Prashant @ Tushar Lalchand Bhamre vs The State Of Maharashtra And ...
2017 Latest Caselaw 1980 Bom

                                                   1816.2017 Cri.Appln.odt
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               IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY 
                          BENCH AT AURANGABAD

                  CRIMINAL APPLICATION NO.1816 OF 2017 

          Prashant @ Tushar Lalchand Bhamre,  
          Age- 33 Years, Occ-Private Class, 
          R/o. - Jaibhairav Nagar, Plot No.85, 
          Sakri Road, Dhule Dist.Dhule        APPLICANT 

                     VERSUS 

          1.       The State of Maharashtra,  
                   Through P.I., City Police Station,  
                   Dhule, Dist. Dhule.  

          2.       The Superintendent of Police 
                   Dhule, Tq. & Dist. Dhule 

          3.       Yoges s/o. Hanumant Bhokre, 
                   Age: 20 Years, Occu-Education, 
                   R/o. Plot No.107, Johrawali Society,  
                   Dhule, Dist. Dhule.           RESPONDENTS

                                ...
          Mr.N.L.Choudhari, Advocate for Applicant 
          Mr.S.J.Salgare, APP for Respondent  Nos.1 and 
          2/State.  
          Mr.R.S.Shinde, Advocate for respondent No.3.
                                ...
                          CORAM:  S.S.SHINDE & 
                                  K.K.SONAWANE,JJ.     

Reserved on : 21.04.2017 Pronounced on : 25.04.2017

JUDGMENT: (Per S.S.Shinde, J.):

1. This Application is filed under

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Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code

with prayer to quash and set aside the

criminal proceedings / FIR bearing Crime

No.17/2017, registered with Dhule City Police

Station, Dhule, for the offences punishable

under Sections 307, 323, 504, 506 of the

Indian Penal Code.

2. The learned counsel appearing for

the applicant submitted that the applicant is

well-educated person and conducts private

tuition at Pimpalner, District Dhule.

Respondent no.3 herein i.e. informant-Yogesh

Hunumant Bhokre filed First Information

Report bearing Crime No.17/2017 for the

offence punishable under Sections 307, 323,

504, 506 of the Indian Penal Code with Dhule

City Police Station, Dhule, against the

applicant. It is submitted that, with

intervention of the senior persons residing

in the vicinity wherein the houses of the

applicant and respondent no.3 are situated;

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they have decided amicably to settle the

dispute in order to have peace and cordial

relations between each other. It is submitted

that, respondent no.3 has not suffered any

grievous injuries and in the interest of

justice keeping in view the judgment of the

Supreme Court in the case of Gian Singh Vs.

State of Punjab and anr.1 when the informant

i.e. victim and the offender have decided to

bring amicable settlement, in that case, the

possibility of conviction may be remote and

bleak and continuation of criminal case would

put accused to great oppression and prejudice

and extreme injustice would be caused to him.

The learned counsel appearing for the

applicant invites our attention to the

contents of the compromise pursis and submits

that the applicant and respondent no.3 have

affirmed the compromise pursis and it is

stated that the applicant and respondent no.3

1 2012 AIR SCW 5333

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will reside peacefully and will not quarrel

or create any dispute henceforth. There will

not be any such incident in future. The

applicant and respondent no.3 have no any

grievance or objection, if the criminal

proceedings are quashed.

3. The learned counsel appearing for

respondent no.3 also submits that in the

light of compromise between the applicant and

respondent no.3, the application may be

allowed.

4. The learned APP appearing for the

respondent - State vehemently opposed the

prayer and submits that there is criminal

antecedent of the applicant. The applicant

assaulted respondent no.3 by knife and tried

to kill him. The offence is serious in

nature. From the date of registration of the

offence, the applicant has absconded. The

injury is inflicted by the applicant on the

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chest of respondent no.3, therefore, the

injury is on vital part. The applicant is

likely to cause disappearance of the evidence

including knife used in the alleged

commission of offence. The medical

certificate of respondent no.3 is collected

by the Investigating Officer. The possibility

of indulgence of the accused in similar

commission of the offences cannot be ruled

out. The applicant has created fear in the

mind of the school going students. Though the

applicant applied for the anticipatory bail,

the said application was withdrawn.

5. We have considered the submissions

of the learned counsel appearing for the

applicant, learned counsel appearing for

respondent no.3, and the learned APP

appearing for respondent - State. With their

able assistance, we have carefully perused

the contents of the FIR, contents of the

application, and the joint compromise pursis

1816.2017 Cri.Appln.odt

filed by the applicant and respondent no.3,

and also the investigation papers, and we are

of the opinion that, since the alleged

offence is punishable under Section 307 of

the Indian Penal Code and the injury

inflicted by the applicant is on vital part

i.e. chest of respondent no.3, and also there

is no denial to the fact that earlier also

the applicant was involved in the alleged

commission of some other offence, in our

opinion, the prayer of applicant to quash the

FIR on the basis of amicable settlement

cannot be acceded to.

6. We have carefully perused the injury

certificate. There is stab injury over chest,

and also there are more than four eye

witnesses to the incident. It appears that,

the incident had taken place at public place.

The Supreme Court in the case of Gian Singh

Vs. State of Punjab and anr. [cited supra] in

para 54 of the judgment has observed that, in

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respect of serious offences like murder,

rape, dacoity, etc; or other offences of

mental depravity under IPC or offences of

moral turpitude under special statutes, like

Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences

committed by public servants while working in

that capacity, the settlement between

offender and victim can have no legal

sanction at all. The Supreme Court in the

case of Narinder Singh and others Vs. State

of Punjab and another2 in para 29 has laid

down the principles by which the High Court

would be guided in giving adequate treatment

to the settlement between the parties and

exercising its power under Section 482 of the

Code while accepting the settlement and

quashing the proceedings or refusing to

accept the settlement with direction to

continue with the criminal proceedings:

"29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down

2 [2014] 6 SCC 466

1816.2017 Cri.Appln.odt

the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:

29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.

29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:

(i) ends of justice, or

(ii)to prevent abuse of the process of any court. While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the

1816.2017 Cri.Appln.odt

aforesaid two objectives.

29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by Public Servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.

29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.

29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.

29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC

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would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony

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between them which may improve their future relationship.

29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings / investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge-sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not.

Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by

1816.2017 Cri.Appln.odt

the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime."

7. In the aforesaid clause 29.6, the

Supreme Court has considered the seriousness

of the offence punishable under Section 307

of the IPC and observed that, the offence

under said section is the crime against the

society and not against the individual alone.

However, merely because Section 307 of the

IPC is mentioned in the FIR, cannot be a

ground for not accepting prayer for quashing

the FIR on the basis of the settlement. But,

it would be open to the High Court to go by

the nature of injury sustained, whether such

injury inflicted on the vital/delegate parts

of the body, nature of weapons used, medical

1816.2017 Cri.Appln.odt

report in respect of injuries suffered by the

victim. As already observed, in the present

case, weapon used is a knife. The injury

inflicted is on the chest of respondent no.3

by the applicant. The medical report clearly

suggests that the said injury is on vital

part and there are eye witnesses to the

incident. It prima facie appears that, an

incident has occurred at public place,

wherein the witnesses had opportunity to

witness the said incident. During the course

of argument, the learned APP has pointed out

that even earlier the applicant is made

accused in some other offence.

8. In that view of the matter, keeping

in view the guidelines laid down in the

judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of

Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab and anr.

[supra] and in the case of Narinder Singh and

others Vs. State of Punjab and another

[supra], we are not inclined to quash the FIR

1816.2017 Cri.Appln.odt

on the basis of the compromise / settlement

between the applicant and respondent no.3.

9. We have also considered the prayer

of the applicant for quashing the FIR on

merits. However, in the light of discussion

in the foregoing paragraphs and upon perusal

of the allegations in the FIR, an ingredients

of the alleged offences have been attracted

and alleged offences under Section 307 and

other provisions of the Indian Penal Code are

constituted and disclosed, we are not

inclined to entertain the prayer, even on

merits.

10. In that view of the matter, the

application stands rejected. An observations

made herein before are prima facie in nature

and trial Court should not get influenced by

the said observation.

              [K.K.SONAWANE]            [S.S.SHINDE]
                  JUDGE                    JUDGE  
          DDC