Citation : 2015 Latest Caselaw 439 Bom
Judgement Date : 16 October, 2015
WP2086.15.doc
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO.2086 OF 2015
Sherwood Resorts Pvt.Ltd. and another ... Petitioners
v/s
State of Maharashtra and others ... Respondents
Mr Praful Joshi with Ms Karen Sequeira i/b M/s Hariani and Co. for
Petitioners.
Mr B.B. Sharma, AGP for Respondent No.1 - State.
Mr Nilesh Rikame for Respondent No.2.
CORAM: S.C. DHARMADHIKARI & B.P. COLABAWALLA JJ.
Reserved on : 29th September, 2015.
Pronounced on : 16th October, 2015.
JUDGMENT [ Per B. P. Colabawalla, J ]:-
1. Rule. Respondents waive service. By consent of parties,
Rule made returnable forthwith and heard finally.
2. By this Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, the Petitioners challenge the legality and validity of the
attachment order dated 29th April, 2013 but signed on 2nd May,
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2013 (for short, the "impugned attachment order") (Exh 'Q' to
the Petition), passed by the Sale Tax Authorities. The attachment
was levied on an immovable property purchased by the Petitioners
pursuant to an auction conducted by Respondent No.2 - SICOM
under the provisions of the Securitization and Reconstruction of
Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002
(for short, the "SARFAESI Act"). Petitioner No.1 is a Company
incorporated and registered under the provisions of the Companies
Act, 1956 and Petitioner No.2 is its shareholder. It is the case of the
Petitioners that the impugned attachment order was passed by
Respondent No.5 (Sales Tax officer, C-008, VAT Recovery, Raigad
Division, Belapur, Navi Mumbai), after the said property was
purchased by the Petitioners for valuable consideration and
without any notice of the alleged charge of the Sale Tax Authorities,
which they now seek to enforce against the said property.
3. It is the case of the Petitioners that one M/s. Iccon Oil
and Specialties Ltd (for short, "Iccon Oil") was the owner of an
immovable property consisting of land and factory buildings, other
structures and plant and machinery, situate at Plot No.1, Survey
No.59 (Part) of Village Honad, at Takai - Adhoshi Road, Taluka
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Khalapur, District Raigad, area of plot admeasuring approximately
10,790 sq.mtrs. and built up area thereon admeasuring 10,552.31
sq.ft. (hereinafter referred to as the "secured property"). The said
Iccon Oil was also a debtor of Respondent No.2 - SICOM. To recover
its dues from Iccon Oil, Respondent No.2 conducted an auction of
the secured property under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act. In
this auction, the Petitioners were the highest bidder and the sale
was accordingly confirmed in their favour. It is in these
circumstances that the Petitioners claim to be the owners of the
secured property.
4. It appears that Iccon Oil, apart from being a debtor of
Respondent No.2, was also in arrears of its Sales Tax dues to the
tune of Rs.2,77,72,073/-. To recover these arrears, Respondent
No.5 passed the impugned attachment order, attaching the secured
property. As stated earlier, it is the case of the Petitioners that
when they purchased the secured property, they had no notice of
the purported charge / claim of the Sales Tax Authorities in the
sum of Rs.2,77,72,073/-. It is in these circumstances that the
Petitioners challenge the legality and validity of the impugned
attachment order (Exh.'Q' to the Petition), on the ground that the
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same is arbitrary, illegal and without jurisdiction.
5. The contesting Respondents in this Writ Petition are
Respondent Nos.1, 3, 4 & 5. Respondent No.1 is the State of
Maharashtra and Respondent Nos.3 to 5 are high ranking officials
of the Sales Tax Department. Respondent No.6 is the Official
Liquidator of the erstwhile Iccon Oil that has been ordered to be
wound up pursuant to an order dated 18th March, 2015 passed by
this Court in Company Petition No.653 of 2013. Respondent No.7 is
the Tahsildar of Taluka Khalapur, District Raigad and Respondent
No.8 is the Talathi, Honad, Taluka Khalapur.
6. It is the case of the Petitioners that on the secured
property, the said Iccon Oil carried on its business as a
manufacturer of lubricating and other oils, petroleum products,
petro-chemicals etc. During the course of its business, Iccon Oil
obtained financial assistance from banks like Central Bank of India,
Union Bank of India and State Bank of Indore (now merged in State
Bank of India). Such assistance was obtained inter alia against
security of its immovable and movable property, including plant
and machineries. Since Iccon Oil did not pay its dues to the banks,
on 8th October 2003, Central Bank of India issued a notice under
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section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act calling upon Iccon Oil to repay
an amount of Rs.12,05,77,541/- as on 14th March, 2001. As Iccon
Oil failed to comply, a notice was published in the newspapers on
17th April, 2004 notifying that Central Bank of India had taken over
possession of the secured property under the provisions of the
SARFAESI Act.
7. Thereafter, by a Deed of Assignment dated 31st March
2010, Respondent No.2 - SICOM inter alia acquired all the right,
title and interest arising out of the loan disbursed by the said
Central Bank of India to Iccon Oil, alongwith the assignment of the
secured property. Therefore, by virtue of this Deed of Assignment,
Iccon Oil became the debtor of Respondent No.2.
8. Since Iccon Oil did not honour its debt, under the
provisions of the SARFAESI Act, Respondent No.2 sought to enforce
its security by sale of the secured property. Accordingly, on 9th
December, 2011 Respondent No.2 published a sale notice which
was followed by another sale notice on 28th December, 2011. These
sale notices were challenged by Iccon Oil in the Debt Recovery
Tribunal (DRT), as well as the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal
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(DRAT), without any success.
9. Since the said challenge failed, Respondent No.2 once
again issued a sale notice on 25th August, 2012 under the
provisions of the SARFAESI Act, inviting offers in respect of the
secured property on an "as is where is" and "as is what is" basis.
The Petitioners, being desirous of purchasing the secured property,
bid in the public auction held on 10th September, 2012 and offered a
consideration of Rs.2,21,50,000/-. This offer was subsequently
revised on 21st February, 2013 to Rs.2,65,00,000/-.
10. On 15th March 2013, Respondent No.2 was pleased to
accept this offer of the Petitioners and accordingly, the Petitioners
made payment of the full sale consideration of Rs.2,65,00,000/- on
21st March 2013. On 1st April 2013, Respondent No.2 confirmed
receipt of the entire sale consideration and requested the
Petitioners to proceed with the execution of the sale certificate.
11. It is the case of the Petitioners that prior to purchasing
the secured property, the Petitioners undertook a complete title due
diligence and obtained a 7/12 extract dated 15th May, 2012
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(Exh.'G' to the Petition) in respect of the secured property which
recorded the name of Iccon Oil as the owner. The "other rights
column" of the 7/12 extract recorded that one District Industries
Centre, Raigad had a charge on the secured property in the sum of
Rs.4,30,601/-. In the said 7/12 extract, no charge of the Sales Tax
Authorities was reflected at that time. It was in these
circumstances that the Petitioners decided to bid for the secured
property. It is the further case of the Petitioners that even after the
sale of the secured property was confirmed in its favour, they once
again obtained another 7/12 extract dated 12th April, 2013 (Exh 'L'
to the Petition) which also did not reflect the purported charge of
the Sale Tax Authorities in the sum of Rs.2,77,72,073/-.
12. As stated earlier, after the entire sale consideration of
Rs.2,65,00,000/- was paid, the Petitioners were requested to
proceed with the execution of the sale certificate. It is the case of
the Petitioners that the only reason the Petitioners could not obtain
registration of the Sale Certificate is on account of the excessive
stamp duty demanded by the registering authority by taking into
account the alleged arrears of sales tax dues of Iccon Oil, in addition
to the consideration paid (of Rs.2,65,00,000/-) by the Petitioners to
Respondent No.2. It is in this light that the Petitioners once again
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applied for and obtained the latest 7/12 extract dated 9th January,
2014 in respect of the secured property. It is at this time that they
were shocked and surprised to note that now the said 7/12 extract
showed an additional entry. Now, apart from the earlier charge of
Rs.4,30,601/- of the District Industries Centre, Raigad, for the first
time, the said 7/12 extract also reflected a charge of
Rs.2,77,72,073/- of the Sales Tax Authorities. This was duly
brought to the notice of Respondent No.2 and Respondent No.2 was
informed that this charge of the Sales Tax Authorities in the sum of
Rs.2,77,72,073/- was not reflected in the 7/12 extract when they
purchased the secured property from Respondent No.2. Thereafter,
it is stated in the Petition that the Petitioners have obtained
physical possession of the secured property with the help of Police
Officials of Khopoli Police Station on 3rd April, 2014. This is how
they claim to be in possession as well as the owners of the secured
property.
13. As mentioned earlier, an order of attachment dated 29th
April, 2013 but signed on 2nd May, 2013 (Exh 'Q' to the Petition)
was passed by Respondent No.5 attaching the secured property for
recovery of the outstanding dues of the Sales Tax Authorities.
These dues of M/s Iccon Oil (in the sum of Rs.2,77,72,073/-) were
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for the periods 1999-2000, 2001-2002 and 2002-2003.
Accordingly, by a letter dated 22nd May 2013, Respondent No.7
(Tahasildar, Khalapur) enclosed a copy of the said order of
attachment and directed Respondent No.8 to take further
necessary action to record the charge of the Sales Tax Authorities
in the sum of Rs.2,77,72,073/-. After the Petitioners obtained
possession of the secured property, on 7th April 2014, a visit was
paid by the Sales Tax Inspectors to the place of business of Iccon Oil
for recovery of the sales tax dues. At this time, the Sales Tax
Inspectors learnt that the secured property had been sold by
Respondent No.2 and the same was in possession of the Petitioners.
This was duly recorded by the Sales Tax Inspectors in their
submission which is annexed at Exh. 'P' to the Petition.
14. Be that as it may, in furtherance of recovering the Sale
Tax dues, on 20th June 2014, Respondent No.3 (Commissioner of
Sales Tax, VAT, Admin.) issued a notice under section 62A of the
Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959 to Respondent No.2 (with a copy
marked to the Petitioners) inter alia alleging that though the
secured property was attached by the Sales Tax Authorities way
back in April 2013, Respondent No.2 had sold the same to the
Petitioners and that the said transfer being an intent to defraud the
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revenue, there was reason to believe that the transfer by
Respondent No.2 was void under section 62A of the Bombay Sales
Tax Act, 1959.
15. In view of the aforesaid notice, the Petitioners attended
the hearing in the Office of Respondent No.3 on 15th July, 2014 and
submitted their written submissions inter alia stating that the
notice issued was completely illegal and unsustainable in law. It
was submitted that the purported new charge of Rs.2,77,72,073/-
was recorded in the 7/12 extract of the secured property only after
22nd May 2013, while the Petitioners had bonafide purchased the
same by paying the full consideration to Respondent No.2 on 21st
March 2013, without any knowledge of the alleged encumbrance of
the Sales Tax Authorities. At that time, the only encumbrance
recorded in the 7/12 extract was a sum of Rs.4,34,601/- due to
District Industries Centre, Raigad. It is important to note that in
the written submissions filed by the Petitioners, they also intimated
the Sales Tax Authorities that the said defaulter M/s Iccon Oil was
already functioning at another address duly registered under the
Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act, 2002.
16. Thereafter, the Petitioners, through their Advocates
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and Solicitors, also addressed a letter dated 22nd June 2015 to
Respondent No.5 calling upon him to direct the Office of the
Respondent No.7 to withdraw / cancel the alleged charge of the
Sales Tax Authorities and submit a copy of the written
communication to the Petitioners within 7 days of receipt of the
said letter. No action was taken on this letter and neither has the
impugned order of attachment been lifted and / or cancelled. It is in
these circumstances that the Petitioners have approached us inter
alia praying that the impugned order of attachment be quashed and
set aside.
17. For the sake of completeness, we must mention here
that apart from taking action under the provisions of the SARFAESI
Act, Respondent No.2 also initiated winding up proceedings against
Iccon Oil, by filing Company Petition No.653 of 2013 in this Hon'ble
Court. In the said Company Petition, on or about 18th November,
2014 Respondent No.5 herein (Sales Tax Officer, C008) filed
Company Application (L) No.603 of 2014 praying that this Court be
pleased to direct Iccon Oil to settle the dues of the Sales Tax
Authorities amounting to Rs.2,77,73,073/-. Thereafter, Company
Petition No.653 of 2013 as well as Company Application (L) No.603
of 2014 were disposed of by two separate orders, both dated 18th
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March, 2015. By the order passed in the Company Petition (Exh
'W' to the Petition), this Court ordered the winding up of M/s Iccon
Oil and appointed the Official Liquidator (Respondent No.6 herein)
to take charge of the assets belonging to M/s Iccon Oil. As far as
Company Application (L) No.603 of 2014 is concerned, this Court
ordered that since Iccon Oil had been wound up, the Government of
Maharashtra through the Department of Sales Tax, shall file their
claim before the Official Liquidator (Exh 'X' to the Petition). With
these directions Company Application (L) No.603 of 2014 was
disposed of.
18. In this factual background, Mr Joshi, learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the Petitioners, submitted that they are the
bonafide purchasers of the secured property under a public auction
conducted by Respondent No.2 - SICOM under the provisions of the
SARFAESI Act. Admittedly, the Petitioners did not have any notice
of the dues of the Sales Tax Authorities either when they bid for the
secured property or when the sale was completed in their favour.
Mr Joshi further submitted that the sale of the secured property
was advertised in the newspapers as required under the provisions
of the SARFAESI Act and the Rules framed thereunder. Despite
this publication, the Sales Tax Authorities did not inform
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Respondent No.2 of its claim or raise any objection to the sale that
was to be conducted by Respondent No.2. He submitted that as far
back as on 10th September 2012, the Petitioners had bid for the
secured property in the sum of Rs.2,21,50,000/- which was
subsequently revised on 21st February, 2013 to a sum of
Rs.2,65,00,000/-. He submitted that before purchasing the secured
property, the Petitioners had undertaken a due diligence of the title
of the secured property and obtained a 7/12 extract in respect
thereof which only recorded the charge of the District Industries
Centre, Raigad in the sum of Rs.4,30,601/-. There was no charge of
the Sales Tax Authorities reflected in the 7/12 extract dated 15th
May, 2012. It was in these circumstances that the Petitioners bid
for the secured property and Respondent No.2 was pleased to
accept the same on 15th March, 2013. The Petitioners thereafter
made full payment of the sale consideration of Rs.2,65,00,000/- on
21st March 2013, the receipt of which was duly confirmed by
Respondent No.2 on 1st April, 2013 and the Petitioners were
accordingly requested to proceed with the execution of the Sale
Certificate.
19. Mr Joshi submitted that even after the purchase of the
secured property, they once again obtained a 7/12 extract dated
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12th April, 2013 which also did not reflect the purported charge of
the Sales Tax Authorities to the tune of Rs.2,77,73,073/-. This
alleged charge of the Sales Tax Authorities was for the first time
reflected in 7/12 extract dated 9th January, 2014. This was long
after the secured property was purchased by the Petitioners in the
public auction conducted by Respondent No.2. Looking to all these
facts, Mr Joshi submitted that the Petitioners were bonafide
purchasers of the secured property for valuable consideration and
without any notice of the charge/dues of the Sales Tax Authorities
and therefore the impugned attachment order passed by
Respondent No.5 in relation to the secured property and belonging
to the Petitioners, was arbitrary, capricious, without jurisdiction
and in flagrant violation of the principles of natural justice.
20. Mr Joshi additionally submitted that the Sales Tax
Authorities have been extremely complacent, if not negligent, in
pursuing their claim against Iccon Oil. He submitted that on their
own showing the assessment orders for the periods 1999-2000,
2001-2002 and 2002-2003 were passed as far back as on 20th
October, 2006, 20th October, 2006 and 26th February, 2008
respectively. Despite this, and having their claim crystallized as far
back as on 20th October, 2006 and 26th February 2008, the Sales
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Tax Authorities did nothing to ensure that their charge / claim is
reflected in the 7/12 extract of the secured property. The Sales
Tax Authorities being this complacent, could not now decide to
chase the secured property in the hands of the Petitioners, who
admittedly have no outstanding dues of the Sales Tax Department.
He submitted that Respondent No.5 has further been complacent by
not pursuing the recovery proceedings against the defaulting
Company (Iccon Oil) which is very much in existence and
functioning at the address supplied by the Petitioners as is reflected
in the written submissions filed by them in answer to the notice
issued under section 62A of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959.
21. It was the submission of Mr Joshi that where there was
only a transfer of individual assets of the defaulting Company,
rather than the defaulting Company being sold as a going concern,
those individual assets could not be chased in the hands of bonafide
purchasers. He submitted that this charge of the Sales Tax
Authorities could not be enforced against a transferee who had no
notice of the same, unless by law the requirement of such notice has
been waived. He submitted that in the present case, admittedly
there has been no waiver of such notice by the Petitioners. For all
the aforesaid reasons, Mr Joshi submitted that the impugned
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attachment order dated 29th April, 2013 and signed on 2nd May,
2013 (Exh.'Q' to the Petition) is wholly illegal and ought to be set
aside by us in our writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India and the Petitioners are thus also entitled to
other consequential reliefs.
22. On the other hand, Mr Sharma, learned counsel
appearing on behalf of Respondent No.1, submitted that the facts of
the present case would clearly establish that the Sales Tax
Authorities were diligent in pursuing their claim against Iccon Oil.
He submitted that after the assessment orders were passed on 20th
October 2006, 20th October, 2006 and 26th February 2008, a notice
under section 39 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959 was served on
Iccon Oil on 17th November, 2012. Thereafter, a notice dated 19th
November, 2012 was issued and served upon Iccon Oil under
section 178 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966.
Thereafter, on 26th December, 2012 an order of attachment in Form
No.4 was issued under section 182 of the said Maharashtra Land
Revenue Code 1966. Accordingly, on 3rd January 2013, the
Tahasildar of Khalapur, District Raigad (Respondent No.7) directed
the Talathi of Honad Village (Respondent No.8) to lodge the claim of
the Sales Tax Authorities in the 7/12 extract which was duly
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acknowledged by the Talathi's Office. On 12th March 2013, the said
Talathi, Honad Village informed the Tahasildar, Khalapur that he
had taken note of the sales tax dues and made an entry in Ferfar
Note 1483 dated 15th January, 2013 as per the directions of the
Tahasildar. Thereafter, on 29th April, 2013 additional information
was provided in Form No.4 to the Tahasildar, Khalapur, District
Raigad regarding the survey numbers. In this factual background,
Mr Sharma submitted that the Petitioners had full knowledge of the
dues of the Sales Tax long before they decided to purchase the
secured property. Having done so with open eyes, the Petitioner
today cannot contend that they are bonafide purchasers for value
without notice of the claim of the Sales Tax Authorities. He
therefore submitted that the impugned order of attachment levied
on the secured property is fully justified and the Sales Tax
Authorities would be entitled to recover their dues by enforcing
their charge against the said secured property.
23. With the help of learned counsel, we have perused the
papers and proceedings in this Writ Petition alongwith the
impugned order of attachment. It is not in dispute that the secured
property was mortgaged inter alia in favour of Central Bank of
India who issued a demand notice under section 13(2) of the
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SARFAESI Act to Iccon Oil for repayment of the amounts due to it
as on 14th March, 2001. Iccon Oil did not comply with the aforesaid
demand notice. Therefore, on 17th April 2004, Central Bank of
India published a notice in the newspapers notifying that it had
taken over possession of the secured property under the provisions
of the SARFAESI Act. Thereafter, by a Deed of Assignment dated
31st March 2010, the debts (along with the underlying security)
owed by Iccon Oil to Central Bank of India were assigned in favour
of Respondent No.2. It is in these circumstances that Respondent
No.2, to recover dues, issued a sale notice on 25th August, 2012
inviting offers in respect of the secured property. When this sale
notice was published, the Sales Tax Authorities did not object to the
sale of the secured property on the ground that they had a claim
against Iccon Oil. Be that as it may, pursuant to this sale notice, the
Petitioners bid for the secured property as far back as on 10th
September, 2012 for a consideration of Rs.2,21,50,000/- (which
was subsequently revised on 21st February, 2013 to
Rs.2,65,00,000/-).
24. It is also not in dispute that before bidding for the
secured property, the Petitioners obtained the 7/12 extract dated
15th May, 2012 in respect of the secured property. This 7/12
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extract did not reflect the charge of the Sales Tax Authorities. It
was in these circumstances that the Petitioners bonafide believed
that the only charge on the secured property was the dues of the
District Industries Centre, Raigad in the sum of Rs.4,30,601/-.
Therefore, the Petitioners bid for the secured property, which bid
was duly accepted by Respondent No.2 on 15th March, 2013. In
fact, the Petitioners made full payment of the sale consideration of
Rs.2,65,00,000/- on 21st March 2013, the receipt of which was duly
accepted by the Respondent No.2 on 1st April 2013. From these
facts it is clear that the sale of the secured property was confirmed
in favour of the Petitioners on 1st April, 2013.
25. Even after the purchase of the secured property, the
Petitioners once again obtained a 7/12 extract of the secured
property dated 12th April, 2013. Even in this 7/12 extract, the
charge of the Sales Tax Authorities (in the sum of Rs.2,77,73,073/-)
was not reflected. It is only for the first time on 7th January, 2014
that the charge of the Sales Tax Authorities was reflected in the
7/12 extract of the secured property. This was much after the sale
of the secured property was confirmed in favour of the Petitioners.
In these circumstances, we find that Mr Joshi is fully justified in
contending that the Petitioners had no knowledge or notice of the
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charge of the Sales Tax Authorities before they purchased the
secured property from Respondent No.2 and therefore, the Sales
Tax Authorities cannot enforce their charge against the secured
property.
26. As far as the documents relied upon by Mr Sharma are
concerned, nothing has been brought to our notice that any of these
documents were brought either to the notice of Respondent No.2 or
the Petitioners, or that the Petitioners had knowledge (actual or
constructive) of the claim/charge of the Sales Tax Authorities, prior
to them purchasing the secured property in a public auction
conducted under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act.
27. There is no dispute about the fact that the dues of Iccon
Oil crystallized in favour of the Sales Tax Authorities by virtue of
the assessment orders that were passed as far back as on 20th
October 2006, 20th October, 2006 and 26th February 2008
respectively. Despite this, until November 2012, the Sales Tax
Authorities took no action whatsoever against M/s Iccon Oil for
recovery of their dues. Furthermore, it is also an admitted fact that
when the Petitioners purchased the secured property in the public
auction conducted by Respondent No.2, no charge of the Sales Tax
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Authorities was reflected in the 7/12 extract of the said property.
The only charge reflected at that time was a charge of the District
Industries Centre, Raigad in the sum of Rs.4,30,601/-. In these
circumstances, Mr Joshi is fully justified in contending that when
they purchased the property, the Petitioners had no notice of the
dues payable to the Sales Tax Authorities by Iccon Oil and whose
property the Petitioners purchased in the public auction.
28.
On the issue of enforcement of charge, it would be
apposite to refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of
State of Karnataka & Anr. Vs. Shreyas Papers P. Ltd.1 and more
particularly paragraphs 18 to 21 thereof (of the SCC report) which
read as under:-
"Enforceability of the charge
18. The next limb of Mr Hegde's arguments was that since Section
13(2)(i) of the KST Act creates a charge on the property of the defaulting company, the charge would continue on the properties, even if it changes hands by transfer.
19. While the expression "charge" is not defined by the KST Act,
this concept is well known in property law and has been defined by Section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (hereinafter "the TP Act"). Here "charge" is defined as:
"100.
Where immovable property of one person is by act of parties or
operation of law made security for the payment of money to another,
and the transaction does not amount to a mortgage, the latter person
is said to have a charge on the property, and all the provisions
1 (2006) 1 SCC 615 : AIR 2006 SC 865
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hereinbefore contained which apply to a simple mortgage shall, so far
as may be, apply to such charge.
Nothing in this section applies to the charge of a trustee on the
trust property for expenses properly incurred in the execution of his
trust, and, save as otherwise expressly provided by any law for the
time being in force, no charge shall be enforced against any property
in the hands of a person to whom such property has been transferred
for consideration and without notice of the charge."
(emphasis supplied)
20. As the section itself unambiguously indicates, a charge may not be enforced against a transferee if she/he has had no notice of the same, unless by law, the requirement of such notice has been waived. This position has long been accepted by this Court
in Dattatreya Shanker Mote v. Anand Chintaman Datar [(1974) 2 SCC 799, 811 (para 18)] and in Ahmedabad Municipal Corpn. of
the City of Ahmedabad v. Haji Abdulgafur Haji Hussenbhai [(1971) 1 SCC 757, 759-61 (paras 3 & 4) : AIR 1971 SC 1201, 1202- 04(para 3)] (hereinafter "Ahmedabad Municipal Corpn."). In this
connection, we may refer to the latter judgment, which is particularly relevant for the present case.
21. Ahmedabad Municipal Corpn. [(1971) 1 SCC 757, 759-61 (paras 3 & 4) : AIR 1971 SC 1201, 1202-04 (para 3)] was a case
where a person was in arrears of property tax, due under the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949.
Consequently, the Municipal Corporation created a charge over the property of the defaulter. However, the property was sold in execution of a mortgage decree. When the Municipal Corporation purported to exercise their charge over the property, the purchaser
in court-auction filed a suit for a declaration that he was the owner of the property and that the arrears of municipal taxes due by the transferor were not recoverable from him by proceeding against the property purchased in the auction. In the appeal before this Court, the Municipal Corporation's main argument was that where the
local law provided for the creation of a charge against a property for which municipal taxes were due, transferees of such properties were imputed with constructive knowledge of any charge created against the properties that they had purchased. This argument was, however, rejected. This Court held that while constructive notice was sufficient to satisfy the requirement of notice in the proviso to Section 100 of the TP Act, whether the transferee had constructive notice of the charge had to be determined on the facts and
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circumstances of the case. [Ibid., at SCC pp. 765-66 (para 12) : AIR pp. 1207-08(para 8)] In other words, this Court held that there
could be no fixed presumption as to the transferee having constructive notice of the charge against the property. In fact, the principle laid down inAhmedabad Municipal Corpn. [(1971) 1 SCC
757, 759-61 (paras 3 & 4) : AIR 1971 SC 1201, 1202-04(para 3)] has been correctly applied in a sales tax case similar to the present case. [CTO v. R.K. Steels, (1998) 108 STC 161 (Mad)]"
(emphasis supplied)
29. In view of this authoritative pronouncement of the
Supreme Court, in the facts of the present case we have no
hesitation in holding that the Petitioners, having no knowledge of
the charge of the Sales Tax Authorities before they purchased the
secured property, the Sales Tax Authorities could not enforce their
charge against the secured property.
30. Faced with this situation, Mr Sharma submitted that the
ratio of the aforesaid Supreme Court decision cannot be applied to
the facts of the present case as the provisions under consideration
before the Supreme Court were that of the Karnataka Sales Tax
Act, 1957 and not of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959. On this
ground he sought to distinguish the judgment of the Supreme Court
in the case of Shreyas Papers.1 This argument is stated, only to be
rejected. Firstly, the expression "charge", just like in the Karnataka
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Sales Tax Act, 1957, is also not defined in the Bombay Sales Tax
Act, 1959. On the issue of enforceability of charge, the Supreme
Court, whilst considering the provisions of Section 100 of the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 gave its findings in paragraphs 18
to 21 thereof. These findings are binding on us and we cannot
distinguish the aforesaid decision on the specious ground that the
same is rendered in the context of the provisions of the Karnataka
Sales Tax Act, 1957. Secondly, even otherwise, we find that the
very same judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Shreyas
Papers1 has been relied upon by a another Division Bench of this
Court in the case of M/s.National Steel and Agro Industries Ltd,
Mumbai v/s the State of Maharashtra and Others.2 to which one
of us (S. C. Dharmadhikari, J.), was a party. This decision was
rendered in context to the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959. We find
that this exact argument was canvassed before the the Division
Bench in M/s.National Steel and Agro Industries Ltd's case2,
and the same was repelled by this Court. The argument canvassed
before the Division Bench was that no assistance could be derived
from the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Shreyas
Papers.1 After relying upon the very same paragraphs of the
2 2015 (2) ABR 805
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Supreme Court judgment that have been reproduced above, this
Court repelled the aforesaid contention in paragraphs 35 and 36 of
its decision. In this view of the matter, we find no substance in this
argument.
31. Mr. Sharma then submitted that admittedly the sale
certificate in respect of the secured property has not yet been
registered and therefore the title to the property does not pass to
the Petitioners. In these circumstances, Mr Sharma submitted that
therefore the Sales Tax Authorities were justified in attaching the
secured property and enforcing their charge against the same. In
the facts of the present case, we are unable to agree with this
submission. As stated by the Petitioners in their affidavit in
rejoinder, the only reason why the Sale Certificate could not be
registered was because the stamp duty demanded by the
Registering Authority was taking into account the arrears of Sales
Tax dues of Iccon Oil, in addition to the consideration already paid
by the Petitioners to Respondent No.2. Admittedly, the Petitioners
are not liable for this amount as they are not the debtors of the
Sales Tax Authorities. Furthermore, when the sale of the secured
property was confirmed in favour of the Petitioners, admittedly the
charge of the Sales Tax Authorities was not reflected in the 7/12
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extract of the said property. We therefore find no substance in the
aforesaid argument canvassed by Mr Sharma.
32. We also must note here that Iccon Oil was wound up by
and under the orders of this Court and this Court by its order dated
18th March 2015, passed in Company Application (L) No.603 of
2014, has given liberty to the Sales Tax Authorities to file their
claim before the Official Liquidator. We are informed that the claim
of the Sales Tax Authorities has also been filed thereafter with the
Official Liquidator of this Court and we are of the view that the Sales
Tax Department is free to pursue its claim against Iccon Oil.
33. Before parting, we must clarify that we haven't entered
upon any controversy regarding the priority the Sales Tax
Authorities may have on the sale proceeds received from the sale of
the secured property to the Petitioners. The priority, if any, of the
Sales Tax Authorities is not in issue before us and therefore we
should not be understood to have rendered any finding in that
regard. The issue of priorities shall be decided in appropriate
proceedings before the appropriate forum, and in accordance with
law.
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34. In view of our foregoing discussion, Rule is made
absolute and the Writ Petition is granted in terms of prayer clauses
(a), (b), (e), (g) and (h). However, in the facts and circumstances
of the case, we leave the parties to bear their own costs.
(B.P. COLABAWALLA, J.) (S.C.DHARMADHIKARI J.)
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