Jagjeet Singh vs Heard Learned Counsel Mr. R.S. ...
2012 Latest Caselaw 472 Bom

                                             1                                       apl449.12.odt




                                                                                     
                   
                      IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY,




                                                             
                                NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR.


                      CRIMINAL APPLICATION (APL) NO.449 OF 2012




                                                            
     Jagjeet Singh s/o Chandan Singh Kalsi,
     Aged about 43 years, 
     Occupation - Business, 




                                                
     R/o Vaishali Nagar, Nagpur.                              ....               APPLICANT


                 VERSUS
                            
                           
     State of Maharashtra, 
     through Forest Range Officer, 
     Rajura, Tahsil-Rajura, 
     District-Chandrapur                                      ....        NON-APPLICANT
      


     ___________________________________________________________________
   



                    Mr. R.S. Renu, Advocate for the applicant,
                  Mr. M.P. Badar, Advocate for the non-applicant.
     ___________________________________________________________________





                                  CORAM : M.L. TAHALIYANI, J.

     DATE OF RESERVING THE JUDGMENT    :                              17-10-2012
     DATE OF PRONOUNCING THE JUDGMENT  :                              11-12-2012





                                   


     JUDGMENT : 

1. Heard learned Counsel Mr. R.S. Renu for the applicant and

learned Counsel Mr. M.P. Badar for the non-applicant.

2. Admit.

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3. The question which may come up for determination in the

present criminal application is that as to whether the property seized by the

officer empowered under Section 50 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972

becomes the Government property immediately after the seizure thereof. In

the present case, Truck No. MH-31-DS-2030 belonging to the applicant was

seized during the investigation of P.O.R. No.67/2008 by the competent Forest

Officer. It was alleged that the said Truck loaded with 320 bags of cement

was intercepted on 29th February, 2012 near Rajura Town. It is the case of

prosecution that a carcass of spotted-deer, truck and cement bags were

seized under the panchanama. An offence vide P.O.R. No.67/2008 dated

29th February, 2012 was registered at the office of Range Forest Officer,

Rajura for alleged contravention of provisions of the Wild Life (Protection)

Act, 1972.

4. The applicant moved the learned Judicial Magistrate First

Class, Rajura for return of the said Truck on execution of his requisite bond

to the satisfaction of the learned Magistrate. The learned Magistrate declined

to return the Truck. He, however, directed that 320 bags of cement found in

the Truck be returned to the applicant on execution of his bond of

Rs.1,00,000/-. The learned Magistrate took the view that since the Truck

was involved in the offence punishable under the Wile Life (Protection) Act,

1972 and it was seized by the competent officer, it became the Government

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property.

5. The order of the learned Magistrate was challenged before the

Sessions Court in Criminal Revision Application No.50/2012. The learned

Additional Sessions Judge-2, Chandrapur by a reasoned order held that since

the investigation prima facie indicated that the vehicle was used for

commission of offence under the Wile Life (Protection) Act, 1972, the

application was rightly rejected by the learned Magistrate as the vehicle was

likely to be forfeited under the provisions of Section 51 of the Wild Life

(Protection) Act, 1972.

6. I have gone through the impugned orders passed by the learned

Magistrate and learned Additional Sessions Judge. In fact, both the courts

below have not given any clear finding as to on what grounds the prayer of

the applicant was not granted. However, it appears from the orders of both

the Courts below that they held a view that since the vehicle was seized for

contravention of provisions of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972, it had

become a Government property and therefore, could not be released on

execution of bond. Whether the property seized for alleged contravention of

provisions of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 becomes the Government

property immediately after seizure thereof had come up for determination

before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh

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and others ..vs.. Madhukar Rao, reported at (2008) 14 SCC 624. The

Hon'ble Supreme Court while deciding the said issue had made following

observations at Paras 16, 17 & 18 as under :

"16. We are unable to accept the submissions. To contend that the use of a vehicle in the commission of an offence

under the Act, without anything else would bar its interim release appears to us to be quite unreasonable. There may

be a case where a vehicle was undeniably used for commission of an offence under the Act but the vehicle's owner is in a position to show that it was used for committing the offence only after it was stolen from his

possession. In that situation, we are unable to see why the vehicle should not be released in the owner's favour during the pendency of the trial.

17. We are also unable to accept the submission that Section 50 and the other provisions in Chapter VI of the Act

exclude the application of any provisions of the Code. It is indeed true that Section 50 of the Act has several provisions especially aimed at prevention and detection of offences under the Act. For example, it confers powers of entry, search, arrest and detention on Wild Life and Forest Officers

besides police officers who are normally entrusted with the responsibility of investigation and detection of offences; further sub-section (4) of Section 51 expressly excludes application of Section 360 of the Code and the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act to persons eighteen years or

above in age. But it does not mean that Section 50 in itself or taken along with the other provisions under Chapter VI constitutes a self-contained mechanism so as to exclude every other provision of the Code. This position becomes further clear from sub-section (4) of Section 50 that requires that any person detained, or things seized should forthwith be taken before a Magistrate.

18. Sub-section (4) of Section 50 reads as follows :

"50. (4) Any person detained, or things seized under the foregoing power, shall forthwith be taken before a

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Magistrate to be dealt with according to law under

intimation to the Chief Wild Life Warden or the officer authorised by him in this regard."

It has to be noted here that the expression used in the sub-

section is "according to law" and not "according to the provisions of the Act". The expression "accordingly to law" undoubtedly widens the scope and plainly indicates the application of the provisions of the Code."

As such the Hon'ble Supreme Court had approved the Full

Bench judgment of Madhya Pradesh High Court delivered in the matter of

Madhukar Rao s/o Malik Rao .vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and others.

7. This issue had again come up for consideration before the

Hon'ble Supreme Court in the recent judgment in the case of Principal Chief

Conservator of Forest and Anr. .vs. J.K. Johnson and Ors., reported at AIR

2012 SC 61. The Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering the said issue

has said as under.

"28. One thing is clear that the statutory provisions noticed above do not in explicit terms provide for the forfeiture of the seized items by the departmental authorities from a person who is suspected to have committed offence/s against the 1972 Act. Chapter VI-A which has been inserted in the 1972 Act by Act 16 of 2003 that provides for forfeiture of property derived from illegal hunting and trade is entirely different provision and has nothing to do with forfeiture of the property seized from a person accused of commission of offence against the 1972 Act. Insofar as Section 39(1) (d) of the 1972 Act is concerned, it provides that every vehicle, vessel, weapon,

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trap or tool that has been used for committing an offence

and has been seized under the provisions of the Act shall be the property of the State Government and in a certain situation, the property of the Central Government. The key words in Clause (d) of Section 39(1) are, "----- has been

used for committing an offence. ....". What is the meaning of these words ? The kind of absolute vesting of the seized property in the State Government, on mere suspicion of an offence committed against the 1972 Act, could not have been intended by the Parliament. It is not even scarcely

disputed that every enactment in the country must be in conformity with our Constitution. In this view, it is not

sufficient - nor the law-makers intended to make it - to deprive a person of the property seized under the 1972 Act on accusation that such property has been used for committing an offence against the Act. Section 39(1)(d)

does not get attracted where the items, suspected to have been used for committing an offence, are seized under the provisions of the Act.

It seems to us that it is implicit in Section 39(1)(d) that for

this provision to come into play there has to be a categorical finding by the competent court of law about the use of

seized items such as vehicle, weapon, etc. for commission of the offence. There is merit in the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent Nos.1 to 3 that if the construction put upon Section 39(1)(d) by Mr. R. Sundervardhan is accepted, the expression 'has been used

for committing an offence' occurring therein has to be read as, 'is suspected to have been used for committing an offence'. In our view, this cannot be done.

29. Section 51(2) of the 1972 Act provides for forfeiture

of the property on conviction; it says, inter-alia, that when any person is convicted of an offence against the Act, the court trying the offence may order that any captive animal, wild animal, etc. in respect of which the offence has been committed and any vehicle, vessel or weapon etc. used in the commission of the said offence be forfeited to the State Government.

31. In Madhukar Rao (AIR 2008 SC (supp) 1410 : 2008 AIR SCW 787), albeit, the question was little different but this Court considered the ambit and scope of Section 39(1)

(d). That matter reached this Court from a Full Bench

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decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court. The question

before the Full Bench was whether as a result of deletion of sub-section (2) of Section 50 withdrawing power of interim release, there existed any power with the authorities under the 1972 Act or the Code to release the vehicle used in the

course of alleged commission of offence under the Act. The Full Bench of the High Court held that any property including vehicle seized on accusation or suspicion of commission of offence under the 1972 Act can be released by the Magistrate pending trial in accordance with Section

50(4) read with Section 451 of the Code. The Full Bench also held that mere seizure of any property including vehicle

on the charge of commission of offence would not make the property to be of the State Government under Section 39(1)

(d) of the 1972 Act. Against the decision of the Full Bench, the State of Madhya Pradesh preferred special leave petition

in which leave was granted. This Court extensively considered the statutory provisions and approved the view of the Full Bench of the High Court that deletion of sub- section (2) and its replacement by sub-section (3A) in

Section 50 of the 1972 Act had no effect on the powers of the Court to release the seized vehicle during the pendency

of trial under the provisions of the Code. While dealing with Section 39(1)(d), this Court also approved the view of the Full Bench of the High Court that Section 39(1)(d) would come into play only after a court of competent jurisdiction found that accusation and allegations made against the

accused were true and recorded the finding that the seized article was, as a matter of fact, used in the commission of offence. This Court said :

"..... Any attempt to operationalise Section 39(1)(d) of the

Act merely on the basis of seizure and accusations/ allegations, levelled by the departmental authorities would bring it into conflict with the constitutional provisions and would render it unconstitutional and invalid......"

32. We are in complete agreement with the view of this Court in Madhukar Rao (AIR 2008 SC (Supp) 1410 : 2008 AIR SCW 787) that on the basis of seizure and mere accusations/allegations, Section 39(1)(d) of the 1972 Act cannot be allowed to operate and if it is so done, it would be hit by the constitutional provisions."

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8. As such it is clear that there is no bar on the powers of

Magistrate to consider the application for return of vehicle under the Code of

Criminal Procedure. Obviously the application has to be considered on

merits. The rejection of the application on the ground that the property

seized by the competent officer under the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972

had become Government property was, in my view, not correct. Though the

learned Additional Sessions Judge has not clearly indicated that he rejected

the application because the property had become a Government property,

however he was definitely influenced by the provisions of Section 39(1)(d)

of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 and has, therefore, taken erroneous

decision by rejecting the revision application.

9. In this regard, it may be noted here that the powers of the

forfeiture of property involved in the offences punishable under Section 51 of

the Act are also given to the Magistrate trying the offence.

Sub-section (2) of Section 51 runs as under :-

"When any person is convicted of an offence against this Act, the Court trying the offence may order that any captive animal, wild animal, animal article, trophy, (uncured trophy, meat, ivory imported into India or an article made from such ivory, any specified plant, or part of derivative thereof) in respect of which the offence has been committed, and any trap, tool, vehicle, vessel or weapon, used in the commission of the said offence be forfeited to the State Government and that any licence or permit, held by such person under the provisions of this Act, be cancelled."

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As such the issue of forfeiture of vehicle arises only when a

person is convicted of the offence against the Act and such a forfeiture is to

be ordered by the court trying the offence.

10. In the present case, it is stated by the applicant that he is

registered owner of Truck No. MH-41-DS-2030. The driver and cleaner were

arrested for violation of provisions of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972

and were produced before the learned Magistrate. The vehicle came to be

seized by the non-applicant i.e. Forest Range Officer, Rajura, District

Chandrapur. It is the case of the applicant that the offence was committed

without his knowledge. One carcass of spotted-deer was found in the said

Truck when it was intercepted at Rajura. The truck was loaded with 320

bags of cement. Whether the spotted-deer was killed by the driver and the

cleaner or as to whether they had picked up the carcass of spotted-dear

already lying on the road will have to be decided by the Court trying the

offence. The fact remains that the applicant is not accused in the said case.

He claims vehicle because he was registered owner of the vehicle and he

claimed to be innocent. The alleged offence has been committed by his

driver and cleaner.

11. The learned Additional Sessions Judge while rejecting the

revision application has relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of

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State of Maharashtra, through Assistant Wild Life Warden and Range

Forest Officer .vs. Gajanan s/o Dajiba Jambhulkar reported at 2002

Bom.C.R. (Cri.) 71, where this Court has observed that "casual and liberal

approach in the matter of releasing the seized property or the vehicle by the

courts which is subject to forfeiture at the conclusion of the trial, is uncalled

for as the release of the vehicle, according to us, is likely to frustrate the

provisions of the Act. Before the courts allow the application of the accused

for releasing the vehicle on Supratnama, the courts have to give sound

reasons which justify such release of the vehicle, to prima facie exclude the

possibility of such vehicle being liable for forfeiture as per section 51 of the

Wild Life Protection Act at the conclusion of the trial."

12. I have gone through the said judgment delivered by the

Division Bench. Note of caution was recorded in the said judgment for the

trial Magistrates. Absolute bar has not been created on exercise of powers by

the Magistrate under Section 457 or 451 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,

as the case may be.

13. In the light of observations of this Court reproduced

hereinabove, if the facts of the present case are taken into consideration, it

can be seen that the applicant is resident of Nagpur; the Truck was basically

sent to Andhra Pradesh for transporting cement; the truck was loaded with

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320 bags of cement and a carcass of spotted-deer was found in the truck by

the Range Forest Officer when the Truck was intercepted at Rajura. It is not

the case of the non-applicant that the spotted-deer was killed either by the

driver or the cleaner. In any event, what apparently can be seen is that the

applicant was not aware of the activities of his driver and his cleaner when

they were on their way to Nagpur from Andhra Pradesh. As such it is

difficult to say at this stage whether the Truck would be forfeited or

otherwise even if the driver or cleaner are found guilty of the offence

punishable under Section 51 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972.

14. In the circumstances, I am inclined to direct release of Truck on

execution of requisite bond to the satisfaction of the learned Magistrate.

Hence, I pass the following order.

The application is allowed.

The order passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class,

Rajura dated 7th April, 2012 in Criminal Application No.31/2012 and judgment and order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Chandrapur dated 11th June, 2012 in Criminal Revision Application No.50/2012 are set aside.

The learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Rajura is hereby directed to release Truck No. MH-31-DS-2030 in favour of the applicant after examining all necessary documents and on execution of a requisite bond

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with conditions to the satisfaction of the learned Magistrate, including the

condition that the vehicle shall be produced before the Court as and when required during the course of trial or for further proceedings, if any.

The application stands disposed of.

JUDGE.

pma