Citation : 2021 Latest Caselaw 11205 Bom
Judgement Date : 18 August, 2021
Digitally signed by
JAYARAJAN JAYARAJAN
ANJAKULATH ANJAKULATH NAIR
NAIR Date: 2021.08.20
17:00:27 +0530
1/18 00 BA-4688.20.odt
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
BAIL APPLICATION (ST.) NO.4688 OF 2020
Duryodhan Tukaram Pawar ]
R/at, Village - Taraswadi, Tal. Atpadi, ]
Dist. Sangli. ]
[Presently at Central Jail, Kolhapur.] ] ... Applicant
Versus
The State of Maharashtra ]
[I/O. Atpadi Police Station, Sangli.] ] ... Respondent
...
Mr. Niranjan Mundargi i/b Mr. Raviraj Paramane for the
Applicant.
Mr. A.R. Kapadnis, A.P.P. for the State.
...
CORAM : SMT. BHARATI DANGRE, J.
DATED : 18TH AUGUST, 2021.
P.C:-
1. The Applicant came to be arraigned as an accused in C.R. No.I-193 of 2019 registered with Atpadi Police Station, Sangli, invoking offences punishable under Sections 498-A, 306, 323, 504 read with Section 34 of the IPC. On the said C.R. being registered, he was arrested on 18/08/2019 and produced before
AJN 2/18 00 BA-4688.20.odt
the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Atpadi and remanded to the judicial custody on 18/08/2019. Offences under Sections 302 and 201 of the IPC came to be added in the said crime on 27/08/2019.
2. According to the Applicant, since the 90 days for completion of investigation in terms of sub-section (2) of Section 167 of the Cr.P.C. ended on 15/11/2019 and the charge-sheet was not filed till then, on 16/11/2019, the Applicant preferred an Application before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, claiming to be released on bail and undertaking to abide by the conditions, which may be imposed.
3. The Application was considered by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Atpadi and, on 16/11/2019, it was recorded that the Applicant was produced before the Court on 18/08/2019 and sent to jail. Till the order was passed i.e. on 16/11/2019, the charge- sheet was not filed. After referring to the decisions in the case of Ravi Prakash Singh @ Arvind Singh v. State of Bihar in Criminal Appeal No.325 of 2015 dated 20/02/2015 and Chaganti Satyanarayan & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh reported in (1986) 3 SCC 141, taking a view that while computing the period of default bail under Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C., the Court has to consider the date of arrest and on consideration of the decisions in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Rustam & Ors. reported in 1995 (Supp.) (3) SCC AJN 3/18 00 BA-4688.20.odt
221, where the Supreme Court has excluded the day on which the accused was produced before the Court, the Application came to be rejected.
4. By the present Application, the Applicant has prayed for his release on bail in view of the indefeasible right, which has accrued to him when the charge-sheet was not filed on completion of investigation on 15/11/2019. The charge-sheet came to be filed on 16/11/2019 at 5.00 p.m. and the submission is by filing of the charge-sheet on the 91st day, the indefeasible right, which has accrued in the Applicant, cannot be taken away since he was ready and willing to offer the bail bond.
5. Heard Mr. Mundargi, learned counsel appearing for the Applicant and Mr. Kapadnis, learned A.P.P. for the State.
6. In the wake of the rejection of his Application by the courts below, the Applicant is before this court. The dates, which are relevant for adjudication of the Application seeking default bail are not in dispute. Before the learned Magistrate, the decision dated 02/08/2020 of the Bombay High Court in the case of Kapil Wadhvan v. State of Maharashtra in Criminal Bail Application No.400 of 2020 and the decision in the case of Ramesh Madhukar Thombare v. State of Maharashtra, reported in 1999(5) Bom. C.R. 355 were cited on behalf of the Applicant. Learned A.P.P. has placed reliance of the Apex Court AJN 4/18 00 BA-4688.20.odt
judgment in the case of Ravi Prakash v. State of Bihar in Criminal Appeal No.325 of 2015 dated 20/02/2015. The Magistrate relied upon the decision in the case of Ravi Prakash (supra), which held that while computing the period of 90 days, the day on which the accused was remanded to the judicial custody should be excluded and the day on which the Challan is to be filed should be included. The aforesaid decision was the genesis of the decision of the Additional Judicial Magistrate, which is upheld by the Sessions Court at Malegon.
7. The decision of the Bombay High Court in Kapil Wadhwan (supra) takes a view that the first day of remand cannot be excluded in computing the period of 60 days and the decision of the Sessions Judge excluding the first day of the remand was set aside and the filing of the charge-sheet by the Enforcement Directorate on 13/07/2020 being after 60 days, by exclusion of the day of remand i.e. 14/05/2020, made the Applicant entitled for being released on default bail.
8. The said decision came to be delivered by formulating a precise question to the following effect:
"Whether in computing the period of 90 days or 60 days, as contemplated in Section 167(2)(a) of the Cr.P.C., the day of remand is to be included or excluded?"
AJN 5/18 00 BA-4688.20.odt
9. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Apex Court in case of Chaganti Satyanarayan & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh reported in (1986) 3 SCC 141 followed by a decision in the case of CBI v. Anupam Kulkarni reported in (1992) 3 SCC 141 and a further decision in the case of Pragyna Singh Thakur v. State of Maharashtra reported in (2011) 10 SCC 445. Reliance was also placed on the decision of learned Single Judge of this court in the case of Deepak Satyavan Kudalkar v. State of Maharashtra in LDVC Bail Application No.197 of 2020. The Enforcement Directorate, Government of India, through its learned counsel has relied upon the decisions of the Apex Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Rustam & Ors. Reported in (1995) Supp. 3 SCC 221 and Ravi Prakash Singh @ Arvind Singh v. State of Bihar reported in (2015) 8 SCC
340. On consideration of the ratio flowing from the aforesaid decisions, the day of remand was held to be included in the period of 60 days or 90 days for determining the limitation prescribed for filing of the charge-sheet and any default to adhere to the period, conferred an indefeasible right on the accused to be released on bail.
10. The said decision was assailed before the Hon'ble Apex Court in Criminal Appeal No.701-702 of 2020 by the Enforcement Directorate, Government of India. On 23/02/2021, the Hon'ble Apex Court by referring to the core issue for consideration whether while computing the period of 60 days or AJN 6/18 00 BA-4688.20.odt
90 days as contemplated in Section 167(2)(a)(ii) of the Cr.P.C, the day of remand is to be included or excluded, for considering a claim for default bail, observed as under:
"4. The moot question has been considered by this Court in various matters, but there is divergence of opinion on how the period available for completing the investigation is to be computed. Some judgements have favoured the exclusion of date of remand, while few other cases have taken a contrary view.
5. The appellants rely inter alia on the line of reasoning in State of M.P. Vs. Rustom & Ors.1, Ravi Prakash Singh Vs. State of Bihar2 and M. Ravindran Vs. Intelligence Officer, Director of Revenue Intelligence where it was held that the date of remand is to be excluded for computing the permitted period for completion of investigation.
6. On the other hand, the Respondents seek to rely inter alia on Chaganti Satyanarayan Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, CBI Vs. Anupam J Kulkarni, State Vs. Mohd. Ashraft Bhat, State of Maharashtra Vs. Bharati Chandmal Varma, and Pragyna Singh Thakur Vs. State of Maharashtra to contend that the date of remand must be included for computing the available period for investigation for determining entitlement to default bail."
11. In view of the conflicting proposition of law in grant of default bail, Their Lordships observed that in Chaganti Satyanarayan (supra), the Court examined the legislative intent AJN 7/18 00 BA-4688.20.odt
for expeditious conclusion of investigation and the consequences of the failure of the prosecution to conclude investigation within the permitted period. However, the ratio in Chaganti Satyanarayan (supra) was not brought to the notice of the Three Judges Bench in M. Ravindran v. Intelligence Officer, Director of Revenue Intelligence reported in (2020) SCC OnLine SC 867 and the Court took a contrary view in declaring that the date of remand is to be excluded for computing the period of investigation. Since the earlier position of law was not considered and the latest decision in M. Ravindran (supra) is of Three Judges' Bench, Their Lordships deem it appropriate to refer the issue to a Bench of appropriate strength to settle the law. While making the reference, Their Lordships of the Apex Court also directed that unless the issue is appropriately determined, the courts across the country may take decision on the issue depending upon which judgment is brought to the Court's notice or on the Courts own understanding of the law, covering default bail under Section 167(2)(a)(ii) of the Cr.P.C.
12. The position of law qua the issue as regards whether the day of remand is to be included or excluded, while computing the period of 60 days or 90 days while seeking default bail is thus pending consideration of the larger Bench in terms of the Reference Order dated 23/02/2021.
13. Section 167 of the Cr.P.C. sets out the procedure when the AJN 8/18 00 BA-4688.20.odt
investigation cannot be completed in 24 hours and, the relevant portion of the said Section, reads as under:
"167. Procedure when investigation cannot be completed in twenty-four hours. - (1) Whenever any person is arrested and detained in custody, and it appears that the investigation cannot be completed within the period of twenty-four hours fixed by section 57, and there are grounds for believing that the accusation or information is wellfounded, the officer in charge of the police station or the police officer making the investigation, if he is not below the rank of sub- inspector, shall forthwith transmit to the nearest Judicial Magistrate a copy of the entries in the diary hereinafter prescribed relating to the case, and shall at the same time forward the accused to such Magistrate.
(2) The Magistrate to whom an accused person is forwarded under this section may, whether he has or has not jurisdiction to try the case, from time to time, authorise the detention of the accused in such custody as such Magistrate thinks fit, for a term not exceeding fifteen days in the whole; and if he has no jurisdiction to try the case or commit it for trial, and considers further detention unnecessary, he may order the accused to be forwarded to a Magistrate having such jurisdiction:
Provided that--
(a) the Magistrate may authorise the detention of the accused person, otherwise than in custody of the police, beyond the period of fifteen days, if he is satisfied that adequate grounds exist for AJN 9/18 00 BA-4688.20.odt
doing so, but no Magistrate shall authorise the detention of the accused person in custody under this paragraph for a total period exceeding
(i) ninety days, where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years;
(ii) sixty days, where the investigation relates to any other offence,
and, on the expiry of the said period of ninety days, or sixty days, as the case may be, the accused person shall be released on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish bail, and every person released on bail under this sub-section shall be deemed to be so released under the provisions of Chapter XXXIII for the purposes of that Chapter;]"
14. Section 57 of the Cr.P.C. puts an embargo of the power of the Police Officer to detain in custody a person arrested without warrant and Section 57 of the Cr.P.C., whcih reads as under:
"57. Person arrested not to be detained more than twenty-four hours. - No police officer shall detain in custody a person arrested without warrant for a longer period than under all the circumstances of the case is reasonable, and such period shall not, in the absence of a special order of a Magistrate under section 167, exceed twenty- four hours exclusive of the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the Magistrate's Court".
AJN 10/18 00 BA-4688.20.odt
15. Construing the said two provisions, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Chaganti Satyanarayana (supra), has clearly interpreted its purport in the following words:
"On a reading of the sub-sections (1) and (2) it may be seen that sub-section (1) is a mandatory provision governing what a police officer should do when a person is arrested and detained in custody and it appears that the investigation cannot be completed within the period of 24 hours fixed by Section 57. Sub-section (2) on the other hand pertains to the powers of remand available to a Magistrate and the manner in which such powers should be exercised. The terms of sub-section (1) of Section 167 have to be read in conjunction with Section 57. Section 57 interdicts a police officer from keeping in custody a person without warrant for a longer period than 24 hours without production before a Magistrate, subject to the exception that the time taken for performing the journey from the place of arrest to the Magistrate's Court can be excluded from the prescribed period of 24 hours. Since sub-section (1) provides that if that investigation cannot be completed within the period of 24 hours fixed by Section 57 the accused has to be forwarded to the Magistrate along with the entries in the Diary, it follows that a police officer is entitled to keep an arrested person in custody for a maximum period of 24 hours for purposes of investigation. The resultant position is that the initial period of custody of an arrested person till he is produced before a Magistrate is neither referable to nor in pursuance of an order of remand passed by a Magistrate. In fact the powers of remand given to a Magistrate become execisable only after an accused is
AJN 11/18 00 BA-4688.20.odt
produced before him in terms of sub-section (1) of Section 167."
16. The earlier period when the accused is in custody of the police officer in exercise of his power under Section 57 of the Cr.P.C. has been held as not constituting the detention, pursuant to authorization issued by the Magistrate. The powers of the remand given to the Magistrate becomes exercisable only after an accused is produced before him in terms of Section 167(1) of the Cr.P.C. Construing proviso (a) either in conjunction with sub-section (2) of Section 167 or as an independent paragraph, it is clear that the total period of 90 days under clause (I) and the total period of 60 days under clause (II) has to be calculated only from the date of remand and not from the date of arrest. The ratio of Chaganti Satyanarayana (supra) is enunciated in paragraph 25 of the judgment.
17. The earlier decisions cited before the Apex Court have been exhaustively dealt with, including the decision in the case of Mohd. Shafi v. State reported in 1997 Cr. L.J. 1309 and duly considered and put to rest by the following observations.
"31. Some of the decisions cited on either side have been rendered prior to the amendment of proviso (a) by Act 45 of 1978 and some have been rendered after the amendment. Mr. Ram Reddy sought to make a distinction of the earlier decisions by contending that they ceased to have
AJN 12/18 00 BA-4688.20.odt
relevance because of the amendment to proviso
(a) making it an independent paragraph all by itself. Since we have held that in whichever way proviso (a) is construed i.e. with reference to Section 167(2) or without reference to it the periods of 90 days and 60 days prescribed by the Legislature can be reckoned only from the date of remand the distinction sought to be made between the decisions rendered prior to Amendment Act 45 of 1978 and subsequent to it does not have much of significance."
18. The position of law flowing from Chaganti Satyanarayana (supra) clearly leads to a conclusion that the Magistrate can authorize the detention of the accused for a maximum period of 15 days from the date of remand and place the accused either in police custody or in judicial custody during the period of 15 days' remand. However, if an accused is remanded to police custody, the maximum period during which he can be placed in police custody is only 15 days. Beyond that period, no Magistrate can authorize the detention of the accused in police custody, which can be granted pursuant to a single order of remand or more than one order, when the remand is restricted on each occasion to a lesser number of days. The historical background of the proviso to Section 167(2) was also highlighted in Chaganti Satyanarayana (supra) and the underlying object considered while interpreting the proviso to Section 167(2) being to safeguard the liberty of the citizens but also to safeguard the interests of the State or in other words the
AJN 13/18 00 BA-4688.20.odt
public. This decision is followed in Anupam Kulkarni (supra), where it has been held that Section 167 is supplementary to Section 57 of the Cr.P.C. and expects the investigation to be completed in the first instance within 24 hours and, if not, the arrested person should be brought by the police before a Magistrate as provided under Section 167. While doing so, the police should transmit a copy of the entries in the diary relating to the case so as to afford an opportunity to the Magistrate to arrive at a decision whether the accused should be detained in the custody further or not. It is open to the Magistrate to release him on bail, if an application is made in that behalf and if he is satisfied that there are no grounds to remand him to custody, but if he is satisfied that further remand is necessary then he should act in terms of Section 167. The Judicial Magistrate can authorize detention of the accused either in police or judicial custody from time to time, but the total period of detention shall not exceed 15 days in the whole and the custody can be altered from judicial custody to police custody or vice-versa. After the expiry of the first period of fifteen days, the accused could only be in judicial custody or any other custody as ordered by the Magistrate but not in police custody. In Anupam Kulkarni (supra), it has been held that the police custody even if necessary, can be ordered only during the first period of 15 days. If further interrogation is necessary even after the expiry of the period of first fifteen days, there is no bar for interrogating the accused, who is transmitted to judicial custody for a period of 90 AJN 14/18 00 BA-4688.20.odt
days or 60 days. I am unable to accept this contention. There cannot be any detention in police custody after expiry of first 15 days even in a case where the offence is serious in nature. The power of the Magistrate to authorize detention, however, is limited by prescription of period of 90 days or 60 days and if the investigation is not completed within the said period, the accused has to be released on bail in terms of proviso to Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. Paragraph 13 of the judgment in Anupam Kulkarni (supra) clarifies the position of law in the following words:
"After the expiry of the first period of fifteen days the further remand during the period of investigation can only be in judicial custody.
There cannot be any detention in the police custody after the expiry of first fifteen days even in a case where some more offences either serious or otherwise committed by him in the same transaction come to light at a later stage. But this bar does not apply if the same arrested accused is involved in a different case arising out of a different transaction. Even if he is in judicial custody in connection with the investigation of the earlier case he can formally be arrested regarding his involvement in the different case and associate him with the investigation of that other case and the Magistrate can act as provided under Section 167(2) and the proviso and can remand him to such custody as mentioned therein during the first period of fifteen days and thereafter in accordance with the proviso as discussed above. If the investigation is not completed within the period of ninety days or sixty days
AJN 15/18 00 BA-4688.20.odt
then the accused has to be released on bail as provided under the proviso to Section 167(2). The period of ninety days or sixty days has to be computed from the date of detention as per the orders of the Magistrate and not from the date of arrest by the police. Consequently the first period of fifteen days mentioned in Section 167(2) has to be computed from the date of such detention and after the expiry of the period of first fifteen days it should be only judicial custody."
19. My attention is invited to the Division Bench decision of this court in the case of Nijamuddin Mohammad Bashir Khan v. State of Maharashtra reported in 2006 (5) Mh.L.J. 690. It has taken a view that the right of the accused to be released on bail in default, on completion of investigation within the prescribed period, the computation of the statutory period of 60 days or 90 days must be started from the date of the first remand by the Magistrate. The Division Bench has relied upon the decision in the case of Chaganti Satyanarayana (supra) before reaching the said conclusion.
20. Another decision of the learned Single Judge in the case of Deepak Satyavan Kudalkar (supra) is also brought to my notice, which takes a similar view. I am party to the decision in the case of Kapil Wadhawan (supra), wherein relying the ratio laid down in Chaganti Satyanarayana (supra), the period of remand has been counted in calculating the outer limit of 60 days
AJN 16/18 00 BA-4688.20.odt
or 90 days for completion of investigation.
21. Other sets of decisions are also brought to my notice since the decision in case of Ravi Prakash Singh (supra) and Rustam (supra), which have taken a view that date of remand is to be excluded for computing the period permitted for completion of investigation, did not consider the ratio laid down in Chaganti Satyanarayana (supra) and since I am of the considered opinion that the scheme of the Code of Cr.P.C. does not permit a face where the accused remains without being in custody, which would make his detention unauthorized, the exclusion of the date of remand would run contrary to the spirit of the Cr.P.C., which controls the movement of the suspect when he is arrested and made an accused by making it imperative for the police officer to bring him before the nearest Magistrate within a period of 24 hours, who will then authorize the detention of the accused in such custody as the Magistrate may think fit for a term not exceeding 15 days in the whole and, thereafter, further authorize his detention otherwise than in police custody beyond the period of 15 days, but not exceeding the period of 90 days or 60 days as the case may be and, on expiry of the said period, the accused person is entitled to be released on bail, if he is prepared to and does furnish bail bond and such a release shall be deemed to be a release under Chapter XXXIII. The aforesaid understanding of the provisions to claim default bail, in my considered opinion, entitles the present Applicant to be released on bail by including AJN 17/18 00 BA-4688.20.odt
the date of remand.
22. In the present case, the accused was arrested on 18/08/2019 and the charge-sheet was not filed till 15/11/2019. The period of 90 days came to an end on 15/11/2019 and on expiry of 90 days, the Applicant filed an Application under Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. for being released on default bail on 16/11/2019 and the charge-sheet came to be filed subsequent to the filing of the Application, where the Applicant showed his preparation to furnish bail. The subsequent filing of the charge- sheet on the 91st day will not deprive him of the right, which has already accrued to him when the charge-sheet was not filed within 90 days on completion of investigation. The Applicant is, therefore, entitled to be released on bail, which is an indefeasible right, which vests in him on 16/11/2019 i.e. the 91 st day. The Applicant is, therefore, entitled to be released on bail on default bail under Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. subject to the following condition.
ORDER
(a) The Applicant - Duryodhan Tukaram Pawar shall be released on bail in C.R. No.I-193 of 2019 registered with the Atpadi Police Station, District Sangli, on furnishing P.R. bond to the extent of
AJN 18/18 00 BA-4688.20.odt
Rs.25,000/- with one or two sureties of the like amount.
(b) The Applicant shall not directly or indirectly make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with facts of case so as to dissuade him from disclosing the facts to Court or any Police Officer and the Applicant should not tamper with evidence.
(d) The Applicant shall attend to the Atpadi Police Station, District Sangli as and when called by the Investigating Officer.
23. The Application is allowed in the aforestated terms.
24. All parties are directed to act on the downloaded copy of the order supplied by the Advocate under his seal and signature.
[SMT. BHARATI DANGRE, J.]
AJN
Publish Your Article
Campus Ambassador
Media Partner
Campus Buzz
LatestLaws.com presents: Lexidem Offline Internship Program, 2026
LatestLaws.com presents 'Lexidem Online Internship, 2026', Apply Now!