Citation : 2016 Latest Caselaw 2114 Bom
Judgement Date : 2 May, 2016
sa462.02.odt 1/13
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH : NAGPUR.
SECOND APPEAL NO.462 OF 2002
APPELLANT: Vijay Kumar S/o Vithaldas Chandak,
aged about 32 years, occupation
(Original plff)
Agriculturist and business (General
on R.A.)
Store) R/o Rohana, Tq. Khamgaon Distt.
Buldhana.
ig -VERSUS-
RESPONDENT: Sukhdev S/o Ninaji Rothe, aged about
59 years, Occupation-Agriculturist, R/o
(Original deft)
Rohana, Tq. Khamgaon, Distt. Buldhana.
Shri D. G. Patil, Advocate for the appellant.
Shri A. V. Bhide, Advocate for the respondent.
CORAM: A.S. CHANDURKAR, J.
DATED: 2 nd MAY, 2016.
ORAL JUDGMENT :
1. The original plaintiff who is aggrieved by the judgment
of the appellate Court reversing the decree passed by the trial
Court for possession has filed the present appeal.
2. Land admeasuring 0.86R (2 acres 5 Gunthas) is the
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subject matter of the present proceedings. According to the
plaintiff, the aforesaid property was in possession of the defendant
as owner thereof. On 13-7-1992, the sale deed in respect of
aforesaid land for consideration of Rs.30,000/- came to be
executed by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff. According to
the plaintiff, as there were standing crops in the said land, the
defendant had requested that the possession of the suit field would
be handed over by 15-12-1992. However, as the defendant did
not hand over possession of the field in question, the plaintiff
issued a notice to the defendant on 05-1-1993. The same was
replied on 14-1-1993 by the defendant in which it was stated that
the suit property was joint family property and the defendant was
not the sole owner of the same. On that basis, the plaintiff on
3-2-1993 filed Regular Civil Suit No.21/1993 for possession of the
suit field along with a prayer for mesne profits.
3. The defendant filed his written statement opposing the
claim as made. He took the plea that the property was ancestral in
nature and belonged to the joint family. The defendant alone did
not have any title to sell the same nor was there any legal necessity
on the part of the defendant to alienate the same. A further plea
was taken that the plaintiff was a money lender doing the business
of money lending without having any license in that regard.
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4. Before the trial Court, the plaintiff examined himself
below Exhibit-17. He also examined two attesting witnesses below
Exhibit-25 and 26 in support of his case. The defendant examined
himself at Exhibit-31 as well as other witnesses below Exhibits 32-
5. The trial Court by its judgment dated 9-1-1995 held
that the defendant had sold the suit property to the plaintiff on
13-7-1992 and hence, had title to the same. It further accepted
the case of the plaintiff that the defendant had refused to hand
over possession of the suit field as agreed. It, therefore, decreed
the suit and also granted damages of Rs.1000/-.
6. In the appeal preferred by the defendant, the first
appellate Court held that the sale deed dated 13-7-1992 did not
give valid title to the plaintiff. It did not accept the evidence led
by the plaintiff and, therefore, allowed the appeal setting aside the
decree passed by the trial Court.
On 10-3-2005, the second appeal came to be dismissed
by holding that the same did not give rise to any substantial
question of law. It upheld the judgment of the first appellate
Court. Being aggrieved, the original plaintiff filed Civil Appeal
No.3039/2008. The Hon'ble Supreme Court by its judgment dated
29-4-2008 observed that the question which was required to be
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decided was whether the transaction in question was an out and
out sale or was a loan transaction. It was held that as the relevant
material had not been considered while dismissing the second
appeal, said order was liable to be set aside. Thus, the order
dismissing the second appeal was set aside and the appeal was
remanded for fresh consideration in accordance with law.
7. After the proceedings were remanded, the following
substantial question of law was framed:
ig Whether the finding of the first appellate Court with
regard to the transaction being one of loan is against the evidence
on record and as such perverse?
8. Shri D. G. Patil, the learned Counsel for the appellant
submitted that the finding recorded by the first appellate Court
that the transaction in question was with regard to a loan given by
the plaintiff to the defendant was not substantiated by any
evidence whatsoever. He submitted that the document dated
13-7-1992 was a registered sale deed at Exhibit-18. According to
him, the said document was voluntarily executed by the defendant
after accepting the consideration of Rs.30,000/-. The transaction
was completed in the presence of the Registrar and the same was
never questioned. According to him, there was no evidence
whatsoever to indicate that the execution of the said document
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was the outcome of a loan transaction. He then submitted that the
sale was executed only in respect of 0.86R land by demarcating
the boundaries. The plea that the mother of the defendant -
Gangubai was also a joint owner of the suit property was raised
only to defeat the claim of the plaintiff. Even if it was assumed that
she had a share in the land, it was to be noted that the total land
admeasured 2H 96R while the sale deed was in respect of only
0.86R. The evidence on record indicated that in the year 1974
itself said Gangubai had sold part of her share of the land by
executing a sale deed. He, therefore, submitted that in absence of
any evidence to indicate that the transaction was a loan
transaction, the appellate Court was not justified in reversing the
decree passed by the trial Court. In any event, it was submitted
that the document in question would bind the defendant to the
extent of his share in the suit land and considering the fact that
only 0.86R land had been sold, the rights of Gangubai would not
be affected. In support of his submissions, he placed reliance on
the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kartar Singh V.
Harjinder Singh and others AIR 1990 SC 854 and Ramdas v. Sitabai
and others (2009) 7 SCC 444. He, therefore, submitted that the
decree passed by the trial Court was liable to be restored.
9. Shri A. V. Bhide, the learned Counsel for the
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respondent on the other hand supported the impugned judgment.
According to him, the defendant was the karta of the joint family
and was not entitled to alienate the land in question in absence of
any legal necessity. He submitted that there was no evidence led
by the plaintiff with regard to the legal necessity on the part of the
defendant to alienate the suit property. No enquires were made by
the plaintiff about the title to the said property. This fact was
admitted by the plaintiff in his cross-examination. He further
submitted that the fact that the possession had not been handed
over after executing the sale deed itself indicates that the
transaction was not one of sale. According to him, the share of
Gangubai could not have been sold by the defendant. By relying
upon the judgment in Muddasani Sarojana v. Muddasani Venkat
Narsaiah and others AIR 2007 AP 50, he submitted that the aspect
regarding delivery of possession was material and in absence
thereof the document at Exhibit-18 could not have been
considered. He also placed reliance on the judgment of the
learned Single Judge in Bhimrao S/o Kondiba Bhosale and others
vs. Ankush S/o Ranganath Khadke and others 2012 (6) Mah.L.J. 88
and the judgment in M/s Uma Kant and Co. Ltd. v. Niranjan Prasad
Mahesh and others AIR 2006 Rajasthan 46.
Without prejudice, it was submitted that even if the
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suit was decreed, the same could have been only to the extent of
the share of the defendant and the decree could not bind
Gangubai. He, therefore, submitted that the appellate Court was
justified in reversing the decree passed by the trial Court.
10. I have heard the respective counsel for the parties at
length and I have given due consideration to their respective
submissions. The document at Exhibit-18 is the sale deed dated
13-7-1992. The stamp paper for the said transaction is shown to
have been purchased by the defendant who had signed thereon.
In the said document, the property sold is described as being
owned by the defendant which was falling in his share. The said
property is also described by giving its boundaries. On the
northern boundary was the land that was belonging to his mother
Gangubai. The sale deed was registered and there were two
attesting witnesses namely Kisan Gopal Agarwal and Samadhan
Satav to the document. In this regard, it is to be noted that the
defendant in his cross examination has accepted his signatures on
the stamp papers as well as the sale deed. He has further admitted
that he had gone to the office of the Registrar to have the sale
deed registered. He was knowing the attesting witnesses as they
were residing in the same village. Both the attesting witnesses -
Kisan Gopal Agarwal and Samadhan Satav were examined by the
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plaintiff. They have deposed about the execution of the document
and payment of the amount of consideration to the defendant.
Aforesaid is the evidence with regard to the manner in
which the document at Exhibit-18 was executed by the defendant.
The ratio of the decision in Maddasani Sarojana (supra) cannot
apply to the present facts in view of the admitted position that the
plaintiff did not receive the possession immediately after execution
of the sale deed.
ig While examining the stand of the defendant that the
document in question was executed by way of security for a loan,
it is to be noted that in the written statement a plea was taken in
para 13 that the plaintiff was a money lender indulging in such
business without having a valid licence. It was pleaded that the
defendant had various transactions with the plaintiff and on each
occasion the amounts borrowed had been returned. The plaintiff
was cross-examined by the defendant wherein the plaintiff has
stated that except the credit granted by him in the grocery shop,
he was not having any transaction with the defendant. In the
evidence led by the defendant, he has stated that he had borrowed
some amount for his daughter's marriage. As he was in need of
some more money and as certain amounts borrowed earlier were
still to be repaid, the document in question came to be executed.
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In his cross-examination, he stated that in April, 1992 an amount
of Rs.2000/- to 3000/- had been borrowed from the plaintiff but
said fact was not pleaded in the written statement. Similarly, the
defendant has examined Jagdeo Khandare and Shama Khandare
who deposed that the plaintiff was having a grocery shop and
certain agricultural fields. It was stated that he was doing money
lending business. In the cross-examination it was suggested to said
witnesses that they were close to the family of the plaintiff. This is
the evidence that is available on record to substantiate the plea of
loan transaction.
12. From the aforesaid, it is clear that the execution of the
sale deed dated 13-7-1992 has not been specifically denied by the
defendant. On the contrary, the defendant has admitted that he
had gone to the office of the Registrar for executing said document
voluntarily. He was acquainted with both the attesting witnesses.
He continued in possession as there were agricultural crops
standing on the land and it is only after notice dated 5-1-1993 that
the stand that the property was joint family property was raised by
the defendant. If this evidence is considered along with the stand
of the defendant that said document was executed as security for a
loan transaction, it is found that there is no substantial evidence
on record to substantiate the same. It was vaguely pleaded in the
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written statement that the plaintiff was a money lender and the
defendant had various transactions with the plaintiff. Except these
pleadings, there is no specific evidence on record led by the
defendant to justify the same. The defendant in his cross-
examination admitted that there were various transactions
between the parties and that he failed to plead about the same in
his written statement. There is no evidence led that the plaintiff
was habitually engaged in the business of money lending and that
he had transactions with various people. In short, there is no
sufficient evidence led by the defendant to indicate that
transaction dated 13-7-1992 was by way of security for a loan.
13. The appellate Court has not recorded any specific
finding in that regard. On the contrary, the appellate Court has
proceeded on the basis that it was likely that the defendant might
have purchased some grocery articles for his daughter's marriage
from the shop of the plaintiff. As the amounts were not repaid,
it was likely that the plaintiff insisted upon him to execute the
document and hence, the defendant might have agreed to execute
such document. These observations can be found in para 7 of the
judgment of the appellate Court. However, in absence of any clear
evidence to indicate the fact that the sale deed dated 13-7-1992
was a document executed as security for loan transaction, such
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finding could not have been recorded. In fact, the appellate Court
has not even recorded a categorical finding that the trial Court had
erroneously came to the conclusion that the transaction was not
one of loan. The appellate Court merely on the basis of surmises
has proceeded to hold that it was likely that the defendant did not
intend to sell the suit land.
14. Even on the aspect of the receipt of consideration of
Rs.30,000/- reference thereto has been made in the document at
Exhibit-18. The defendant in his deposition at Exhibit-31 has not
stated that such amount was never received or that what has been
stated in Exhibit-18 in that regard was incorrect. The plaintiff had
admitted that only the accounts of the grocery shop were
maintained. The appellate Court in para 10 of its judgment has,
however, held otherwise in absence of any evidence whatsoever.
15. As regards the stand of the defendant that his mother
Gangubai also had a share in the suit property, it is to be noted
that the property sold had been demarcated by indicating its
boundaries. Except the plea that the mother of the defendant also
had a share in the land in question, the defendant has not led any
specific evidence to indicate the total properties owned by the joint
family and the respective shares of the family members. The
defendant in his deposition stated that Gat No.512 was
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admeasuring 7 acres 13 gunthas and his mother Gangubai had half
share in said property. Reference was made to the same in 7/12
Extracts in his cross-examination. Revenue records by themselves
cannot be treated as documents of title. Even if it is assumed that
the defendant's mother had half share in the said land which was
admeasuring 7 acres 13 gunthas, it is to be noted that a portion
less than half was sold on 13-7-1992 by the defendant. The land
sold was admeasuring 2 acres and 5 gunthas which is lesser than
half of 7 acres 13 gunthas. Moreover, the portion sold has been
demarcated by giving boundaries and on the northern boundary
the land falling to the share of the defendant's mother was
situated. In this background, therefore, the stand as sought to be
pleaded by the defendant cannot be accepted. Even otherwise as
held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kartarsingh and Ramdas
(supra) to the extent of the share of the defendant, the plaintiff
would be entitled to succeed. However, considering the clear
admission of the defendant that his mother had half share in the
entire Gat No.512 and the portion sold being less than half, the
plaintiff would be entitled for the decree of possession.
The decision in M/s Uma Kant (supra) relied upon by
the learned Counsel for the respondent and the ratio therein
cannot be applied to the facts of the present case especially when
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the land sold is less than the total of the entire land which was
stated to be owned by two persons. Similarly, the decision in
Bhimrao Bhosale (supra) on the aspect of burden to prove legal
necessity cannot assist the defendant in absence of any factual
foundation.
16. In view of aforesaid discussion, the substantial
question of law as framed is answered by holding that the finding
of the first appellate Court that the transaction in question was one
of loan is against the evidence on record and hence perverse.
Hence, the judgment dated 17-7-2002 passed in Regular Civil
Appeal No.37/1995 is set aside. The judgment dated 9-1-1995 in
Regular Civil Suit No.21 of 1993 stands restored. The second
appeal is allowed in aforesaid terms with no order as to costs.
JUDGE
//MULEY//
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