation and requires that such a notice of resignation shall not be
given within a month after the beginning of the first term of the
year.
17. The requirements, as enumerated in Rule 40 (1) and 40
(3) of the MEPS Rules, have to be read in a manner, so as to render
them meaningful, as the language used therein, which is plain and
unambiguous clearly manifest the intention of the legislature in
enacting the same, that it is for the benefit of the employee and
though the employee, may by his conduct, waive off the
requirement, that however, would not mean that the resignation
ought not to be accepted or such acceptance not placed on record, or
that the acceptance, could be by anyone other than the
Management.
18. That apart, considering the date of the so-called
resignation, which is dated 22/6/2015, the same admittedly, is
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during the period of vacation, and therefore, stands covered by the
language of Rule 40 (3) of the MEPS Rules, on account of breach of
which, it would become invalid, as held in Bahujan Vikas Mandal
(supra) itself, as cited by Shri Shelat, learned Counsel for the
petitioners.
19. The communications dated 12/8/2015 and 20/8/2015
by the respondent no.1 to the petitioners, have not been replied at
all by the petitioners. The contention by the respondent no.1, that
the School reopened on 15th of July, 2015, and therefore, there was a
violation of the requirement of Rule 40 (3) of the MEPS Rules, also
remained unaddressed.
20. The contention that the mother of the respondent no.1
was running a School in which due to the vacancies arisen, the
respondent no.1 being interested had resigned is not borne out from
the position on record.
21. The delay in filing of the complaint stands explained on
account of the summer vacation in the School and its late opening
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on 15/7/2015 and refusal of the petitioners in permitting the
respondent no.1 to resume his services thereafter.
22. In that view of the matter, since in the instant case, on
the facts available, though the resignation, is admittedly in the
handwriting of the respondent no.1, since a plea was set up by the
petitioners, that the resignation, was on account of compensation
received by the respondent no.1, which position has been found to
be incorrect by the learned Tribunal and also by this Court as
discussed above, I do not find any merit in the petition. The
judgment of the learned Tribunal considers the factual position
before it rightly by applying the law applicable. The writ petition is
therefore dismissed. Rule stands discharged. There shall be no order
as to costs.
(AVINASH G. GHAROTE, J.)
Wadkar
