The State Of Maharashtra Thr. ... vs Dr.Subhash Dhondiram Mane
2014 Latest Caselaw 29 Bom

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          IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION




                                                        
                     WRIT PETITION NO. 9660 OF 2014 

    The State of Maharashtra,




                                                       
    through Secretary Cooperation,
    Marketing and Textile Department,
    Mantralaya, Mumbai - 400 032.                        ... Petitioner
                v/s




                                           
    Dr.Subhash Dhondiram Mane,
    Additional Commissioner,
    Cooperation Office, Central Building,
    Pune - 411 001.                                      ... Respondent
                           
    Mr.A.Y.   Sakhare,   Senior   Advocate   along   with   Mr.A.B.   Vagyani, 
    Government Pleader for the Petitioner.
           


    Mr.V.M.   Thorat,   Advocate   along   with   Mr.Ashish   S.   Gaikwad, 
    Advocate for the Respondent.
        



                                            CORAM: ANOOP V. MOHTA &
                                                      N.M. JAMDAR, JJ.





                                            DATED : 1 DECEMBER 2014

    JUDGMENT (Per N.M.Jamdar, J.):

Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. By consent of both

parties, petition taken up for final disposal.

1. By this petition, the State of Maharashtra has challenged the order passed by the Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal dated 13 December 2014, allowing the Original Application filed by the Respondent and setting aside the order dated 4 September 2014

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suspending the Respondent from service.

2. The Respondent, Dr.Subhash Dhondiram Mane, is working as

a Director of Marketing, which is a senior level post. He is due to retire on superannuation shortly, on 31 December 2014.

3. The Respondent, entered the services of State of Maharashtra on 19 January 1983 as a Deputy Registrar, Class-I. Thereafter he

worked in various capacities and was promoted as an Additional

Registrar, Class-I post in July, 2009. He was sent on deputation as Managing Director, Maharashtra State Power-loom Corporation.

He was posted as an Administrator, Maharashtra State, Cooperation and Agricultural Rural Development Bank in April, 2010. The Respondent made grievance that he was posted on a defunct bank

and he was not permitted to work in a honest and diligent manner.

After some other postings, the Petitioner was posted as an Additional Commissioner of Agricultural Produce Market Committee, Navi Mumbai, and was then transferred to the post of

Administrator of Maharashtra State Agricultural and Rural Development Bank. Thereafter, the Respondent made representations for repatriation and posting on a vacant post.

4. The Respondent filed an original application in respect of continuation of his deputation for more than four years. The original application was allowed by the Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal by an order dated 29 November 2013. Since this order

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was not complied with, a contempt petition was filed by the

Respondent. In this contempt petition, a notice was issued by the Tribunal. Thereafter, the Petitioner State issued an order of

repatriation on 18 March 2014 and the Respondent was appointed as Director of Marketing and he took charge on 18 March 2014.

On 20 March 2014, the powers delegated to Director of Marketing were stayed by the State Government. Thereafter, the Respondent filed another original application, upon which the Tribunal issued

an interim order on 3 April 2014 staying the order of 20 March

2014. On 27 June 2014, the Respondent was served with a show cause notice in respect of certain news items pertaining to

Agricultural Produce Market Committee, Mumbai. It was alleged that the Respondent was instrumental in publishing the news reports. Another show cause notice was served on 30 June 2014

alleging that the Respondent did not behave properly with

representatives of people and used abusive language in respect of higher dignitaries. The Respondent gave his reply to both the notices. Thereafter the Petitioner-State issued an order for

deputation-cum-transfer of the Respondent. The Respondent challenged the action of the State Government by filing Original Application, and the Tribunal by its speaking order dated 2 July

2014 stayed the order of transfer. Thereafter the Petitioner-State suspended the Respondent by order dated 4 September 2014, which is the subject matter of the present proceeding. The order of suspension stated that the Respondent gave false information to media and maligned the image of the Government, participated

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in a Television programme, criticized the Government and his

behaviour with various higher functionaries and representatives of people was not proper.

5. The Respondent filed an Original Application No.834 of 2014

challenging the order of suspension dated 4 September 2014. The Respondent alleged that the order was malafide, issued with an intention to victimize the Respondent at the fag end of his career.

He narrated the history of previous orders issued by the Petitioner

State and the orders passed by the Tribunal to demonstrate that the order of suspension was a colourable exercise, only to victimize and

punish the Respondent. A reply came to be filed by the Petitioner State, in which the Petitioner justified its action. It was contended that the Respondent had an alternate remedy available to challenge

the order of suspension. On this basis it was contended that the

challenge to the order was premature. Thereafter, an additional affidavit in reply was filed by the Petitioner State dealing with the contentions raised by the Respondent, on merits. It was contended

that since the charges are serious, the Respondent might interfere with the departmental enquiry and it was necessary to place him under suspension. The allegations regarding victimization were

denied and various instances of misbehaviour on the part of the Respondent were detailed. The incidents specified in the order of suspension were justified by pointing out that there was a cogent material in support of the charges.

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6. The Tribunal considered the preliminary objection regarding

maintainability of the Original Application on the ground of availability of alternate remedy and held that the said remedy will

not be efficacious and there was no legal bar to consider the original application. The Tribunal found that the history of

litigation instituted by the Respondent including the orders passed by the Tribunal indicated that the action against the Respondent was by way of victimization. The Tribunal did not find any prima

facie case of gross misconduct that warranted suspension of a

senior officer that too at the fag end of his career. The Tribunal noted that the incidents which was formed basis of suspension

order were also grounds for transfer of the Respondent, which order was stayed by the Tribunal. The Tribunal opined that the Respondent is not likely to influence the enquiry in any manner,

looking at the nature of charges. The Tribunal allowed the Original

Application by the impugned order dated 13 October 2014. The Tribunal set aside the order of suspension and directed the Petitioner-State to issue order of placing the Respondent back as

Director of Marketing within a week, failing which the Respondent would stand reinstated on 20 October 2014. The Tribunal imposed costs of Rs.2 lacs on the Petitioner-State and directed that the

enquiry must be concluded within six months from the date of suspension order, failing which it will automatically abate.

7. The Petitioner-State moved the present petition on 20 October 2014. On 20 October 2014, the Respondent appeared in

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person and submitted that he has already taken charge in the

morning on that day in view of self operative order of the Tribunal. The learned Vacation Judge granted ad-interim relief in favour of

the Petitioner State and thereafter the matter was posted for consideration before us,

8. We have heard Mr.A.Y. Sakhare, learned senior advocate for the Petitioner-State and Mr.V.M. Thorat, learned Advocate for the

Respondent.

9.

The first contention raised on behalf of the Petitioner State is

that the Tribunal ought not to have entertained the Original Application in view of the alternate remedy available to the Respondent. Reliance was placed by Mr.Sakhare, on Section 20(1)

and (2) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. According to

Mr.Sakhare, as per Rule 17 of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1979, a remedy of appeal against the order of suspension has been provided. Mr.Sakhare submitted

that the reason given by the Respondent for not availing of this remedy that since the order is passed in concurrence of the Chief Minister and therefore no appellate authority will give a decision

against him, is an untenable reason. He submitted therefore that the discretion used by the Tribunal in entertaining the application was improper and therefore the order be set aside. We do not find any merit in this submission. Section 20(1) of the Administrative Tribunal Act does not place an absolute embargo on the Tribunal to

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entertain an application if alternate remedy is available. It only

states that the Tribunal shall not ordinarily entertain application unless the Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant has availed the

alternate remedy. This phraseology itself indicates that in a given case the Tribunal can entertain an application directly without

relegating the applicant to the alternate remedy. In the present case, the Tribunal has found, on examination of various peculiar facts and circumstances, that, it will be futile to drive the

Respondent to an alternate remedy. The Tribunal found that the

order of suspension was based on the same grounds as the order of transfer, which was stayed and the order of suspension was an act

of victimization. Having convinced that strong case for entertaining an application was made out, the Tribunal entertained the application. It was within the discretion of the Tribunal to do

so. No absolute bar was shown, neither it exists. We are not

inclined, at this stage, to accede to the submission of Mr.Sakhare, and set aside the impugned order on this ground alone.

10. It was then contended by Mr.Sakhare that the Tribunal could not have gone into the merits of the charges and interfere with the order of suspension and the exercise was premature. He placed

reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of District Forest Officer v/s R. Rajamanickam & anr., reported in (2000) 9 SCC 284 and in the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Chandrakant Damodar Kale v/s nagpur Improvement Trust, reported in 1997(4) Bom.C.R. 607. He contended that the

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State Government, as an employer, has a power to place employee

under suspension under Rule 4(1)(a) of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, when an enquiry against an

employee is pending or is in contemplation. He submitted that the order of suspension is purely an administrative act and the Court is

not entitled to examine the merits of the charges, which will be considered at the time of the enquiry. It is not possible to accept such an absolute proposition. Though it is the power of the

Petitioner State to place an employee under suspension, the order

of suspension is not immune from judicial scrutiny. An employee can always challenge the order of suspension on the ground that it

is actuated by malafides, arbitrariness or that it is issued with an ulterior purpose. The suspension order ordinarily should be passed when there is strong prima facie case against the delinquent and if

the charges are proved it would warrant an imposition of major

penalty. This position has been made clear in the decision rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Union of India & anr. v/s Ashok Kumar Aggarwal, reported in 2014 (1) SCJ 115.

11. If the above grounds are available for an employee to challenge the order of suspension and he agitates the same in his

application to the Tribunal, it is necessary for the Tribunal to examine, prima facie, the case against such applicant. For considerartion of the contention that the order of suspension is vitiated by malice, ulterior motive or that no strong prima facie case exists, it is necessary for the Tribunal to consider the factual matrix

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in that context. The decision in the case of District Forest Officer

(supra) relied upon by Mr.Sakhare was in respect of challenge to a charge-sheet and in that context the Apex Court observed that the

merits of the charges would be considered at the time of the enquiry. In the case of Chandrakant Kale (supra), the Division

Bench of this Court was considering the case of an employee who was dismissed from service after holding an enquiry and the period of suspension was not to be treated as duty period. When the order

of suspension was put into issue, the Division Bench found that no

failure of justice had occasioned as the Petitioner had a fair and reasonable opportunity to reply to the chargesheet and contest and

participate in the enquiry. The facts of this case are totally different from the case at hand. The Tribunal thus, to our mind, rightly considered the the factual aspect to ascertain whether the challenge

raised by the Respondent fell under the available heads of

challenge. The Tribunal was justified in looking at the material to find out whether the grounds of malafide and victimization made out by the Respondent were justified.

12. In respect of allegation of malafides, Mr.Sakhare contended that they are vague and no individual has been joined as a party

Respondent to prove the allegation of malafides. If the case put up by the Respondent is carefully considered, the case is of victimization and of legal malice. In the case of Kalabharati Advertising v/s Hemant Vimalnath Narichania & ors., reported in AIR 2010 SC 3745, the Apex Court explained the concept as

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under :-

"25. The State is under obligation to act fairly without

ill will or malice - in fact or in law. "Legal malice" or "malice in law" means something done without lawful excuse. It is an act done wrongfully and willfully without reasonable or probable cause, and not

necessarily an act done from ill feeling and spite. It is a deliberate act in disregard to the rights of others. Whether malice is attributed to the State, it can never be a case of personal ill will or spite on the part of the

State. It is an act which is taken with an oblique or indirect object. It means exercise of statutory power for

purposes foreign to those for which it is in law intended". It means conscious violation of the law to the prejudice of another, a depraved inclination on the

part of the authority to disregard the rights of others, which intent is manifested by its injurious acts.

26. Passing an order for an unauthorized purpose constitutes malice in law."

The above mentioned passage indicates that an order for

unauthorized purpose and that purpose other than for which it was intended, constitute legal malice.

13. The Tribunal has taken note of the previous litigation

instituted by the Respondent, which is a matter of record, to draw a conclusion that there was a pattern of passing adverse orders against the Respondent and he was consistently shifted from department to department on deputation to prevent him from taking certain actions. Various orders were passed by the Tribunal

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protecting the respondent from the orders of the Petitioner State.

Considering this record, the Tribunal arrived at a finding that the series of events lead to an inference that there was malice in law

against the Respondent. If the record pertaining to the Respondent and the earlier orders are perused, it cannot be said that no

Tribunal would have arrived at such a finding. Merely because, upon construing the material afresh, we may come to another conclusion is not enough to interfere with the order of the Tribunal

in writ jurisdiction. In fact, the material on record justifies the

interference drawn by the Tribunal. If the previous litigation, which is part of the record, itself establishes malice in law and that

is being taken as a basis, it cannot be said that the Tribunal has traveled beyond its jurisdiction.

14. Mr.Thorat, relied upon the decision in the case of Ashok

Kumar Aggarwal (supra) which arose from a case of suspension of an employee. In this case, the Apex Court held that if the suspension order is based on the same material in respect of which

there has been earlier judicial pronouncement, then the suspension will have to be treated as vitiated. In the present case, the allegation against the Respondent that he had misbehaved with

representative of public and had uttered improper words against the higher dignitaries and that he was instrumental in issuing certain newspaper reports, were foundation for order of transfer, which was already stayed by the Tribunal by a speaking order. In view of the aforesaid decision of the Apex Court, the conclusion by

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the Tribunal that the same material could not have been used for

order of suspension, cannot be termed as perverse. The only other ground is regarding a Television interview where the Respondent is

stated to have criticized the Government. The compact disc in respect of the said programme is not furnished to the Respondent

neither it was placed on record of the Tribunal. Least the Petitioner-State could have done is to indicate in the order of suspension as to why in spite of earlier order of the Tribunal, the

order of suspension was warranted. The Respondent has

categorically denied that he criticized the Government and has stated that he only referred to the fact of dissolution of the

Agricultural Produce Market Committee. The Tribunal has found that even this charge prima facie does not have any merit and may not lead to imposition of major penalty. This is a possible view to be

taken.

15. Mr.Sakhare then submitted that, if the approach adopted by the Tribunal in setting aside the order of suspension by considering

the merits of charges is upheld, then it will have wide ramification and will create serious difficulties in the way of Administration. We do not see any warrant for such an apprehension. The principle

that the action of suspension should not be used for malafide purpose and for ulterior motive, is well established. The question whether the power of suspension is used for extraneous and malafide reasons and by way of victimization, will depend on facts

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of each case. By deciding that in a particular case such a ground is

made out no way lays down any wider proposition neither will have any administrative ramifications. We are only concerned with

the facts of the case in hand.

16. We have to also keep in mind that, we are not testing the

validity of the order of suspension at the first instance. This exercise has been undertaken by the Administrative Tribunal. The

Petitioner-State has invoked our jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, which is limited to see if there is patent

illegality or perversity in the order challenged and if there is any

gross failure of justice. As regard equity and failure of justice is concerned, the question of suspension of the Respondent is only relevant for next 30 days or so, as the Respondent will retire on

superannuation on 30 December 2014. The Petitioner State has

made a statement that an enquiry will be initiated soon which, it appears, will continue beyond the date of superannuation. If the Respondent is found guilty, he will be dealt with accordingly.

Therefore, the Respondent is not going scot-free. The question is whether we should set aside the order of the Tribunal at this stage and place the Respondent under suspension. The Tribunal has

rightly noted that the charges are such that the Respondent is not likely to tamper with the evidence nor influence any witness. There is no charge of misappropriation against the Respondent. It is not that the orders passed by the Respondent in office are immune from correction. The actions of the State Government as

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an employer must be fair and reasonable in respect of its

employees.

17. Mr.Sakhare submitted that the direction given by the Tribunal that enquiry must be completed within six months from the date of the order of suspension or it will abate, is uncalled for. We find

merit in this submission. It is not necessary to place the Petitioner State under such embargo. The enquiry may not be completed in

six months for various reasons. Further more, there is no discussion in the judgment of the Tribunal to arrive at this

conclusion. The direction contained in paragraph 56 of the

impugned judgment is set aside. It is however expected that the Petitioner State will conclude the enquiry, if initiated, within a reasonable period.

18. A grievance was made by Mr.Sakhare regarding the

imposition of costs of Rs.2 lacs upon the Petitioner-State. He submitted that the imposition of costs was unwarranted and the

Petitioner-State was not put to notice that such a heavy cost will be imposed. While we do not wish to disturb the conclusion of the Tribunal that the Original Application should have been allowed

with costs, we do not find any discussion preceding grant of costs which appear to be almost in the nature of punitive damages. Mr.Sakhare is justified in his grievance that the Tribunal ought to have put the Petitioner-State to notice as regard the quantum of costs and then appropriate submissions could have been then made. Since we are not disturbing the decision to impose the costs

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and that to remand the matter to the Tribunal only for

determination of quantum of costs, will not be in interest of both the parties, we feel that the costs of Rs.20,000/- on the Petitioner-

State would be appropriate in the facts and circumstances of the case.

19. Mr.Sakhare then made an alternate submission that, if the order of the Tribunal is to be upheld, the Petitioner-State should be

permitted to shift the Respondent from his present post. This

request was strongly opposed by Mr.Thorat. He pointed out that the order of transfer of the Respondent from the present post was

stayed by the Tribunal and has not been challenged by the Petitioner-State and therefore this is an attempt to over reach the order of the Tribunal. The request of Mr.Sakhare cannot be

accepted. If the order of transferring the Respondent from the

present post, substantially on the same ground has been stayed, there is no question of granting liberty to the Petitioner-State to transfer the Respondent from the present post.

20. There was a controversy as to whether the Respondent took charge on 20 October 2014 and whether he continues to hold the

same. Both sides have filed the affidavits on this aspect. But this issue has more or less became academic in view of the fact that we have heard the matter finally. In any case, the letters issued by the officers of the State Government annexed to additional affidavit of the Respondent indicate that the Respondent is holding the charge

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at present. Therefore the interim order granted on 20 October

2014 does not survive. Mr.Sakhare made a grievance that the action of the Respondent unilaterally taking charge that too before

the office hours is high handed. No doubt, the act of the Respondent in proceeding in the morning of 20 October 2014 and

taking charge is an act of over zealousness, but one has to consider the back ground of the case and the peculiar facts and circumstances and its effect on the state of mind of the Respondent

and his attempt to retain his prestige at the end of his career.

Therefore, we are not inclined to take a serious view of the matter.

21. In the circumstances, the writ petition is disposed of as under :

(a) The order passed by the Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal dated 13 October 2014 setting

aside the order of suspension dated 4 September 2014, is upheld.

(b) The direction contained in paragraph 56 of the impugned order is set aside, however, it is clarified that

the enquiry, if instituted, will be completed within a reasonable period.

( c) The order of imposition of costs of Rs.2 lacs by the Tribunal is modified and the amount of Rs.2 lacs is reduced to Rs.20,000/-.

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(d) Ad-interim order stands vacated.

(e) No order as to costs.

Rule disposed of accordingly.

At this stage, Mr.C.P. Yadav, the learned A.G.P. appearing for

the Petitioner-State seeks to stay the operation of the judgment and

order which we have pronounced today in the open Court and continuation of ad-interim relief. However, for the reasons so

recorded above, no case is made out for continuation of interim order granted by this Court 20 October 2014. The oral application is accordingly rejected.

          (N.M. JAMDAR, J.)                    (ANOOP V. MOHTA, J.)