Bombay High Court
Deepak Vinayak Angre vs The State Of Maharashtra And Ors on 20 November, 2017
Bench: R.V. Ghuge
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
WRIT PETITION NO.4777 OF 2002
Deepak s/o Vinayak Angre,
Age-42 years, Occu-Service,
R/o Neharu Colony, Bhingar,
Ahmednagar, Dist.Ahmednagar -- PETITIONER
VERSUS
1. The State of Maharashtra,
2. The Deputy Director of
Regional Fisheries,
Nashik Division,
Nashik,
3. The District Fisheries Development
Officer, Sudake Mala,
Kaustub Building, Ahmednagar -- RESPONDENTS
Mr.N.B.Suryawanshi, Advocate for the petitioner.
Mrs.A.V.Gondhalkar, AGP for State.
( CORAM : RAVINDRA V. GHUGE, J.)
DATE : 20/11/2017
ORAL JUDGMENT :
1. The petitioner is aggrieved against the judgment of the
Industrial Court dated 12/03/1999 delivered in Complaint (ULP)
No.347/1994, only to the extent of the deprivation of back wages.
2. I have considered the strenuous submissions of
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Mr.Suryawanshi, learned Advocate for the petitioner/workman and
the learned AGP on behalf of the respondents.
3. There is no dispute that the petitioner approached the
Industrial Court by filing his complaint u/s 28(1) r/w Item 9 of
Schedule IV of the MRTU and PULP Act, 1971 seeking a relief of
reinstatement in service with continuity and back wages from
19/02/1991 when he was terminated. By the impugned judgment,
the Industrial Court has allowed the complaint and by declaring that
the respondent has engaged in ULP, has directed the reinstatement of
the petitioner with continuity in employment with the further
direction to release increments of the petitioner. It was held that he
would not be entitled for the wages for the period when he was out of
employment.
4. It cannot be ignored that Section 5 defines the duties of the
Industrial Court and Section 7 prescribes the duties of the Labour
Court. Section 4 pertains to the establishment/constitution of the
Industrial Court and Section 6 pertains to the Constitution of the
Labour Court. It requires no debate that matters of termination,
discharge, dismissal, removal from service or otherwise termination
would be covered by Item 1 of Schedule IV of the said Act and the
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jurisdiction would exclusively lie to the Labour Court.
5. Learned Advocate for the petitioner submits that he became
aware of his termination only after approaching the Industrial Court.
That would however not invest the Industrial Court with the
jurisdiction to decide a cause of action with regard to termination.
However, as this Court has admitted the petition, learned Advocate
for the petitioner submits that the issue of jurisdiction need not be
gone into. He hastens to add that he had approached the Industrial
Court with the case that there was oral refusal of work.
6. I am not required to go into these aspects as the respondents
have not challenged the judgment of the Industrial Court.
7. Issue before this Court is as regards the unauthorized absence
of the petitioner on the following dates and days :-
01/04/1987 to 31/08/1987 - 153 days
01/10/1987 to 31/11/1987 - 63 days
07/07/1988 to 18/11/1988 - 135 days
01/03/1989 to 30/06/1989 - 122 days
01/11/1989 to 01/12/1989 - 31 days
13/04/1990 to 18/08/1990 - 128 days
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8. Considering the above, it is obvious that as the petitioner was
unauthorizedly absent on the above mentioned dates and had not
availed of any leave, the principle of "no work - no wages" would
squarely be applicable. An employee, who has remained
unauthorizedly absent, cannot be rewarded with wages.
9. Considering the above, this petition, being devoid of merit, is
therefore, dismissed.
10. Rule is discharged.
( RAVINDRA V. GHUGE, J.)
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