Citation : 2009 Latest Caselaw 27 Bom
Judgement Date : 8 December, 2009
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
O. O.C. J.
WRIT PETITION (LD) NO.2152 OF 2009
M/s.Goregaon Petrol Supply Co.& Anr. ...Petitioners.
Versus
State of Maharashtra & Ors. ...Respondents.
.......
Mr. Ashish Kamath i/b. Mr.Sanjay S. Gawde for the Petitioners.
Mr. J.Saluja, AGP for Respondent No.1.
Mr. N.M.Ganguli for Respondent No.3.
......
CORAM : DR. D.Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.
December 8, 2009.
ORAL JUDGMENT:
Rule, returnable forthwith. By consent of Counsel and at
their request taken up for hearing and final disposal.
2. The First Petitioner is a partnership firm which conducts a
Petrol Pump at S.V. Road, Goregaon. An incident took place on 22 nd
March 2006, when three workmen including the Third Respondent
were called to the cabin of a partner to enquire about another
workman, Soma Ghadshi, who was not reporting for duty and had not
furnished a written intimation for overstaying the period of leave.
The aforesaid workman had been asked by the management on 20th
March 2006 about his unauthorised absentism and was directed to
submit his written explanation. It was reported by the management
that the Third Respondent asked the co-workman not to furnish
anything in writing. When the Third Respondent was asked to
explain his conduct, it was alleged that he started shouting and used
filthy language against the partner of the Petitioner and threatened
that the Petrol Pump would be shut down if the management
addresses any query to the co-employee. The Third Respondent was
suspended on 22nd March 2006. Following the suspension, the
workman addressed a letter on 23rd March 2006 apologizing for the
incident. A collective letter was addressed by all the workmen on 1st
April 2006 apologizing for the incident and seeking a revocation of
the order of suspension that was issued to the Third Respondent. A
letter was also addressed on behalf of the Union on 1st April 2006.
3. The management issued a chargesheet on 27th March 2006,
setting out the aforesaid allegation and charging the workman inter
alia with willful insubordination and of the commission of an act
subversive of discipline. An Enquiry Officer was appointed and the
workman was allowed to be represented by a defence representative
who was an Advocate. During the course of the enquiry, the
workman accepted that he had signed a letter of apology, Exhibit 11,
and stated that its contents were true. The workman also accepted
the correctness of the collective letter signed by all the workmen. The
Enquiry Officer came to the conclusion that the charge of misconduct
was proved, in his report dated 26th June 2006. A copy of the report
was forwarded to the workman on 30th June 2006. An order of
dismissal was passed on 3rd July 2006.
4. The workman instituted a complaint of unfair labour
practices under Items 1(a), (b), (c ), (d), (f) and (g) of Schedule IV of
the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of
Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971. During the course of his cross-
examination, the workman admitted that he was represented by an
Advocate and that he had raised no protest during the course of the
enquiry that the recording of the Enquiry Officer was not proper.
The workman admitted his own letter of apology and the letter
addressed by all the workmen collectively.
5. The Labour Court by its judgment dated 27th February
2008, came to the conclusion that the enquiry was fair and proper
and the finding of the Enquiry Officer was not perverse. By its
judgment dated 28th January 2009, the Labour Court came to the
conclusion that the complaint of unfair labour practices was lacking in
substance. The complaint was accordingly dismissed. In revision,
the Industrial Court, by its order dated 31st August 2009, remanded
the proceedings back to the Labour Court.
6. The only ground on which the Industrial Court remanded
the proceedings, was that the Labour Court had failed to consider
whether the Model Standing Orders were applicable to the
establishment. The Industrial Court held that in the absence of
service rules applicable to the establishment, it was not possible for
the revisional Court to consider as to whether the action of the
employer was in accordance with such Rules.
7. Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners submitted
that the workman had not raised any challenge to the enquiry on the
ground of the alleged inapplicability of the Model Standing Orders,
either in the complaint of unfair labour practices or in the memo
before the revisional Court. Reliance was sought to be placed on
judgments of the Supreme Court in support of the submission that
even in the absence of the Model Standing Orders, the employer is not
precluded from holding a disciplinary enquiry. On the other hand, it
is urged on behalf of the workman that the question which has been
raised in the order of the Industrial Court, goes to the root of the
matter and hence a remand is warranted.
8. The record before the Court will indicate that even before
the enquiry commenced, letters were addressed to the management
by the workman, by all the workmen collectively and by the Union.
In his letter dated 23rd March 2006, the workman expressed an
apology for the incident which had taken place on 26th March 2009
and sought leniency. Similar were the contents of the letter dated 1 st
April 2006, addressed by the workmen collectively. During the course
of the enquiry, the workman accepted having signed the aforesaid
letter and correctness of the contents thereof. Evidence was adduced
for and on behalf of the workman in the complaint of unfair labour
practices. There was no substantial challenge whatsoever to the
fairness of the enquiry. Neither in the complaint of unfair labour
practices, nor before the Labour Court, was there any challenge on the
part of the workman to the convening of the enquiry on the ground of
the alleged inapplicability of the Model Standing Orders. The
Industrial Court has referred to the submission recorded in paragraph
7 of the judgment of the Labour Court. In paragraph 7 of the
judgment of the Labour Court what was recorded as having been
argued before the Labour Court is that the misconduct which was
proved against the workman "is not an employment misconduct at
all" and on the other hand, "it had arisen due to pure trade union
activities". In other words, the contention of the workman was that
he was victimised for trade union activities. This is a completely
different submission than what the Industrial Court perceived it to be.
The point which has been raised in the judgment of the Industrial
Court, for the first time, was not raised in the proceedings before the
Labour Court. The point was not raised before the Labour Court in
the complaint of unfair labour practices. There is no reference thereto
in the affidavit in lieu of the Examination-in-Chief. The memo of the
Revision Application before the Industrial Court is also silent on such
a challenge. In these circumstances, the Industrial Court was clearly
in error, in allowing the submission to be raised. There was no
justification for the order of remand.
9. In any event, the submission is wholly devoid of
merits,having regard to the well settled position in law. The employer
is not precluded from holding a disciplinary enquiry even if the
Standing Orders do not apply to the establishment. In Agnani
(W.M.) Vs. Badri Das,1 the law on the subject has been crystalised in
the judgment of the Supreme Court thus:
"It is true that in the absence of standing orders, it would be open to the employer to consider reasonably what conduct
can be properly treated as misconduct. It would be difficult to lay down any general rule in respect of this problem. Acts which are subversive of discipline amongst the employees would constitute misconduct; rowdy conduct in
the course of working hours would constitute misconduct; misbehaviour committed even outside working hours but
within the precincts of the concern and directed towards the employees of the said concern may, in some cases, constitute misconduct; if the conduct proved against the
employee is of such a character that he would not be regarded as worthy of employment, it may, in certain circumstances, be liable to be called misconduct. What is misconduct will naturally depend upon the circumstances of
each case. It may, however, be relevant to observe that it would be imprudent and unreasonable on the part of the
employer to attempt to improve the moral or ethical tone of his employees' conduct in relation to strangers not employed in his concern by the use of the coercive process
of disciplinary jurisdiction. As we have already observed, it is not possible and we do not propose to lay down any general rule in that behalf. When standing orders were framed, there is no difficulty because they define misconduct. In the absence of standing orders, the question
will have to be dealt with reasonably and in accordance with commonsense." (emphasis supplied).
1 1963 I L.L.J. 684
In The Management of Utkal Machinery Ltd. vs. Workman, Santi
Patnaik,2 the Supreme Court held that in the absence of a Standing
Order, unsatisfactory work of the employee may be treated as
misconduct in certain circumstances and an enquiry would be
necessitated. The Supreme Court held thus :
"In the absence of any Standing Order, the unsatisfactory work of an employee may be treated as misconduct and
when the respondent was discharged according to the management for unsatisfactory work it should be taken that
her discharge was tantamount to punishment for an alleged misconduct. If this conclusion is correct the management was not justified in discharging the respondent from service
without holding a proper enquiry." (emphasis supplied)
10. For the aforesaid reasons, the entire approach of the
Industrial Court has suffered from a perversity of approach and is
liable to cause a miscarriage of justice. The Industrial Court was
clearly in error in allowing a challenge, which was not raised before
the Labour Court or before it, in the memo of Revision, to be raised
for the first time. In any event, the challenge is lacking in merit or
2 AIR 1966 SC 1051
substance.
11. The Labour Court held that the enquiry was fair and proper;
that the findings did not suffer from perversity and that the
punishment did not warrant interference. The Industrial Court has
not considered these aspects which arise in the revisional application.
Hence, it would be for the Industrial Court in revision to decide the
Revision Application on merits. In order to facilitate this exercise, the
impugned order of the Industrial Court dated 31st August 2009 is set
aside. Revision Application No.25 of 2009 is restored to the file of
the Industrial Court, which shall pass an order afresh on the Revision
Application, after hearing the parties. All the rights and contentions,
except on the issue which has been decided in this judgment, are kept
open. Rule made absolute in the aforesaid terms. No order as to
costs.
.....
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