Citation : 2017 Latest Caselaw 2432 Bom
Judgement Date : 9 May, 2017
WP/115/1998/Group
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
WRIT PETITION NO. 115 OF 1998
1. Shramik Shikshan Mandal
(A Public Trust registered under
the Bombay Public Trusts Act),
A/p-Parsamal, Tq. Sindkheda,
Dist. Dhule, through its President.
2. Pujya Sane Guruji Madhyamik Vidyalaya,
Chougaon, Tq. Sindkheda, Dist. Dhule.
Through its Head Master. ...Petitioners.
Versus
1. The State of Maharashtra.
2. Jaysing S/o. Mithesing Girase,
Age. 46 yrs, Occ. Teacher,
R/o. Parsamal, Tq. Sindkheda,
Dist. Dhule.
3. Backward Classes Cell,
Commissioner's Office,
Nasik, Division Nasik.
4. Education Officer,
Zilla Parishad,
Dhule, District Dhule. ...Respondents.
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO. 119 OF 1998
1. Shramik Shikshan Mandal
(A Public Trust registered under
the Bombay Public Trusts Act),
Tq. Sindkheda, Dist. Dhule,
through its President.
2. Pujya Sane Guruji Madhyamik Vidyalaya,
Chougaon, Tq. Sindkheda, Dist. Dhule.
Through its Head Master. ...Petitioners.
Versus
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WP/115/1998/Group
2
1. The State of Maharashtra.
2. Sattarsing S/o. Chandrasing Girase,
Age. 28 yrs, Occ. Service,
R/o. Virdel, Tq. Sindkheda,
Dist. Dhule.
3. Backward Classes Cell,
Commissioner's Office,
Nasik, Division Nasik.
4. Education Officer,
Zilla Parishad,
Dhule, District Dhule. ...Respondents.
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO. 128 OF 1998
1. Shramik Shikshan Mandal
(A Public Trust registered under
the Bombay Public Trusts Act),
Tq. Sindkheda, Dist. Dhule,
through its President.
2. Pujya Sane Guruji Madhyamik Vidyalaya,
Chougaon, Tq. Sindkheda, Dist. Dhule.
Through its Head Master. ...Petitioners.
Versus
1. The State of Maharashtra.
2. Bhimsing S/o. Bhagwansing Girase,
Age. 36 yrs, Occ. Teacher,
R/o. Bhade, Tq. Sindkheda, Dist. Dhule.
3. Backward Classes Cell,
Commissioner's Office,
Nasik, Division Nasik.
4. Education Officer,
Zilla Parishad,
Dhule, District Dhule. ...Respondents.
...
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WP/115/1998/Group
3
Advocate for Petitioners : Shri P.R.Patil
AGP for Respondent 1 & 4 : Shri S.S.Daund
Advocate for Respondent 2 : Ms. Pradnya Talekar
h/f Shri S.B.Talekar
...
CORAM : RAVINDRA V. GHUGE, J.
Dated: May 09, 2017 ...
ORAL JUDGMENT :-
1 These three petitions have been admitted by this Court on
17.2.1998 and by a common interim order, interim relief was granted
to the petitioner / management, by which the impugned judgments
in favour of the respondent No.2 / employees in all these matters
were stayed. Consequentially, all these respondents / employees
(hereinafter referred to as the "appellants") were kept out of
employment from April 1993.
2 I have heard the submissions of the learned counsel for the
petitioner / management and the original appellants in extenso.
3 Learned counsel on behalf of the appellants has cited the
following reported judgments.
i. Jagbir Singh Vs. Haryana State Agriculture Marketing Board [(2009) 15 SCC 327],
ii. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan Development Corporation and another Vs. Gitam Singh [(2013) 5 SCC 136],
iii. BSNL Vs. Man Singh [(2012) 1 SCC 558],
WP/115/1998/Group
iv. Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division, Kota Vs. Mohan Lal [2013 LLR 1009],
v. Deepali Gundu Surwase Vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and others [(2013) 10 SCC 324],
vi. M/s Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd. Vs. The Employees of M/s Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd. - (1979) 2 CC 80,
viii. Murari Mohan Deb Vs. Secretary to the Government of India - (1985) 3 SCC 120,
ix. Educational Society Tumsar Vs. State of Maharashtra - (2016) 3 SCC 512,
x. St.Ulai High School Vs. Shri Devendraprasad Jagannath, [2007(109) Bom.L.R. 60 = 2007(1) Mh.L.J. 597],
xi. Manorma Verma Vs. State of Bihar - 1994 Supp (3) SCC 671,
xii. Shri Bhagwan Mahavir Primary School Vs. Presiding Officer - 2014 (3) Mh.L.J. 161,
xiii. Matoshri Ramabai Ambedkar Vidyarthi Vasatigruh Vs. Bharat D. Hambir - 2008 BCI 1 and
xiv. Sayyed Maksood Ali Sayyed Roshid Ali Vs. Uruj-E-Urdu Education Society - 2011 (4) Mh.L.J. 952.
4 For the sake of clarity, the details about the services of the
appellants in these three petitions are as under:-
(i) Appellant Jaysing Girase is B.A., B.Ed.
(ii) Appellant Sattarsingh was a Peon and no qualifications were prescribed.
WP/115/1998/Group
(iii) Appellant Bhimsingh Girase is B.A., B.P.Ed.
(iv) Appellant Jaysingh was initially appointed as an Assistant Teacher on 1.7.1989. He was then appointed as an in- charge Head Master in between 1991 and 1992. He was again appointed as an Assistant Teacher for the academic year 1992-
93.
(v) Appellant Satarsingh was appointed as a Peon on 1.3.1990. He is said to be terminated on 1.4.1991 and again appointed for one year upto 1992. He is said to be terminated on 1.4.1992 and yet again appointed for the year 1992-93.
(vi) Appellant Bhimsingh was initially appointed as an untrained Teacher on 15.10.1987. He is said to have left the services in 1989. In 1990, he was again appointed as an untrained Teacher and terminated on 1.4.1991. For the academic years 1991-92 and 1992-93 he was appointed as an Assistant Teacher.
5 The cause of action for these three appellants arose on
account of the refusal of the petitioner in granting them an
appointment order for the academic year 1993-94. They approached
the School Tribunal by filing Appeal Nos.36, 37 and 38 of 1993. It was
contended that the management prevented them from reporting for
duties on 12.6.1993 which was the beginning of the academic year
1993-94.
WP/115/1998/Group
6. The appeals were initially allowed ex-parte when the
petitioner / management did not cause it's appearance despite the
service of Court notice. By judgment dated 7.1.1995, these
appellants were granted reinstatement with continuity and
backwages by the School Tribunal. The petitioner / management
approached this Court in Writ Petition Nos.1081 to 1983 of 1996.
Suffice it to say that the matter was remanded by this Court on the
condition of payment of Rs.25,000/- to each of the appellants for
remanding the matter. Ultimately, by the impugned judgment, dated
29.9.1997, all the appeals were allowed under Section 9 of the
Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service)
Regulation Act, 1977 ("the MEPS Act" for short) and the appellants
were granted reinstatement with continuity and 50% backwages.
7 After these matters were before this Court, the impugned
judgments were stayed. Eventually the matter reached the
Honourable Apex Court and each of these appellants were granted
Rs.25,000/- towards continuing the stay to the impugned judgment.
Consequentially, all these appellants have been out of employment
for the past about 24 years.
8 Shri Patil, learned counsel for the petitioner / management
has primarily canvassed the following points:-
WP/115/1998/Group
(i) None of these appellants have been granted regularization, were not in regular employment and hence have no right to employment.
(ii) None of these appellants were granted approval by the Education officer and hence they could not be continued in employment.
(iii) Each of these appellants have resigned voluntarily by resignation letter dated 20.4.1993, which were accepted on 22.4.1993.
(iv) Each of these appellants were appointed de-hors the reservation and considering the backlog, they could not be continued in employment as they did not belong to the reserved categories.
9 Learned counsel for the appellant has pointed out from the
impugned judgment that the theory of reservation putforth by the
management was an attempt to mis-lead the School Tribunal and the
Tribunal has accordingly concluded that the said attempt was only to
defeat the claim of the appellants. She further points out that the
petitioner / management has no where challenged the manner of
appointment of the appellants, their qualifications for being eligible
to appointment and the legality of their appointments. She points
out from the record that the petitioner / management had never
taken up these grounds. She hastens to add that the appellant
Sattarsingh was a Peon and no qualification was prescribed Both the
WP/115/1998/Group
other appellants were having requisite qualifications and hence,
there was no issue about their eligibility to be appointed.
10 After considering the submissions of the learned counsel for
the respective sides and upon going through the record, I find that
the management has taken a peculiar stand at the initiation of the
process for terminating the services of these appellants. It was stated
by the management that the School record of the X standard
examination had plunged and consequentially, the dismal
performance of the students indicated that the two appellants, who
are Teachers, could be said to be responsible for the debacle of the
School's performance. Surprisingly, even Sattarsingh who is a Peon
was said to be responsible for the bad performance of the X Standard
students.
11. It cannot be appreciated that a Class IV Peon could have any
contribution for lifting the performance of the X Standard students.
Moreover, the record reveals that the students have failed badly in
the English subject and none of the two appellants / Teachers ever
imparted education in the English subject. One was a History
teacher and another was a Geography teacher. In this backdrop, I do
not find that the impugned judgment could be termed as perverse or
erroneous, when the bad result of the X standard examination was
exclusively on account of the bad performance in the English subject.
WP/115/1998/Group
12 The petitioners have also taken a stand that one of the
appellants - Jaysingh Girase - was an in-charge Head Master and he is
responsible for the bad performance. This aspect has also been dealt
with by the School Tribunal, since in the academic year preceding
the disengagement of the said appellant, he was an Assistant
Teacher.
13 The petitioners have taken a stand that these appellants have
resigned voluntarily since they were given a notice of termination
dated 15.1.1993. They were also given a show cause notice on
31.12.1992.
14 The School Tribunal has dealt with this aspect of resignation.
All the resignations are identical, in a typed form and carrying the
same date 20.4.1993. A resolution is said to have been passed by the
petitioner / management accepting the resignation letters within 48
hours on 22.4.1993. There is no evidence of convening the meeting
for acceptance of the resignations.
15 Section 7 of the MEPS Act clearly provides that an employee
who intends to resign from his post, shall draw up a letter of
resignation in duplicate and sign both the copies of that letter by
putting a date thereon. One copy is to be forwarded to the
WP/115/1998/Group
management by registered post. Rule 40 of the Maharashtra
Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Rules, 1981
("MEPS Rules" for short) mandates three months notice for
acceptance of resignation in case of a permanent employee and one
month's notice in case of a temporary employee.
16 As such, the issue would be as to whether these appellants,
who have not been granted approval and orders of confirmation,
could be said to be permanent employees. Section 5(2) of the MEPS
Act reads as under:-
"Section 5 - Certain obligations of Management of private schools.
(1) .........................
(2) Every person appointed to fill a permanent vacancy except shikshan sevak shall be on probation for a period of two years. Subject to the provisions of sub-sections (3) and (4), he shall, on completion of this probation period of two years, be deemed to have been confirmed :
Provided that, every person appointed as shikshan sevak shall be on probation for a period of three years."
17 The learned Full Bench of this Court in the matter of St. Ulai
(supra), has concluded that lack of approval or refusal of approval to
WP/115/1998/Group
the appointment of an employee cannot be a ground for terminating
his services and cannot be an impediment for his continuation in
services. It was established before the Tribunal that though the
management has shown gaps in employment of these appellants only
for the period of summer vacations, they were artificial break and
since the summer vacations need to be computed while considering
the length of service, the Tribunal concluded that these appellants
were deemed to be permanent employees since the Assistant
Teachers have worked for about 4 years and the Peon had worked for
about 3 years.
18 When these appellants were legally qualified to be appointed
and the petitioner / management had appointed them on year to
year basis and had continued them for the period mentioned above,
the Tribunal in my view, has rightly concluded that they are deemed
permanent employees.
19 In this backdrop, by relying upon Section 7 of the MEPS Act and
Rule 40 of the MEPS Rules, the Tribunal has concluded that the
acceptance of resignation was in violation of these provisions and
hence were unsustainable.
20 I have gone through the resignation letters and the resolutions
claimed to have been passed by the petitioners for accepting the said
WP/115/1998/Group
resignations. There is no dispute that these three resignation letters
are identical, all are typed out and they bear the signatures of these
appellants at the bottom of the page. The appellants have contended
that they have not submitted these resignations. Nevertheless, these
resignations have been accepted within 48 hours and the factum of
convening a special meeting of the Governing Council of the
petitioner and passing of such resolution for accepting such
resignations, was not proved by the management.
21 This case takes a curious turn on account of the fact that the
management has never conveyed to these appellants their decision of
acceptance of resignation and the dates on which they are being
relieved. These documents have seen the light of the day only after
this Court remanded the matter back to the Tribunal by setting aside
the exparte judgments and on imposing costs upon the petitioners.
Until that moment these appellants have never received any
communication as regards the acceptance of resignation. So also no
such document was placed before the Tribunal to show that the
acceptance of resignation was conveyed to the appellants and that
they have received such communication. In this backdrop, I do not
find that the conclusions drawn by the Tribunal on the facts of these
cases could be termed as being perverse or erroneous.
22 In so far as the contention of the petitioner / management
WP/115/1998/Group
that these three positions occupied by the appellants were reserved
for backward classes is concerned, the Tribunal has concluded that a
false case was put up by the management. Learned counsel for the
petitioner has strenuously tried to impress this Court that these
appellants did not deserve to continue in employment because of the
backlog of the reserved categories, being seen from the record. It is
stated that the B.C. cell of the Education Department has confirmed
the backlog.
23 I find that this eventuality has occurred much after the
disengagement of the appellants. The documents placed on record
were disbelieved by the School Tribunal. I find that the
advertisement published by the petitioner / management, which is
referred to in paragraph No.9 of the impugned judgment does not in
any manner indicate that the posts on which these appellants were
appointed, were subject to any backlog of reservation. The
appointment orders also do not indicate this aspect. Proposals for
approval were not sent by the management to the Education
Department, which indicates the conduct of the management of
deliberately suppressing the proposals so as to keep the appellants
temporary. The conduct of the management of appointing these
appellants for each academic year and terminating them at the
stroke of the summer vacation and suppressing their appointments
from the Education Officer, would establish apparent unfair and
WP/115/1998/Group
malafide conduct of the management.
24 Notwithstanding the above, if at all there was any backlog, the
petitioner could have done away with the said backlog by ensuring
that future appointments are made from the reserved categories.
Considering these aspects, I find that the conclusion of the Tribunal
in paragraph Nos.9 and 10 of the impugned judgment that the
management had tried to mis-direct the Tribunal, does not appear to
be perverse or vitiated.
25 The petitioners vehemently contend that these three
appellants have again applied in 1993 for reemployment in the
academic year 1993-94 and hence, by their conduct it needs to be
inferred that they have accepted their termination. I find this to be
yet another attempt of the management for misdirecting this Court.
The modus operandi of the management was to disengage the
appellants, to terminate them after every academic year at the
stroke of vacations and compel them to apply for a fresh
appointment. This was to create a picture that they are reapplying
for appointment. These practices of the management have been
tested in law over several decades and have been termed as artificial
breaks (H.D.Singh Vs. Reserve Bank of India - (1985) 4 SCC 201 and
State of Haryana Vs. Piara Singh (3 Judges Bench) (1992) 4 SCC 118.)
This contention therefore, needs to be rejected instantly.
WP/115/1998/Group
26 Issue before this Court is that in the light of the interim orders
of this Court and the orders of the Honourable Apex Court, the
impugned judgment was stayed and these appellants have been out
of employment for 24 years. Appellant Jaysingh has attained the age
of superannuation in 2008, having put in 4 years of service.
Appellant Bhimsingh has put in 6 years in service and would be
attaining the age of superannuation in 2019. Appellant Sattarsingh
worked for 3 years as a Peon and his retirement would be in 2027.
The Tribunal has granted reinstatement with continuity and 50%
backwages to all these appellants.
27 I have considered the judgments cited by the learned counsel
for the appellants. In the matter of Deepali (supra), the Honourable
Apex Court has granted 100% backwages with reinstatement and
continuity. None of these appellants have challenged the denial of
50% backwages by the School Tribunal. Considering the unfair
conduct of the management and the pendency of this litigation, for
which these appellants cannot be faulted and it is merely a matter of
their destiny, I find that the appellant Sattarsingh can be reinstated
in service with continuity and 50% backwages, as on the date of this
judgment. He would consequentially be able to work for ten years
and support himself and his family.
WP/115/1998/Group
22 Section 11(e) and (f) of the MEPS Act read as under:-
"Section 11 - Powers of Tribunal to give appropriate reliefs and directions.
(1) ..............................
(2) Where the Tribunal, after giving reasonable
opportunity to both parties of being heard, decides in any appeal that the order of dismissal, removal, otherwise termination of service or reduction in rank was in contravention of any law (including any rules made under this Act), contract or conditions of service for the time being in force or was otherwise illegal or improper, the Tribunal may set aside the order of the Management, partially or wholly, and direct the Management,-
(a) ..............................
(b) ..............................
(c) ..............................
(d) ..............................
(e) where it is decided not to reinstate the
employee or in any other appropriate case, 1[to give to the employee twelve months' salary (pay and allowances, if any) if he has been in the service of the school for ten years or more and six months' salary (pay and allowances, if any) if he has been in service of the school for less than ten years], by way of compensation, regard being had to loss of employment and possibility of getting or not getting suitable employment
WP/115/1998/Group
thereafter, as it may specify; or
(f) to give such other relief to the employee and to observe such other conditions as it may specify, having regard to the circumstances of the case. ................"
29 Appellants Jaysing and Bhimsingh who are Assistant Teachers
and have not been in the teaching profession for 24 years as they
have claimed to be unemployed, I do not find that any purpose would
be served in reinstating appellant Bhimsingh who has only 2 academic
years prior to his retirement. Appellant Jaysingh has already
attained the age of superannuation in 2008. In this backdrop, I find
that the impugned judgment of the Tribunal, by which reinstatement
is impossible with appellant Jaysing and impracticable with appellant
Bhimsingh, needs to be modified. Considering the conduct of the
petitioner / management, I deem it appropriate to exercise
jurisdiction under Section 11(2)(f) by which, other reliefs in lieu of
resintatment can be granted to the two appellants having regard to
the circumstances of the case.
30 These petitions are, therefore, partly allowed. The impugned
judgment to the extent of grant of reinstatement with continuity and
50% backwages in the case of appellant Jaysing is modified and he
will stand entitled to continuity of service with all retiral benefits till
his age of superannuation, which is 2008. His 50% backwages shall be
WP/115/1998/Group
computed till the age of retirement on the basis of the gross salary
payable as per the different Pay Commission's recommendations
applicable from time to time.
31 Similarly, the directions of the Tribunal in favour of appellant
Bhimsingh shall stand modified and he shall be granted continuity in
service with 50% backwages and the date of judgment of this Court
would be the date of his superannuation for the purposes of
calculating his retiral benefits.
32 Learned counsel for the appellants Bhimsingh and Jaysingh
submits on instructions that the said directions are acceptable to
them.
33 The petitioner / management shall, therefore, calculate the
backwages of all these appellants and ensure payment of the said
amounts from the funds of the management within a period of 12
weeks from today, failing which these amounts shall carry interest at
the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the impugned judgment of
the Tribunal. Similarly, the gratuity amounts payable to the two
appellants shall also be paid by the petitioners in the above
mentioned time frame and subject to the same direction for interest
in case of delay.
WP/115/1998/Group
34 Their proposals for retiral benefits shall be forwarded by the
petitioner / management within eight weeks from today. Payment of
backwages to appellant Sattarsingh will be in the light of the above
directions / time frame and interest, if payment is delayed, as like
the other two appellants, shall be payable. Sattarsingh shall be
reinstated by the petitioners within eight weeks from today.
35 Rule is made partly absolute in the above terms.
( RAVINDRA V. GHUGE, J. )
...
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