Citation : 2017 Latest Caselaw 8817 Bom
Judgement Date : 17 November, 2017
LPA.(S)74.10
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT NAGPUR, NAGPUR.
...
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 74/ 2010
IN
WRIT PETITION NO. 1010/2009
Ku.Nazma Begum D/o Jameel Ahmed
Ro Gujari Bazar, Kamthee, Dist.Nagpur. .. APPELLANT
versus
1) Kamthee Yuvak Shikshan Prasarak Mandal
Kamthee : Through its Secretary
Shri Ramesh Dube,
C/o Headmaster, Rashtriya Urdu Prathmik Shala,
Ward No. 46, Shiv Panchayat Nagar,
Kamthee, Dist. Nagpur.
2) Headmaster,
Rashtriya Urdu Prathmik Shala,
Ward no. 46, Shiv Panchayat Nagar, Kamthee
Dist. Nagpur.
3) Education Officer (Sec)
Zilla Parishad, Nagpur.
4) The Presiding Officer
School Tribunal, Nagpur. .. RESPONDENTS
...............................................................................................................................................
Mr. P.N. Shende, Advocate for the appellant
Mr. R.S. Parsodkar, Advocate for respondent nos.1 and 2
Respondents 3 and 4 served.
................................................................................................................................................
CORAM: B.P. DHARMADHIKARI &
MRS. SWAPNA JOSHI, JJ.
DATE OF RESERVING : 05.10.2017 DATE OF PRONOUNCEMENT: 17.11.2017
LPA.(S)74.10
ORAL JUDGMENT: (PER MRS.SWAPNA JOSHI, J.)
1. By this Appeal, the appellant has impugned the judgment and order
dated 27.11.2009 in Writ Petition No.1010/2009 whereby the learned single Judge of
this Court allowed the Writ Petition filed by respondent nos.1 and 2 and set aside the
judgment and order passed by learned Presiding Officer, School Tribunal, Nagpur
whereby the termination of the appellant was quashed and set aside and the appellant
was directed to be reinstated with back wages.
2. The case of the appellant, in a nutshell, is that the appellant was
appointed as a trained Primary Teacher in the school run by respondent no.1-Mandal,
in the academic session 2000-01 on a clear and vacant post. She worked there for
more than eight years continuously that too without break in her service. It is the case
of the appellant that she was on medical leave from 11.11.2006 which was extended
from time to time till 25.6.2007. When she joined her duty on 26.6.2007, she was
allowed to join her service but was denied to sign the muster roll. On 11.07.2007,
the respondent nos.1 and 2 restrained the appellant from working in the School which
amounted to oral termination. The appellant challenged the action on the part of
respondent nos.1 and 2 in the School Tribunal, on the ground that the termination
was without following the procedure laid down under the Maharashtra Employees of
Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act,1977 and Maharashtra
Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Rules,1981 (henceforth
abbreviated to " the Act of 1977" and "the Rules of 1981" respectively).
LPA.(S)74.10
3. The respondent nos. 1 and 2 denied the case of the appellant and
contended that she had resigned from her services on 15.11.2006 and her voluntary
resignation was accepted by the management vide Resolution dated 24.11.2007 i.e.
above one year thereafter. Hence, there is no question of allowing the appellant to
work in the School and terminate her services, orally.
4. The learned Presiding Officer, School Tribunal, Nagpur allowed the
Appeal preferred by the appellant, on the ground that the resignation of the appellant
was invalid as the provisions under the Act of 1977 and Rules of 1981 were not
followed and as such, the termination was illegal.
5. The respondent nos. 1 and 2 preferred Writ Petition bearing No.
1010/2009 in this Court challenging the judgment and order passed by the learned
Presiding Officer of School Tribunal. The learned single Judge held that the resignation
of the appellant herein was a valid and voluntary resignation which was accepted by
the management. The said judgment and order passed by the learned single Judge is
impugned in the present Appeal.
6. Heard Shri P.N. Shende, learned counsel for appellant and Shri R.S.
Parsodkar, learned counsel for respondent nos.1 and 2. Nobody appears on behalf of
the respondent nos. 3 and 4.
7. The arguments of Shri Shende are two-fold. He vehemently argued that
the learned single Judge has ignored the fact that the appellant was a permanent
employee in the school run by respondent no.1, who has worked for about 6-years
and she could not have been orally terminated by respondent nos.1 and 2. The
LPA.(S)74.10
appellant was on medical leave from 11.11.2006 which was extended from time to
time, till 25.6.2007. However the services of the appellant are terminated orally on
26.6.2007 and 11.7.2007, without conducting an enquiry in the matter under the
provisions of the Act of 1977 and Rules framed thereunder. Secondly, he contended
that the resignation allegedly tendered by the appellant is not a valid resignation in the
eyes of law as the provisions under 7 of the Act of 1977 and Rule 40 of the Rules of
1981 are not followed by the respondent nos.1 and 2. According to him, the duration of
resignation ought to have been of three months as the appellant was a permanent
employee. There was nothing on record before the School Tribunal to suggest that the
respondent nos.1 and 2 accepted the resignation after demanding a proportionate
amount for shortfall from appellant or deducted the amount from the dues of the
appellant. He submitted that the signatures of the appellant were obtained on the
blank papers at the time of her appointment and the same were used in the
resignation letter.
8. In support of his contentions, Shri Shende placed reliance upon the
Division Bench judgment of this Court, in the case of Chandrakant Lone vs.
Chhatrapati Shivaji Education Society and others, reported in 1988 Vol.1 CLR P.175
wherein it is held that though the provisions are not mandatory they are relevant for
deciding the controversy whether the resignation was tendered or not.
9. Per contra, Shri Parsodkar, learned counsel for respondent nos. 1 and
2 canvassed that the resignation tendered by the appellant was a valid resignation
hence there is no question of terminating the services of the appellant, orally. It is
LPA.(S)74.10
further stated that various judgments of this Court which comment upon scheme of
Rule 40 of the Rules of 1981 and Sec.7 of the Act of 1977 have been looked into and
thereafter a possible view has been taken by the School Tribunal. According to him,
there is no jurisdictional error or perversity in the judgment passed by the School
Tribunal. Hence this Appeal needs to be dismissed.
10. It is well-settled by now that the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of
this Court under the Letters Patent is very limited. It is equally well-settled that if two
views are possible and the learned single Judge has taken a plausible view, in Letters
Patent Appeal, this Court is not expected to re-appreciate the evidence on record and
substitute the view taken by the learned single Judge, by its own view.
11. Upon hearing both sides and on a careful scrutiny of the order passed
by learned single Judge and the material placed on record, it is noticed that the
learned single Judge has opined that the School Tribunal was not justified in allowing
the Appeal filed by the appellant herein, and was not further justified in holding that
the management had failed to prove that the appellant had voluntarily submitted her
resignation on 15.11.2006. It was held that the Tribunal was not justified in holding that
the resignation letter was invalid merely because some of the provisions under
Section 7 of the Act of 1977 Rule 40 of the Rules of 1981 were not complied with. It
was further observed that the appellant has failed to prove that her leave for seven-
and-a-half months was a sanctioned leave and, thus, the petition filed by the
respondents was allowed by the learned single Judge.
12. In this regard, significantly, the Appeal-memo filed by the appellant
LPA.(S)74.10
before School Tribunal transpires that the appellant had applied for medical leave from
11.11.2006 to 26.06.2007, to respondent nos. 1 and 2 from time to time and the same
were granted by respondent nos.1 and 2. Thereafter on 26.06.2007, the appellant
submitted her joining report and she was permitted to join her services but she was
not allowed to sign the Muster roll. The appellant claims that she was continuously
working with respondent nos. 1 and 2 and obtained the signatures of respondent no.
2 on daily notes. The appellant was not allowed to work in the School on 11.7.2007. All
these aspects could have been looked into by the learned single Judge as well as the
School Tribunal.
13. It is pertinent to note that the learned single Judge has come to the
conclusion that since the case regarding the leave has not been proved by the
appellant, she must have resigned from her services from 15.11.2006, which does not
appear to be convincing. It appears that the case of resignation of appellant with the
case of respondent nos. 1 and 2 that the appellant has not proved that she was on
leave during the period between 11.11.2006 and 25.06.2007 and, therefore, she must
have resigned from her services has been corelated. Significantly, the respondent
nos.1 and 2 failed to produce any record before the School Tribunal to show that the
resignation was accepted by the management vide resolution dated 24.11.2007. For
the first time, the resolution appears to have been placed before the School Tribunal
at the time of hearing arguments. There is no whisper of the resolution dated
24.11.2007 in the written statement filed by the respondents, in the School Tribunal.
Moreover, there is nothing on record to show that the Chief Executive Officer who is
LPA.(S)74.10
empowered to execute the decision of the management as per the Rules of 1981,
has executed the decision of the management with regard to the acceptance of
resignation and, accordingly, the services of the appellant were discontinued. In
writing, there was no communication to the appellant about acceptance of the so
called resolution dated 24.11.2007. Interestingly, the resolution dated 24.11.2007 is
passed by the School Committee. There is no evidence on record to show that the said
resolution was confirmed by the Management and the appellant was relieved from
services.
14. In the facts and circumstances of the case, it would be advantageous
to go through the provisions of Section 7 of the Act of 1977, which is couched in the
following terms :-
"7. Procedure for resignation by employees of private schools:
If any employee intends to resign his post in any private school, at any time after the appointed date, he shall draw up a letter of resignation in duplicate and sign both the copies of that letter and put the date thereon He may then forward one copy to the Management by registered post and keep the other copy with him."
15. In the instant case,the above-said provision is apparently not followed
by respondent nos.1 and 2. The onus is on the respondents to prove that the
resignation tendered by the appellant was as per the provisions laid down under the
Act of 1977 and Rules framed thereunder.
16. By introducing the provisions of Section 7 of the Act of 1977, the
intention of the legislature was to abide by the law in its letter and spirit, in order to
LPA.(S)74.10
avoid misuse of the signature of the employee as a weapon to remove him/her from
services whenever required which is normally obtained while engaging him/her in
the service, by the employer. Admittedly, the resignation is not in conformity with the
requirement of Section 7. It is clear from the preamble of the Act that it is a piece of
legislation which was enacted with a view to provide safety, stability and security of
services of the employees to enable them to discharge their duties as teachers, to
impart education effectively and efficiently. The provisions of Section 7 are certainly
germane to decide the controversy whether the resignation tendered was voluntary or
otherwise.
17. The respondent nos.1 and 2 have not complied with the Rule 40 of the
Rules of 1981, which is reproduced below :
"(1) A permanent employee may leave service after giving three calendar months notice and a non-permanent employee may leave service after giving one calendar month's notice. The management may, however, allow an employee to leave service earlier on payment of pay (excluding allowance) for three months, or as the case may be, one month in lieu of notice by the employee. The amount in lieu of notice shall be restricted to the pay or the period by which the notice period falls short. (2) If any Management allows an employee to leave service earlier either without due notice or without making payment of pay in lieu of notice as specified in sub-rule (1), a proportionate amount of pay in lieu of notice shall be deducted from the grant due to the school concerned. (3) An employee entitled to vacation shall not give notice of resignation during the vacation or so as to cover any part of the vacation. The notice of resignation shall not be given within a month after the beginning of the first term of the year."
LPA.(S)74.10
18. There is absolutely no evidence on record to show that the appellant
has issued three months prior notice to the respondent nos.1 and 2, prior to the
acceptance of her resignation. Thus, the provisions of Rule 40 of the Rules of 1981
have not been complied with and, therefore, the resignation cannot be termed as a
valid resignation and the same cannot be acted upon.
19. In this circumstances, it is difficult to believe that the appellant would
have tendered a voluntary resignation which is not in her own handwriting and date is
not put in her handwriting, which is the contrary to the provisions of Section 7 of the
Act of 1977 and Rule 40 of the Rules of 1981. There was no reason for the appellant
to resign from the service. The stand taken by the respondent nos.1 and 2 that the
resignation tendered by the appellant was accepted by them on 24.11.2007 by
passing a resolution is not justifiable as there was no resignation in existence. Thus,
the resignation allegedly tendered by the appellant does not appear to be a valid
resignation.
20. Pertinently, it is not the case of respondent nos.1 and 2 that after
resignation and acceptance of the same, immediately some other teacher was
appointed in place of the appellant, on a clear vacancy. Thus, the case put up by the
respondent nos.1 and 2 about the appellant's resignation and its acceptance is not
digestable.
21. A perusal of judgment of School Tribunal depicts that the School
Tribunal although came to the conclusion that the resignation tendered by the
LPA.(S)74.10
appellant is not a valid resignation, however, it is not clear from its judgment and
order whether the resignation was in the handwriting of the appellant. Whether the
dues were cleared from the appellant by the respondent nos.1 and 2 on its
acceptance after an year from tendering it as the resignation was dated 15.11.2006,
whereas the resolution was passed on 24.11.2007, i.e., almost one year after the
alleged tendering of resignation. There is no mention of acceptance of the resignation
from respondent nos.1 and 2. So also, there is no communication to appellant on
record regarding its acceptance. Thus, the resignation appears to be a suspicious
document.
22. Pertinently, there is no discussion in the judgment of the School Tribunal
about the notes prepared by appellant and obtaining the signatures of Headmaster
on her notes after her resuming the services in July,2007. If this assertion is correct,
the resignation may be an afterthought case put up by the respondent nos.1 and 2.
All these facets are to be looked into by the School Tribunal and it needs appropriate
consideration.
23. There appear to be three stages in the case put forth by the appellant,
namely, (i) resignation (ii) leave (iii) resuming the duties in July, 2007. All these
aspects and their mutual impact need to be considered in detail, by the School
Tribunal.
24. In this situation, we quash and set aside the judgment and order dated
21st January,2009 delivered by School Tribunal in Appeal No.STN: 33/2007 and
LPA.(S)74.10
restore the Appeal back to the file of School Tribunal. Parties are directed to appear
before School Tribunal on 28.11.2017 and to abide by its further instructions in the
matter. The School Tribunal shall decide the matter as mentioned supra, within next
three months.
25. With these directions, we partly allow the Letters Patent Appeal and
dispose it of. No costs.
JUDGE JUDGE sahare
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