Bombay High Court

The Public Information Officer & vs 2] Balchandra Vasudev Radkar on 18 October, 2012

Bench: S.C. Dharmadhikari

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          IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                  CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION




                                                                      
                  WRIT PETITION NO.26 OF 2011




                                              
    The Appellate Authority & Chairman
    Shikshan Prasarak Mandali, 
    S.P. College Campus, Tilak Road,
    Pune




                                             
    The Public Information Officer &
    Secretary, Shikshan Prasarak Mandli,




                                  
    S.P. College Campus, Tilak Road,
    Pune.              ig                         .. Petitioners

         Versus
                     
    1] The State Information Commissioner,
    Maharashtra State Information Commission

    2] Balchandra Vasudev Radkar,
      


    Adult, Occupation, Advocate,
   



    R/o.Kayur, Plot No.13, Sunitha Society,
    Gulavani Maharaj Road, Erandvane,
    Pune.                                         .. Respondents





                             ALONG WITH

                   WRIT PETITION NO.27 OF 2011





    The Appellate Authority & Chairman
    Shikshan Prasarak Mandali, 
    S.P. College Campus, Tilak Road,
    Pune

    The Public Information Officer &




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    Secretary, Shikshan Prasarak Mandli,
    S.P. College Campus, Tilak Road,




                                                                   
    Pune.                                      .. Petitioners




                                           
         Versus

    1] The State Information Commissioner,
    Maharashtra State Information Commission




                                          
    2]   Balasaheb Baburao Jambhulkar
         R/o."Draupada", Plot No.72,




                                 
         Rao Colony, Jain School Road,
         Talegaon Dabhade, Taluka Mawal,
                     
         Dist. Pune.                           .. Respondents

                   WRIT PETITION NO.28 OF 2011
                    
    The Appellate Authority & Chairman
    Shikshan Prasarak Mandali, 
    S.P. College Campus, Tilak Road,
      


    Pune
   



    The Public Information Officer &
    Secretary, Shikshan Prasarak Mandli,
    S.P. College Campus, Tilak Road,





    Pune.                                      .. Petitioners

         Versus





    1] The State Information Commissioner,
    Maharashtra State Information Commission

    2]   Balasaheb Baburao Jambhulkar
         R/o."Draupada", Plot No.72,
         Rao Colony, Jain School Road,




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         Talegaon Dabhade, Taluka Mawal,
         Dist. Pune.                           .. Respondents




                                                                   
                                           
                   WRIT PETITION NO.29 OF 2011

    The Appellate Authority & Chairman
    Shikshan Prasarak Mandali, 




                                          
    S.P. College Campus, Tilak Road,
    Pune




                                 
    The Public Information Officer &
    Secretary, Shikshan Prasarak Mandli,
                     
    S.P. College Campus, Tilak Road,
    Pune.                                      .. Petitioners
                    
         Versus

    1] The State Information Commissioner,
    Maharashtra State Information Commission
      
   



    2]   Balasaheb Baburao Jambhulkar
         R/o."Draupada", Plot No.72,
         Rao Colony, Jain School Road,
         Talegaon Dabhade, Taluka Mawal,





         Dist. Pune.                           .. Respondents


                   WRIT PETITION NO.30 OF 2011





    The Appellate Authority & Chairman
    Shikshan Prasarak Mandali, 
    S.P. College Campus, Tilak Road,
    Pune




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    The Public Information Officer &
    Secretary, Shikshan Prasarak Mandli,




                                                                           
    S.P. College Campus, Tilak Road,
    Pune.                                              .. Petitioners




                                                   
         Versus

    1] The State Information Commissioner,




                                                  
    Maharashtra State Information Commission

    2]   Balasaheb Baburao Jambhulkar




                                       
         R/o."Draupada", Plot No.72,
         Rao Colony, Jain School Road,
                        
         Talegaon Dabhade, Taluka Mawal,
         Dist. Pune.                                   .. Respondents
                       
    Mr.N.V.Bandivadekar with Sagar mane for petitioner No.1 in all 
    petitions.
    Ms.M.S.Bane, AGP for respondent No.1 in all petitions
      


    Mr.A.V.Anturkar   with   Amol   Gatne   i/b.   S.B.Deshmukh   for 
   



    respondent No.2 in all petitions.


                            CORAM        : S. C. DHARMADHIKARI, J.

18th October 2012.

ORAL ORDER:-

Rule in each of the writ petitions. Respondents waive

service. Rule made returnable by consent.

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1] By these petitions under Article 226 and 227 of the

Constitution of India, the petitioners are challenging the orders

passed under Right to Information Act, 2005 (RTI Act for short)

and particularly holding that they are amenable to that Act and

obliged to give information in relation to the affairs of the

Educational Institutions, which are managed, administered and

controlled by a Public Charitable Trust. The facts and

arguments are common. They are taken from Writ Petition

No.26 of 2011 for convenience. The respondent No.2 in these

petitions sought information with regard to some complaints

made to the President of the Institution in March or April 2008.

The applicants requested for supply of copies of the complaints

and some other documents, particulars of which have been

given in the appeal memos. The documents demanded are 18

in number, however, the petitioners in reply to the letters

seeking information stated that the Right To Information Act is

not applicable. The stand is that Shikshan Prasarak Mandali, is

neither aided by the Government nor it comes under section

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2(h) of the RTI Act. It is further contended that some of the

schools run by the Trust are aided by the Government and such

schools may be regarded as a Public Authority. However, all

Educational Institutions do not come or fall within the

definition of this term.

2] The argument is that the Trust is not a public authority

within the meaning of Section 2(h) of the RTI Act. An

Educational Institution, managed and administered by the Trust

receives the grants and assistance from the Government. It is at

best that Institution which can be said to be falling within the

definition of the term public authority but certainly this will not

take within its import or fold the public charitable trust and

which merely manages and administers the Educational

Institution. A public charitable trust pure and simple cannot be

said to be a public authority under the RTI Act. It cannot be

said to be a Authority or body owned or controlled by the State

Government.

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3] It is not possible to accept either of these contentions for

obvious reasons. What has led to this argument is an order

which is under challenge in this petition. That order has been

passed by the Commissioner of Information, Pune Bench of the

Maharashtra State Information Commission. That Authority

was dealing with an Appeal challenging an order which was

impugned before it. That was an appeal under section 19(3) of

the RTI Act. It was the case of the petitioner that it is a public

trust registered under the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950 and

Societies Registration Act, 1860. It is running several schools,

colleges and other Educational Institutions. Some of these are

receiving grants in aid from the State Government while some

are run on unaided or no aid or grant basis. The petitioner

Trust is not receiving any grant from Government in any form

whatsoever. The second respondent to this petition made an

application to petitioner No.2, Public Information Officer of the

Trust. By that application, he sought information relating to the

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Trust. He was informed on 6th October 2009 that the provisions

of the RTI Act are not applicable to the Trust. Aggrieved and

dis-satisfied by this communication, he preferred an appeal

before the Appellate Authority under the RTI Act. That appeal

also was disposed of by the appellate authority affirming above

conclusions.

He then filed Second Appeal No.1932 of 2009 on 11 th

December 2009 and which appeal was placed before the

Information Commissioner, who by the impugned order dated

13th September 2010 allowed it and directed the petitioners to

supply the said information.

5] Aggrieved and dis-satisfied with this order that the instant

petition is filed in which Mr.Bandivadekar, learned Counsel

appearing for petitioner made the aforenoted arguments.

6] On the other hand Mr.Anturkar, learned Counsel appearing

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for respondent No.2 submitted that the conclusion of the State

Information Commissioner is in consonance with the object and

purpose of the RTI Act. The term "public authority" as defined

in the RTI Act, would make it clear that first part of it clarifies

that all statutory bodies and authorities would be covered and

the latter part of it includes bodies owned, controlled or

substantially financed by the Government. Now, when non

governmental organisations, substantially financed directly or

indirectly by funds provided by appropriate government are

brought within the ambit and purview of the RTI Act, then, all

the more a conclusion is inescapable that the petitioner trust's

plea could not have been entertained. it is reading the act as if

it applies to an activity or function of a public trust but it will

not apply to that public trust even if that activity or function is

being performed under its auspices or control. If every single

Educational Institution is established, managed, administered

and controlled by the Public Trust or societies or bodies of the

present nature, then, a defence will always be raised to resist

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the application of the Act by urging that the Act will apply to its

activity or function and not to it. In the submission of

Mr.Anturkar, this will defeat and frustrate the Act. It would run

counter to the Legislative intent in making all such bodies,

organisations, including non governmental one, accountable

and answerable to the public. For all these reasons, he submits

that the petition be dismissed. The controversy as noted above

is common to all these petitions.

7] To appreciate it, the RTI Act and its provisions will have to

be borne in mind. On 15 th June 2005 Act 22 of 2005 was

brought into effect whereunder what is paramount and

predominant is conferring of Right to information for citizens.

The RTI Act is only giving effect to and implementing

Constitutional mandate of "Right to Know" which flows from

the right to freedom and expression guaranteed vide Article

19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India, 1950. As would be

evident from the preamble itself, some practical regime had to

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be created so that the substantive right as conferred by the

Constitution of India can be enforced. Therefore, the preamble

states that this is an Act for setting out practical regime of right

to information for citizens to secure access to the information

under the control of public authorities, in order to promote

transparency, accountability in the working of every public

authority, constitution of the Central Information Commission

and State Information Commission and for matters connected

therewith or incidental thereto. The preamble then reads thus:-

"AND WHEREAS democracy requires an informed citizenry and transparency of information

which are vital to its functioning and also to contain corruption and to hold Governments and their instrumentalities accountable to the governed;

AND WHEREAS revelation of information in actual practice is likely to conflict with other public interests including efficient operations of the Governments, optimum use of limited fiscal resources and the preservation of confidentiality of sensitive

information;

AND WHEREAS it is necessary to harmonise these conflicting interests while preserving the paramountcy of the democratic ideal;

NOW, THEREFORE, it is expedient to provide

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for furnishing certain information to citizens who desire to have it."

8] The object and aim of the RTI Act, 2005 was considered by

the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Institute of Chartered

Accountants Vs. Shaunak H. Satya reported in A.I.R. 2011 S.C.

3336. In that context and dealing with some of the provisions of

the Act, it is held as under:-

"18. The information to which RTI Act applies falls into two categories, namely, (I) information which promotes transparency and accountability in

the working of every public authority, disclosure of

which helps in containing or discouraging corruption, enumerated in clauses (b) and © of section 4(1) of RTI Act; and (ii) other information held by public authorities not falling under section 4(1)(b) and © of

the RTI Act. In regard to information falling under the first category, the public authorities owe a duty to disseminate the information wide suo motu to the public so as to make it easily accessible to the public.

In regard to information enumerated or required to be enumerated under section 4(1)(b) and © of RTI Act, necessarily and naturally, the competent authorities under the RTI Act, will have to act in a proactive manner so as to ensure accountability and ensure that the fight against corruption goes on

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relentlessly. But in regard to other information which do not fall under section 4(1)(b) and © of the Act,

there is a need to proceed with circumspection as it is necessary to find out whether they are exempted from

disclosure. One of the objects of democracy is to bring about transparency of information to contain corruption and bring about accountability. But achieving this object does not mean that other equally

important public interests including efficient functioning of the Governments and public authorities, optimum use of limited fiscal resources,

preservation of confidentiality of sensitive information, etc. are to be ignored or sacrificed. The

object of RTI Act is to harmonise the conflicting public interests, that is, ensuring transparency to bring in accountability and containing corruption on the one

hand, and at the same time ensure that the revelation of information, in actual practice, does not harm or adversely affect other public interests which include efficient functioning of the Governments, optimum

use of limited fiscal resources and preservation of

confidentiality of sensitive information, on the other hand. While sections 3 and 4 seek to achieve the first objective, sections 8, 9, 10 and 11 seek to achieve the second objective. Therefore, when section 8 exempts

certain information from being disclosed, it should not be considered to be a fetter on the right to information, but as an equally important provision protecting other public interests essential for the

fulfilment and preservation of democratic ideals. Therefore, in dealing with information not falling under section 4(1)(b) and ©, the competent authorities under the RTI Act will not read the exemptions in section 8 in a restrictive manner but in a practical manner so that the other public interests

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are preserved and the RTI Act attains a fine balance between its goal of attaining transparency of

information and safeguarding the other public interests."

"19. Among the ten categories of information which are exempted from disclosure under section 8 of the RTI Act, six categories which are described in

clauses (a), (b), ©, (f), (g) and (h) carry absolute exemption. Information enumerated in clauses (d),

(e) and (j) on the other hand get only conditional

exemption, that is the exemption subject to the overriding power of the competent authority under

the RTI Act in larger public interest, to direct disclosure of such information. The information referred to in clause (i) relates to an exemption for a

specific period, with an obligation to make the said information public after such period. The information relating to intellectual property and the information available to persons in their fiduciary relationship,

referred to in clauses (d) and (e) of section 8(1) do

not enjoy absolute exemption. Though exempted, if the competent authority under the Act is satisfied that larger public interest warrants disclosure of such information, such information will have to be

disclosed. It is needless to say that the competent authority will have to record reasons for holding that an exempted information should be disclosed in larger public interest."

"25. ..... Public authorities should realise that in an era of transparency, previous practices of unwarranted secrecy have no longer a place. Accountability and prevention of corruption is

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possible only through transparency. Attaining transparency no doubt would involve additional work

with reference to maintaining records and furnishing information. Parliament has enacted the RTI Act

providing access to information, after great debate and deliberations by the Civil Society and the parliament. In its wisdom, the parliament has chosen to exempt only certain categories of information from

disclosure and certain organisations from the applicability of the Act. ....."

"26. We, however, agree that it is necessary to make a distinction in regard to information intended to

bring transparency, to improve accountability and to reduce corruption, falling under section 4(1)(b) and © and other information which may not have a

bearing on accountability or reducing corruption. The competent authorities under the RTI Act will have to maintain a proper balance so that while achieving transparency, the demand for information

does not reach unmanageable proportions affecting

other public interests, which include efficient operation of public authorities and Government, preservation of confidentiality of sensitive information and optimum use of limited fiscal

resources."

When it comes to the definitions, the term "appropriate

Government" has been defined and when it is so defined, what

is crucial therein are the words, "established, constituted,

owned, controlled or substantially financed" by funds provided

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directly or indirectly. Therefore, in properly defining a public

authority, the word "appropriate government" had to be defined

and it is defined in section 2(a) as under:-

"2(a)"appropriate Government" means in relation to a public authority which is established, constituted, owned, controlled or substantially financed by funds provided directly or indirectly ---

(i) by the Central Government or the Union

territory administration, the Central Government;

         (ii)        by   the   State   Government,   the   State 
         Government;"
                        

    9]    The   term   "information"   is   defined   in   section   2(f).     The

later definition and which is directly falling for my

interpretation is section 2(h) and the term "right to

information" as defined in section 2(j). Both read as under:-

"2(h)"Public authority" means any authority or body

or institution of self-government established or constituted -

(a) by or under the Constitution;

(b) by any other law made by Parliament; © by any other law made by State

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Legislature;

(d) by notification issued or order made by the

appropriate Government,

and includes any ---

(i) body owned, controlled or substantially financed;

        (ii)          non-Government                    organisation 
        substantially financed;

directly or indirectly by funds provided by the appropriate Government;"

"2(j) "right to information" means the right to

information accessible under this Act which is held by or under the control of any public authority and includes the right to ---

(I) inspection of work, documents, records;

(ii) taking notes, extracts or certified copies of

documents or records;

(iii) taking certified samples of material;

(iv) obtaining information in the form of diskettes, floppies, tapes video cassettes or in any other

electronic mode or through printouts where such information is stored in a computer or in any other device;"

10] If Chapter II which provides for right to information and

obligations of public authority as contained in sections 3 to 11 is

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taken into account, then, it would be clear that what the

legislature brought in place and effect is a practical regime.

That practical regime means all those who are obliged to

provide information should be properly identified. That

identification has been done so as to then make it possible for

citizens to have this obligation enforced. Therefore, the term

public authority in the first part means any authority or body or

institution of self government, established or constituted by or

under the constitution, by any other law made by the State

Legislature and equally by notification issued or order made by

appropriate government. The word "establish" means "to bring

into existence" whereas the word "constituted" does not

necessarily mean "created" or "set up" though it may mean that

also. The word is used in a wider significance and would

include both the idea of creating or establishing and giving a

legal form to the body (see A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 868 M/s.R.C.Mitter

and Sons Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal). It

includes in the later part "any body owned, controlled or

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substantially financed" and equally a non governmental

organisation, substantially financed directly or indirectly by

funds provided by appropriate government. Thus any body

owned, controlled or substantially financed is being brought

within the net and purview of the definition so as to clearly set

out its duty and obligation to provide information and

thereafter, make it possible for the citizens to enforce it. It is

very clear that the Legislature did not exhaust itself but

included bodies owned, controlled or substantially financed,

directly or indirectly by funds provided by appropriate

Government. Therefore, to urge that there is no control over

the public charitable trust by the appropriate government or if

at all there is any control or the element of public dealings come

in, that is only in relation to Educational Institutions which are

run, administered and managed by the Trust is nothing but an

attempt to escape from being covered by the Act and complying

with its mandate. A definition as inserted and worded in

Section 2(h) of the RTI Act can safely be termed as partly

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exhaustive and partly inclusive. The choice of words as noted

above would mean enlarging the meaning of the words or

phrases occurring in the Statute.

11] The Educational Institutions in this case receive grants in

aid from the State. These institutions are run, admittedly, by

the petitioners. The petitioner No.1 Trust, manages and

administers their affairs and dealings. The Information in

relation to these institutions and particularly their finances,

management and administration is held by or under the control

of the petitioners before me and that is not disputed. If these

are the authorities in charge of the Educational Institutions,

then, to see them, de hors the Trust or as distinct entities from

the Trust would not be proper. In any event, inherent and

implicit in this admission is that these educational institutions

are bodies controlled or substantially financed by the

appropriate Government and, therefore, covered by the

definition. However, then to say that in relation to them any

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information is sought, it must be sought directly from them and

not from the Trust would make it impossible for the citizens to

have access to information in relation to these bodies. That is

not intended by the Statute nor is the Statute enacted so as to

assist anybody much less persons like petitioners to evade

disclosure of their affairs and dealings. The petitioner Trust,

Shikshan Prasarak Mandali, is a Public Trust registered under

the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950 and which is managing these

educational institutions, to which the State funds or grant in aid

is admissible, although, it may be received in the name of

educational institution. If that is made admissible to it for the

purpose of running the Educational Institutions, making

provisions for payment of salaries and taking care of expenses

in relation to infrastructure etc., then, to my mind, allowing the

defence of the nature set up before me would contravene the

mandate of the Act and would defeat and frustrate it wholly.

There are varied activities which are carried out, may be,

philanthropic, charitable and for the benefit and interest of

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public through such Trusts, societies and bodies. To then hold

that whenever such activities are carried out, the activities are

amenable to the RTI Act and if these activities are carried on

under the aegis of distinct bodies, one can seek information

from such bodies but not from the parental authority means

that neither of them would provide information. It is quite

likely that educational institution for illustration, in this case,

would harass citizens and force them to look to the parental

body for information and it may state that it is the Trust's

obligation and duty to maintain record and documents in

relation to the educational activities. Therefore, to view a

school and college or a educational institution in isolation and

a separate legal entity and only deal with or approach them

would mean that the citizens' right which is paramount and

predominant in this case will be rendered nugatory and cannot

be exercised and enforced by them. A citizen is not expected to

indulge in futile litigation and endless chase in overcoming

technical hurdles and obstacles for seeking information. Public

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authorities are not obliging him by giving him information

because the rule of the day is transparency, accountability in

public dealings and public affairs and in relation to public

funds. In cases of present nature, the information can be sought

by approaching both the educational institutions and the parent

entity controlling them or either. However, the duty and

obligation to provide information as long as the right to seek it

is enforceable by the RTI Act, must be discharged by the Public

Authority. In this case, it is the petitioner Trust.

12] In such circumstances, to my mind, the order under

challenge does not suffer from any error apparent on the face of

the record or perversity, warranting interference in writ

jurisdiction. Equally, in the fitness of things when the power

has been exercised so as to enforce a obligation flowing from a

Constitutional Right guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a), then, it

will not be proper to interfere with such exercise in my

equitable and discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 and

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227 of the Constitution. Even otherwise, on facts the

conclusion of the second appellate authority in the impugned

order is based on the materials produced before it. The second

appellate authority has scrutinised them very meticulously and

properly. It has referred extensively to the Annual Report for

the year 2006-07 and the balance sheets. The funds of the

petitioners comprise of and consist of examination fees, other

educational income, Government Grants. The constitution of

the Trust envisages expending these amounts for fulfilling the

objects of the Trust. Even if the grants are admissible to the

Educational Institutions, the power to utilise them is vested in

the managing committee of the Trust. The second appellate

authority has found that the amounts are deducted from the

grants or public funds for services provided by the Trust to the

Educational Institutions. The accounts of the Institutions and

the Trust are consolidated and even the audit is single. In these

circumstances, there is no reason to differ with the conclusions

of the second appellate authority. They are consistent with the

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contents of the documents produced on record. A careful and

complete scrutiny of the annual accounts, entries therein and

the admitted figures is already undertaken. There cannot be a

reappraisal of all this in my limited jurisdiction. Suffice it to

hold that the segregation of the trust and its activities is

impermissible once the establishment, management and

administration of the educational institutions is exclusively by

the public trust. The Trust as indicated by its name, is

established for promoting education in the society. For these

reasons, the petitioners' arguments must fail.

13] Reliance is placed upon the judgement of a learned Single

Judge in the case of Nagar Yuwak Shikshan Sanstha Nagpur &

Anr. Vs. Maharashtra State Information Commission, Vidharbha

Region, Nagpur and Anr. (2009(6)Mh.L.J.85). The learned

Single Judge was dealing with a petition in which the argument

advanced has been noted in para 3. The argument was that

petitioner No.1 is a public Trust registered under the provisions

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of Bombay Public Trusts Act and the second petitioner in that

petition was a unaided Engineering College. Both do not fall

within the definition of "Public Authority" as defined under the

Right to Information Act.

14] It was said that both of them are not receiving any funds

or financial aid from the appropriate Government. With

greatest respect in para 3 of the order this argument is noted

and equally the other one that reimbursement is made by the

Government of the expenses incurred by the petitioners. But

that reimbursement is under several schemes meant for the

students and not for petitioners, particularly towards fees

recoverable from backward class students or other

instrumentation provided by the appropriate Government.

However, the term "control" that is contemplated in the

definition has been construed, again with respect, narrowly and

restricted to financial dealings and matters. The word "aid"

means to support, help or assist. Aid connotes active support

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and assistance. Thus, Aid is a terminology of wide amplitude.

"Grant" is but part of it. Succor, anything helpful, to give

support to, is aiding. If aid is something more than finance and

it can come in all forms, such as making provision for

infrastructure and not just assistance by financial means, then,

the Legislature in this case did not restrict itself when it uses the

term "control". Therefore, the control or substantial finance,

directly or indirectly by funds provided by Government together

with the ownership of a body make it a public authority for the

purpose of the RTI Act. That is how the same learned Single

Judge understood this judgement when he was party to a later

judgement and of a Division Bench, in the case of Shikshan

Prasarak Mandal & Anr. Vs. State Information Commissioner &

Ors. (2010 (6) Mh.L.J.357)

15] To my mind, even if any larger controversy is not to be

considered , with great respect, had the attention of the learned

Single Judge in the earlier case and equally of the learned

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Single Judge in the case of Bhaskarrao Shankarrao Kulkarni Vs.

State Information Commissioner, Nagpur reported in 2009 (4)

Mh.L.J. 802 and in the case of Dr.Panjabrao Deshmukh Urban

Coop.Bank Ltd. Vs. State Information Commissioner, Vidharbha

Region & Ors. reported in 2009 (3) Mh.L.J. 364 had been

invited to the legislative mandate and the broad terminology as

noted above, possibly a different conclusion would have been

reached by them. The Legislature has advisedly employed the

words "owned", "controlled" or "substantially financed" in

section 2(h) so as to distinguish ownership, control and finance.

All three elements have been included but distinctly to define a

public authority. If these words are used to cover different

aspects in relation to any authority owned, controlled or

financed and together with those established or constituted by

or under the constitution or law, then, to construe the Statute

and the definition restrictively would be doing violence to these

plain words.

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16] As far as the present case is concerned, on facts one finds

that the defence of the petitioners was not tenable. The

petitioners do not dispute that they are running a Educational

Institution and the financial aid comes to the Trust for the

purpose of and for being utilised for the Educational

Institutions. If that is an admitted position and that is what is

taken into account by the State Information Commissioner and

a finding is rendered with regard to petitioners being covered

by section 2(h) of the RTI Act, then, the same requires no

interference in writ jurisdiction, even if the larger controversy is

not decided.

17] In Law Lexicon by Mr.P.Ramnatha Aiyer while defining the

term "control", its meaning in several contexts and backdrop

has been given. In a decision reported in A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 636

(Corporation of the City of Nagpur, Civil Lines Vs. Ramchandra

Modak), the Supreme Court holds that the term "control" is of a

very wide connotation and amplitude and includes a large

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variety of powers which are incidental or consequential to

achieve the powers vested in the authority concerned. The

word "control" in legal terminology and parlance means "to

restrain, to regulate, to govern, to keep under check, to rule

and direct, to subject to authority, superintendence". In A.I.R.

1972 S.C. 1248 (The Shamrao Vithal Cooperative Bank Ltd. Vs.

Kasargode Panduranga Mallya), the Hon'ble Supreme Court

outlined the meaning of this term in the following words:-

"6. ...... The word "control" is synonymous with

superintendence, management or authority to direct,

restrict or regulate (see p.442 of Words and Phrases

(Vol.9) Permanent Edition). Control is exercised by a

superior authority in exercise of its supervisory power

......".

18] Similar is the meaning ascribed or given to this term in a

later decision State of Mysore Vs. Allum Karibasappa and Ors.,

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reported in A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1863. Finally in the case of

Corporation of the City of Nagpur Vs. Ramchandra G. Modak,

A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 636, the Supreme Court in para 4 holds as

under:-

"4. It is thus now settled by this Court that the

term "control" is of a very wide connotation and amplitude and includes a large variety of powers

which are incidental or consequential to achieve the powers vested in the authority concerned. In the aforesaid case, suspension from service pending a

disciplinary inquiry has clearly been held to fall within the ambit of the word "control". On a parity of reasoning, therefore, the plain language of clause (b) of section 59(3) as extracted above irresistibly leads

to the conclusions that the Municipal Commissioner

was fully competent to suspend the respondents pending a departmental inquiry and hence the order of suspension passed against the respondents by the Municipal Commissioner did not suffer from any legal

infirmity. The High Court was, therefore, in error in holding that the order of suspension passed by the Municipal Commissioner was without jurisdiction. In this view of the matter the order of the High Court

cannot be maintained and has to be quashed."

19] What the Supreme Court holds is that "control is

exercised by superior authority in exercise of its supervisory

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power." The word is synonymous with superintendence,

management or authority to direct, restrict or regulate.

Therefore, if this term comprehends all incidental or ancillary

powers, then, to hold that the word "control" appearing in

section 2(h) has a very narrow and restricted meaning would be

doing violence to the plain language of the Statute and

interpreting it so, can never be permitted. A somewhat similar

view is taken by a Full Bench of the Kelara High Court in the

case of Mulloor Rural Cooperative Society Ltd. Vs. State of