Smt. Alka Chandewar vs Shamshul Ishrar Khan
2015 Latest Caselaw 474 Bom

                                                                                906-cp-102-2015.doc


                    IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                            CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION




                                                                                         
                           CONTEMPT PETITION NO.102 OF 2015




                                                                 
                Smt. Alka Chandewar                              ...  Petitioner
                     vs.
                Shamshul Ishrar Khan                             ...  Respondent




                                                                
                Mr. Vivek Walawalkar a/w. Mr. S.R. Bhalekar and Mr. S.R. Ingale 
                i/b. Mr. Sameer Bhalekar, Advocate for the Petitioner.
                Ms. Rajani Iyer, Senior Advocate i/b. Mr. Abhay Mahimkar, 




                                                   
                Advocate for the Respondent.                                 
                                       
                             CORAM: MRS. MRIDULA BHATKAR, J.
                      JUDGMENT RESERVED ON : 6th OCTOBER, 2015
                                      
                JUDGEMENT PRONOUNCED ON : 27th OCTOBER, 2015 


         JUDGMENT

. This Contempt Petition is filed on the basis of the

arbitration order dated 5th May, 2014 passed by the Sole Arbitrator

under Section 27 (5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

(hereinafter referred as "the Act").

2. The arbitration proceedings was filed before the Arbitrator

vide Arbitration Application No. 80 of 2010 for dissolution of the

partnership and the assets and share in the partnership. The Vishal

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Petitioner and the Respondent were the partners and a Power of

Attorney was given to the ex-husband of the Petitioner who has

allegedly committed the fraud and forgery in respect of sending letter

of dissolution of the partnership on behalf of the Petitioner. The

Petitioner subsequently divorced her husband who was the Power of

Attorney of the firm. The Petitioner thereafter filed the proceedings

for her share before the Arbitrator against the Respondent. The

learned Arbitrator has passed the interim order on 7th October, 2010

directing that the Respondent shall not dispose of the Flats. However,

the Respondent entered into the registered agreement of sale in

respect of five Flats in the said buildings on 14 th October, 2010. Thus

the order dated 7th October, 2010 was violated. Thereafter, the

Petitioner moved an application No. "C-1" for demanding the

documents and the accounts for the last 10 years from the

Respondent and also filed the interim application No. "C-2" before the

Tribunal for the appointment of Court Receiver to protect the Flats in

one of the buildings constructed by the partnership firm. While

deciding these applications, the Tribunal by its order dated 26 th

March, 2012 has directed the Respondent in operative clause (v) not

to dispose off/ transfer/ alienate or create any encumbrance in

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respect of the unsold flats in the above building namely 'Sarla-Sadan'.

It also directed the Respondent to furnish the bank guarantee in

favour of the claimant to the tune of Rs. 1.25 Crore. However, that

order of the Tribunal was not complied and the Respondent violated

the said order.

3. The Petitioner moved an application before the Tribunal

for reporting contempt to the High Court of the orders dated 7 th

October, 2010 and 26th March, 2012 and also prayed to strike off the

defence filed by the Respondent. This application was moved on 19 th

November, 2013. In the said application, the Respondent appeared

and defended its act. However, the Tribunal rejected the defence of

the Respondent and held that Respondent had committed willful

disobedience of the Tribunal's order dated 26th March, 2012 and held

that it may deem appropriate to take necessary action under Section

27(5) of the said Act.

4. While hearing the Petition following issues were arose:

(i) Whether the interim order passed by the Tribunal under

Section 17 can be covered under Section 27(5) of the Act.

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(ii) Considering the scope of Section 27(5) of the Act,

whether all orders passed by the Arbitral Tribunal can be

covered under the Contempt of Court Act.

5. The learned counsel for the Petitioner has submitted that

the reference is made by the Tribunal as the Tribunal himself was

convinced that his interim order directing the Respondent not to

dispose of the property was violated. Thus, it is a willful disobedience

of the interim order of the Tribunal by the Respondent. He submitted

that as on today though the award is passed by the learned Arbitrator,

at the time of making representation to this Court the interim order

was violated and therefore the reference was rightly made. He relied

on para 6 of the Petition to show that five Flats were transferred by

the Respondent in utter violation of the interim order dated 7 th

October, 2010. He pointed out that for all the five Flats a registered

agreement of sale was executed on 14th October, 2010 with intention

to commit breach of the order which was passed only seven days

earlier. No permission of the Tribunal was sought before disposing of

the said property.

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6. While meeting on the point of maintainability of the order

made by the Tribunal under Section 27(5) of the Act, the learned

counsel for the Petitioner has argued that Section 27(5) of the Act is

the only section available to the Tribunal to seek the assistance of the

Court in the event of the contempt committed by the person during

the arbitral proceedings. The learned counsel also referred Section 43

of the old Arbitration and Conciliation Act which was similar to

Section 27(5) of the new Act. He submitted that under Section 43 of

the old Act, the phrase used is "Parties and Witnesses". This phrase is

changed in Section 27 by using one common word "Person", which

obviously includes both. On this interpretation and application of

27(5) of the Act, he relied on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court

in the case of "Delta Distilleries Limited vs. United Spirits Limited

and Another1. He further pointed out that in the case of "Union of

India vs. M/s. Bhatia Tanning Industries, Kanpur 2, a view was

taken in respect of Section 43 of the earlier Act that the Section is

confined to witnesses and witnesses alone summoned for appearance

before the Arbitrator. He elaborated that the said judgment is referred

and discussed in the case of Delta Distilleries Limited (supra) and the

1. 2014 AIR (SC) 113.

2. AIR 1986 DELHI 195.

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Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the word "Person" includes the

"parties" and so also the "witnesses". He relied on the judgment of

Bombay High Court in the cases of "Anuptech Equipments Private

Limited vs. M/s. Ganpati Co-op. Housing Society Limited and

Others3 and Maharashtra State Electricity Board vs. Datar

Switchgear Limited"4.

7. The learned counsel submitted that in the case of "Vimal

Madhukar Wasnik (Dr.), Nagpur vs. Sole Arbitrator" 6 the Division

Bench of the Bombay High Court has referred to the earlier judgment

of "Anuptech Equipments Private Limited" (supra) in which one of

them was a party. The Division Bench has mentioned that in the case

of "Anuptech Equipments Private Limited" (supra), it went unnoticed

that under Section 27(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,

1996, if a person is guilty of any contempt of Arbitral Tribunal during

the conduct of arbitral proceedings, such person shall be subject to

the like, disadvantages, penalties and punishments by order of the

Court on the representation of the Arbitral Tribunal as they would

3. 1992(2) Bom. C.R. 331.

4. 2003(2) Bom. C.R. 81.

6. 2006(1) Bom. C.R. 419.

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incur for the like offences in suits tried before the Court.

8. The learned counsel for the Petitioner placed heavy

reliance on the judgment Delhi High Court in the case of "Sri Krishan

vs. Anand"5. In the said case, learned Judge was dealing with the

scope and powers under Section 9 and 17 of the Act. Due to non

enforceability of the orders passed under Section 17 of the Act, the

parties take steps under Section 9 of the Act before the Court.

However, the learned Judge held that the Section 17 can not be

rendered otiose and redundant, but it would open floodgates under

Section 9 of the Act. The Section 17 of the Act derives the powers of

enforceability from Section 5 of the Act and he held that making any

other default or being guilty of any contempt of the arbitral tribunal

during the conduct of the proceedings are applicable to any

proceedings including the interim order passed under Section 17 of

the Act.

9. It is held as follows :

"Section 27(5) was not noticed in Sundaram Finance Ltd. or in Sumangal Services Pvt. Ltd. (supra). Perhaps, because

5. Decided on 18th August, 2009 in OMP.No. 597/2008.

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it is hedged in the heading/title of Section 27. However, the said heading/title cannot limit or narrow the otherwise

wide amplitude of sub-section (5) thereof. The default, contempt mentioned therein cannot be limited to that only

in appearance of witnesses before the arbitral tribunal. To do so, would be to render the words "any other default"

and "guilty of any contempt" therein otiose. It may be highlighted that under Section 37(2)(b) of the Act the order of the arbitral tribunal under section 17 of the Act

granting or refusing to grant an interim measure is

appeable before the Court. The same also discloses the legislative intent of the same being in the exercise of the

judicial functions."

It is held that the parties who choose to seek the relief under Section

17 of the Act are not entitled to seek same relief from the Court under

Section 9 of the Act and the multiplicity of the proceedings is to be

avoided in all causes.

10. Thus, the learned counsel for the Petitioner has submitted

that the Tribunal has rightly made representation to the High Court

under Section 27 (5) of the Act and asked to pass the orders on

contempt committed by the Respondent in the arbitral proceedings.

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11. The learned senior counsel Ms. Rajani Iyer for the

Respondent has argued that the Petitioner has no case. This Contempt

Petition should be set aside on following grounds :

a) There is no order against which the contempt should lie.

b) There is no breach of any order of the Court for which the

powers under the Contempt of Court Act to be invoked.

c) Assuming there is contempt of the impugned order of the

Tribunal, it is beyond limitation.

12. The learned senior counsel Ms. Rajani Iyer has submitted

that the arbitral Tribunal is not a Court. This Court has to satisfied be

independently on the issue of commission of contempt by the

contemnor. She submitted that the final award is granted by the

arbitrator giving direction to the Respondent to pay Rs. 8 Crores as

full and final satisfaction to the Petitioner. She further submitted that

it was a partnership firm and the husband of the Petitioner was the

Power of Attorney holder whose signatures are appearing on the said

registered sale deeds. Though the Respondent had signed it, the

documents were got executed by the Power of Attorney and not by

the Respondent and these agreements which are produced here were

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not produced before the Arbitrator. She further submitted that under

Section 27(5) of the Act, said representation can not be made for the

violation of any interim order passed by the arbitrator because the

section pertains to the contempt in respect of taking evidence. She

relied on Section 43 of the earlier Act. She further relied on the

Markanda's commentary on Section 43 of the Act. She submitted that

if Section 27 is read over as a whole, it clearly shows that it pertains

to the steps taken in the recording of evidence and for that purpose

the assistance of the Court can be obtained if the order of the

Arbitrator is violated. She submitted that the sole purpose of Sections

43 and 27 is to ensure service or process upon the witnesses whom

the Arbitrator desires to examine. She submitted that the order passed

under Section 27 of the Act is neither a decision nor an order which

can be challenged under Section 34 of the Act. She further argued

that on these grounds, this Petition should fail.

13. The representation in the present matter is made under

Section 27(5) of the Act. Therefore, the scope of Section 27(5) of the

Act goes to the root of the matter. Section 27 reads as follows :

Section 27 : Court assistance in taking evidence -

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(1) The arbitral tribunal, or a party with the approval of the arbitral tribunal, may apply to the Court for assistance in

taking evidence.

(2) The application shall specify :-- (a) the names and

addresses of the parties and the arbitrators; (b) the general nature of the claim and the relief sought; (c) the evidence to be obtained, in particular, (i) the name and address of any

person to be heard as witness or expert witness and a statement of the subject-matter of the testimony required; (ii)

the description of any document to be produced or property to be inspected.

(3) The Court may, within its competence and according to its rules on taking evidence, execute the request by ordering

that the evidence be provided directly to the arbitral tribunal. (4) The Court may, while making an order under sub-section (3), issue the same processes to witnesses as it may issue in

suits tried before it.

(5) Persons failing to attend in accordance with such process, or making any other default, or refusing to give their

evidence, or guilty of any contempt to the arbitral tribunal during the conduct of arbitral proceedings, shall be subject to the like disadvantages, penalties and punishments by order of the Court on the representation of the arbitral tribunal as

they would incur for the like offences in suits tried before the Court.

(6) In this section the expression "Processes" includes summonses and commissions for the examination of witnesses and summonses to produce documents.

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Section 27 is included in Chapter V of the Act which deals with the

conduct of the arbitral proceedings comprising from Section 18 to

Section 27 of the Act. Under Section 17 of the Act, the arbitral

Tribunal has powers to pass interim measures. The Section 9 is also

regarding the powers to pass the interim measures. However, the

powers under Section 9 of the Act vest with the Court and not with

the Arbitrator. Thus, Section 9 and 17 give powers to issue interim

orders/measures, to different fora i.e. the Court and the Arbitrator.

This fact itself indicates that the arbitral Tribunal is not a Court but it

is altogether a different entity. It is a creature of contract between the

parties. Its functions are not judicial functions. The Contempt of

Courts Act is applicable to the breach or the violation of the orders of

the Court and pertains to the Civil or Criminal contempt which is

defined under the Contempt of Courts Act committed by the parties

causing interference in the judicial proceedings.

14. Though the Court is not separately defined under the

Contempt of Courts Act, it is considered as a "Court" within the

meaning of the Court defined under Section 2(e) of the Arbitration

and Conciliation Act, 1996. Under Section 2(d) of the Act, the

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"Arbitral Tribunal" is defined as "a sole arbitrator or a panel of

arbitrators". Under Section 2(e) of the Act, a "Court" is defined as

follows :

Sec.2(e): "Court" means the principal civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in

exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject-matter of a

suit, but does not include any civil Court of a grade inferior to such principal civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes".

Thus, this clearly shows that Arbitral Tribunal is not a Court and thus

meaning of the Court for the purpose of contempt of Courts Act is to

be restricted the definition of Court under Section 2(e) of the Act

stricto-sensu and therefore the violation of the orders of Arbitrator

unless it is specified can not be subjected under the Contempt of

Courts Act.

15. The arbitration is an alternative forum for redressal of the

dispute between the parties and therefore the procedure before the

Tribunal should not be tardy and complex. The work of the Arbitrator

should not get involved in the procedural wrangles but should be

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quick and smooth and result oriented. Therefore, it appears that no

provision of appeal/revision is available to the parties though the

interim measures/orders by the arbitration Tribunal under Section 17

are violated by either of the parties.

16. Obviously Section 17 of the Act comes into effect after the

formation of the arbitral Tribunal. However, recourse to Section 9 of

the Act can be taken by the parties pre and post arbitration. Keeping

this in view, the procedure under Chapter IV is to be examined. The

Section 17 of the Act is the source of the power of the arbitral

Tribunal to pass interim measures. However, it is not included in

Chapter V which is for the "conduct of arbitral proceedings.

17. The scheme of the Chapter V which is under the caption of

conduct of arbitral proceedings indicates that it is mainly on the

determination of the rules and proceedings of the arbitration, place of

sitting, recording the statement of claimant and defence, commencing

of hearing and written proceedings. The Section 25 of the Act is in

respect of default of the party wherein it is mentioned that if claimant

fails to communicate his statement of claim then the arbitral Tribunal

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shall determine the proceedings and when Respondent fails to

communicate his statement of defence, then Tribunal shall continue

the proceedings. However, there is a rider that failure should not be

teated as an default of the allegations by the Respondent and if the

party fails to appear or produce documentary evidence, the arbitral

Tribunal may continue the proceedings and make the Tribunal award

on the evidence before it. Under Section 26 of the Act, the Tribunal

has power to appoint an expert. Section 27 of he Act enables the

arbitral Tribunal or a party to apply to the Court for assistance while

taking the evidence. Section 27 is divided into 6 sub sections and they

all pertain to the process of recording evidence and a party failing to

attend or refuse to give evidence. Sub section 5 lays down different

circumstances wherein the penalty and the punishment by the order

of the Court can be imposed on such persons which are available to

the Court while trying the suit. As per sub Section 5 of the Act, the

circumstances are as follows :

(1) Persons failing to attend in accordance with such process OR

(2) Making any other default OR

(3) Refusing to give their evidence OR

(4) Guilty of any contempt to the arbitral tribunal during the conduct

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of arbitral proceedings.

Thus these are the four circumstances for which the representation

can be made by the Tribunal to the Court and the assistance of the

Court can be sought to facilitate its working effectively.

18. As per the submissions of the learned counsel Mr.

Walawalkar the Tribunal is empowered to take action under the last

clause which states that the person who is guilty of any contempt of

the arbitral Tribunal can be subjected to the representation by the

Tribunal before the Court. Much emphasis is given to the words "any

contempt" and "during the conduct of arbitral proceedings". It was

argued that the words "any contempt" includes disobedience or non

compliance of interim orders passed by the Tribunal including the

interim measures/orders passed under Section 17 of the Act. It was

also argued that the said clause states about such contempt during

the arbitral proceedings. In support of his submissions, he placed

heavy reliance on the judgment of Delhi High Court in the case of Sri

Krishan vs. Anand (supra). Rather the submissions of learned counsel

are entirely based on the view taken by a single judge of the Delhi

High Court while interpreting Section 27(5) of the Act. The learned

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Judge was to decide the legality of the orders sought under Section 9

of the Act before the Court when such reliefs are already sought and

obtained from the arbitral Tribunal. While dealing with the said issue,

the learned Judge has refused to accept that Section 17 is a toothless

section as there is no remedy provided under the Act in the event of

its non compliance and therefore he laid down the ratio that the

Section is hedged in the heading/title i.e. the Court assistance in

taking evidence and therefore it is not to be given a narrow meaning.

19. With due respect to the single Judge of the Delhi High

Court, I am not in agreement on the point of the interpretation of the

said Section. To examine the language of the statute and to give its

natural meaning is an appropriate way to interpret it. So also each

word used by the legislature carries a particular meaning which can

not be overlooked as even a coma in the statute is not redundant but

speaks volumes.

20. Section 27 of the Act pertains to seeking assistance of the

Court in taking evidence. Though while understanding the section the

meaning should not be confined to its heading, the clause in the said

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section can not be read in isolation or independently without taking

into account context and the flow of the said section. Sub sections 1,

2 and 3 state about taking of evidence, calling the witnesses,

production of documents and property for inspection and the Courts

power to pass the orders accordingly. Sub section 4 of the Section 27

of the Act gives power to the Court to issue process to the witnesses

which are similar to its powers to issue in suits tried before it. Sub

section 5 of Section 27 of the Act is the key section, the contents of

which are discussed above. In all the three sub clauses in sub section

5 of Section 27 of the Act state about the evidence and sub clause 4

which is a subject of the interpretation of the order states about

committing contempt during the conduct of arbitral proceedings. Sub

section 6 of Section 27 gives meaning of the expression 'process'

which is used in sub sections as it includes summons and commission

for examination of witnesses and summons to produce the

documents. Thus, the word 'process' used in sub Section 5 and 4 is

limited to the meaning in sub Section 6 only. It supports that under

sub clause 4 of sub Section 5 'guilty of any contempt' can not be

understood that any act for breach or violation of any order of the

Tribunal, the assistance of the Court can be sought by the Arbitrator.

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21. I would like to highlight the term that the legislature has

used "during the conduct of arbitral proceedings". The phrase "guilty of

any contempt of arbitral Tribunal during the arbitral proceedings" is not

used. A specific term used is "during the conduct of arbitral

proceedings" (emphasis placed).

22. Sections 18 to 27 of the Act constitute a group which is

covered under the conduct of arbitral proceedings. The same phrase is

repeated in clause 4 of sub section 5 of the said Section. Therefore, it

is not the contempt committed by a person during the period of entire

arbitral proceedings, but it is restricted to the contempt during the

'conduct' of arbitral proceedings which is necessarily limited to

Section 18 to 27.

23. A question can be put to oneself whether issuing interim

orders is not a part of arbitral proceedings ? The answer is 'Yes'.

However, the next question can be asked whether issuing interim

orders is a part of 'conduct' of arbitral proceedings ? The answer is

'No'. Sections 16 and 17 of the Act are covered under Chapter IV

which is captioned the "jurisdiction of the arbitral Tribunal". Thus

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Section 17 is the source of power of the Tribunal to pass the interim

orders/measures. The word "conduct" under the Chapter V connotes

a limited specific meaning and that is applicable to proceedings under

Sections 18 to 27.

24. It can be understood better if Section 25 of the Act is

examined. The Section 25 of the Act is also in respect of default of a

party though it is covered under the 'conduct' of the arbitral

proceedings. However, it is not a contempt to the arbitral Tribunal.

Under Section 25 of the Act, the consequences of the default are

mentioned and which does not empower the Tribunal to make

representation of any such default in communication of the

submission and defence to other party. The clause 4 in sub Section 5

is for making any other default for which the assistance of the Court

can be taken. Thus, if the said clause is compared with Section 25

things became more clear. The default contemplated under sub

Section 5 is a default pertaining to violating the order in respect of

taking evidence and the default under Section 25 of the Act is not in

respect of taking evidence though it is covered under conduct of

arbitral proceedings. The word 'conduct' in legal proceedings means

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to take steps. It signals Court's power to decide and to move. Thus by

use of the word 'conduct' in sub clause 4 of sub Section 5 of Section

27 of the Act, the legislature has restricted its meaning to taking of

evidence only and not any other contempt in arbitral proceedings.

25. The Supreme Court in the case of "Delta Distilleries

Limited" has held in para 19 and 20 as under:

Para 19: "As soon from these two sections, Section 25(c)

provides that in the event a party fails to appear at an oral hearing or to produce documentary evidence, the

arbitral tribunal may continue the proceedings and make the arbitral award on the evidence before it. This

evidence can be sought either from any third person or

from a party to the proceedings itself. The substitution of he phrase "parties and witnesses" under Section 43 of the earlier act by the phrase any person cannot make any

difference, or cannot be read whittle down the powers of the Arbitral Tribunal to seek assistance from the Court where any person who is not cooperating with the

Arbitral Tribunal or where any evidence is required from any person, be it a party to the proceedings or others. It is an enabling provision, and it has to be read as such. The term any person appearing under Section 27(2)(c) is wide enough to cover not merely the witnesses, but also

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the parties to the proceedings. It is undoubtedly clear that if a party fails to appear before the Arbitral Tribunal,

the Tribunal can proceed ex-parte, as provided under Section 25(c). At the same time, it cannot be ignored

that the Tribunal is required to make an award on the merits of the claim placed before it. For that purpose, if

any evidence becomes necessary, the Tribunal ought to have the power to get the evidence, and it is for this purpose only that this enabling section has been

provided.

Para 20: "The learned Judge seems to have been misled

by the expression parties appearing in section 43. The word parties is used in the sense where the party itself is desired to be examined as a witness by the arbitrator or

umpire. The expression witnesses used along with the

word parties makes the meaning of the legislature abundantly clear. The principle of construction is that

words of the same feather flock together."

Thus there is no ambiguity that the word "Person" includes "parties as

well as witnesses". The submissions of the learned counsel for the

Petitioner to that extent are correct.

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26. In the case of Anuptech Equipments Private Limited

(supra), the learned single judge was dealing with the issue of

distinction between final award and an order under Section 25(1)(a)

and under Section 32(2) the termination of the arbitral proceedings.

So also the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution or Article

227 as the power of superintendence of this Court over Tribunals.

Incidentally the Court observed that if the interim relief is rejected by

the Tribunal then the Appeal can be preferred under Section 37

before the Court and it can be referred under Section 27(5) of the

said Act is having the power for the punishment for the contempt of

the Tribunal. However, in the judgment of "Anuptech Equipments

Private Limited" there is no ratio laid down in respect of Section

27(5) of the said Act. Hence, it is not useful to the Petitioner.

27. In the judgment of Vimal Madhukar Wasnik (supra), the

main issue before the Division Bench was not the scope Section 27(5)

of the Act but it was in respect of the exercise of extraordinary

jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India over the

order passed by the learned Arbitrator. In the case of Vimal Madhukar

Wasnik (supra), it mainly dealt with the powers of the High Court in

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writ jurisdiction over the orders passed by the Tribunal. Therefore,

passing reference or observation of the Division Bench can not be said

as the ratio laid down by the Bench on scope of Section 27(5) of the

Act. In the case of Anuptech Equipments (supra), it is held that when

there is no remedy under Section 37 or 34 of the Act of 1996 in which

case only the extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court will be invoked.

28. In the case of Datar Switchgear Limited (supra) the

learned judge held that the power of the Court under Section 9 of the

Act is wider than that of Arbitration Tribunal under Section 17 and

Court can exercise the same prior to and even after the proceedings

are initiated. The ratio laid down in the case of "Datar Switchgear

Limited" is also thus not useful to the Petitioner.

29. In view of the above discussion, Section 27(5) of the

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 does not empower the Tribunal

to make representation to the Court for contempt if the orders

including the interim orders passed by the Arbitrator except in respect

of taking evidence are violated by the party. The Contempt Petition

being the representation made by the Tribunal is beyond the period of

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limitation and is not maintainable in law. Moreover, the final award of

Rs. 8 Crores is granted in favour of the Petitioner by the Arbitrator.

30. Thus, Contempt Petition is not maintainable in law, hence

dismissed.

(MRS.MRIDULA BHATKAR, J.)

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