Citation : 2012 Latest Caselaw 285 Bom
Judgement Date : 30 October, 2012
Tapadia RR
1 / 34 WPL/2440/2012
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (LODG) NO. 2440 OF 2012
Builders Association of India .Petitioner
Vs
The State of Maharashtra, and .. Respondents
Ors.
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO. 2502 OF 2012
Maharashtra Chamber of .Petitioners
Housing & Industry and Ors
The State of Maharashtra, and
Vs
.. Respondents
Ors
........
Mr. V. Sridharan, Senior Advocate with Mr V. P. Patkar i/b Mr
M.Vaidya, for the Petitioners.
Mr. Darius J. Khambata, Advocate General with Mr Venkatesh
Dhond, Senior Advocate, Mr B.B.Sharma, A.G.P and Ms Naira
Jejeebhoy for the Respondents.
.......
CORAM : DR.D.Y.CHANDRACHUD AND
R.G.KETKAR,JJ.
DATE : 30 OCTOBER 2012
ORAL JUDGMENT: (PER DR. D.Y.CHANDRACHUD,J.)
1. Rule. By consent, the Rule is made returnable forthwith.
Counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondents waives service.
By consent, both the Petitions are taken up for final hearing at
this stage.
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2. Both these petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution
essentially seek two reliefs: (i) there is a challenge to the
validity of two Circulars issued on 6 August 2012 and 26
September 2012 by the Commissioner of Sales Tax; (ii) the
Petitioners seek the benefit of a composition scheme notified
under section 42(3A) of the Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act,
2002 by a Notification dated 9 July 2010 in respect of the period
commencing from 26 June 2006 in the same manner as extended
by the Notification to agreements which are registered on or after
1 April 2010. The proceedings before this Court have been
instituted by the Builders Association of India and by the
Maharashtra Chamber of Housing and Industry on behalf of their
members.
3. The Legislature in the State of Maharashtra amended the
provisions of Section 2(24) of the Maharashtra Value Added tax
Act, 2002 initially by Maharashtra Act XXXII of 2006 and
thereafter by Maharashtra Act XXV of 2007. Consequent upon
these amendments, the expression "sale" in Section 2(24) is
defined in the following terms:
"(24) "sale" means a sale of goods made within the State for cash or deferred payment or other valuable consideration, but does not include a mortgage, hypothecation, charge or pledge; and the words "sell", "buy" and "purchase", with all their grammatical variations and cognate expressions, shall be construed accordingly;"
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Explanation (ii) provides that for the purpose of this clause, sale
would include:
"(ii) the transfer of property in goods whether as goods or
in some other form involved in the execution of a works contract including, an agreement for carrying out for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration, the building, construction, manufacture, processing, fabrication, erection, installation, fitting out, improvement,
modification, repair or commissioning of any movable or immovable property;"
As a result of the amendment, the State Legislature brought
within the field of taxation under the MVAT Act, the transfer of
property in goods involved in the execution of a works contract
including inter alia agreements for building and construction of
immovable property. The constitutional validity of these
provisions together with those of Rule 58(1A) of the Rules framed
under the Act was challenged in a batch of Writ Petitions before
this Court. The challenge in those cases also involved the
validity of a Trade Circular dated 7 February 2007 and a
Notification dated 9 July 2010. By a Judgment in Maharashtra
Chamber of Housing and Industry and Others Vs. State of
Maharashtra and Others1, this Court repelled the challenges
addressed in the batch of petitions and held inter alia that in
amending section 2(24) the legislature has not transgressed the
limitations prescribed in Article 366(29A)(b) of the Constitution.
1 (2012) 51 VST 168 (Bom)
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The Judgment of the Court held that the amended definition does
not transgress the expanded concept of what constitutes a sale
or purchase of goods for the purpose of Entry 54 of List II of the
Seventh Schedule as defined in Article 366(29A). A batch of
Special Leave Petitions has been filed before the Supreme Court
to challenge the Judgment of this Court.
4. After the Judgment of this Court was delivered on 10 April
2012 the Commissioner of Sales Tax issued a Circular on 6
August 2012 inter alia providing for certain administrative relief
to developers. The Circular inter alia provided that though
ordinarily a delay in obtaining a certificate of registration beyond
a period of five years would be treated as an attempt to evade
tax, in the case of developers such a delay would not be
regarded as an attempt to evade tax and dealers would be
granted administrative relief if they apply for registration before
16 August 2012 and furnish proof of filing returns and the
payment of tax on or before 31 August 2012. In an interim
application filed before the Supreme Court, a stay was sought of
the Circular dated 6 August 2012 besides an order of restraint
against the Sales Tax Authorities from taking coercive steps for
recovery of tax for the period from 2006. In an interim order
dated 28 August 2012 the Supreme Court noted the statement
made by the Advocate General on behalf of the State that the
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time prescribed for registration until 31 August 2012 would stand
extended until 15 October 2012 and the time for filing of returns
would stand extended to 31 October 2012. In view of this
statement, the Supreme Court issued the following interim
directions:
"Having regard to the above statement of the learned Advocate General, we are satisfied that the following interim arrangement shall subserve the ends of justice:
(i) The time for registration by the developers as per clause (1) of the Trade Circular dated August 6, 2012 shall stand extended up to October 15, 2012 and the time for filing
returns by the developers as per clause (m) of the said circular shall stand extended up to October 31, 2012.
(ii) In case the concerned developers pay tax under the
Maharashtra Value Added Tax Act, 2002 (for short "2002 Act") as amended vide section 2(24) w.e.f. June 20, 2006 on or before October 31, 2012, the coercive process for recovery of tax, interest or penalty shall remain stayed.
This shall however not preclude the Assessing Officer to complete the assessment.
(iii) The above payment of tax by the concerned developers shall be subject to the final decision in the matter before this Court.
(iv) In case the amendment in section 2(24) of the 2002
Act is held to be unconstitutional and the tax so deposited/paid by the developers is ordered to be returned by the State Government to the developers, the same shall be returned along with interest at such rate that may be ordered by the court finally at the time of disposal of the matter."
The Supreme Court has directed by way of an interim
arrangement that coercive process for recovery of tax, interest
and penalty shall remain stayed in the case of those developers
who pay tax under the MVAT Act as amended with effect from 20
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June 2006 on or before 31 October 2012. The petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution by the Builders Association of India
was lodged before this Court on 3 October, 2012 while the
petition by the Maharashtra Chamber of Housing and Industry
was lodged on 20 October, 2012, the latter with barely a fortnight
remaining for compliance of the directions issued by the Supreme
Court. Affidavits in reply have been filed by the State of
Maharashtra and we have taken up the petitions for final disposal
in view of the deadline of 31 October, 2012.
5. Before we deal with the merits of the rival submissions, it
would be necessary to set out in brief the import of the two
Circulars dated 6 August 2012 and 26 September 2012 and of
the composition scheme which has been notified by the
Commissioner of Sales Tax on 9 July 2010. As we have noted
earlier, the Circular dated 6 August 2012 inter alia provided for
the grant of certain administrative reliefs to developers. The
Circular inter alia contains the responses of the revenue to
frequently asked questions (FAQs). Among them were the options
available to developers for discharging the tax liability. The
response of the revenue was in the following terms:
"From 20.06.2006 to 31.03.2010
1. Composition Scheme U/s 42 (3)- Under this scheme developer has to pay 5% tax on the agreement value. Land deduction is not available. Input tax credit is available
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subject to the reduction of 4 per cent.
2. Actual Expense Method U/r 58- Under rule 58, the
deduction of Labour and service charges is available on actual basis. Land deduction is also available. Set-off will be
calculated subject to the condition u/r 53 and 54.
3. Standard Deduction Method U/r 58- Under rule 58, the deduction of land cost will be allowed. Thereafter 30% standard deduction from remaining amount will be available as per proviso to sub-rule 1. Set-off will be
calculated subject to the condition u/r 53 and 54. After 01.04.2010 The developers can opt for fourth option also, under this option u/s 42 (3A), developer has to pay 1% tax on
agreement value. No land deduction and input tax credit is available."
In the Circular dated 26 September 2012 the options which were
provided to developers for the payment of VAT were reiterated in
similar terms. The Circular dated 26 September 2012 stipulates
that developers would have to discharge their tax liability by
selecting one option. The Circular then states as follows:
"Some queries have been received regarding liability to be worked out on cost plus basis, i.e. cost of material and profit as per balance sheet. It is now clarified that no method apart from those statutorily prescribed and
mentioned above in the rules will be admissible."
6. Section 42 of the MVAT 2002 provides for composition of
tax. Sub section (3) of Section 42 provides for composition in
respect of a dealer liable to pay tax on sales effected by way of
transfer of property in goods involved in the execution of a works
contract. Under sub section (3) a provision is made for the
payment of a lump-sum by way of composition, subject to the
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restrictions and conditions that may be prescribed, of an amount
equal to (i) five per cent of the total contract value of the works
contract in the case of a construction contract; and (ii) eight per
cent of the total contract value of a works contract in any other
case. Sub section (3A) was introduced by way of an amendment
to section 42 by the Maharashtra Tax Laws (Levy and
Amendment) Act, 2010 with effect from 1 May 2010. Sub-section
(3A) of Section 42 provides as follows:
"(3A) The State Government may, by notification in the
Official Gazette -
(a) to provide a scheme of composition for registered
dealers who undertake the construction of flats, dwellings or buildings or premises and transfer them in pursuance of an agreement along with the land or interest underlying the land;
(b) prescribe the rate of tax by way of composition, in lieu of the amount of tax payable on the transfer of goods
whether as goods or in some other form, in the execution of such works contracts by such registered dealer under this Act."
A Notification was issued by the State Government on 9 July 2010
under section 42 (3A) to provide for a scheme of composition for
registered dealers who undertake the construction of flats,
dwellings, buildings or premises and transfer them in pursuance
of an agreement along with land or interest underlying the land.
The composition amount is 1% of the amount specified in the
agreement or of the value specified for the purpose of stamp
9 / 34 WPL/2440/2012
duty in respect to the agreement under the Bombay Stamp
Act,1958 which is higher. Among the conditions attaching to
the composition scheme is a condition which stipulates that all
agreements which are registered on or after 1 April 2010 shall be
covered under the scheme.
7. Rule 58 of the MVAT Rules provides for determination of the
sale price and of the purchase price in respect of a sale by the
transfer of property in goods involved in the execution of a works
contract. Insofar as is material, the substantive part of sub-rule
(1) provides as follows:
"58. Determination of sale price and of purchase price in respect of sale by transfer of property in goods (whether as good or in some other form) involved in the execution of a works contract.
(1) The value of the goods at the time of the transfer of property in the goods (whether as goods or in some other
form) involved in the execution of a works contract may be determined by effecting the following deductions from the value of the entire contract, in so far as the amounts relating to the deduction pertain to the said works
contract:--
(a) labour and service charges for the execution of the works ;
(b) amounts paid by way of price for sub-contract , if any,
to subcontractors;
(c) charges for planning, designing and architect's fees;
(d) charges for obtaining on hire or otherwise, machinery and tools for the execution of the works contract;
(e) cost of consumables such as water, electricity, fuel used
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in the execution of works contract, the property in which is not transferred in the course of execution of the works
contract;
(f) cost of establishment of the contractor to the extent to
which it is relatable to supply of the said labour and services;
(g) other similar expenses relatable to the said supply of labour and services, where the labour and services are
subsequent to the said transfer of property;
(h) profit earned by the contractor to the extent it is relatable to the supply of said labour and services:"
The proviso to sub rule (1) however stipulates that where the
contractor has not maintained accounts which enable a proper
evaluation of the different deductions as specified above, or
where the accounts maintained by the contractor are not
sufficiently clear or intelligible, the Commissioner may in lieu of
the deductions specified provide a lump-sum deduction as
stipulated in a Table annexed to the proviso. For civil works, such
as construction of buildings, the lump sum deduction is an
amount representing 30%.
8. Sub rule (1A) was introduced into Rule 58 by a Notification
dated 1 June 2009 with effect from 20 June 2006 in the following
terms:
"(1A) In case of a construction contract, where along with the immovable property, the land or, as the case may be, interest in the land, underlying the immovable property is to be conveyed, and the property in the goods (whether as goods or in some other form) involved in the execution of
11 / 34 WPL/2440/2012
the construction contract is also transferred to the purchaser such transfer is liable to tax under this rule. The
value of the said goods at the time of the transfer shall be calculated after making the deductions under sub-rule (1) and the cost of the land from the total agreement value.
The cost of the land shall be determined in accordance with the guidelines appended to the Annual Statement of Rates prepared under the provisions of the Bombay Stamp (Determination of True Market Value of
Property) Rules, 1995, as applicable on the 1st January of the year in which the agreement to sell the property is registered:
Provided that, deduction towards cost of land under this sub-rule shall not exceed 70% of the agreement value."
(The proviso has since been deleted.).
9. Now it is in this background that it would be necessary to
consider the submissions which have been urged on behalf of the
petitioners.
10. Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the
petitioners in the petition filed by the Builders Association of
India urged the following submissions:
(i) The Circular dated 6 August 2012 essentially requires
compliance of the Judgment of this Court upholding the
constitutional validity of Section 2(24) and is unexceptionable.
The substantive challenge, however, is to the Circular dated 26
September 2012 on the ground that the Circular stipulates that
no method apart from those which are statutorily prescribed will
be admissible for determining the assessable value of the goods
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which are transferred in the execution of a works contract; and
(ii) Rule 58(1) stipulates that the value of the goods at the
time of transfer of property in goods involved in the execution of
a works contract may be determined by effecting certain
specified deductions from the value of the entire contract. The
use of the expression 'may be' is indicative of the legislative
intent that the method prescribed by Rule 58(1) is not the only
permissible method. It would be perfectly open to the assessee
to provide his computation of the assessable value on the basis
of the actual cost of the material supplied coupled with a profit
element and the cost plus method is a recognized method of
valuation. Rule 58(1) does not preclude an assessee while filing
returns from taking recourse to the cost plus method. The
Circular dated 26 September 2012,to the extent to which it
stipulates that no other method than what is statutorily
prescribed would be permissible is contrary to rule 58(1);
(iii) The amended provisions of Section 2(24) came into effect
from 20 June 2006. The composition scheme which has been
notified on 9 July 2010 under section 42 (3A) should therefore be
extended with effect from 20 June 2006 and the Notification of
the State Government to the extent to which it applies the
scheme to all agreements registered from 1 April 2010 is
discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The
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rate of tax is the same and since the delegate of the legislature
while notifying the scheme for composition indicated that
payment of tax at the rate of 1% of the agreement value would
sufficiently protect the revenue, there is no justification to apply
the scheme for composition only with effect from 1 April 2010.
11. The following submissions have been urged by learned
Senior Counsel in the petition filed by the Maharashtra Chamber
of Housing and Industry:
(i) Rule 58(1) does not provide the only method of
computing assessable value and it is open to each assessee to
provide its own method of computation. Rule 58(1) is not
exhaustive of the methods to be followed nor do clauses 1 (a) to
(h) contain an exhaustive list of deductions which an assessee
may avail;
(ii) Rule 58(1A) contains an incorporation of the provision of
the Bombay Stamp (Determination of True Market Value of
Property) Rules, 1995. Under the Stamp Duty Rules, it is open to
a developer to demonstrate under rule 4(6) that the market value
for the purposes of stamp duty is less than what is prescribed in
the ready reckoner;
(iii) The Circular dated 26 September 2012 is ultra vires
because it prevents a developer from claiming other deductions
and from providing other acceptable methods for computation of
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the assessable value. Though initially the proviso to rule 58(1A)
had stipulated that the deduction towards the cost of land shall
not exceed 70% of the agreement value, this proviso was deleted
by a Notification dated 30 July 2012 from its inception which
would constitute an acknowledgment that the land cost can
extend beyond 70%. The circular to the extent to which it
restricts options available to the developers under the statutory
rules, would be ultra vires;
(iv) There can be no valid distinction between agreements
which were executed from 20 June 2006 until 30 March 2010 and
those registered after 1 April 2010. Both sets of agreements
constitute the same class. Assessment under the composition
scheme of the value of the goods transferred in the execution of
a works contract is determined at 1% of the contract value and
there is no reason why this should not apply to the period
commencing from 20 June 2006 for which such transactions have
come into the fold of value added taxation. Moreover, since the
amendment which was brought out with effect from 20 June
2006, proceedings were pending before this court and there was
no clarity on the issue until the Judgment of the Division Bench
dated 10 April 2012. In these circumstances, the composition
scheme which applies to agreements which have been registered
after 1 April 2010 should equally apply to agreements which were
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registered prior to that date.
12. In response to the submissions which were urged on behalf
of the petitioners, the learned Advocate General urged the
following submissions:
(i) The provisions of Rule 58(1) including the deductions
that are specified in clause (a) to (h) are in conformity with the
Judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme
Court in Gannon Dunkerley and Co and Others Vs State of
Rajasthan and Ors 2. The proviso to Rule 58(1) is similarly in
accordance with the observations of the Supreme Court insofar
as it provides that in those cases where the accounts of the
developer are not intelligible or worthy of credence, a lump sum
deduction can be allowed in lieu of individual deduction that has
been specified earlier;
(ii) in any event rule 58(1A) which has been held to be
constitutionally valid, provides that where the construction
contract involves a transfer of interest in land, the value of the
goods involved in the execution of the works contract shall be
calculated after making deductions under sub rule (1). In other
words, in respect of those construction contracts where an
element of transfer of interest in land is involved, rule 58(1A)
provides for a mandatory method of computing the assessable
2 (1993) 1 Supreme Court Cases 364
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value. The Circular dated 26 September, 2012 only clarifies what
has been provided in Rule 58(1A) and is, therefore, not ultra
vires;
(iii) There is no challenge in these proceedings either to
Rule 58(1) or to rule 58(1A). The circular does not travel beyond
the boundaries which are set out in the rules and, therefore,
cannot be assailed;
(iv) Rule 58(1A) incorporates only the guidelines appended
to the yearly statement of rates in the stamp duty ready
reckoner. The other provision of the Stamp Duty Rules may only
be looked at for understanding the guidelines. However, the
other provisions do not stand incorporated in Rule 58(1A). Rule
58(1A) is mandatory and both the deductions and the land cost
have to be determined in the mode as specified;
(v) In any event, the judgment of the Constitution Bench of
the Supreme Court in Gannon Dunkerley (supra) held this to
be a permissible method. Once it is a permissible method, it is
open to the Legislature or its delegate to adopt one of those
methods on principles of uniformity;
(vi) A composition scheme involves a concession or
exemption which need not be given to everyone in order to be
valid. Under inclusion can never be a ground to set aside a
concession. A composition scheme is not in the nature of an
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amnesty. While providing a scheme of composition, it was
legitimately open to the government as a delegate of the
legislature to prescribe a cut off date and to extend the scheme
to agreements registered on or after that date. Section 42(3A)
was introduced by way of amendment with effect from 1 April
2010 and a view was taken to the effect that the scheme should
be extended to agreements which are registered after 1 April
2010. That in itself would not render the scheme invalid. Section
42(3A), properly construed, is prospective in nature and it was
open to the Government in consequence to apply the scheme of
composition with effect from 1 April 2010.
13. The rival submissions now fall for consideration.
14. The provisions of Section 2(24) of the MVAT 2002 which
defines the expression "sale" were amended with effect from 20
June 2006 so as to bring within the fold of value added taxation,
the transfer of property in goods involved in the execution of a
works contract including inter alia an agreement for building or
construction of immovable property. The expression "sale price"
is defined in Section 2 (25) to mean the amount of valuable
consideration paid or payable to a dealer for any sale made
including any sum charged for anything done by the seller in
respect of goods at the time of or before delivery. The expression
'turnover of sales' is defined in Section 2(33) to mean "the
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aggregate of the amounts of sale price received or receivable by
a dealer in respect of any sale of goods made during a given
period after deducting the amount of (a) sale price, if any,
refunded by the seller, to a purchaser, in respect of any goods
purchased and returned by the purchaser within the prescribed
period; and (b) deposit, if any, refunded in the prescribed period,
by the seller to a purchaser in respect of any goods sold by the
dealer." The constitutional validity of the provisions of section
2(24) as amended, have been upheld by this Court, though, as
noted earlier, a batch of petitions challenging the Judgment is
pending before the Supreme Court. By and as a result of the
interim order of the Supreme Court, coercive processes for the
recovery of tax, interest and penalty shall not be adopted if the
developers pay the tax due under the MVAT Act 2002, as
amended on or before 31 October 2012. Time for registration was
extended until 15 October 2012 while the time for filing of
returns has been extended until 31 October 2012.
15. Rule 58(1), as originally made, provided for the
determination of the value of the goods involved in the execution
of a works contract at the time of the transfer of property in the
goods by making certain specified deductions from the value of
the entire contract. In Gannon Dunkerley and Co Vs. State
of Rajasthan (supra), the Supreme Court considered the
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constitutional validity of the Forty Sixth Amendment by which
clause 29A was inserted into Article 366. During the course of
the Judgment, the Supreme Court dealt with the submissions of
the State that while determining the value of the goods involved
in the execution of a works contract, a more convenient mode
would be to take the value of the works contract as a whole and
to make certain specified deductions therefrom of the cost of
labour and service rendered by the contractor during the course
of the execution of the works contract. This would also ensure
against an evasion of tax. As the Judgment of the Supreme Court
indicates, counsel for the contractors submitted that in that
event certain deductions would have to be made from the value
of the entire contract in order to arrive at the value of the goods
involved in the execution of the works contract. After considering
the rival submissions, the Supreme Court held as follows ;
"The value of the goods involved in the execution of a
works contract will, therefore, have to be determined by taking into account the value of the entire works contract and deducting therefrom the charges towards labour and services which would cover:
a) Labour charges for execution of the works;
b) amount paid to a sub-contractor for labour and services;
c) charges for planning, designing and architect's fees;
d) charges for obtaining on hire or otherwise machinery and tools used for the execution of the
20 / 34 WPL/2440/2012
works contract;
e) cost of consumables such as water, electricity, fuel etc. used in the execution of the works contract the property in which is not transferred in the course of
execution of a works contract; and
f) cost of establishment of the contractor to the extent it is relatable to supply of labour and services;
g) other similar expenses relatable to supply of labour and services;
h) profit earned by the contractor to the extent it is
relatable to supply of labour and services;
The amounts deductible under these heads will
have to be determined in the light of the facts of a particular case on the basis of the material produced by the contractor."
The Supreme Court held that the value of the goods involved in
the execution of the works contract would have to be determined
after making these deductions and exclusions from the value of
the works contract. When the provisions of Rule 58(1) are read
in juxtaposition with the aforesaid extract of the Judgment of the
Supreme Court, it is evident that the delegate of the legislature
in framing rule 58(1) adopted the very same clauses
representing the deductions that were held to be permissible in
the judgment of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court however
also noted that there may be cases where the contractor has not
maintained proper accounts or where the accounts maintained
by him are not found to be worthy of credence by the assessing
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authority. To deal with such a situation the Supreme Court held
that it would be permissible for the State Legislature to
prescribed a formula for determining the charges for labour and
service after fixing a particular percentage of the value of the
works contract and to allow a deduction of the amount thus
determined from the total value of the works contract for the
purpose of determining the value of the goods involved in the
execution of the works contract. The proviso to rule 58(1) was
enacted to deal with exactly such a situation where the
Commissioner finds that the accounts of the contractor are not
sufficiently clear. In such cases, in lieu of individual deduction, a
lump sum deduction is provided. In the case of a works contract
involving civil works such as construction of the buildings, there
is a lump sum deduction of 30%.
16. Sub rule (1A) to rule 58 was introduced by a Notification
dated 1 June 2009 with effect from 20 June 2006. In other words,
sub-rule 1A relates back to the date of the amendment to section
2(24) of the MVAT Act 2002. Sub Rule (1A) specifically deals with
that category of construction contracts in which, along with
immovable property, the land or interest in land is to be
conveyed and the property in goods involved in the execution of
the construction contract is also transferred to the purchaser.
Rule 58(1A) stipulates that the value of the goods transferred
22 / 34 WPL/2440/2012
shall be calculated after making the deductions under sub-rule
(1) and the cost of the land from the total agreement value. In
other words, in the case of a construction contract where the
works contract involves not just an element of transfer of
property in goods, but a transfer of land or interest in land, there
is a mandate to apply the provisions of sub-rule (1) in computing
the value of the goods at the time of transfer. Similarly, the cost
of the land has to be deducted from the total agreement value.
That the subordinate legislation has made a mandatory provision
is evident from the use of the expression "shall be calculated
after making the deductions under sub-rule (1) and the cost of
the land from the total agreement value." In so far as the cost of
the land is concerned, rule 58(1A) provides that it shall be
determined in accordance with the guidelines appended to the
annual statement of rates prepared under the provisions of the
Bombay Stamp (Determination of true market value of the
Property) Rules 1995 as applicable on 1 January of the year in
which the agreement to sale is registered. Rule 58(1A)
incorporates not the entirety of the Stamp Duty Rules 1995 but
only the guidelines which are appended to the annual statement
of rates prepared under the provisions of the Rules of 1995. Now,
undoubtedly in understanding the guidelines, it would be open to
the Assessing Authority to have due regard to all the provisions
23 / 34 WPL/2440/2012
of the Rules but this is for understanding that part of the Rules
which has been incorporated by Rule 58(1A). In Surana Steels
Pvt Ltd Vs. Dy. Commissioner of Income tax and Ors 3,
Section 115-J of the Income-tax Act, 1961 which fell for
consideration contained an incorporation of the provisions of
Section 205 of the Companies Act, 1956. The Supreme Court,
while citing the seminal work of Justice G.P.Singh on the
Principles of Statutory Interpretation noted that even though only
particular sections of an earlier Act are incorporated into a later
Act, in construing the incorporated sections it may be at times
necessary and permissible to refer to other parts of the earlier
statute which are not incorporated. In that context the Supreme
Court held that all that remained to be done was to read the
provisions plainly and to apply rules of interpretation if any
ambiguity survives.
17. Essentially, what rule 58(1A) does is to provide a particular
modality for determining the value of goods involved in the
execution of construction contracts where an interest in land or
land is also to be conveyed under the contract. The provisions of
rule 58(1A) are not under challenge. Where the Legislature has
an option of adopting one of several methods of determining
assessable value, it is trite law that the legislature or its delegate
3 (1999) 4 Supreme Court Cases 306
24 / 34 WPL/2440/2012
can choose one among several accepted modalities of
computation. The legislature while enacting law or its delegate
while framing subordinate legislation are legitimately entitled to
provide, in the interest of uniformity, that a particular method of
computation shall be adopted. So long as the method which has
been adopted is not arbitrary and bears a reasonable nexus with
the object of the legislation, the Court would not interfere in a
statutory choice made by the legislature or by its delegate. In
the present case, rule 58(1A) mandates how the value of goods
involved in the execution of a construction contract at the time of
the transfer of property in the goods is to be determined in those
cases where contract also involves a transfer of land or interest
in land. The Circular dated 26.9.2012 does no more than specify
the mandate of the statute. The Circular has not introduced a
condition by way of a restriction which is not found in the statute.
Plainly, rule 58(1A) does not permit the developer to take
recourse to a method of computation other than what is specified
in the provision. Hence the Circular dated 6 September 2012
was only clarificatory. In Commissioner of Wealth Tax Vs
Sharvan Kumar Swarup & Sons4, the Supreme Court dealt
with the provisions of rule 1BB of the Wealth Tax Rules 1957 and
the issue which fell for determination was whether that was a
4 (1994) 210 ITR 886 (SC)
25 / 34 WPL/2440/2012
provision which altered substantive rights or was merely
procedural. The Supreme Court noted that rule 1BB merely
provided a choice amongst well known and well settled modes of
valuation and even in the absence of rule 1BB it would not have
been objectionable, nor would there be any legal impediment, to
adopt the mode of valuation embodied in Rule 1BB, namely, the
method of capitalization of income on a number of years
purchase value. The Supreme Court held that the rule was
intended to impart uniformity in valuations and to avoid vagaries
and disparities resulting from the application of different modes
of valuation in different cases where the nature of the property is
similar. The Supreme Court held that rule 1BB was essentially a
rule of evidence as to the choice of one of the accepted methods
of valuation.
18. The next aspect which needs to be considered is the date
of enforcement of the composition scheme. Section 42(3A) was
introduced by the Maharashtra Tax Laws (Levy and Amendment)
Act, 2010 with effect from 1 May 2010. Under the provision the
State Government is empowered by notification to provide a
scheme of composition for registered dealers who undertake the
construction of flats, dwellings building or premises and transfer
them in pursuance of the agreement along with land or interest
underlying the land. The State Government is also empowered to
26 / 34 WPL/2440/2012
prescribe the rate of tax by way of composition, in lieu of the
amount of tax payable on the transfer of goods in the execution
of such works contracts by a registered dealer under the Act. The
composition scheme was notified on 9 July 2010. The conditions
attaching to the scheme stipulate inter alia that all agreements
which are registered on or after 1 April 2010 shall be covered
under the scheme. The Petitioners contend that the cut off date
is arbitrary and that the composition scheme should extend to all
agreements registered after 20 June 2006.
19. Now as a matter of first principle, in framing a scheme of
composition the revenue has to balance several competing
considerations many of which are of a policy nature. One of the
objects of a scheme of composition is to encourage compliance.
Another consideration that may weigh with the revenue is the
element of burden involved in tax administration if assessments
in the normal course are to be carried out. A scheme of
composition essentially seeks to provide an option under which in
lieu of the tax which is payable under the provisions of the Act a
registered dealer can pay what is described as the composition
amount in discharge of the tax liability. In framing a scheme for
composition the State as a delegate of the legislature has to
balance numerous considerations including the interest of the
revenue, the need to encourage compliance and the burden on
27 / 34 WPL/2440/2012
the tax administration which is obviated by the introduction of a
composition option. A scheme for composition provides an
option to an assessee. The assessee is not compelled to accept
the option which is provided in the scheme of composition. The
composition scheme is not in the nature of amnesty but a
provision which has been made by the State acting as a delegate
of the legislature for composition by a registered dealer
undertaking the construction of flats or dwelling units. The
scheme provides for a rate of tax by way of composition in lieu of
the tax payable on the transfer of goods involved in the
execution of a works contract. A scheme for composition is,
therefore, in the nature of a concession which is granted by the
State to a certain class or category of assessees who fulfill the
conditions which are spelt out in the scheme.
20. In Union of India Vs. Parameswaran Match Works and
Ors 5, a Bench of four learned Judges of the Supreme Court laid
down the governing principles of law in the following
observations:
"In the matter of granting concessions or exemption from
tax, the Government has a wide latitude of discretion. It need not give exemption or concession to everyone in order that it may grant the same to some. As we said, the object of granting the concessional rate of duty was to protect the smaller units in the industry from the competition by the larger ones and that object would have
5 1975 1 Supreme Court Cases 305
28 / 34 WPL/2440/2012
been frustrated, if, by adopting the device of fragmentation, the larger units could become the ultimate
beneficiaries of the bounty. That a classification can be founded on a particular date and yet be reasonable, has been held by this Court in several decisions (see Hathisingh
Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Union of India (1960) 3 scr 528, Dr. Mohammed Saheb Mahboon Medico v. The Deputy Custodian General-AIR 1961 SC 1657, Bhikuse Yamasa Kshatriya (P.) Ltd. v. Union of India- AIR 1963 SC 1591, and Daruka & Co. v. Union of India : [1973] 2 SCC 617. The
choice of a date as a basis for classification cannot always be dubbed as arbitrary even if no particular reason is forthcoming for the choice unless it is shown to be capricious or whimsical in the circumstances. When it is
seen that a line or a point there must be and there is no mathematical or logical way of fixing it precisely, the decision of the legislature or its delegate must be accepted
unless we can say that it is very wide of the reasonable mark."
In the Judgment of the Supreme Court in International Cotton
Corpn (P) Ltd Vs. Commercial Tax Officer, Hubli 6, the grant
of a concession in respect of transaction of sale under the Central
Sales Tax Act during a certain period was placed in issue on the
ground that transactions which have been undertaken prior to
the period of concession were not given the same benefit. While
repelling the challenge, the Supreme Court observed as follows:
"Firstly, the fact that transactions of sale prior to the period before 10th November 1964 or at least the period between
23-1-1962 and 10-11-64 were not given the same concession as the transactions between 10-11 -64 and 9-6- 1969 does not mean that the latter concession is unconstitutional. A concession is not a matter of right.
Where the Legislature taking into consideration the hardships caused to a certain set of taxpayers gives them a
6 (1975) 3 Supreme Court Cases 585
29 / 34 WPL/2440/2012
certain concession it does not mean that that action is bad as another set of tax-payers similarly situated may not
have been given a similar concession. It would not be proper to strike down the provision of law giving concession to the former on the ground that the latter are not given
such concession. Nor is it possible for this Court to direct that the latter set should be given a similar concession. That would mean legislation by this Court and this Court has no legislative powers."
Extrapolating these observations to the facts of the present case,
what the scheme of composition has done is to make it
applicable to agreements which were registered after 1 April
2010. It would not be proper for this court to strike down the
provision by which the option of composition has been given to
agreements which were registered after 1 April 2010. Nor for
that matter, would the Court be justified in directing that the
same option of composition should be allowed to agreements
which were registered prior to 1 April 2010. By issuing such a
direction the Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article
226 would be legislating by directing the delegate of the
legislature to extend the ambit of the composition of scheme
beyond what was provided in the scheme. That is impermissible.
21. But it is sought to be urged that those agreements
registered after 1 April 2010 and those which have been
registered prior to that date fall in the same category and it
would be open to the Court under Article 226 to direct the State
30 / 34 WPL/2440/2012
Government to extend the same benefit. In support, reliance was
placed on the Judgment of the Supreme Court in D.S.Nakara
and Ors Vs. Union of India 7 . Now Nakara was a case where
an existing scheme of pension was sought to be liberalized
through an upward revision. The Supreme Court made it
abundantly clear that the Court was not dealing with a new
scheme but the revision of an existing scheme. Since pension is
not an incentive but a reward for past service, any revision of an
existing benefit would stand on a different footing than a new
retiral benefit. The decision in Nakara therefore stands on a
completely different foundation. Similarly, the Judgment of the
Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan Vs. Mukun Chand and
Ors 8, dealt with the provisions of the Rajasthan Jagirdars' Debt
Reduction Act, 1957, whose object was to provide for the scaling
down of debts of those Jagirdars whose jagir lands had been
resumed under the provisions of the state land reform legislation.
While defining the expression "debt," Section 2(e) of the Act
excluded certain categories of debts including those due to the
Central Government or State Government, Scheduled Banks and
Co-operative Societies, Waqf, Trust or a person where the debt
was advanced on his behalf by the court of Wards. The
Supreme Court held that the object of the Act being to ameliorate 7 (1983) 1 Supreme Court Cases 305 8 AIR 1964 SC 1633
31 / 34 WPL/2440/2012
the condition of those persons whose capacity to pay debts had
been reduced by the resumption of their lands, the exclusion in
section 2(e) bore no rational relationship with the object sought
to be achieved. Mukun Chand's case therefore dealt with social
welfare legislation that was intended to provide relief by way of
amelioration to those persons whose lands had been resumed by
the State. Having regard to the object of the legislation the Court
held that the exclusion of a certain category of debts would not
subserve the object of the law. The Judgment of the Supreme
Court in Vishnudas Hundumal Vs The State of M.P. 9 dealt
with a situation where holders of stage carriage permits
granted under the Motor Vehicles Act 1939 were operating stage
carriages on routes for which permits were granted. A scheme
was framed by the State Road Transport Corporation under which
certain routes came to be reserved for exclusive operation by the
Corporation. Part of the routes on which the petitioners were
operating overlapped with the notified routes, as a result of
which their permits were curtailed or cancelled by prohibiting
them from operating their stage carriages on a portion of the
routes which overlapped with the notified routes. The Supreme
Court noted that there were other permit holders in the same
class whose routes had overlapped with the notified routes in
9 AIR 1981 SC 1636
32 / 34 WPL/2440/2012
respect of which their permits were neither curtailed nor
cancelled. The Supreme Court held that this was an error or
omission on the part of the Regional Transport Authority which
had resulted in gross discrimination between one class of permit
holders whose routes overlapped with the notified routes. In this
background, the Supreme Court held that the State cannot take
recourse to inadvertence the result of which was to cause a
glaring discrimination. The Supreme Court therefore held that it
was open to the court to remove the cause of discrimination by
placing the petitioners in the same class as those who had
enjoyed favourable treatment by inadvertence on the part of the
Regional Transport Authority. This judgment of the Supreme
Court would not really advance the case of the Petitioners any
further because evidently that was a case where there was an
inadvertent act on the part of the authority as a result of which
19 persons whose routes overlapped with the notified routes
were allowed to ply their stage carriages while the petitioners
were denied similar treatment. In the present case, the date of
1 April 2010 which has been prescribed for composition is not an
act of inadvertence on the part of the delegate of the legislature.
In framing a scheme of composition it is open to the legislature
and its delegate to determine a cut off date with effect from
which an option of composition is available. In view of the
33 / 34 WPL/2440/2012
Judgment of the Supreme Court in Parmeshwaran Match
Works (supra) the legislature in enacting law and the delegate
of the legislature while framing subordinate legislation have a
wide degree of latitude and a concession does not have to be
provided to everyone in order that it should be given to someone.
These observations must apply a fortiori to revenue legislation
where it is well settled that the court would allow a wide degree
of latitude and discretion to the legislature and to its delegate.
The Judgment in Lohara Steel Industries Ltd Vs. State of A.P
and Anr,10 dealt with a case where a taxing statute imposed tax
on the subject which were exempted by the constitution. The
Supreme Court held that if the taxing statute has imposed a tax
which is divisible in nature and subjects which are exempted by
the Constitution are wrongly taxed, the entire taxing statute
could not be declared ultra vires because it would be feasible to
separate taxes levied on authorised subjects from those which
are levied on exempted subjects. That deals with a completely
different situation. Similarly in Trade Links Limited Vs. State
of Uttar Paradesh,11 the provisions of the Act in the State of U.P
expressly contemplated that consideration for a liquor license
could be determined either by auction or by calling tenders or
otherwise. The Supreme Court held that the use of the 10 (1997) 2 Supreme Court Cases 37 11 (1982) 2 Supreme Court Cases 337
34 / 34 WPL/2440/2012
expression 'or otherwise' indicated that several methods were
available.
22. For these reasons, we have come to the conclusion that
there is no merit in the challenges which have been addressed by
the Petitioners before this Court. We hold in consequence that
the Circulars dated 6 August 2012 and 26 September 2012 are
not ultra vires. We have also come to the conclusion that the
composition scheme is not ultra vires in imposing a condition to
the effect that it shall cover all agreements registered after 1
April 2010. During the course of the hearing we have been
informed by counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners that
representations have been submitted to the State Government
for extending the benefit of the composition scheme to
agreements which were registered between 20 June 2006 and 31
March 2010. We clarify by way of abundant caution that this
Judgment would not stand in the way of the State Government
taking an appropriate decision on the representations that have
been submitted in that regard.
23. For these reasons, the Petitions are dismissed. Rule is
discharged. There shall be no order as to costs.
(Dr.D.Y.Chandrachud,j.)
(R.G.Ketkar, J.)
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