Citation : 2012 Latest Caselaw 264 Bom
Judgement Date : 25 October, 2012
ash 1 CRWP-1900.12
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO. 1900 OF 2012
Shri Irfan Ibrahim Qadri. .. Petitioner
Vs
Medha Gadgil & Others. .. Respondents
-
Shri D.S. Mhaispurkar for the Petitioner.
Smt. P.H. Kantharia, APP for the Respondent Nos.1 to 5.
Smt. A.S. Pai, Special Public Prosecutor for Respondent No.6 (DRI).
--
CORAM : A.S. OKA & SMT. SADHANA S. JADHAV, JJ
DATE ON WHICH SUBMISSIONS WERE HEARD : 29TH OCTOBER, 2012
DATE ON WHICH JUDGMENT IS PRONOUNCED: 6TH NOVEMBER, 2012
JUDGMENT ( PER A.S. OKA, J )
1. By this Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India seeking a writ of habeas corpus, the Petitioner is praying for
quashing and setting aside the order dated 17 th April, 2012 passed by
the first Respondent in exercise of powers conferred by Sub-section (1)
of Section 3 of Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of
Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as
"COFEPOSA Act"). The Petitioner's brother has been ordered to be
detained with a view to prevent him in future from smuggling goods.
ash 2 CRWP-1900.12
2. Learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner submitted that
the detinue was arrested for the offence under Section 135(1)(ii) of the
Customs Act on 18th May, 2011 and was ordered to be released on bail
by the learned Magistrate on the same day. He submitted that apart
from directing the detinue to furnish PR bond and solvent surety (one
or two) in the sum of Rs.2 lakhs, he was directed to attend the
concerned department/Investigating Officer once in a week. A
condition was imposed of not leaving Mumbai without prior permission
of the Investigating Officer. He was directed not to leave India without
permission of the Court. He pointed out that under the same order, the
detinue's passport was ordered to be retained with the Department. He
submitted that admittedly the said order was not placed before the
detaining authority. He submitted that the order granting bail in the
present case was a vital document. He submitted that the subjective
satisfaction of the detaining authority was vitiated as the bail order was
not considered by the detaining authority as the same was not placed
before her. He submitted that the sponsoring authority had placed
before the detaining authority an application made for cancellation of
the said bail order. He submitted that the said application was
withdrawn on 22nd November, 2011 and the said order was not placed
before the detaining authority. Learned counsel appearing for the
Petitioner relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Sunila
ash 3 CRWP-1900.12
Jain v. Union of India & Another [(2006)3 SCC 321]. Relying upon
Paragraphs 18 of the said decision, he submitted that in the facts of the
case, the bail order was a vital document and the non-placement and
non-consideration of the bail order vitiates the detention order. He
placed reliance on a decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the
case of Baban Prakash Ranware v. Commissioner of Police, Pune &
Others decided on 23rd July, 2012. He, therefore, urged that as the
subjective satisfaction is vitiated, the impugned order deserves to be
quashed and set aside.
3. The learned Special Public Prosecutor appearing for the
sixth Respondent urged that the offence in relation to which the bail
was granted to the detinue does not form part of the grounds of
detention. The detention order is based on subsequent incident of 26 th
August, 2011 and subsequent prejudicial conduct of the detinue. She,
therefore, urged that it was not at all necessary for the sponsoring
authority to place the bail order before the detaining authority and in
any case, it was not a vital document at all as the offence in connection
with which bail was granted is not even referred to in the grounds.
She pointed out that the application for cancellation of bail may be a
part of the documents submitted by the sponsoring authority before the
detaining authority but the same has not been considered by the
detaining authority. She invited the attention of the Court to what is
ash 4 CRWP-1900.12
held by the Apex Court in Paragraphs 19 to 22 of the same decision in
the case of Sunila Jain (supra). She submitted that in any event the
bail order was passed in case of a bailable offence and, therefore, it was
not necessary to place the said fact before the detaining authority. She
submitted that in the facts of the case before the Apex Court in Sunila
Jain's case (supra), the Apex Court held that the order granting bail in
case of a bailable offence is not at all a vital document.
4.
She relied upon Section 5A of the COFEPOSA Act and
submitted that the grounds of detention are severable. She submitted
that in view of Section 5A of the COFEPOSA Act, the grounds of
detention being severable, even assuming that the submission made by
the Petitioner has some merit, the order of detention cannot be set aside
on that count. She has placed reliance on the decision of the Apex
Court in the case of Prakash Chandra Mehta v. Commissioner and
Secretary, government of Kerala and Others (1985 (Supp) SCC 144 ).
She, therefore, submitted that there is no merit in the challenge to the
order of detention. The learned APP appearing for the detaining
authority and the State of Maharashtra made similar submissions. By
way of rejoinder, the learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner
submitted that in the bail order, there are stringent restraints imposed
on the detinue and that is the reason why it was a vital document.
ash 5 CRWP-1900.12
5. We have given careful consideration to the submissions. It
is contended by the Respondents that there is no reliance placed on the
offence which is subject matter of RA No.29 of 2011 in which the
detinue was enlarged on bail on 18th August, 2011. This was a case
where it was alleged that on 17 th May, 2011, the detinue was arrested at
Chhatrapati Shivaji International Airport which resulted in the recovery
of Iridium concealed in his undergarments and recovery of electronic
goods such as mobile phones, i-pads and 68 kgs of some white chemical
powder. The value of the goods was Rs.61,65,000/-. After recording
his statement under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962, he was
produced before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate on 18 th May, 2011
when the bail was granted to the detinue. In the order of detention,
reliance is placed on the incident of 26 th August, 2011 when DRI
intercepted two passengers viz. Khatib Shamshouddin Shaukat and
Khalid Mohamed Idris Qureshi who arrived from Hong Kong to
Mumbai. They were found carrying Iridium powder worth
Rs.30,00,000/-. The said Khatib disclosed that the detinue had given
him the job of carrier. It is alleged that one statement of detinue was
recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 on 18 th October,
2011 in which he stated that he was given assignment of smuggling
Iridium by one Vicky. Paragraph 7 of the grounds reads thus:-
"7. Your statement was recorded under section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962. On 18.10.2011 at DRI Mumbai office in which you stated that you are running transport business of your proprietorship
ash 6 CRWP-1900.12
firm of M/s. Anupam Logistics. During your stay at Hong Kong, one Shri Vicky, had given you assignment of smuggling of Iridium from Hong Kong
to India for monetary consideration of Rs.30,000/- per kg. Shri Vicky gave you one consignment of 68
kgs of white powder which was 'anti malaria' and 'anti cancer' drug for smuggling from Hong Kong to India for monetary consideration of Rs.1500/- per kg. You also smuggled 12 I-Phones and 3 I-Pads from Hong Kong to India for one of your friend Shri
Raju without monetary consideration. You were apprehended by DRI, Mumbai on 17.05.2011 at CSI, Airport, Mumbai along with above mentioned smuggled 'Iridium Powder', 'White Powder', 12 i-
phones and 3 i-pads and were arrested in the same case on 18.05.2011."
ig (underline added )
Moreover in Paragraph 9 of the ground, it is stated that "you have
engaged in such prejudicial activities, it is imperative that you should be
detained.....". Thus, in the grounds, there is a reference to the incident
of 17th May, 2011 in which case, the bail was granted on 18th May, 2011.
Thus, the submission made by learned Special Public Prosecutor on
behalf of the sixth Respondents that the incident of 17 th May, 2011 is
not a part of grounds of detention is factually incorrect and is contrary
to record.
6. It will be necessary to make a reference to the order
granting bail dated 18th May, 2011 in the case relating to aforesaid
incident of 17th May, 2011 referred to in the grounds. The relevant part
of which reads thus:-
ash 7 CRWP-1900.12
"Perused heard. As per complainant he is regular
traveller and hence bail may be granted with certain condition. The Ld. APP clearly mentioned
in writing and orally submitted that the offence is bailable.
So considering the same accused be released on PR and solvent surety (one or two) of Rs.Two
lacs. He is at liberty to deposit cash bail of same amount provisionally for 8 weeks. The accused is directed to attend the concerned department/I.O. once in a week. The I.O. is hereby directed to
retain the passport in further orders. The accused is hereby directed not to leave Mumbai without
permission and/or consent of the I.O. and not to leave India without permission of the Court.
Pronounce in open court."
( underline added )
7. At this stage, it is necessary to make a reference to the
decision of the Apex Court in the case of Ahamed Nassar v. State of
Tamil Nadu & Others [(1999)8 SCC 473]. In Paragraph 20, the Apex
Court has observed thus:-
"20. .....A man is to be detained in the prison based on the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. Every conceivable material which is relevant and vital which may have a bearing on the
issue should be placed before the detaining authority. The sponsoring authority should not keep it back, based on his interpretation that it would not be of any help to a prospective detenu. The decision is not to be made by the sponsoring authority. The law on this subject is well settled; a detention order vitiates if any relevant document is not placed before the detaining authority which reasonably could affect his decision."
ash 8 CRWP-1900.12
8. As far as the order on bail application is concerned, in
Clause 12(6) of Paragraph 13 of the decision of the Apex Court in the
case of Abdul Sathar Ibrahim Manik v. Union of India (supra), the Apex
Court held thus:-
"12(6) In a case where detenu is released on bail and is at liberty at the time of passing the order
of detention, then the detaining authority has to necessarily rely upon them as that would be a vital ground for ordering detention. In such a case the bail application and the order granting bail should
necessarily be placed before the authority and the copies should also be supplied to the detenu."
9. The decision in the case of Abdul Sathar Ibrahim Manik
(supra) was considered in the case of Sunila Jain (supra). In Paragraph
12 of the decision in the case of Sunila Jain (supra), it was held thus:-
"12. The question as to whether an offence is
bailable or not is not a vital fact whereupon an order of bail can be passed. Application of mind to the averments made in a bail application may be relevant where the grounds stated therein reveal
certain facts which are vital for passing an order of detention. In a case of such nature, it may be said that the application for bail was necessary to be placed before the detaining authority and non- furnishing a copy thereof to the detenu would
vitiate the order of detention."
10. In Paragraphs 18 to 21 of the decision in the case of Sunila
Jain (supra) the Apex Court has held thus:-
"18. The decisions of this Court referred to hereinbefore must be read in their entirety.
It is no doubt true that whether a detenu on the date of the passing of the order of detention was in custody or not, would be a
ash 9 CRWP-1900.12
relevant fact. It would also be a relevant fact that whether he is free on that date and if he is, whether he is subjected to certain
conditions in pursuance to and in furtherance of the order of bail. If pursuant to or in
furtherance of such conditions he may not be able to flee from justice, that may be held to be relevant consideration for the purpose of passing an order of detention but the converse is not true. Some such other
grounds raised in the application for bail and forming the basis of passing an order of bail may also be held to be relevant. It would, however, not be correct to contend that
irrespective of the nature of the application for bail or irrespective of the nature of the
restrictions, if any, placed by the court of competent jurisdiction in releasing the detenu on bail, the same must invariably and
mandatorily be placed before the detaining authority and the copies thereof supplied to the detenu.
19. The decisions relied upon by Mr. Mani in our opinion do not lay down as universal rule
that irrespective of the facts and circumstances of the case it would be imperative to place all applications for bail as also the orders passed thereupon before the
detaining authority and copies thereof supplied to the detenu. On the petitioner's own showing, only that part f the application for grant of bail that the offence in question is bailable, was relevant. No other submission
had been raised at the Bar. Whether a provision of law is bailable or not is a question of law. The same is presumed to be known to the courts and/or the detaining authority. It may not be necessary even to be stated in the application for bail. If a person had been released on bail on the ground that the offence is bailable, it would not be necessary to bring the said fact before the detaining authority. The detaining authority will have to satisfy himself on the basis of the materials placed on record, as to whether the
ash 10 CRWP-1900.12
order of preventive detention should be passed against the detenu or not. The constitutional mandate can be said to be
violated, provided; (1) the impairment has been caused to the subjective satisfaction to
be arrived at by the detaining authority; and (2) if relevant facts had not been considered or the relevant or vital documents have not been placed before the detaining authority.
20. In the instant case the order of detention has taken note of the fact that the detenu had already been released on bail in the following terms:
ig "You were arrested on 30-1-2003 and released on bail by the Hon'ble Judge, Special Court of Economic Offences, Bangalore, upon executing a personal
bond for an amount of Rs.10,000/-
and security in the form of cash for the like sum."
21. It is also not in dispute that a copy of the order granting bail and order of remand has
been furnished to the detenu. In this view of the matter we are of the opinion that non-
furnishing of a copy of the application of bail cannot be said to be a ground which impaired
the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority or the same was a relevant fact which was required to be taken into consideration by him and the application for bail was required to be supplied to the
detenu. It is now well settled that all the documents placed before the detaining authority are not required to be supplied; only relevant and vital documents are required to be supplied."
(Underlines supplied)
11. Before dealing with the issue whether the bail order is a
vital document, it must be noted here that this Court is not examining
ash 11 CRWP-1900.12
the correctness of the decision of the detaining authority, but this Court
is examining the decision making process. An order of preventive
detention is always based on subjective satisfaction of the detaining
authority. Every document which may affect the subjective satisfaction
of the detaining authority one way or the other is a vital document and
the said document should not be kept back from the detaining
authority. This Court cannot go into the question as to what could
have been the effect on the subjective satisfaction of the detaining
authority on consideration of a vital and relevant document. This Court
has to consider only the question whether a vital document which may
have affected the subjective satisfaction is kept away from the detaining
authority. The reason being that non-placement or non-consideration of
a vital document affects the decision making process of the detaining
authority of recording subjective satisfaction. As far as the order
granting bail is concerned, as held by the Apex Court in the case of
Sunila Jain (supra), irrespective of the nature of application for bail or
irrespective of the nature of restrictions imposed by releasing the
detinue on bail, the same does not become vital document. In
paragraph 12 of the decision in the case of Sunila Jain (supra), the
Apex Court observed that the question as to whether the offence is
bailable or not is not a vital fact whereupon an order of bail can be
passed. Paragraph 18 clearly lays down parameters to decide whether
the bail order is a vital document. There are two considerations. One
ash 12 CRWP-1900.12
is the nature of application for bail and the other is the nature of
restrictions imposed while granting bail. If offence alleged against the
detinue is bailable, and if there are no restrictions or conditions
imposed while granting bail, except for the condition of executing bond
and furnishing surety, the order granting bail may not be a vital
document as it may not affect the subjective satisfaction of the
detaining authority. In case of bailable offence, while granting bail, if a
condition is imposed to ensure that the detinue does not flee from
justice, such order will certainly become a vital document looking to the
nature of condition. Discussion made in Paragraphs 19 and 20 of the
decision in the case of Sunila Jain (supra) shows that in the facts of the
case before the Apex Court, the bail was granted in a bailable offence
without imposing any constraint except the condition of executing
personal bond and furnishing cash surety. The argument before the
Apex Court of the Petitioner was that only that part of the bail
application which disclosed that the offence was bailable was relevant.
In the facts of the present case, apart from the condition of furnishing
personal bond and one or two solvent sureties to make up the amount
of Rs.2 lakhs, the learned Magistrate directed that the passport of the
detinue should be retained by the Investigating Officer and he was
directed to attend the office of the Investigating Officer once in a week.
Moreover, further condition was imposed on the detinue not to leave
Mumbai without prior permission and/or consent of the Investigating
ash 13 CRWP-1900.12
Officer and not to leave India without permission of the Court. Thus,
restraints of substantial nature were imposed on the detinue as a
condition for grant of bail to ensure that he should not flee from justice.
He was deprived of the custody of passport and that he was prevented
from leaving the city of Mumbai. We may note here that the order of
detention has been passed with a view to prevent detinue in future from
smuggling goods. Thus, the order is passed by invoking clause (i) of
Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act. The clause (ii) of
Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act was not invoked.
The detinue was also prevented from leaving India by virtue of grant of
bail and by virtue of the fact that his passport was to remain with the
Investigating Officer. These conditions are certainly vital.
12. Considering the drastic conditions imposed while granting
bail, the order granting bail becomes relevant and vital document as the
same would have influenced the subjective satisfaction of the detaining
authority. We must note here that admittedly the sponsoring authority
had placed a copy of the application for cancellation of the same bail
order before the detaining authority. In the present case, there is no
dispute that the bail order was not placed before the detaining authority
and, therefore, was not considered by the detaining authority. As we
have pointed out earlier, in Paragraph 7 of the grounds of detention,
there is a specific reference to the arrest of the detinue in the said case
ash 14 CRWP-1900.12
on 18th May, 2011. In the ground of detention, reliance has been
placed on the incident of 17 th May, 2011 apart from the subsequent
incident of 26th August, 2011. Therefore, the submission of the learned
counsel appearing for the Petitioner that the bail order was a vital
document will have to be accepted.
13. The Special Public Prosecutor appearing for the
Respondent No.6 has relied upon Section 5A of the COFEPOSA which
reads thus:-
"5A. Grounds of detention severable.- Where a
person has been detained in pursuance of an order of detention under sub-section (1) of section 3 which has been made on two or more grounds, such order of detention shall be deemed to have been made
separately on each of such grounds and accordingly -
(a) such order shall not be deemed to be invalid or inoperative merely because one or some of the grounds is or are -
(i) vague,
(ii) non-existent,
(iii) not relevant,
(iv) not connected
(v) invalid for any other reason whatsoever,
and it is not, therefore, possible to hold that the Government or officer making such order would have been satisfied as provided in sub- section (1) of section 3 with reference to the remaining ground or grounds and made the order of detention;
ash 15 CRWP-1900.12
(b) the Government or officer making the order of detention shall be deemed to have made the order of detention under
the said sub-section (1) after being satisfied as provided in that sub-section
with reference to the remaining ground or grounds."
14. In Paragraph 71 of the decision of the Apex Court in the
case of Prakash Chandra Mehta (supra), it is held thus:-
"71. Section 5-A stipulates that when the
detention order has been made on two or more grounds, such order of detention shall be deemed to have been made separately on each of such grounds
and accordingly that if one irrelevant or one inadmissible ground had been taken into consideration that would not make the detention order bad."
15. In the present case, the subjective satisfaction of the
detaining authority is vitiated due to non-consideration of the bail order
imposing drastic conditions. It is not the case of the Respondents that
on the date of passing of the detention order, the conditions in bail
order were no longer in force. On account of non-consideration of vital
document of bail order, the subjective satisfaction of the detaining
authority stands vitiated. Therefore, reliance placed on Section 5A of
the COFEPOSA Act will not save the order of detention. Therefore,
the Petition must succeed and we pass the following order.
ash 16 CRWP-1900.12
ORDER :
The Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer clause (a)
which reads thus:-
"(a) That this Hon'ble Court be pleased to issue a
Writ of Habeas Corpus or any other appropriate
writ, order or direction quashing and setting aside
the said order of detention bearing No.PSA-
1211/CR-110/SPL/3(A) dated 7.4.2012 and be
pleased to direct that the detenu Imran Ibrahim
Qadri be set at liberty."
( SMT. SADHANA S. JADHAV, J ) ( A.S. OKA, J )
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