Surjeet Singh vs Smt. Kala W
2013 Latest Caselaw 123 Bom

     sa434.11.odt                                                                                               1/22 

                  IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                            NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR




                                                                                                    
                                SECOND APPEAL No.434 OF 2011




                                                                      
     Smt. Varhyan wd/o. Narendra Singh 
     Chhatwal (since deceased, 




                                                                     
     through Legal Representatives : 
     already on record as 
     defendant Nos.2 to 5 and was deleted 
     as defendant No.1 as per 




                                                   
     Trial Court's order dated 15.3.2005)
                           
     1.     Surjeet Singh s/o. Narendra Singh,
             Chhatwal, aged about 52 years,
             Occupation : Business.
                          
     2.     Surendrapal Singh s/o. Narendra
             Singh Chhatwal, aged about 47 years,
             Occupation : Business, (dead)
      
   



     3.     Kuldeep s/o. Narendra Singh
             Chhatwal, aged about 42 years,
             Occupation : Nil.





     4.     Smt. Harjeet Kaur w/o. Harendrapal
             Singh Chandak, aged about 45 years,
             Occupation : Nil.

     5.     Smt. Prabhjot Kaur @ Parjyoti Kaur 





             w/o. Surendrapal Singh Chhatwal, 
             aged about 39 years, Occupation : Nil.

             Nos.1,2,3 & 5 all resident of Plot No.1010,
             Buddha Nagar, Nagpur.




                                                                      ::: Downloaded on - 27/11/2013 20:30:50 :::
      sa434.11.odt                                                                                               2/22 

             No.4 resident of Plot No.38, 
             Ashik Tower, Near Sanathan Dharam Bhavan, 




                                                                                                    
             Kadbi Chowk, Nagpur.




                                                                      
             (Original Defendants 2 to 6 on R.A.)    :      APPELLANTS


                                         ...VERSUS...




                                                                     
     1.    Smt. Kala wd/o. Narendra Singh Chhatwal,
            Aged about 55 years,




                                                   
            Occupation : Medical Practitioner.
                           
     2.    Ku. Sonu d/o. Narendra Singh Chhatwal,
            Aged about 26 years,
            Occupation : Not known.       
                          
           
     3.    Ku. Jeetu d/o. Narendra Singh Chhatwal,
            Aged about 24 years,
            Occupation : Not known. 
      


            
            Respondent Nos.1 to 3 all resident of 
   



            (New Address)
            5/3, Vishad Apartment, 
            1085 Gorepeth, Nagpur.              :       RESPONDENTS





     =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
     Mr. S.W. Sambre, Advocate for the Appellants.
     Mr. N.A. Padhye, Advocate for the Respondent No.1.
     =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=





                                         CORAM :   S.B. SHUKRE, J.                                                   

th DATE : 29 OCTOBER, 2013 .

ORAL JUDGMENT :

1. This appeal is directed against the judgment

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delivered on 26.7.2011 in Misc. Civil Application No.291 of

2011 in First Appeal that was sought to be filed against the

judgment, order and decree passed by the 7th Joint Civil Judge,

Senior Division, Nagpur on 10.6.2009 in Special Civil Suit

No.848 of 2003. After hearing the learned counsel for the

appellants and the learned counsel for the respondents, this

Court admitted the appeal on a substantial question of law.

The substantial question of law involved in the appeal is as

under :-

"Whether the finding recorded by the first appellate Court in deciding the application for condonation of delay to prefer first appeal that

the appellants have not shown sufficient cause for condoning the delay is not based upon the

facts before it and is thus perverse ?

2. Shri S.W. Sambre, learned counsel for the appellants

has submitted that the first appellate Court, in rejecting the

application filed for condoning the delay that had occurred in

filing of the First Appeal proceeded absolutely on wrong

footing that the original defendant No.1/Smt. Varhyan wd/o.

Narendra Singh Chhatwal died on 10.9.2010 and that there

sa434.11.odt 4/22

was no evidence to show that from the date of receipt of the

certified copies of the judgment and decree on 15.2.2010 till

10.6.2010, Smt. Varhyan wd/o. Narendra Singh Chhatwal was

not keeping good health, which made the learned District

Judge find that there was a negligence on the part of the

applicants. The learned counsel for the appellants has

submitted that the copy of the death certificate of

Smt. Varhyan was already produced before the first appellate

Court and it clearly showed that she had died on 30th January,

2005. He also submitted that in fact, Smt. Varhyan had died

during the pendency of the Civil Suit and since her legal

representatives were already there on record, her name was

deleted from the array of the defendants. He further submitted

that even when Misc. Civil Application No.291 of 2011 was

filed, the cause title clearly indicated this fact and that the

names of the applicants, in all five, began with the name of

Surjeet Singh Narendra Singh Chhatwal. However, according

to him, these facts present on record were completely missed

by the learned District Judge and the result was a perverse

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order against the present appellants. He further submits that

in a case involving questions relating to title and right to

possession of an immovable property, Courts should not take

any technical or pedantic approach and decide such disputes

not on technicalities, but on merits of the matter and that this

is a fit case wherein opportunity needs to be given to the

appellants to present their case on merit.

3.

Shri N.A. Padhye, learned counsel for the

respondents submits that there may be a mistake in making

reference to Smt. Varhyan wd/o. Narendra Singh Chhatwal

and particularly about her death on 10.9.2010 on the part of

the first appellate Court. But, he submits that this mistake was

the result of a mistake committed by the applicants in their

application for condonation of delay. He points out from

paragraph No.4 of the application that the applicants had

clearly mentioned that the delay was mainly on account of

illness of the applicant No.1, which resulted in death of

applicant No.1 on 10.9.2010. He further submits that the

impugned judgment would show that the first appellate Court

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had not proceeded merely on the basis that Smt. Varhyan

wd/o. Narendra Singh Chhatwal did not take steps for filing of

the appeal from 15.2.2010 till her death on 10.9.2010,

although it was on a misconception of fact, but had also found

absolute negligence on the part of the rest of the applicants in

taking diligent and prompt steps in filing of the First Appeal.

All these facts are clearly borne out from the reasons given by

the first appellate Court in its impugned Judgment. He further

argued that the law does not and should not support a person

who is indolent. The law relating to condonation of delay is

meant for lending its supporting hand to diligent litigants and

who, for some reasons beyond their control, are not able to

knock at the doors of the law within stipulated period of time,

so submits learned counsel for respondents. Therefore,

according to him, this is not a case meriting any indulgence to

the appellants.

4. The impugned judgment dated 26th July, 2011 shows

that the learned counsel for the appellants is right when he

submits that the first appellate Court has assumed wrongly that

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Smt. Varhyan Chhatwal expired on 10.9.2010 and then

wrongly noted that there was no evidence showing that during

the period from 15.2.2010 till her death on 10.9.2010, she was

ill and bedridden. But, this error, as we would see in later

parts of this judgment, has not gone to the root of the whole

case and has not rendered the impugned order perverse.

5. In this case, the judgment, order and decree sought

to be assailed by filing the First Appeal were rendered on

10.6.2009. It is the case of the appellants that they were not

informed of passing of this judgment and order by the trial

Court and they acquired knowledge about the same on 8th

February, 2010 only when they were served with the notice of

execution of the said judgment and decree. The appellants

have also submitted that they immediately moved an

application for grant of certified copies of the judgment and

order on 9th February, 2010, which they received on 15th

February, 2010. According to the appellants, this period

starting from 11.6.2009 till receipt of the certified copies of the

judgment and decree on 15.2.2010 deserves to be excluded

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from computation of the limitation period and the limitation

should be held to have started from 15.2.2010. The appellants

have also submitted that the application for condonation of

delay was filed on 11.10.1010 and the delay that occurred

especially between 15.2.2010 to 11.10.2010 has been properly

explained by them. So far as the period starting from

11.6.2009 and ending on 15.2.2010 is concerned, the

explanation given by the appellants that they were not

informed of the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court,

although there is no affidavit filed on record of the concerned

Advocate, can be accepted simply by relying upon the

statement of the appellants. The reason for this is that

ordinarily, the appellants would not have sat idle if they had

really come to know about passing of the judgment and decree

against them immediately and they would have at least filed an

application for grant of certified copies of the same, as they did

on 9th February, 2010. But, the matter does not end here as

the appeal with delay condonation application were not filed

immediately thereafter. So, the further questions are: What

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the appellants did after the certified copies of the judgment

and decree were delivered to them on 15.2.2010? Whether

they acted thereafter with sufficient promptitude or whether

they were negligent and allowed the rights acquired by the

respondents to be consolidated and finalized.

6. In order to find out answers to the questions, let us

turn again to the impugned order. The first appellate Court in

paragraph No.13 has mentioned, though wrongly as stated

earlier, that Smt. Varhyan expired on 10.9.2010 and assuming

this fact to be true, the first appellate Court also proceeded to

consider whether Smt. Varhyan was diligent and prompt in

prosecuting the remedy available to her under the law and

further found that she was not so. The first appellate Court

found that no evidence was available showing that during the

relevant period from 15.2.2010 till 10.9.2010, Smt. Varhyan

was not keeping good health. In fact, her name was removed

from the array of the defendants during the pendency of suit

itself. Besides, there was also available on record, as submitted

by learned counsel for the appellants, her death certificate

sa434.11.odt 10/22

indicating that she had expired on 30th January, 2005.

Therefore, the finding recorded by the trial Court on this aspect

of the case is not based upon the evidence available on record

and has to be held as illegal. However, as rightly submitted by

learned counsel for the respondents, this does not seem to be

the only reason which went behind recording of the finding

that the appellants have not made out any sufficient cause for

filing the appeal within the period of limitation.

7. It appears that the appellants were also not careful in

raising their contentions before the first appellate Court when

they filed their application seeking condonation of delay. In

paragraph No.4 of this application bearing Misc. Civil

Application No.291 of 2011, the applicants have stated that the

applicant No.1 died on 10.9.2010 and that since he was

consistently ill for a long period of time and ultimately died,

the delay of about 354 days had occurred. The cause title of

this application discloses that Surjeet Singh s/o. Narendra

Singh Chhatwal was the applicant No.1 and there is no dispute,

Grace to God, that he is very much alive till date. Learned

sa434.11.odt 11/22

counsel for the appellants has submitted that the applicants in

fact wanted to show that the applicant No.2, who has been

shown as deceased appellant No.2 (Surendrapal Singh) in the

present appeal, had expired on 10.9.2010 after a prolonged

illness and this fact was clarified to the first appellate Court

during the course of the argument. It might be so and it

appears that the first appellate Court has indeed considered

this argument when it found that said Surendrapal Singh was

admitted to the hospital on 10.8.2010 and was discharged on

2.9.2010. But it also found that before his admission to the

hospital, there was no reason for him to not take any steps in

filing the First Appeal. Learned counsel for the appellants

submits that even before his admission to hospital on

10.8.2010, Surendrapal Singh, because of his prolonged illness,

was not in a position to take steps necessary for filing of the

appeal and this can be seen from the medical reports starting

from 17.10.2002. He submits that these reports together with

the discharge card vide Exhibit-21/8 produced before first

appellate Court would show that Surendrapal Singh was a

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chronic alcoholic, suffering from severe anemia and serious

liver disease, which ultimately took a toll on his life. He,

therefore, submits that the first appellate Court has wrongly

found that Surendrapal Singh has not explained properly as to

why did he not take any steps for filing of the appeal after

15.2.2010 till his admission to the hospital on 10.8.2010.

8. This much of argument of learned counsel for

appellants can also be accepted for the reason that the medical

reports of the year 2002 would have to be considered together

with the discharge card vide Exhibit-21/8 which expressly

mentions about serious ailments suffered by Surendrapal

Singh. In a cumulative manner, these documents would be

sufficient to enable any one to infer that Surendrapal Singh

was keeping ill health generally and, therefore, the first

appellate Court was not right in blaming the unexplained delay

on Surendrapal Singh. But, the inference that Surendrapal

Singh generally had a fragile health, much due to his alcoholic

tendencies, itself had a flip side to tell. Surendrapal Singh was

also a person who could not have been relied upon for taking

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appropriate steps for filing of the appeal. This fact was also

known to rest of the appellants. Therefore, one is surprised as

to why the remaining appellants, inspite of very well knowing

serious ailments and alcoholic proclivities of Surendrapal

Singh, did not take any steps for filing of the First Appeal. This

is what has been pinpointed by the first appellate Court in the

subsequent portion of the paragraph 13 of the impugned

judgment. It has found that apart from the illness of

Surendrapal Singh, there was no reason for other applicants,

namely, Surjeet Singh, Kuldeep Singh, Smt. Harjeet Kaur and

Smt. Prabhjot Kaur for not filing the First Appeal within a

period of limitation. For this reason, the first appellate Court

found that there was no sufficient and reasonable cause shown

for not filing of appeal within a period of limitation. Having

regard to facts of the case, I have no reason nor any adequate

reason has been shown to me, to find any flaw in this finding.

One can very well see that the appellants have not explained as

to what the other appellants, apart from Surendrapal Singh,

were doing after receiving the certified copies of the impugned

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judgment and decree on 15.2.2010 till filing of the application

for condonation of delay on 11.10.2010. It is true that for

some period of time, the appellants had been prosecuting First

Appeal preferred before this Court, which was then returned to

them for being presented to the appropriate forum. The First

Appeal was filed on 25.8.2010. Even if this date is taken into

account for considering the argument that delay is in fact not

so much as it looks to be, still, there is quite a long period in

which no action has been taken by appellants, barring

Surendrapal Singh. One would surely see that appellants,

apart from Surendrapal Singh, could and should have taken

steps for filing of the challenge immediately after 15.2.2010

and if they had not done so, they ought to have given sufficient

explanation for their failure to do so. The remaining

appellants, have not given any explanation absolutely as to

why they did not take any steps for filing of the appeal against

the decree of the trial Court. Therefore, I find substance in the

argument of the learned counsel for the respondents that the

appellants have not shown any sufficient cause in this case in

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filing their challenge to the judgment and decree of the trial

Court. It is seen that these appellants very well knew that their

brother Surendrapal Singh was an alcoholic, was suffering

from serious ailments of anemia and liver and, therefore, could

not have been counted on for filing of an appeal against the

judgment and decree of the trial Court. Therefore, it was

expected of them to have taken prompt steps in the matter and

avoid any negligence on their part. It appears that they were

just sitting idle and have not shown any bona fides on their

part and, therefore, the benefit of the discretionary relief under

Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 cannot be given to them.

9. Learned counsel for the appellants has referred to me

the case of Yuvraj Vithu Sutar vs. Dinkar Lahu Sutar,

reported in 2012(2) Mh.L.J. 174, wherein, this court has

taken a view that in the matter of condonation of delay, a

highly pedantic approach should be avoided and the

appropriate course should be to enhance the cause of

substantial justice. That is a well settled law and there can be

no quarrel about it. But, at the same time law does not say

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that even in cases where the delay is seen to be deliberate or is

not for any bona fide reasons or where the applicants are

negligent, still, it should be condoned. The law in this regard

has been settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of

Lanka Venkateswarlu (dead) by L.Rs. vs. State of Andhra

Pradesh and others, reported in (2011) 4 SCC 363, referred

to me by the learned counsel for the respondents. The Hon'ble

Apex Court has laid down that while considering application

for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act,

1963 the courts do not enjoy unlimited and unbridled

discretionary powers. It has further held that the discretion

has to be exercised in a systematic manner well supported by

the reasons and that there is no scope for any whims or fancies

in the matter. The Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that if

delay is condoned even in a case where the party is negligent

in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally

unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has

accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly. While

explaining the concepts of liberal approach and reasonableness

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in exercise of the discretion by the Courts in condoning the

delay, the Hon'ble Apex Court referred to the observations of

the Supreme Court made in the case of Balwant Singh (Dead)

vs. Jagdish Singh and others, reported in (2010) 8 SCC

685, by reproducing them in paragraph 23 thus :

"25. We may state that even if the term "sufficient cause" has to receive liberal

construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of

the party concerned. The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of 'reasonableness' as it is understood in

its general connotation.

26. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of a party to arise (sic a lis). These

principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and

circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right has accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain

the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party.

Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly."

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10. It will be also useful to refer to further observations

of the Hon'ble Supreme Court made in the said case of Lanka

(supra) and appearing in paragraph 29, which are reproduced

thus :

"........Whilst considering applications for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the courts do not enjoy unlimited and unbridled discretionary powers. All

discretionary powers, especially judicial powers, have to be exercised within reasonable bounds,

known to the law. The discretion has to be exercised in a systematic manner informed by reason. Whims or fancies, prejudices or

predilections cannot and should not form the basis of exercising discretionary powers."

11. In an earlier case of State of West Bengal vs. The

Administrator, Howrah Municipality and others, reported in

(1972) 1 SCC 366, the Hon'ble Apex Court had taken a

similar view. It then held that delay in filing an appeal should

not have been for reasons which indicated the party's

negligence in not taking necessary steps, which he could have

or should have taken.

12. It is thus clear from the above referred discussion of

the principles of law governing the discretionary powers of

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Court under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 that though a

technical approach in the matter of condonation of delay is

better avoided, these discretionary powers should not be so

exercised as to help a party which is negligent and does not

present a bona fide case. This is based on the principle,

vigilatibus, et non dormientibus, jura subveniunt or law

comes to the aid of the vigilant and not the slumbering. It is

also clear that the Courts are required to the extent it is

possible to strike a balance between the rights of the party

seeking condonation of delay and rights of the party staying

vigilant in enforcing it's rights and in doing so the Courts also

have to see that no injustice is caused to the party which is

vigilant.

13. As already stated, the appellants, barring

Surendrapal Singh, had no reasons to not take any prompt

steps in filing an appeal especially during the period from

15.2.2010 till 25.8.2010 and since it has not been shown that

they were acting with due diligence, it must be held that these

appellants were negligent in prosecuting the remedy available

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to them at law. Therefore, following the law laid down by the

Hon'ble Apex Court in the said case of Lanka Venkateswarlu

(dead) by LRs, I find that discretion available to the court

under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 could not have

been worked for the benefit of the appellants. The first

appellate Court was right in basing its finding on the reason,

that other appellants, namely, Surjeet Singh, Kuldeep Singh,

Smt. Harjeet Kaur and Smt. Prabhjot Kaur were not careful in

resorting to the remedy available to them to challenge the

judgment and decree of the first appellate Court and that they

were negligent in the matter. This finding was based upon the

facts before the first appellate Court and, therefore, I find no

merit in the argument advanced in this regard on behalf of

appellants and find substance in the contentions raised on

behalf of respondents.

14. There is one more case referred to me by learned

counsel for appellants, which I must consider before parting

with the judgment. The case is of Improvement Trust,

Ludhiana vs. Ujagar Singh and others reported in (2010) 6

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SCC 786. In this case, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that

while considering application for condonation of delay, no

straitjacket formula can be prescribed and each case is to be

weighed from its own facts and circumstances. It has also held

in the facts of that case that delay not being so huge as to

warrant dismissal on hypertechnical ground, a case for

condonation of delay was made out and the appellants were

directed to pay Rs.50,000/- by way of costs to respondent

No.5 therein. This case has been relied upon by the learned

counsel for the appellants, in support of his argument that if

there is any inconvenience caused to the other side, it can be

compensated by directing the applicants to pay costs to the

other side and delay can always be condoned upon such a

condition. I am not inclined to accept this argument. In this

very case of Improvement Trust, Ludhiana, the Hon'ble Apex

Court has held that conduct of parties itself is required to be

seen and not its counsel and that there should be bona fide

reasons put forward by the parties seeking condonation of

delay. It has observed that the conduct, behavior and attitude

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of the party should not indicate that it had been absolutely

negligent in prosecuting the matter. These observations, would

go to show that if there is any negligent conduct or deliberate

delay, no sufficient cause can be said to be made out justifying

exercise of discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in

favour of such a party. I have already found that there has

been negligence in this case and, therefore, I do not think that

this is a fit case for condoning the delay by putting the

appellants to the condition of payment of costs to other side,

especially when the other side has been vigilant in protecting

its rights which have accrued to it as a result of the judgment

and decree passed on 10.6.2009. The finding recorded in this

behalf by first appellate Court against the appellants is indeed

based on the facts before it and there is no perversity in it. The

substantial question of law is answered accordingly.

15. In the circumstances of the case, the appeal deserves

to be dismissed and accordingly it stands dismissed. There

shall be no order as to costs.

JUDGE DWW