Santosh @ Sonu Balram Jadhav vs State Of Maharashtra
2013 Latest Caselaw 217 Bom

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                                                           criwp571-13.doc

         IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
               CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION




                                                                       
             CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO.571 OF 2013




                                               
    Santosh @ Sonu Balram Jadhav                    .. Petitioner

          Versus




                                              
    State of Maharashtra,                           .. Respondent

Mr.D.G. Khamkar appointed Advocate for petitioner Mrs.A.S.Pai, APP for State.

                     
                          CORAM : S.C.DHARMADHIKARI &
                    
                                  G.S.PATEL, JJ

               RESERVED ON           : 20th October 2013
      

PRONOUNCED ON : 28th November, 2013.

ORAL ORDER (PER DHARMADHIKARI, J):

1] Rule. Respondents waive service. Since this matter

comes from prison, the Registry was requested to appoint

an Advocate and Mr.Daulat Khamkar, Advocate was

appointed for the petitioner - prisoner.

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2] The learned APP appears on behalf of respondent

state.

3] The petitioner invokes jurisdiction of this Court under

Article 226 of the Constitution of India to obtain premature

release on the footing that he has completed 14 years of

imprisonment. In terms of the order dated 30 th October

2012, the petitioner cannot be released until he completes

26 years of imprisonment. The petitioner challenges this

order by urging that at best, he can be kept in custody for 22

years, including remission but the impugned order

determines the period of 26 years and that is contrary to law.

The petitioner has given instance and illustration of one

convict No.7092 Prakash Vitthal Kharat. According to the

petitioner - prisoner, even this prisoner was meted out with

similar treatment but later on when he approached this

Court by filing a criminal writ petition, the State released him

on completion of 22 years imprisonment, inclusive of

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remission. The petitioner prisoner places his case on par

with the said Prakash Kharat.

4] The few facts in relation to the petitioner's conviction

and sentence are that the petitioner was arrested on 6 th

September 1998 by Mulund Police Station in connection

with a crime registered and punishable under section 302 of

Indian Penal Code (IPC). The petitioner was put up for trial

in Sessions Case No.1323 of 1998. On conclusion of his

trial by a judgement of conviction and sentence rendered on

21st July 2000, the petitioner was held guilty of the offences

punishable under section 302 of IPC and sentenced to

suffer life imprisonment. The petitioner's case was put up

for premature release but the Government of Maharashtra

passed an order on 30th October 2012 holding that in the

light of the Government policy and particularly contained in

the Government Resolution dated 15th March 2010, a copy

of which is at page 54 of the paperbook, the petitioner's

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case falls under category (2)(c) and, therefore, he cannot be

released unless he completes 26 years' actual imprisonment

including remission.

5] The reason assigned by the State is that this was a

crime committed with exceptional violence and/or with

brutality and against a woman. The petitioner was put up for

trial because the charge against him was that on 5 th

September 1998 at about 10.15 p.m. He caused death of

the deceased Rekha Rajiv Rathod by pouring kerosene on

her and then lit her with match stick. This was with intent to

cause her burn injuries and which, the petitioner was aware,

would cause her death.

6] Therefore, the petitioner came to be convicted and

sentenced as such and the State has categorised the crime

as one being brutal and committed against a helpless

woman. Therefore, the request for premature release has

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been considered and disposed of in the above manner.

Mr.Khamkar, learned Advocate for petitioner submitted

before us that the categorisation of the case of the petitioner

is patently arbitrary. This is not a case where the crime was

committed in a premeditated and brutal manner as alleged.

The crime was committed in the heat of the moment. The

petitioner went to the house of deceased Rekha and

demanded food.

igThe petitioner was hungry and when

Rekha refused to supply him food that he got agitated and

annoyed and in a fit of anger committed the said crime.

Therefore, this was not a case of the crime being committed

with exceptional violence and/or with brutality. Mr.Khamkar

has taken us through all the guidelines which have been

issued for premature release and has submitted that the

categorisation is bad in law and arbitrary so also

discriminatory. He has cited the illustration of the convict

Prakash Kharat and submitted that the petitioner's case is

on par with the said convict.

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7] In support of his submissions, Mr.Khamkar places

reliance upon the judgement of the Supreme Court in the

case of State of Haryana Vs. Jagdish reported in A.I.R. 2010

S.C. 1690.

8] On the other hand, Mrs.Pai, learned APP appearing for

the State has supported the impugned order. She has

submitted that remission is not a matter of right and,

therefore, there is no substance in the contentions of

Mr.Khamkar. A convict like the petitioner who commits a

heinous crime of murder can hardly be heard to say that a

sympathetic view should be taken as he has served a

sentence of imprisonment by spending nearly 15 years in

custody. Therefore, the petition be dismissed.

9] With the assistance of the learned Advocates

appearing for the parties, we have perused the petition and

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all annexures thereto. We have also perused the copy of

the judgement in Sessions Case No.1323 of 1998 arising

out of C.R.No.347 of 1998 registered by the State through

Mulund Police station against the petitioner. The judgement

was delivered on 21st July 2000.

10] The learned Judge while recording the conviction and

sentence has held that the deceased Rekha was put on fire

by the petitioner. The Court has observed that from the

deposition of all witnesses examined on behalf of the State,

it is apparent that the deceased was done away with in a

brutal manner. She was burnt alive by pouring kerocene on

her. This was with an intention to teach her a lesson. The

petitioner accused had neither tried to rescue her nor any

attempt was made by him to extinguish the fire. All these

denotes the manner in which the crime was committed.

11] Now coming to the guidelines for premature release,

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what has been stated in the latest Resolution placed on

record namely Government of Maharashtra Home

Department, Government Resolution dated 15th march 2010

is as under:-

"Government had revised guidelines for premature release of prisoners undergoing life sentences from time to time. These guidelines are applicable to the prisoners committing crimes

mentioned in the Indian Penal Code. However, said guidelines does not cover grave offences

such as life imprisonment under stringent laws like TADA, MCOCA, POTA etc. Therefore, in exercise

of power vested in it under section 432 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the State Government has decided to modify the existing guidelines of even number dated 11th April 2008

and dated 13th June 2008 and pleased to sanction revised guidelines. These revised guidelines are

enclosed herewith as a Annexure I and Annexure II. These guidelines will be applicable to the prisoners who are convicted on or after the date of issue of this Government Resolution.

"2. In cases of life convicts covered under these guidelines, the process of review shall commence after completion of 12 years of actual

imprisonment for review under "14 Year Rule" to which provision of section 433-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure are applicable and after completion of eight years to which provisions of section 433-A of the Code is not applicable. Prisoners convicted for offences against State or

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in terrorist activities or organised crime or similar nature activities will not be selected for open

prison.

"3. If there is a difference of opinion between the Prison Advisory Board and Inspector General of Prisons, Maharashtra State, Pune, Inspector General of Prisons shall record the

specific reasons in support of his recommendations.

"4. The State Government reserves its

rights to remit any sentence to to release the prisoners only after undergoing imprisonment in

excess for which there is no specific guidelines as mentioned in the annexures enclosed with this

Government Resolution."

12] Annexure I to this G.R. is the categorisation of crime,

category number, sub-category and the period of

imprisonment to be undergone including remission, subject

to minimum 14 years of actual imprisonment, including set

off period.

13] In this behalf a useful reference can be made to

section 432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

(Cr.P.C.). That confers powers to suspend or remit the

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sentences and reads as under:-

"432. Power to suspend or remit sentences:- (1)

When any person has been sentenced to punishment for an offence, the appropriate Government may, at any time, without conditions or upon any conditions which

the person sentenced accepts, suspend the execution of his sentence or remit the whole or any part of the punishment to which he has been sentenced. (2) Whenever an application is made to the appropriate

Government for the suspension or remission of a sentence, the appropriate Government may require the

presiding Judge of the Court before or by which the conviction was had or confirmed, to state his opinion as

to whether the application should be granted or refused, together with his reasons for such opinion and also to forward with the statement of such opinion a certified copy of the record of the trial or of such record thereof

as exists.

(3) If any condition on which a sentence has been suspended or remitted is, in the opinion of the appropriate Government, not fulfilled, the appropriate Government may, cancel the suspension or remission,

and thereupon the person in whose favour the sentence has been suspended or remitted may, if at large, be arrested by any police officer, without warrant and remanded to undergo the unexpired portion of the

sentence.

(4) The condition on which a sentence is suspended or remitted under this section may be one to be fulfilled by the person in whose favour the sentence is suspended or remitted, or one independent of his will.

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(5) The appropriate Government may, by general

rules or special orders, give directions as to the suspension of sentences and the conditions on which

petitions should be presented and dealt with:

Provided that in the case of any sentence (other than a sentence of fine) passed on a male person above

the age of eighteen years, no such petition by the person sentenced or by any other person on his behalf shall be entertained, unless the person sentenced is in jail, and -

(a) where such petition is made by the person

sentenced, it is presented through the officer in charge of the jail; or

(b) where such petition is made by any other person, it contains a declaration that the person sentenced is in jail.

(6) The provisions of the above sub-sections shall also

apply to any order passed by a Criminal Court under any section of this Code or of any other law, which restricts the liberty of any person or imposes any liability upon him or his property.

(7) In this section and in Section 433, the expression "appropriate Government" means,--

(a) in cases where the sentence is for an offence against, or the order referred to in subsection (6) is passed under, any law relating to a matter to which the executive power of the Union extends, the Central Government;

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(b) in other cases, the Government of the State within which the offender is sentenced or the said order

is passed.

14] Then comes section 433 which confers power on the

appropriate Government without consent of the person

concerned to commute the sentence and that section and

the further section 433A read as under:-

"

433. Power to commute sentence:- The appropriate Government may, without the consent of the

person sentenced, commute -

(a) a sentence of death, for any other punishment provided by the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860);

(b) a sentence of imprisonment for life, for

imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years or for fine;

(c) a sentence of rigorous imprisonment, for

simple imprisonment for any term to which that person might have been sentenced, or for fine;

(d) a sentence of simple imprisonment, or fine."

"433A. Restriction on powers of remission or commutation in certain cases:- Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 432, where a sentence of imprisonment for life is imposed on conviction of a person for an offence for which death is one of the

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punishments provided by law, or where a sentence of death imposed on a person has been commuted under

Section 433 into one of imprisonment for life, such person shall not be released from prison unless he had

served at least fourteen years of imprisonment."

15] In Criminal Writ Petition No.4187 of 2012 (Subhash

Bhosale Vs. State of Maharashtra) decided on 4 th

September 2013, in the context of a distinction between

parole and furlough, the Division Bench of this Court to

which one of us (S.C.Dharmadhikari, J.) was a party had an

occasion to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in the

case of State of Haryana Vs. Jaisingh, reported in A.I.R.

2003 S.C. 1696. In paras 31 and 32 of this Court's

judgement, this is what is observed:-

31] In that regard, a decision of the Supreme

Court in the case of State of Haryana Vs. Jaising

reported in A.I.R. 2003 S.C. 1696 is relevant. In

that case, what the Supreme Court was

considering was a case of remission. However, a

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notification giving the benefit of remission made

certain prisoners and convicts ineligible for the

same. The classification was that the convicts

who have been convicted for rape, dowry death

and abduction and murder of children below 14

years unnaturally, offences of robbery, prisoners

sentenced under NDPS Act, TADA and

Foreigners

Act and those detained under

detention laws and found guilty of violation of Jail

Manual shall not be given such remission. That

provision came to be challenged before the

Punjab and Haryana High Court. The High Court

held that it is not open to the State Government

while granting general remission to carve out

special exception to cases which according to it,

could be termed as heinous offences and deny

benefit of remission to such class of convicts.

Therefore, the petition of Jai Singh was allowed.

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32] The State of Punjab and Haryana appealed

to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court

held as under:-

"8. The answer to the said question, in our opinion, should be in the negative. This Court in a

catena of decisions has recognised that the gravity of an offence and the quantum of

sentence prescribed in the Code could be a reasonable basis for a classification. This Court in

State of Haryana & Ors. v. Mohinder Singh etc. (2000 (3) SCC 394) held : "Prisoners have no absolute right for remission of their sentence unless except what is prescribed by law and the

circular issued thereunder. That special remission shall not apply to a prisoner convicted of a

particular offence can certainly be a relevant consideration for the State Government not to exercise power of remission in that case." (emphasis supplied)

"9. In Maru Ram etc. etc. v. Union of India & Anr. (1981 (1) SCR 1196), this Court while

repelling an argument of discrimination in regard to the sentence to be imposed in murder cases, held :

"The logic is lucid although its wisdom, in the light

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of penological thought, is open to doubt. We have earlier stated the parameters of judicial restraint

and, as at present advised, we are not satisfied that the classification is based on an irrational

differentia unrelated to the punitive end of social defence. Suffice it to say here, the classification, if due respect to Parliament's choice is given, cannot be castigated as a capricious enough to

attract the lethal consequence of Art. 13 read with Art. 14."

"10. In Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration & Ors. (AIR 1978 SC 1675), this

Court upheld the validity of a classification based on the gravity of the offence."

"11. From the above observations of this Court, it is clear that the gravity of the offence

can form the basis of a valid classification if the object of such classification is to grant or not to

grant remission."

"12. Having come to the conclusion that the

gravity of the offence can be the basis for a valid classification, we will now consider whether the offences excluded from the impugned notification can be said to be such offences which have been

wrongly excluded from the benefit of remission. We notice that the convicts who have been excluded from the benefit of said notification, are those convicts who have been sentenced for offences of rape, dowry death, abduction and murder of a child below 14 years, offences

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coming under Sections 121 to 130 IPC, dacoity, robbery, etc. These are the offences for which

the Code has prescribed the sentence of rigorous imprisonment extending up to life, therefore, from

the very nature of the sentence which the offence entails, the said offences can be categorised as grave offences, therefore, they can be aptly classified as grave offences, which classification

will be a valid classification for the purpose of deciding whether the persons who have committed such offences should be granted remission or not. On this basis, we are of the

opinion that the State Government having decided not to grant remission to these

offenders/offences which carry life imprisonment, should not be granted remission, is justified in

doing so."

"13. Similarly, the offences under the NDPS

and the TADA Acts, apart from carrying heavy penal sentences are offences which could be

termed as offences having serious adverse effect on the society, cognisance of which is required to be taken by the State while granting remission, therefore, they can also be classified as offences

which should be kept out of the purview of remission.

"14. The offences enumerated in Sections

121 to 130 IPC are the offences against the State, though some of them may not be punishable with life imprisonment, still taking into consideration the nature of offence which undermines the security of the State, in our opinion, can be classified for exclusion from the

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benefit of remission."

"15. Again the offences under the

Foreigners Act, Passport Act, Official Secrets Act also being offences against the State, they can be classified as offences which will not be entitled to the benefit of remission. The persons who have

indulged in the breach of mandate of the Jail Manual can also be classified as the offenders who should not be granted the incentive of remission because of their conduct during the

period of their conviction. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the offences excluded from the

benefit of remission under the impugned notification have been properly classified which

classification, in our opinion, is a valid classification for the purpose of making them ineligible for the grant of remission."

16] In two later decisions of the Supreme Court reported in

A.I.R. 2013 S.C. 447 namely Sangeet and Anr. Vs. State of

Haryana and Budhsingh Vs. State of Haryana, A.I.R. 2013

S.C. 2386, the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the

legal position once again. In Sangeet (supra) the Supreme

Court held thus:-

"74. Under the circumstances, it appears to

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us there is a misconception that a prisoner serving a life sentence has an indefeasible

right to release on completion of either fourteen years or twenty years imprisonment.

The prisoner has no such right. A convict undergoing life imprisonment is expected to remain in custody till the end of his life, subject to any remission granted by the appropriate

Government under Section 432 of the Cr.P.C. which in turn is subject to the procedural checks in that Section and the substantive check in Section 433-A of the Cr.P.C.

75. In a sense, therefore, the application of

Section 432 of the Cr.P.C. to a convict is limited. A convict serving a definite term of imprisonment

is entitled to earn a period of remission or even be awarded a period of remission under a statutory rule framed by the appropriate Government or under the Jail Manual. This period is then offset

against the term of punishment given to him. In such an event, if he has undergone the

requisite period of incarceration, his release is automatic and Section 432 of the Cr.P.C. will not even come into play. This Section will come into play only if the convict is to be given an

"additional" period of remission for his release, that is, a period in addition to what he has earned or has been awarded under the Jail Manual or the statutory rules.

76. In the case of a convict undergoing life imprisonment, he will be in custody for an indeterminate period. Therefore, remissions earned by or awarded to such a life convict are only notional. In his case, to reduce the period

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of incarceration, a specific order under Section 432 of the Cr.P.C. will have to be passed by the

appropriate Government. However, the reduced period cannot be less than 14 years as per

Section 433-A of the Cr.P.C.

77. Therefore, Section 432 of the Cr.P.C. has application only in two situations: (1) Where a

convict is to be given "additional" remission or remission for a period over and above the period that he is entitled to or he is awarded under a statutory rule framed by the appropriate

Government or under the Jail Manual. (2) Where a convict is sentenced to life

imprisonment, which is for an indefinite period, subject to procedural and substantive checks.

78. What Section 302 of the IPC provides for is only two punishments - life imprisonment and death penalty. In several cases, this Court

has proceeded on the postulate that life imprisonment means fourteen years of

incarceration, after remissions. The calculation of fourteen years of incarceration is based on another postulate, articulated in Swamy Shraddananda, namely that a sentence of life

imprisonment is first commuted (or deemed converted) to a fixed term of twenty years on the basis of the Karnataka Prison Rules, 1974 and a similar letter issued by the Government of Bihar.

Apparently, rules of this nature exist in other States as well. Thereafter, remissions earned or awarded to a convict are applied to the commuted sentence to work out the period of incarceration to fourteen years.

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79. This re-engineered calculation can be made only after the appropriate Government artificially

determines the period of incarceration. The procedure apparently being followed by the

appropriate Government is that life imprisonment is artificially considered to be imprisonment for a period of twenty years. It is this arbitrary reckoning that has been

prohibited in Ratan Singh. A failure to implement Ratan Singh has led this Court in some cases to carve out a special category in which sentences of twenty years or more are awarded, even after

accounting for remissions. If the law is applied as we understand it, meaning thereby that life

imprisonment is imprisonment for the life span of the convict, with procedural and substantive

checks laid down in the Cr.P.C. for his early release we would reach a legally satisfactory result on the issue of remissions. This makes an order for incarceration for a minimum period

of 20 or 25 or 30 years unnecessary.

Conclusion:

80. The broad result of our discussion is that a relook is needed at some conclusions that have

been taken for granted and we need to continue the development of the law on the basis of experience gained over the years and views expressed in various decisions of this Court. To

be more specific, we conclude:

1. ...........

2. ...........

3. ........

4. ........

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5. The grant of remissions is statutory.

However, to prevent its arbitrary exercise, the legislature has built in some procedural

and substantive checks in the statute. These need to be faithfully enforced.

6. Remission can be granted under Section

432 of the Cr.P.C. in the case of a definite term of sentence. The power under this Section is available only for granting "additional" remission, that is, for a period over and above

the remission granted or awarded to a convict under the Jail Manual or other statutory

rules. If the term of sentence is indefinite (as in life imprisonment), the power under Section 432

of the Cr.P.C. can certainly be exercised but not on the basis that life imprisonment is an arbitrary or imprisonment.

7. Before actually exercising the power of remission under Section 432 of the Cr.P.C. the

appropriate Government must obtain the opinion (with reasons) of the presiding judge of the convicting or confirming Court. Remissions can, therefore, be given only on a case-by-case

basis and not in a wholesale manner."

17] In Budhsingh (supra) the supreme Court observed as

under:-

"7. The matter having reached this Court on the basis of a certificate granted by the High Court, the question that had arisen was

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formulated in the following terms:-

"The main question therefore that falls for consideration is whether

the order of remission has the effect of reducing the sentence in the same way in which an order of an appellate or revisional criminal court has the effect

of reducing the sentence passed by the trial court to the extent indicated in the order of the appellate or revisional court."

"8. On a detailed examination and scrutiny

of the various dimensions of the question that had arisen, this Court upheld the view taken by

the High Court and answered the question formulated by it by holding that "....... the effect of an order of remission is to wipe out that part of the sentence of imprisonment which has not

been served out and thus in practice to reduce the sentence to the period already undergone, in

law the order of remission merely means that the rest of the sentence need not be undergone, leaving the order of conviction by the court and the sentence passed by it untouched."

"9. In Maru Ram Vs. Union of India and Ors, reported in (1981) 1 SCC 107 : (A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 2147) this Court had observed that Article

20(1) of the Constitution engrafts the rule that there can be no ex post facto infliction of a penalty heavier than what had prevailed at the time of commission of the offence. Section 32A ex facie has nothing to do with the punishment or penalty imposed under the Act. In fact, no

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change or alteration in the severity of the penalty under the NDPS Act has been brought about by

the introduction of section 32A with effect from 29.05.1989. What section 32A has done is to

obliterate the benefit of remission(s) that a convict under the NDPS Act would have normally earned. But, if the correct legal position is that the remission(s) do not in any way touch or affect

the penalty / sentence imposed by a court, we do not see how the exclusion of benefit of remission can be understood to have the effect of enlarging the period of incarceration of an accused

convicted under the NDPS Act or as to how the said provision i.e. section 32A can have the effect

of making a convict undergo a longer period of sentence than what the Act had contemplated at

the time of commission of the offence."

18] The argument of Mr.Khamkar, however, is that in the

above decisions the attention of the Honourable Supreme

Court was not invited to the law laid down by the three

Judge bench in Jagdish Vs. State of Haryana (supra). In

that case, the Supreme Court, according to Mr.Khamkar,

held that the power of remission of sentence is absolute and

unfettered. He submits that this judgement holds that the

right of the convict, though limited, is to the extent that his

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case be considered in accordance with the relevant rules.

He cannot claim that he should be released prematurely and

as of right. Centrainly, he can claim benefit of the policy of

remission. That policy ought to be applied uniformly.

19] We are afraid, there is no merit in this contention

because even if one follows and applies the judgement in

the case of State of Haryana Vs. Jagdish 2010 S.C. 1690,

which the Government has referred to in the impugned

order, yet the legal position cannot be any different. The

Supreme Court even in Jagdish's case (supra) does not

hold that there is any absolute right of remission in the

prisoner or convict. The matter before the Supreme Court

arose because of a difference of opinion in several two

Judge bench decisions. It was to resolve that conflict that

the Supreme Court framed the question as to whether the

policy which makes a provision for remission of sentence

should be that which was existing on the date of conviction

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of the accused or it should be the policy that exists on the

consideration of his case for premature release by

appropriate authority. The Supreme Court while resolving

the conflict held that the right of the prisoner to get his case

considered on par with others is, therefore, to be considered

on the strength of the policy that was existing on the date of

his conviction. However, the Supreme Court held that the

said authority is under an obligation to at least exercise its

discretion in relation to an honest exception perceived by

the convict at the time of his conviction that his case for

premature lease would be considered after serving the

sentence prescribed in the short sentencing policy existing

on that date. Therefore, the argument of Mr.Khamkar is that

more liberal policy, if prevailing should be applied, and

premature release be ordered on that basis. Mr.Khamkar's

argument overlooks the fact that in the very same

judgement the Supreme Court has referred to the

categorisation of prisoners, even for premature release.

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The Supreme Court has not elevated the guidelines which

have been evolved as in our case, to the level of any

statutory rules. It has cautioned that premature release

must be in accordance with some well defined and avowed

policy.

20] In the very Judgement (State of Haryana vs. Jagdish)

the Supreme Court has held in para 38 as under:-

"38. At the time of considering the case of premature release of a life convict, the authorities may require to consider his case mainly taking into consideration whether the offence was an

individual act of crime without affecting the society at large; whether there was any chance of future

recurrence of committing a crime; whether the convict had lost his potentiality in committing the crime; whether there was any fruitful purpose of confining the convict any more; the socio

economic condition of the convict's family and other similar circumstances."

21] In the case at hand, according to the petitioner, what

was in force on the date of his conviction are the guidelines

of 11th May 1992. According to these guidelines, the

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categorisation of crimes is to be found as an Annexure to

the letter dated 11th May 1992. Therein also if the crime is

committed with premeditation and exceptional violence or

with perversity, the period of imprisonment to be undergone

including remission, subject to minimum of 14 years of

actual imprisonment, including the set off period is 28 years.

Even if we take that to be the applicable policy, considering

the facts of the present case, it cannot be said that the

petitioner's case is covered by a category as claimed,

namely, where the crime is committed by a convict / person

who has no previous criminal history and the murder is

committed in an individual capacity in the moment of anger

and without premeditation. In the present case, even if 1992

policy/ guidelines are stated to be applicable, still if the crime

is committed with exceptional violence or with perversity and

premeditation, 26 or 28 years of actual imprisonment has to

be undergone. Even in cases where murders are committed

for other reasons, the period is 26 years.

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22] In the later guidelines of 11th April 2008, the

categorisation of crimes and particularly of offences relating

to crimes against women and minors is spelt out and

thereunder if an offence relating to crime against women

and minors is committed with exceptional violence and/or

with brutality or death of victim is caused with burn and/or

murder or rape, then, the period to be undergone is 28

years. We do not see how the petitioner has any beneficial

policy and which could be traced to the guidelines framed by

the State and notified from time to time. If 1992, 2008 and

2010 are the only guidelines and in each of them, if the

petitioner's case can be categorised as a crime committed

with exceptional violence and/or with brutality, then, he has

to undergo 26 years of imprisonment. There is, therefore,

no inconsistency in the views of the Supreme Court. In fact

the later decisions clarify the position in law. The position in

law after Jagdish's case (supra) thus clarified, does not

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result in any conflict or diversion or departure from the

earlier views. The consistent view is that life imprisonment

is for a term and that is entire life and, therefore,

inderminate, has never been deviated from any time.

23] As a result of the above discussion, we do not find any

merit in the petition. The impugned order is consistent with

the guidelines framed and is also in tune with the law laid

down by the Supreme Court from time to time. There is thus

no error of law apparent on the face of the record or

perversity warranting interference in our writ jurisdiction with

the conclusions reached in the impugned order dated 30 th

October 2012, Annexure "A". The writ petition, therefore,

deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed.

Rule is discharged. No costs. Registrar (Judicial) and the

learned Public Prosecutor to communicate this order to the

Jailer and concerned Authorities as expeditiously as

possible. In addition, a certified copy be also made

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available to the prisoner - petitioner concerned free of cost.

(G.S.PATEL, J) (S.C.DHARMADHIKARI, J)