Citation : 2017 Latest Caselaw 7112 Bom
Judgement Date : 14 September, 2017
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO. 3347 OF 1995
Sadanand Krishnaji Kirloskar
(since deceased through his
legal representatives)
Nirmala Sadanand Kirloskar & Ors. .. Petitioners
vs.
Talakchand Gangaram Doshi
(since deceased)
through his legal representatives
Amrutlal Talakchand Doshi
(since deceased)
through his legal representatives
Rajesh A. Doshi & Ors. .. Respondents
WITH
CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 3107 OF 2010
Mr. V. S. Gokhale i/b. Mr. T. D. Deshmukh for Petitioners.
Mr. Sachin Dhakephalkar for Respondents.
CORAM : M. S. SONAK, J.
Date of Reserving the Judgment : 06 September 2017 Date of Pronouncing the Judgment : 14 September 2017
JUDGMENT :-
1] The petitioners (landlords) challenge the judgment, decree
and order dated 22nd March 1995 made by the III Additional District
Judge, Solapur (Appeal Court) in Civil Appeal No. 247 of 1991 and
seek restoration of judgment, decree and order dated 29 th June
1991 made by the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Solapur (Trial Court)
in Regular Civil Suit No. 1439 of 1986 ordering the eviction of the
respondents (tenants) from the commercial premises admeasuring
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1511 sq. ft., Pofferin Chowk, Solapur (suit premises) on the ground
of reasonable and bona fide requirement of the landlords,
subletting, non user and acquisition of alternate accommodation.
2] The landlords case as pleaded in the suit seeking eviction is
that the suit premises were let out to late Mr. Vishwanath Kanhale to
undertake the business of grocery shop under the name and style
of 'Anand Stores' some time in the year 1932. The said Mr. Kanhale,
sold the goodwill of the grocery business along with the stock-in-
trade to M/s. Mohanlal Doshi, which was a partnership firm
comprising Mohanlal Doshi and Talakchand Gangaram Doshi
(original defendant no. 1 in the suit) as partners. Thereafter the firm
was dissolved and Talakchand continued the business of grocery in
the suit premises.
3] The landlord, Sadanand Krishnaji Kirloskar (Kirloskar) in the
year 1955 completed course of licentiate relating to manufacture of
textiles. Kirloskar served with Jain Mills at Solapur as Spinning
Technician and Assistant Spinning Master. In 1977 or thereabouts,
there was a family partition in which the suit premises along with
some other properties came to be allotted to Kirloskar.
4] The landlord Kirloskar on 19th December 1986 instituted
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Regular Civil Suit No. 1439 of 1986 seeking eviction of the tenants
inter alia on the grounds that the suit premises were required
reasonably and bona fide for the use of the landlord and his two
sons who intended to start the business from the suit premises;
non user of the suit premises by the tenants, unauthorised
subletting, default in payment of rents and acquisition of alternate
accommodation by the tenants. In the suit, application was taken
out for appointment of Court Commissioner to inspect suit premises
and submit the report. The application was allowed and the Court
Commissioner submitted his report on 22nd December 1986.
5] The tenants contested the suit by filing a written statement.
Evidence was led in the matter and eventually, the trial Court, by
judgment and decree dated 29th June 1991 decreed the landlords
suit and ordered the eviction of the tenants on the grounds of
reasonable and bona fide requirement of the landlords,
unauthorised subletting, non user and acquisition of alternate
accommodation.
6] The tenants instituted Civil Appeal No. 247 of 1991 before the
appeal Court, which has, vide impugned judgment, decree and
order dated 22nd March 1995, allowed the appeal and set aside the
judgment, decree and order dated 29th June 1991 made by the trial
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Court. Aggrieved by the impugned judgment, decree and order
dated 22nd March 1995, the landlords have instituted the present
petition.
7] Mr. Gokhale, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that
the appellate Court has misdirected itself in law and overlooked vital
and relevant evidence on record. Mr. Gokhale submits that it is
settled position in law that a tenant cannot direct the landlord the
manner in which the landlord is required to undertake his business
or to assess his own requirement. Mr. Gokhale submits that such an
exercise is also not within the province of a court. Yet, the appeal
Court, has virtually indulged in such an exercise, which is ex facie in
excess of jurisdiction vested in the appeal Court. Mr. Gokhale has
placed reliance upon the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
the case of Meenal Eknath Kshirsagar (Mrs) vs. Traders &
Agencies & Anr.1 and Dattatraya Laxman Kamble vs. Abdul
Rasul Moulali Kotkunde & Anr.2 and decision of this Court in
Chotumal Bahiramal Sindho (since deceased through LRs.) vs.
Baburao Vinayak Mohadkar (since deceased through Lrs.)3.
8] Mr. Gokhale submits that the appeal Court has grossly erred
in reversing the trial Court's eviction order on the ground that the
1 (1996) 5 SCC 344 2 (1999) 4 SCC 1 3 2009 (5) ALL MR 342
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landlords did not allegedly establish that they had the qualifications
or sufficient experience in undertaking the business which they
propose to undertake through the suit premises. Mr. Gokhale
submits that the appeal Court further erred and acted contrary to
the settled position in law in reversing the trial Court's eviction order,
on the ground that the landlords failed to examine the Managing
Directors of the Companies who had issued letters of intent or offers
of work to the landlords, in case, the landlords commence the
proposed business through the suit premises. Mr. Gokhale submits
that the appeal court has failed to consider or give due credence to
the overwhelming evidence on record which establishes that not
only Kirloskar was well qualified and experienced to undertake the
business of dealing in spare parts relating to textile nature but
further, even the landlords two sons Shailendra and Amarendra
were equally competent to undertake such business and further, the
two sons, were in dire need of the suit premises to undertake /
expand their existing business of sale of biscuits, noodles, tea etc.
Mr. Gokhale submits that the approach of the appeal Court is
contrary to several decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well
as this Court in the matters of assessment of reasonable and bona
fide requirement.
9] Mr. Gokhale further submits that the appeal Court's
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judgment, decree and order is riddled with errors apparent on face
of record. The appeal Court has taken cognizance of sale of an
open plot of land by the landlords to Kadam and Shah in the year
1980, when in fact, the need for bona fide and reasonable
requirement was pleaded as having arisen in the year 1986 when
the suit for eviction was instituted. Further, the appeal Court, has
denied decree on grounds of bona fide and reasonable requirement
of holding that the landlords extended the period of lease with the
Indian Oil Company (IOC), where the Company, had set up a petrol
pump on an open plot. Mr. Gokhale submits that the petrol pump
premises were already in possession of the IOC and the same were
by no means useful for undertaking the business proposed through
the suit premises. Mr. Gokhale submits that in any case, the choice
in this regard had to be left to the landlords. The extension of lease
in favour of IOC, was not required to be construed as making a dent
to either the reasonableness or the bona fides of the landlords
requirement in respect of the suit premises.
10] Mr. Gokhale submits that the appeal Court has also grossly
erred in referring to the sale of five shop premises to the existing
tenants. Mr. Gokhale submits that in the first place the shop
premises did not belong exclusively to the landlords but belonged to
the landlord and his brother. Secondly, the shops were sold to the
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existing tenants, since, the eviction of such tenants was not agreed
to by the landlord's brother and in any case, the same, may or may
not have been feasible. Besides, Mr. Gokhale emphasized that
these are matters which are best left to the judgment of the
landlord. Mr. Gokhale submits that such sales in fact demonstrate
that the landlords were in dire need of the suit premises so as to
commence their own business from secure and vantage premises.
Mr. Gokhale points out that the suit premises are located on a
corner plot most suitable to undertake the business which the
landlords proposed to undertake through the suit premises.
11] Mr. Gokhale submits that the appeal Court has also
misconstrued the scope of the expression 'comparative hardships'.
He submits that the mere circumstance that the tenant will have to
face eviction cannot, by itself, be regarded as a hardship sufficient
to deny the landlords decree of eviction on the ground of
reasonable and bona fide requirement. Mr. Gokhale submits that
there is ample evidence on record that in fact the suit premises
were not even being used by the tenants and the sole objective of
the tenants was to stay put in the suit premises so as to deprive the
landlords user / possession of their own premises. Mr. Gokhale
points out that the tenant Talakchand Gangaram Doshi did not
even step into the witness box and therefore, the trial Court, had
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rightly, drawn an adverse inference against the tenants. The appeal
Court, in such circumstances, was entirely unjustified in reversing
the trial Court's eviction order on the ground of reasonable and
bona fide requirement.
12] Mr. Gokhale, in response to certain alleged subsequent
developments attempted to be placed on record by the tenants vide
Civil Application No. 3107 of 2010 submits that there is total breach
of the procedural requirements in the matter of production of an
additional evidence on record. He submits that on this ground itself,
the Civil Application should be dismissed and the alleged
subsequent developments ignored. In any case, he submits that
the Civil Application hardly makes any reference to significant
subsequent developments. He submits that most of the
developments have been noticed by the trial Court as well as the
appeal Court. The sale of open plot to IOC, is hardly a subsequent
development which can have any effect on the reasonability and
bona fides of the landlords requirement. Some of the subsequent
developments like recovery of additional premises are irrelevant, in
as much as the recovered premises are residential and not
commercial as in the case of the suit premises. Mr. Gokhale points
out that certain chawl premises referred to by the tenants have no
nexus whatsoever with the landlord or his sons and therefore, the
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reference to such premises is totally irrelevant for deciding the issue
of reasonable and bona fide requirement. In any case, Mr. Gokhale
submits that subsequent developments must be of such nature as
eclipse the bona fide and reasonable need of the landlord. He
submits that in the course of a litigation which runs over decades
some events are bound to take place. But, he submits that it is not
the law that cognizance is required to take of all such events so as
to deprive the landlord, for no fault on his part of the fruits of the
decree of eviction already made by the trial Court on legal and
cogent grounds. Mr. Gokhale placed reliance on the decisions of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Nidhi vs. Ram Kripal
Sharma (Dead) through Legal Representatives4 and Gaya
Prasad vs. Pradeep Srivastava5.
13] Mr. Gokhale submits that in this case there is overwhelming
evidence regards non user of the suit premises. In particular, Mr.
Gokhale stresses upon the Court Commissioner's report and upon
orders made by authorities concerned with professional tax and
income tax. Mr. Gokhale submits that the appeal Court, has virtually
ignored orders made by the tax authorities which record that the
tenants have discontinued their business from the suit premises. He
submits that the appeal Court has misconstrued the Court
4 (2017) 5 SCC 640 5 (2001) 2 SCC 604
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Commissioner's report as merely holding that there was some dust
on the grocery items in the suit premises. The Court
Commissioner's report very graphically describes the state of the
suit premises and on the basis of the same the only inference
possible was that the tenants had ceased to use the suit premises
for their business purposes. Mr. Gokhale submits that the trial Court
had rightly made an order for eviction on the grounds of non user
and there was no justification for the appeal Court to reverse the
eviction order. Mr. Gokhale submits that the findings recorded by
the appeal Court on the ground of non user constitute a perversity
and warrants interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of
India.
14] Mr. Gokhale submits that the suit premises had in fact been
let out to the tenant. However, one of the licenses in respect of the
suit premises was found to be in the name of the original defendant
no. 3 i.e. the daughter-in-law of the original tenant. Mr. Gokhale
submits that this documentary evidence constitutes sufficient
evidence of unauthorised subletting. Mr. Gokhale submits that the
onus of establishing the precise status of original defendant no. 3
lay upon the tenants and such onus, has not been discharged by
the tenants and therefore the trial Judge was justified in making
decree of eviction on ground of unauthorised subletting as well.
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15] Mr. Gokhale submits that this is a fit case where a decree
must be made on the grounds of reasonable and bona fide
requirement of the landlords, non user and unauthorised subletting.
Mr. Gokhale does not press any other grounds of eviction. He relies
upon certain decisions including, the decision in the case of Savita
Chemicals (P) Ltd. vs. Dyes & Chemical Workers' Union & Anr. 6
and Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao vs. Ashalata S. Guram 7 to
submit that findings if vitiated by perversity can always be
interfered with by the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He submits that in this
case the findings recorded by the appeal Court are vitiated by
perversity as well as misdirection of law. He submits that the
impugned judgment and order dated 22 nd March 1995 made by the
appeal Court warrants interference and may be set aside.
16] Mr. Sachin Dhakephalkar, learned counsel for the tenants
submits that findings of record recorded by the appeal Court are
backed by the material on record. There is absolutely no perversity
in the record of such findings of fact. He submits that this Court, in
exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may
not re-assess or re-evaluate the material on record, since, this
6 (1999) 2 SCC 143 7 (1986) 4 SCC 447
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Court, does not, under Article 227 of the Constitution exercise
appellate jurisdiction. He submits that the appeal Court, normally, is
the final Court in so far as findings of fact are concerned. He
submits that in this case there is overwhelming evidence which
establishes that the need of the landlords was neither reasonable
nor bona fide. He submits that there is ample material on record
which demonstrates that the landlords have several residential as
well as commercial premises. He submits that the landlords have,
during the pendency of the proceedings for eviction , transferred
several residential as well as commercial premises and in these
circumstances it can never be said any ground for eviction as
contemplated by the Rent Control legislation was made out. He
submits that there is admission on the part of the landlords that
apart from the suit premises, the tenants have no other premises
from which to undertake their business. In these circumstances, he
submits that the issue of comparative hardship was quite rightly
decided in favour of the tenants by the appeal Court. There is
neither any error of jurisdiction nor any perversity in this regard.
17] Mr. Dhakephalkar submits that the subsequent developments
referred to in Civil Application No. 3107 of 2010, in any case,
establish that the need of the landlords is neither surviving nor was
the same ever reasonable or bona fide. He submits that during the
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pendency of the proceedings, the landlords have acquired several
other premises, which they have chosen to dispose of. He submits
that all this militates against both the bona fides as well as the
reasonability of the requirement portrayed by the landlords. He
submits that cognizance is required to be taken of such subsequent
developments and in this regard, he relied upon Om Prakash
Gupta vs. Ranbir B. Goyal8, Shrirang Dharamraj Kale & Anr. vs.
Najmunissa A. Rahimbee Shaikh9 and Kiran K. Gujar & Ors. vs.
Pradip B. Kasavkar & Ors.10
18] Mr. Dhakephalkar submits that there is absolutely no case
made out for eviction on the ground of any alleged non user. He
submits that the appeal Court has very rightly analyzed the report
of the Court Commissioner as well as the other evidence on record
and concluded that there was no non user without any reasonable
cause. He submits that for some brief period, the grocery business
may have been dis continued on account of serious health issues
concerning the family members of the landlords. He submits that
this is reasonable cause. He submits that voluminous documentary
evidence in the form of admissions of 156 documents has been
produced on record, which clearly establishes user of the suit
premises. These documents relate to supplies and sales of
8 (2002) 2 SCC 256 9 2003 3 All MR 51 10 2002 6 Bom. C.R. 109
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groceries. At least three suppliers have been examined and the
appeal Court, has rightly, taken all this material into consideration to
conclude that the case of non user portrayed by the landlords was
false and frivolous. He submits that the trial Court, had erred grossly
in ordering eviction of the landlords on the ground of any alleged
non user of the suit premises and the appeal Court, quite rightly,
has reversed the learned trial Court in this regard.
19] Mr. Dhakephalkar submits that merely because one of the
several licensees was found to be in the name of original Defendant
No. 3, who, admittedly, is the daughter-in-law of the original tenant,
can never be a ground for eviction of a tenant on the ground of
subletting. The finding recorded by the trial Court were patently
perverse and the same were rightly set aside by the appeal Court.
20] For the aforesaid reasons, Mr. Dhakephalkar submits that the
impugned judgment, decree and order dated 22nd March 1995 made
by the appeal Court warrants no interference whatsoever and prays
that this petition may be dismissed with costs.
21] The rival contentions now fall for determination.
22] As regards ground of subletting, there is absolutely no case
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made out to interfere with the impugned judgment, decree and
order. There is virtually no evidence on record to sustain the finding
of any subletting, much less, unauthorised subletting. Only one of
the licenses out of several licenses in relation with the grocery
business undertaken by the tenants in the suit premises was in the
name of the original defendant No. 3, who, is admittedly the
daughter-in-law of the original tenant. As against this, there is
voluminous evidence on record which indicates that it is the tenant
who was undertaking the grocery business from the suit premises.
In such circumstances, the appeal Court, was entirely justified in
interfering with the trial Court's order on the aspect of unauthorised
subletting. There is absolutely no perversity in either the approach
or in the record of findings of the appellate Court on the aspect of
unauthorised subletting. Accordingly, Mr. Gokhale's contention on
the aspect of unauthorised subletting is required to be and is hereby
rejected.
23] Similarly, on the aspect of non user of the suit premises,
again, it cannot be said that the findings recorded by the appeal
Court are vitiated by any misdirection in law or perversity. The
appeal Court, has taken cognizance of the orders made by the
taxing Authorities. But at the same time, the appeal Court, has also
taken cognizance all other documentary evidence like telephone
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bills, electricity bills and most importantly almost 156 documents
which relate to the actual conduct of the grocery business from the
suit business. Initially, no leave was granted to produce these 156
documents. However, later on, such leave was granted and such
documents were admitted in evidence. In support of such
documents, even the three suppliers, namely, Prabhu Sopan,
Shrikant Shamrao and Subhash Baburao came to be examined. All
these witnesses deposed to the veracity of the documents and the
transactions which said documents evidence. There is accordingly
substantial evidence on record in the form of supply bills, sales bills,
account books, telephone bills, electricity bills etc. in support of the
appeal Court's reasoning that no case of non user of the suit
premises without any reasonable cause or even otherwise was
made out by the landlords. It is not for this Court to re-evaluate or
re-assess the material on record, as if, it was exercising any
appellate jurisdiction. In such circumstances, it is not possible to
agree with the contentions of Mr. Gokhale that the impugned
judgment, decree and order dated 22nd March 1995 made by the
appeal Court warrants interference on the aspect of denial of
eviction on the ground of non user of the suit premises by the
tenants.
24] On the aspect of denial of eviction on the ground of
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reasonable and bona fide requirements of the landlords however,
there is much substance in the contention of Mr. Gokhale that the
appeal Court has misdirected itself in law, ignored vital and relevant
evidence on record and displayed perversity of approach.
25] In this case, the landlord, has made detailed pleadings in
respect of reasonable and bona fide requirement. The landlord has
pleaded that he along with his two sons, intends to undertake the
commercial venture of dealing in sale of spare parts, accessories
etc. needed for textile machinery. The landlord has pleaded that he
has qualifications of licentiate in this line and further, he has
experience on account of his service in textile mills. He has pleaded
to various position he has held in the course of his service in the
textile mills. The landlord has further pleaded that his son has taken
agency of biscuits, soaps and cosmetics and has every intention of
expanding this business activity. He has pleaded that on account of
constraints of space, this is not possible. The landlord has pleaded
that one of his sons has qualification of M.B.A. and the landlord
and his son accordingly have the means and the necessary
experience and capacity for undertaking the business proposed.
26] The evidence on record which has been marshalled by
learned Trial Judge at paragraphs 22 to 24 of the judgment, decree
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and order dated 29th June 1991 substantially supports the pleadings
seeking eviction on the ground of reasonable and bona fide
requirement. The original landlord has deposed to the size of his
family. He has deposed to the qualifications and experience which
he possessed. He has deposed to the qualifications and the
experience of his two sons. He has deposed to the fact that his
eldest son is an agent of Bakeman's Biscuits etc. He has deposed
to the status of premises through which the son undertakes his
business. He has deposed to the offers, which his son is receiving
for expansion of business. He has deposed that expansion of
business is not feasible on account of space constraints. He has
deposed that the premises at Sahyadri Shopping Center through
which the son undertakes his business is on inner side and there is
no scope for expansion. He has deposed that his second son is
also interested in joining the proposed business venture. He has
deposed that he along with his two sons proposes to start of
business of sale of spare parts, accessories and allied equipments
required for textile machineries. He has deposed that the second
son is already working as an Agent / Liaison Officer of Maratha
Engineering Industry and Hindustan Textile Industries. He has
produced certain documents which indicate the appointment. He
has also produced certain documents, which are in the nature of
Letters of Intent (LOI).
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27] The landlord's son Shailesh Kirloskar has also been
examined as PW-2. He has deposed that he has completed MBA
qualification and his business activity from the premises at Sahyadri
Shopping Center. He has deposed that he has received a notice
from the Corporation requiring him to vacate the premises at
Sahyadri Shopping Center.
28] In the cross-examination, the evidence of landlord (PW-1) and
his son (PW-2) has really not been dented. Except for
suggestions/denials, the tenants, have not succeeded in
demolishing the deposition of PW-1 and PW-2. Learned Trial Judge
has in fact accepted the evidence of the landlord. As will be noticed
later, the Appeal Court for reasons which are neither germane nor
relevant has chosen to discard such evidence and even overlooked
such evidence in support of the ground of reasonable and bona fide
requirement.
29] The tenants, examined one Gopal Zanvar as DW-2, who has
deposed that he has own agency of Kasturi Tea and his cousin has
agency of Bakeman's Biscuits. However, DW-2, however, in his
cross-examination conceded that he has no personal knowledge
about the agency of Bakeman's Biscuits and therefore, he is not in a
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position to depose to any details in that regard. DW-2 was possibly
examined to establish that the landlord's son (PW-2) had no agency
of Kasturi Tea or Bakeman's Biscuits. In this, DW-2 has failed.
30] The Appeal Court, has reversed the Trial Court on the issue
of reasonable and bona fide requirement, primarily on the following
grounds:
a] That the landlords have not examined the Managing
Director or any Officers of the industries like Maratha
Engineering Industry, Hindustan Textile Industries and Visdhut
Meters Pvt.Ltd. Etc., who had issued documents in the nature
of LOI or assurances of work orders in case the landlords
undertake business of dealing with spare parts of the
machinery and allied equipments relating to textile industries
(Exhibit.41, 42 and 43);
b] That the landlords have sold five shops premises at
ground floor of CTS No.14/1 to 14/6 to Dilip Y. Pethe and
others for Rs1,30,000/-. The Appeal Court reasons that if the
need of the landlord was genuine, then the landlord and his
two sons could have started business from these premises
rather than sell these premises to Dilip Pethe and others;
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c] That the landlords have extended the lease of the open
plot, which they own, to the Indian Oil Company for the period
of 20 years after the lease expired in the year 1968. The
Appeal Court has reasoned that if the requirement of the
landlords was bona fide, then, the landlords would not have
extended these lease, but started the proposed business in
the open plot or by putting up of a construction in the open
plot. The Appeal Court has relied upon the decision of this
Court in Smt Sabu Tai Tanna Vs. Kisen M. Borade - 1976
Bombay Rent Cases page 97, where reasonable and bona
fide requirements ground was rejected on the finding that the
plaintiff had give on lease as room held by him, hardly a year
before the institution of eviction proceedings; and
d] That the landlords have sold another open plot to one
Mrs. Kadam, Advocate and Dilip Shah in the year 1980, which
plot was adjacent to the suit premises.
31] On the aspect of comparative hardships, the Appeal Court
has held that the landlord and his two sons have other properties.
The Appeal Court has held that the landlord in his deposition has
admitted to having commenced construction in property bearing
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CTS No.8306/3 and 8306/4. The Appeal Court has reasoned that
the landlord and his sons can always start their business activity
from the said construction. The Appeal Court has faulted the Trial
Court for drawing an adverse inference against the tenants for not
stepping into the witness box. The Appeal Court has reasoned that
even though the tenant may not have stepped into the witness box,
his son has stepped into the witness box and that was sufficient.
The Appeal Court has reasoned that there is some open space
available in property bearing CTS No. 8306/3, 8306/4 and 8306/5
and the landlord and his sons can always make use of the said
place for commencing their business instead of seeking recovery of
possession of the suit premises. The Appeal Court has also held
that apart from the suit premises the tenants have no other
premises from which to undertake business. The Appeal Court has
reasoned that Garud Bunglow which the tenants own is used for the
residential purpose. The Appeal Court has reasoned that the
landlord has not taken action against some other tenants like
Punekar - Kamathe, Sugar Juice Center, and Kona Stores and
Vijay Medical Stores and such failure to take action against other
tenants is relevant for determining the issue of comparative
hardships.
32] Most of the reasons stated by the Appeal Court in the
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impugned judgment, decree and order dated 22 nd March 1995 are
not valid or relevant reasons to deny the landlord a decree of
eviction on the ground of reasonable and bona fide requirements.
The reasons are in fact contrary to several decisions of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court as well as this Court in the matter of evaluation of
bona fide requirement and reasonable requirement.
33] The evidence on behalf of the landlords was not at all shaken
in the course of cross-examination. On the aspect of LOI and
proposed work orders in the form of Exhibit-41 to Exhibit-43 from
various industries concerned in the textile business, the Appeal
Court, was not at all justified in rejecting this evidence on the
ground that the landlords failed to examine the Managing Directors
or the Officers of the Companies, who had issued such
LOI/proposed work order.
34] As regards the sale of five shops in CTS Nos.14/1 to 14/6, the
Appeal Court has completely glossed over the evidence which
indicates that the said five shops were not owned by the landlord
exclusively but were owned by landlord and his brother. Further,
there is evidence which establishes that the five shops were also
tenanted and were ultimately sold to the tenants. In these
circumstances, sale of five shops which were co-owned by the
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landlords to the tenants who were occupying the said five shops is
hardly a circumstance, which makes any dent to the reasonable and
bona fide requirement pleaded and substantially established by the
landlords. On the basis of such kind of a sale, the Appeal Court,
was entirely unjustified in deciding the issue of comparative
hardships against the landlords.
35] The extension of lease of the open plot in favour of the Indian
Oil Company is also not relevant for determining the reasonable
and bona fide requirement of the landlord. Admittedly, the suit
premises is a constructed structure ready for use as commercial
premises. In contrast, the lease which was extended in favour of
Indian Oil Company was in respect of open plot, on which, the
Indian Oil Company has put up a petrol pump. There can be no
comparison between the open plot and the suit premises. Besides,
the Appeal court, is not right in its observation that the landlords
could have carried out their business by putting up some
constructions on this open plot. The landlords, would, have to seek
the eviction of IOC, which might not have been easy task in itself. If
in such circumstances, the landlords chose to extend the lease of
the plot or as has been stated by the tenants in Civil Application No.
3107 of 2010, the landlords ultimately sold the said plot to IOC, that
by itself, does not make any dent to the reasonableness or the
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bona fides of the requirement of the suit premises by the landlord.
The Appeal Court has completely misdirected itself in both law and
fact by taking into consideration this circumstance.
36] The decision in Smt. Sabu Tai Tanna (supra), is completely
distinguishable and was not at all applicable to the fact situation of
the present case. Further, the sale of the open plot to Mrs. Kadam
Advocate and Mr. Dilip Shah was in the year 1980 whereas, the suit
for eviction on the grounds of reasonable and bona fide requirement
was instituted in the year 1986. Again, what was sold to Mrs.Kadam
and Dilip Shah was a open plot, which, is not comparable to the suit
premises in respect of which eviction has been applied for.
37] The Appeal Court, has completely misdirected itself in law in
returning findings on the aspect of comparative hardships. For
reasons, which are neither germane nor relevant, the Appeal Court,
has reversed the cogent findings recorded by the Trial Court on the
aspect of reasonable and bona fide requirements and comparative
hardships. The Appeal Court, in this case, has virtually advised the
landlords what according to it, is the best manner for undertaking
their proposed business. In Meenal Kshirsagar (supra), the
Supreme Court in no uncertain terms, has held that the landlord is
the best judge of his requirement. If the landlord desires to
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beneficially enjoy his own property when the other property
occupied by him as a tenant or on any other basis is either insecure
or inconvenient, it is not for the Courts to dictate to him to continue
to occupy such premises. It is for the landlord to decide how and in
what manner he should live and hie is the best judge of his
requirement.
38] In Raj Kumar Khaitan and ors. vs. Bibi Zubaida Khatun
and anr.11, the Supreme Court ruled that the pleadings in a suit
seeking eviction on the grounds of reasonable and bona fide
requirement have to be construed liberally. In such a suit, it is not
even necessary for the landlords to indicate the precise nature of
the business which they intended to start in the premises. Further,
even if the nature of business is indicated, nobody can bind the
landlords to start the same business in the premises after it is
vacated.
39] In Dattatraya L. Kamble (supra), the Supreme Court has held
that the expression "reasonably and bona fide requirement by the
landlord" indicates that the requirements must be really genuine
from any reasonable standards. However, the genuineness of the
requirement is not to be tested on a par with the dire need of a
landlord because the latter is a much greater need. The Hon'ble 11 (1997) 11 SCC 411
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Supreme Court set aside the decision of the High Court for having
interfered with a finding of fact recorded by the Trial Court on the
aspect of reasonable and bona fide requirement on the ground that
the landlord had not placed material on record to show that he had
the "know how" necessary for starting business in electrical goods.
The Supreme Court observed that the contention that a person
having no practical experience in a particular field, though
academically qualified, expressing a wish to start a business in such
a field reflects a lack of his bona fides, is fallacious and
unpragmatic. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has gone to extent of
observing that though there is no dispute that the landlord has to
prove that he needs the building for his own occupation but there is
no warrant for presuming that his need is not bon fide. The statute
enjoins that the court should be satisfied about the requirement. In
appropriate cases it is even open to the Court to presume that the
landlord's requirement is bona fide and to place the burden of
disproving the presumption on the tenant. The Hon'ble Supreme
Court has ultimately held that the Courts ought not to take
uncharitable view of the landlord when it comes to determining the
reasonable and bona fide requirement.
40] In Ragavendra Kumar vs. Firm Prem Machinery and Co.12,
the Supreme Court reiterated that the landlord is the best judge of 12 (2000) 1 SCC 679
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his own requirement for residential or business purposes and has
complete freedom in the matter. In this case, the landlord had
admitted that he owns several other shops and houses, but had
stated that they were not vacant and also that the suit premises
were suitable for proposed business. In such circumstances, the
Supreme Court allowed the landlord's eviction petition on the
grounds of reasonable and bona fide requirement.
41] The reasoning of the Appeal Court is contrary to the settled
position of law as enunciated by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid
decisions. The Appeal Court has clearly misdirected itself in law in
ignoring the relevant and vital material on record and further, failing
to advert to settled position in law in the matters of evaluation of
reasonable and bona fide requirement.
42] In Civil Application No.3107 of 2010, the tenant, has
purported to place reliance upon certain alleged subsequent
developments. In support of propositions that such subsequent
developments have to be considered, Mr. Dhakephalkar has placed
reliance upon the decisions of this Court in Kiran Gujar (supra) and
Shrirang Kale (supra).
43] In Kiran Gujar (supra), this Court, in the peculiar facts and
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circumstances of the said case, merely remanded the matter to the
Appellate Court for reconsideration. The direction was also issued
to consider the application for adducing additional evidence in
accordance with law and on its own merits. This decision can hardly
be of any assistance to the tenant in the fact situation of the present
case. Shrirang Kale (supra), in fact lays down that in absence of
prayer for amendment of the pleadings and without such
amendment subsequent events cannot even be considered.
44] In this case, except for filing Civil Application No. 3107 of
2010 and setting out therein certain alleged subsequent
developments, the tenants have not even applied for any
amendment to the pleadings. Even in Om Prakash Gupta (supra),
upon which reliance has been placed by Mr. Dhakephalkar, the
Supreme Court has categorically held that the person wishing Court
to take notice of subsequent events, must make out a case
justifying such notice being taken. Further, the Supreme Court has
held that subsequent events can be taken cognizance of only if the
Court's attention is invited towards them according to established
rules of procedure so that the prerequisites of affording the
opposite party an opportunity of meeting the new case and of
determining the real questions in controversy are fulfilled. Where,
the appellant-defendant before the Supreme Court only filed an
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affidavit stating certain facts and did not seek to amend the the
pleadings, nor made a prayer regarding cognizance of subsequent
events, nor prayed for appropriate relief, the Court would not be
justified in taking into consideration the facts concerned.
45] Apart from the procedural obstacles, if Civil Application No.
3107 of 2010 is perused, then, it can hardly be said that
developments referred to therein are really in the nature of
subsequent developments, which are relevant for deciding the issue
of reasonable and bona fide requirement or the issue of
comparative hardship. The tenant has made reference to the age of
landlord Kirloskar and the fact that he is bed ridden for 4 to 5 years
and he is suffering from Kidney or other ailments. On this basis,
Mr.Dhakephalkar urged that it is impossible for the landlord to
undertake the proposed business in this state of his health. The
submission deserves rejection. On account of litigative process,
such subsequent developments are inevitable. In this case, the
requirement pleaded was not merely of the landlord himself, but
also of his two sons.
46] In the civil application, there is reference to recovery of some
other tenanted premises from one Mr. Joshi in Kirloskar Chawl. It is
stated that the sons of the landlord are now doing the business of
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supply of machinery parts to textile industries and distribution of
wholesale Tea from this new premises for the last 13 to 14 years.
Again, this can hardly be said to be some subsequent
developments which will impact the decree granted by the Trial
Court. In any case, by way of reply, the landlords have pleaded that
House No.40 in Kirloskar Chawl is the residential house of the
landlords and on account of non-availability of the suit premises, the
landlord and his son are forced to inconveniently carry on the
business from the residential house. This means that this so called
development strengthens the case of the landlord rather than
weakens their case.
47] The civil application also makes reference to certain
residential premises, the possession of which, the landlords have
recovered in the meanwhile. Again, this is clearly irrelevant because
the suit premises are being used for commercial purposes and the
landlords have made out a case that they require the suit premises
for commercial purposes.
48] The civil application, once again makes reference to sale of
open plot to Indian Oil Company. For reasons, indicated earlier, this
is an irrelevant circumstance insofar as the issue of reasonable and
bona fide requirement of the suit premises is concerned. There is,
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accordingly, no case made out to upset the decree made by the
Trial Court on the grounds of so called subsequent developments
referred to in Civil Application No. 3107 of 2010.
49] In Gaya Prasad (supra), the Supreme Court has held that
subsequent developments during pendency of eviction petition
occurring because of slowness of process of litigation itself cannot
be made use by the tenants for denying landlord reliefs, when the
litigation at last reaches the final stages. Further, the Supreme
Court has held that subsequent events should be of such nature
and dimension as to completely eclipse such need and make it
loose significance altogether. The developments in lives of landlord
and his family, cannot be expected to come to a standstill during
pendency of eviction petition, especially in view of tardiness and
delays plaguing the legal system. Bona fides of the requirement
have to be tested in relation to the date on which the eviction was
applied for. Where premises were required for starting a son's
business, the fact that during the years that the matter is pending,
the son gets a job or moves out of town, cannot be used against the
landlord. For these reasons also, there is no question of depriving
the landlords reliefs on the grounds of the alleged subsequent
developments referred to in Civil Application No. 3107 of 2010.
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50] Upon cumulative consideration of the material on record as
well as the legal position enunciated by the Supreme Court and this
Court, the impugned judgment, decree and order dated 22 nd March
1995 made by the Appeal court denying relief of eviction of the
tenant on the ground of reasonable and bona fide requirement
warrants interference. Accordingly, the impugned judgment, decree
and order dated 22nd March 1995 made by the Appeal Court to the
extent, it reverses the judgment, decree and order dated 29th June
1991 made by the Trial Court on ground of reasonable and bona
fide requirement, is hereby set aside. This means that the judgment,
decree and order dated 29th June 1991 made by the Trial Court
ordering eviction of the tenants on the ground of reasonable and
bona fide requirement of the landlords is hereby restored.
51] The respondents-tenants are directed to hand over the vacant
and peaceful possession of the suit premises to the landlords within
a period of three months from today. This time is granted subject to
the tenants filing usual undertaking before the Trial Court within a
period of four weeks from today after furnish of advance copy to the
landlords or their advocates.
52] Rule is made absolute in the aforesaid terms. There shall
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however, be no order as to costs.
53] Civil Application No. 3107 of 2010 is disposed of in the
aforesaid terms.
(M. S. SONAK, J.)
Chandka/Sherla
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