Citation : 2016 Latest Caselaw 5335 Bom
Judgement Date : 16 September, 2016
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY,
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR
WRIT PETITION NO.3474 OF 2016
1. Ambedkarite Party of India,
through its Authorised General
Secretary Mrs.Vidya Kishor
Bhimte, having its registered
Office at Plot No.1672, near
Nav Buddha Vihar, Nara Road,
Indora (Warphakhad),
Nagpur-440014. .......... PETITIONER
// VERSUS //
1.State of Maharashtra,
Through its Principal Secretary,
Mantralaya, Mumbai-400032.
2. State of Maharashtra,
through its Urban Development
Department, Mantralaya,
Madam Cama Marg, Hutatma
Rajguru Chowk, Mumbai-400 032.
::: Uploaded on - 22/09/2016 ::: Downloaded on - 23/09/2016 00:10:59 :::
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3. State Election Commission of
Maharashtra through its
Election Commissioner,
1st Floor, New Administrative
Building, Hutatma Rajguru
Chowk, Madam Cama Road,
Mumbai 400 032.
4. Election Commission of India,
Nirvachan Sadan, Ashoka Road,
New Delhi - 110001.
5. Union of India,
through its Cabinet Secretary,
Cabinet Secretariat, Government
of India, Rashtrapati Bhavan,
New Delhi - 110004. .......... RESPONDENTS
____________________________________________________________
Mr.N.D.Sonare, Adv. for the Petitioner.
Mr.Rohit Deo, Acting Advocate General with Mrs.Bharti
Dangre, G.P. for Respondent nos. 1 to 3.
Ms N.G.Choubey, Adv. for Respondent No.4.
____________________________________________________________
CORAM : B.R. GAVAI
AND
V. M. DESHPANDE, JJ.
DATED : 16th September, 2016.
ORAL JUDGMENT (Per B.R. GAVAI, J) :
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1. Petitioner has approached this Court being
aggrieved by the Ordinance promulgated by the Hon'ble
Governor of Maharashtra called as "the Maharashtra
Municipal Corporations and the Maharashtra Municipal
Councils, Nagar Panchayats and Industrial Township
(Amendment) Ordinance, 2016 hereinafter referred to "the
amended Ordinance". By virtue of the said Ordinance,
amendments have been effected to the Maharashtra
Municipal Corporations Act (hereinafter referred to as
"the Corporations Act" and the Maharashtra Municipal
Councils, Nagar Panchayats and Industrial Townships Act,
1965 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act of 1965"). The
amendments provide that, insofar as the Municipal
Corporation is concerned, each of the wards shall elect as
far as possible four Councillors but not less than three and
not more than five Councillors. It further provide that each
voter would be entitled to cast the same number of votes,
as number of Councillors to be elected in his ward.
2. Insofar as the general elections to the Municipal
Council are concerned, it has been provided that each of
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the wards shall elect as far as possible two Councillors but
not more than three Councillors. It has been further
provided that each voter shall, not withstanding anything
contained in sub-section (2) of Section 14, be entitled to
cast the same number of votes, as the number of
Councillors to be elected in his ward.
3. Another ground of challenge is with regard to
election of Chairpersons of Municipal Councils directly.
According to the learned Counsel, there is no provision in
the Constitution which permits election to the post of
President of Municipal Council to be done directly and as
such, the amendment violates the Constitution of India.
4. Mr.N.D.Sonare, learned Counsel appearing on
behalf of the petitioner, which is a registered political
party, submits that the Constitution Bench of Hon'ble
Supreme Court has held that Secularism is one of the basic
feature of the Constitution of India. Learned Counsel
submits that, by providing for multi Member Ward System,
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the very concept of Secularism is under attack inasmuch as
the community having majority of votes in a particular
ward would be dominating the elections in that ward.
Learned Counsel submits that such a System is prejudicial
to small political party like the petitioner.
5. Learned Counsel further submits that 'One Man
One Vote and One Value' is the basic concept recognized
in the Constitution of India and by the impugned
Ordinance, the said principle is sought to be given a total
go-bye.
6. The learned Counsel has taken us through the
speeches given by Dr.B.R.Ambedkar as well as other
members in the Constituent Assembly debates.
7. Mr. Rohit Deo, learned Acting Advocate General,
on the contrary, submits that the issue is no more res
integra. He submits that the issue is put to rest by two
Division Bench Judgments; one in Writ Petition No.4855 of
2011 delivered by the Division Bench at Aurangabad on
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23.8.2011 and the other one in Writ Petition No.10354 of
2011 delivered by the Division Bench at the Principal Seat
in Mumbai on 23.12.2011.
8. Nodoubt that the arguments advanced by the
learned Counsel for the petitioner appears to be attractive
at the first blush. Nobody would deny that the Indian
Constitution recognizes Secularism to be one of the basic
concepts of it. With the development of law by Their
Lordships of Hon'ble Supreme Court and various High
Court, it cannot be denied that Secularism will have to be
construed to be a basic structure of the Constitution of
India. However, the question that would be required to be
considered is as to whether the impugned Ordinance
attacks the concept of Secularism or not.
9. Another argument of the learned Counsel
regarding the concept of 'One Man One Vote and One
Value' also finds place in the Indian Constitution. Learned
Counsel is right in relying upon various speeches of
Dr.B.R.Ambedkar as well as other eminent members of the
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Constituent Assembly wherein they have stated that the
Indian Constitution promises political democracies by
adopting principle of 'One Man One Vote and One Value' .
However, again question would be as to whether the Multi
Member Ward System attacks the said principle or not.
10. Insofar as the first submission is concerned, we
are unable to understand as to how the Multi Member
Ward System would attack the concept of Secularism. The
concept of Secularism could be said to have been attacked,
if there was any communal reservation provided in the
Constituencies. What would not be permissible by the
concept of Secularism is reservation for a particular
community professing a particular religion. Same would
not be at all permissible under our Constitutional Scheme.
However, none of the provisions of the impugned
Ordinance would show that any attempt is made in that
regard. Needless to state that all the eligible candidates
professing any religion would be entitled to contest
elections provided that they are otherwise eligible for
contesting elections and insofar as the Constituencies
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which are reserved for various categories are concerned,
they belong to that category. Equally the person belonging
to any religion would be entitled to cast vote for any
candidate though he may be belonging to different religion
or community.
11. As a matter of fact, the Constitution Bench of
Apex Court in the case of R.C.Poudyal .vs. Union of
India and Others reported in AIR 1993 SC 1804 has
clearly held that no reservations could be provided in the
electorates on the basis of any religion. In the said
Judgment, Their Lordships have elaborately considered the
debates in the Constituent Assembly wherein there was
almost unanimity amongst the Hon'ble Members of the
Constituent Assembly, that the greatest evil in this Country
in the past was of communal electorate. It could be seen
that, in one of the debates, the legendary Sardar Patel has
observed that introduction of the system of communal
electorates is poison which has entered into the body of
politics of our Country. Apart from that, it could be seen
that, the Sub-Committee of the Constituent Assembly, on
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the question, as to whether separate electorates for
particular communities could be permitted under the
Constitution, had firmly opined against separate
electorates and had recommended all the elections to the
Central Province Legislature on the basis of joint
electorate. It can thus be seen that the concept of joint
electorates is not introduced by the impugned Ordinance
for the first time but it finds its origin in the report of the
Sub-Committee of the Constituent Assembly. In that view
of the matter, we find that merely because the impugned
ordinance is capable of causing some prejudice to the
petitioner party, cannot be a ground to hold the same to be
unconstitutional.
12. Insofar as the second argument regarding the
impugned Ordinance violating the principle of 'One Man
One Vote and One Value' is concerned, in our considered
view, the same is also without substance. If a particular
ward is to elect five Councillors, then a person from the
said ward will have to vote for different five persons
contesting from the said ward. It is not as if, that the voter
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would be entitled to cast all his five votes in favour of one
particular candidate. Had this been the position, then
certainly the petitioner would have been justified in saying
that the principle of 'One Man One Vote and One Value' is
adversely affected. However, the learned Counsel fairly
concedes that, that is not the position.
13. Insofar as the principle of 'One Man One Vote
and One Value' is concerned, it would further be relevant
to refer to the following observations of Their Lordships of
the Apex Court in the case of R.C.Poudyal (supra) :
" The principle of one man, one vote envisages
that there should be parity in the value of votes of electors. "
14. Now the only question that requires to be
considered is regarding prejudice caused to the small
political parties like the petitioner. By now it is a settled
principle of law that the Courts are not required to
consider the matter from a political angle. The political
considerations would not weigh with the Court. While
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considering the challenge to statutory enactments or
ordinance, only two grounds that will be available for
scrutiny would be : (1) whether the Legislature has
competence to enact the said enactment and
correspondingly as to whether the Hon'ble President or the
Hon'ble Governor would have competence to issue an
Ordinance in respect thereof (2) As to whether the
enactment or Ordinance is in conflict with any of the
provisions of the Constitution.
15. It is not the case of the petitioner that the
Ordinance which is issued is beyond legislative
competence of State Legislature. In that view of the
matter, it will be in the competence of Hon'ble Governor to
issue Ordinance till such time it is placed before the
Houses of the Legislature.
16. Insofar as the second ground is concerned, no
provision of the Constitution has been pointed out which
can be said to be in conflict with the said Ordinance.
Hence, the challenge on that ground would also fail.
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17. In any case, the question regarding Multi
Member Ward System has fallen for consideration before
the two Division Benches of this Court, one at Aurangabad
Bench and one at Principal Seat at Mumbai in the above
referred cases. The said challenge was rejected by this
Court.
18.
As has already been discussed hereinabove, the
impugned Ordinance does not provide for any disparity of
value of votes amongst one section of people as against
another section of people. The value of votes in a particular
ward of all the voters belonging to any religion,
community, caste or creed would be the same.
19. Insofar as the third challenge regarding direct
election of the Chairperson of a Municipality, it will be
relevant to note that under Article 243 R Clause 2(b) of the
Constitution of India, it is for the Legislature of a State to
enact law providing for the manner of the election of the
Chairperson of the Municipality. It can thus be seen that
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the Constitution of India has itself left it to the wisdom of
Legislature to provide for the manner of election of
Chairperson of the Municipality. Unless there is any
provision under the Constitution which prohibits election
of the President of Municipal Council by direct electorate,
the statutory provision cannot be held to be
unconstitutional. Learned Counsel has not been in a
position to point out to us any provision in the Constitution
which prohibits direct election of the President of
Municipal Council.
20. In view of the above, since the present Writ
Petition is devoid of merits, the same is dismissed. No
order as to costs.
JUDGE JUDGE
[jaiswal]
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CERTIFICATE
I certify that this Judgment uploaded is a true and correct copy of original signed Judgment.
Uploaded by : Jaiswal, P.S. Uploaded on : 22.9.2016.
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