Rajesh S/O Suryabhan Nayak vs The State Of Maharashtra, Through ...
2006 Latest Caselaw 535 Bom

JUDGMENT

J.N. Patel, J.

1. These two writ petitions had been filed by the petitioners raising several key issues in reference to the practice and procedure followed by the Police Officers, who are vested with the powers of Executive Magistrate for conducting proceedings under Chapter VIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as 'Code' for short).

2. In Criminal Writ Petition No. 428/2002 the petitioner is an Advocate, who was required to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court, as one person by name Khobaib Raja engaged him to represent his case before the Special Executive Magistrate, Tahsil Division, city of Nagpur, in the proceedings initiated under Section 107 of the Code at the behest of Police Station Lakadganj, and has highlighted the various illegalities and irregularities being practiced in the court of Special Executive Magistrate, who also happens to be the Assistant Commissioner of Police of Kotwali Division, and has been joined in person as respondent No. 3. The main grievance of the petitioner is that in addition to the procedure adopted by respondent No. 3 and the officials working under him, respondent No. 3's behaviour is unbecoming of holding the said post, as he misbehaved, insulted and humiliated the petitioner, who is an Advocate and was appearing for his client, by giving threat and used unparliamentary words, and that inspite of the petitioner having made complaints to the Superior Officers of respondent No. 3, no action in the matter was taken. It is further contended that the person, whom the petitioner was representing, was reprimanded for engaging the petitioner and was threatened with detention in jail by respondent No. 3 through his Clerk Shri Karade, in event of his failure to pay sum of Rs. 2000/-as bribe. Therefore, according to the petitioner, the respondent No. 3 has violated the majesty and dignity of the court of Special Executive Magistrate and solemn office of Executive Magistrate held by him and in connivance with his staff has been extorting money from persons against whom proceedings under Chapter VIII of the Code are initiated in his court under duress of detaining them in jail, if their demands are not fulfilled and by discouraging such persons to engage an Advocate of their own choice by insisting upon engaging Advocate who are patronised by his office and, therefore, such conduct of the respondent No. 3 and his staff is violative of Article 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India, as it deprives personal liberty of a citizen without following the procedure established by law, which should be reasonable, fair and just. Further, their conduct in denying a person to be defended by legal practitioner of his choice is violative of his rights under Article 21 and 22 of Constitution of India.

3. In so far as Criminal Writ Petition No. 293 of 2003 is concerned, it is filed by the petitioners contending that they were called upon to execute a bond of Rs. 25000/-in a proceedings initiated by Walgaon Police under Section 151 read with Section 107, 116(3) of the Code, by insisting upon executing the bond for the sum of Rs. 25000/-with one cross-surety in the like amount belonging to rival group, as interim order passed under Section 116(3) of the Code without following provisions of law and sent the petitioners in jail thereby curtailing their personal liberty contrary to the procedure established by law.

4. This court in both the matters has passed various interim orders including an enquiry into the allegations made by the petitioner Advocate Shri R.S.Nayak in Criminal Writ Petition No. 428 of 2002 against respondent No. 3 and the staff working with him by senior Police Officer and also obtained record and proceedings of the cases in the two petitions. By its order dated 23/9/2003 in Criminal Writ Petition No. 498 of 2002 this Court thought it proper that both the petitions can be heard together and that is how we proposed to dispose of both these petitions by common judgment and order, as the nature of allegations made in the petitions and the illegalities and irregularities, which are alleged to have been adopted by the court of Executive Magistrate are of identical nature.

5. We have heard the learned Counsel for the petitioners and so also the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, representing the respondents in both the matters and with the able assistance of the learned Counsel for the parties, we have examined the record and proceedings in the two cases. What we find is that the allegations made in both the petitions - in so far as it relates to the procedure adopted by the Police Officers who are holding post of Executive Magistrate for conducting proceedings under Chapter VIII of the Code - that it is not properly followed resulting in violation of rights of the petitioners under Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India and it deserves to be streamlined, and effective vigilance on the functioning of such courts of Executive Magistrate is need of the day so that such malpractices can be prevented and their working regulated and controlled by judicial supervision by the court of Sessions and so also administrative control by Senior Police Officers, who have disciplinary control over the persons functioning in such courts including the Presiding Officers, who are of the rank of Inspector of Police and Assistant Commissioner of Police and are conferred with powers of Executive Magistrates, and conduct proceedings under Chapter VIII of the Code.

6. It is in this backdrop that we want to examine the allegations made in the two petitions against the conduct of the authorities and before we dwell on specific allegations made in these two petitions, we would like to reiterate the settled principles relating to initiation of proceedings under Chapter VIII, which provides for security for keeping the peace and for good behaviour. The provisions in this Chapter which empower courts and Magistrate to obtain security from a person to prevent him from committing offences in the future are of two kinds. Firstly, security for keeping the peace, which is contemplated under Sections 106 and 107 of the Code and secondly security for good behaviour, which is specified in Sections 108 to 110 of the Code. Rests of the chapter contains procedure and provisions which is set out in Sections 111 and 112 of the Code. We need not go into a detailed analysis of these provisions but we would like to highlight the practice and procedure which is to be adopted by person holding the post of Special Executive Magistrate or Executive Magistrate while conducting these proceedings.

7. Though the incidents of the various proceedings under this Chapter (Sections 106 to 110 of the Code) differ in material respects, there is one aspect, namely, that all these proceedings have for their object -the prevention, and not punishment of a crime. The other common aspect of all these proceedings is that they are not obligatory but confer the discretionary power on the specified court or magistrate to exercise such power in the specified circumstance being an interference with the liberty of the individual, such power must be exercised judicially, and strictly in accordance with the procedure laid down in the relevant sections. The Magistrate must first himself consider that immediate measures are necessary for the prevention of the breach of the peace or the disturbance of the public tranquility or then commission of any offence or for the public safety and then after recording his reasons in writing, direct the person concerned to execute a bond for keeping the peace, etc. until the conclusion of the enquiry. This postulates application of his judicial mind by the Magistrate, whose order is subject to judicial scrutiny by superior Courts of Revision and superintendence. He cannot completely mortgage his decision, or abdicate his power or surrender his own responsibility in favour of the police, though it would be well within his competence, in a given case to take into account the police report for what it is worth in forming his own conclusion on the material legally available to him. But this exercise must indisputably be seen to be done and the order of the Magistrate must clearly reflect the application of the Magistrate's own judicial mind to the facts and circumstances properly placed before him. However, summary the proceedings under Chapter VIII, Cr.P.C., may be considered, they are judicial proceedings and have to be conducted in accordance with the Code and the Magistrate holding these proceedings must see that the fundamental elements of the judicial process find expression in the machinery for administering justice. It is clear that an order under Sub-section (3) of Section 116 of the Code for furnishing of bond can be made only after the commencement of the enquiry and before its completion, provided the allegations forming the basis of the parent proceeding or the allegations leading to the necessity for furnishing of interim bonds are tested by inquiry and judicial mind is applied for ascertaining whether there is prima facie justifiable basis for such a direction. Sub-section (2) of Section 116 provides that the inquiry is to be as nearly as practicable in the manner prescribed for conducting trial and recording of evidence in summons cases. Chapter XX of the Code makes provision for trial of summons cases. Until the allegations are supported by materials so as to satisfy the judicial mind that a direction for bond is called for, no order for furnishing of a bond can be given. Section 116 of the Code of 1973 corresponds to Section 117 of the Code of 1898, Sub-section (6) and (7) of the 1973 Code are new provision. Old Sub-section (3) commenced with .pending the completion of the enquiry.. The new Sub-section (3), however, starts with .after the commencement and before the completion of the enquiry.. This change has been made so as to put the matter beyond doubt that an interim bond can be called for only after commencement of the enquiry and before its completion. The amendment gives effect to the Supreme Court's decision in Madhu Limaye v. Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Momghyr (A.I.R.1971 S.C.2481)

8. The next important aspect, which has come to our knowledge by examining various record and proceedings from the file of the Executive Magistrate is the manner in which orders are passed under Section 111 and Section 116(3) of the Code. We are shocked and surprised to note that so far as the Execute Magistrate of Kotwali Division is concerned, the learned Special Executive Magistrate has got a printed form incorporating both the orders leaving certain margins so as to fill in the blanks/gaps which only go to indicate that the two orders are passed in a rigid manner without application of mind. We are afraid but have no hesitation to observe that this practice and procedure is probably followed by all the Executive Magistrates, who are Police Officers of the rank of the Assistant Commissioner of Police functioning in their respective Division throughout the city of Nagpur. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor on seeking instructions has made a statement that this practice would be discontinued forthwith. We may remind the Presiding Officers of the courts of Executive Magistrates that both the orders i.e. 1) Under Section 111 and other under Section 116(3) of the Code has to be passed by the learned Magistrate on due application of mind. In so far as order under Section 111 of the Code is concerned, it enjoins upon the Magistrate to make an order in writing, setting forth the substance of information received, the amount of the bond to be executed, term for which it is to be in force, and the number, character and class of sureties (if any required) and the Magistrate can only proceed to pass an order under Section 111 of the Code on the basis of substance of the information received by him, which has to be spelt out in the order, which requires that there must be information of a nature which convinces him that there is likelihood of a breach of peace. The person, who gave information might not be in a position to give details, but the source of information might be sufficient to convince the Magistrate that the breach of the peace was likely and if he was convinced, the law required him to take action. Needless to say, the substance of information must be setforth in the order which depends in each case upon the circumstances of the case. Without an order under Section 111 of the Code, the Magistrate has no competence to deal with such person. In so far the order which is required to be passed under Section 116(3) of the Code -The provisions of Section 116(3) clearly mention that the order of interim bond should be passed after recording reasons therefor. The Magistrate while acting under Sub-section (3) of Section 116, Cr.P.C., has to make careful consideration as regards to the separate case of emergency as contemplated under the said section and he must be satisfied that immediate steps are necessary. The fact that the police report indicated that the members of the opposite-party were likely to create breach of the peace is not sufficient to pass an order and it cannot be said that the Magistrate has given a careful consideration to the existence of a case of emergency when he merely relies on a police report without even calling the police officer to the witness box. An order made under Sub-section (3) is bad if it is not accompanied by reasons recorded in writing why the Magistrate wants to take the emergency measures..

9. The next important thing which is required to be kept in mind by the learned Magistrate is in relation to the amount of the bond. This should be fixed with due regard to the circumstances of the case, and must not be excessive. The Magistrate should consider the station in life of the person concerned, and should not go beyond a sum for which there is a fair probability of his being able to find security. Imprisonment is provided as a protection to society against the perpetration of crime by the individual, and not as a punishment for a crime committed, it is only reasonable and just that the individual should be afforded a fair chance at least of complying with the required condition of security.

10. While passing an order under Section 116(3) of the Code, the Magistrate is also expected to be conscious about the provisions relating to requirements of the bond. Since under new Section 116(3) of the Code a Magistrate cannot demand any surety bond, in a proceeding initiated under Section 107 of the Code the question of executing the bond or the liability of furnishing the surety will no longer arise under the said Section. The relevant provisions of Section 116 of the Code reads as under:

Section 116 : Inquiry as to truth of information. -

(1) When an order under Section 111 has been read or explained under Section 112 to a person present in Court, or when any person appears or is brought before a Magistrate in compliance with, or in execution of, a summons or warrant, issued under Section 113, the Magistrate shall proceed to inquiry into the truth of the information upon which action has been taken, and to take such further evidence as may appear necessary.

(2) Such inquiry shall be made, as nearly as may be practicable, in the manner hereinafter prescribed for conducting trial and recording evidence in summons cases.

(3) After the commencement, and before the completion, of the inquiry under Sub-section (1), the Magistrate, if he considers that immediate measures are necessary for the prevention of a breach of the peace or disturbance of the public tranquility or the commission of any offence or for the public safety, may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, direct the person in respect of whom the order under Section 111 has been made to execute a bond, with or without sureties, for keeping the peace or maintaining good behaviour until the conclusion of the inquiry, and may detain him in custody until such bond is executed or, in default of execution, until the inquiry is concluded: Provided that -

(a) no person against whom proceedings are not being taken under Section 108, Section 109, or Section 110 shall be directed to execute a bond for maintaining good behaviour;

(b) the condition of such bond, whether as to the amount thereof or as to the provision of sureties or the number thereof or the pecuniary extent of their liability, shall not be more onerous than those specified in the order under Section 111. Sub Section (4) ...onwards not relevant for our purpose.

11. This, we are required to highlight as a fact that in a proceedings initiated under Section 107 of the Code, it is common practice on the part of the Executive Magistrate to insist for surety bond by passing interim order under Section 116(3) Cr.P.C. The court has taken judicial notice of this that inspite of a clear cut provisions in Clause (a) of the proviso to Sub-section 3 of Section 116 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in a proceeding initiated under Section 107 of the Code and the form No. 12 (Scheduled II) which is prescribed for executing bond under Section 107 of the Code, persons are detained in judicial custody for their failure to furnish interim surety in a proceedings initiated under Section 107 of Chapter VIII of the Code in exercise of jurisdiction not vested upon them in law. {See State of Maharashtra and Anr. v. Mangali Dewaiyya Pupalla, Mh.L.. 483, Mrs.Pramila Navin Shaha v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. 2005 All MR (Cri) 1233}. Having clarified the fact that in a proceedings initiated under Section 107 of the Code no surety/security or personal bond is required to be furnished under an interim order under Section 116(3) Cr.P.C., henceforth if it comes to the notice of this Court that a person against whom proceedings are initiated under Section 107 of the Code is detained in judicial custody for failure on his part to furnish interim surety/security Bond or personal Bond pursuant to an order passed under Section 116(3) of Cr.P.C. The State shall be liable to pay compensation to such person for violation of his fundamental right enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and the aggrieved person may also take recourse to other remedies available to him under the general law viz to prosecute the said magistrate for wrongful confinement and appropriate compensation for wrongful detention.

12. It will be fruitful to mention at this stage that there is a practice on the part of Executive Magistrate for insisting upon surety from caste, creed and religion other than that of the person against whom proceedings are initiated under the nomenclature .cross surety.. We may like to impress upon the Executive Magistrate, exercising powers under Chapter VIII of the Code, that such insistence of cross-surety irrespective of the nature of the case is unwarranted and most of the time it is insisted upon so as to deprive a person of his personal liberty so as to make it beyond his reach to fulfill such a condition. This is in addition to the practice of quoting excessive and prohibitive amount as sum of surety, though Clause (b) of proviso to Section 117 of the Code clearly provides that the amount of every bond shall be fixed with due regard in the circumstances of the case and shall not be excessive.

13. Concept of cross-surety has to be understood in the context of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, which is being dealt by the Executive Magistrate. One can understand that in a given case where proceedings are initiated against persons of the rival group to give security in keeping the peace of the opposite party. It has been so ordered in Criminal Writ Petition No. 293 of 2003 wherein the Executive Magistrate has specified that in order to keep peace and tranquility in village Kamunja, as there was probable and imminent danger of likelihood of breach of peace due to the rival claim and possession over the mosque Madarsa of Kamunja between two sect of Muslim namely 'Sunni' and 'Tablig', and hence such an order was required to be passed.

14. In reference to the grievance made by the Petitioner' Advocate Shri R.S.Nayak in Criminal Writ Petition No. 428 of 2002 an enquiry was conducted according to order passed by this Court by the Joint Commissioner of Police wherein the petitioner as well as his client was examined and the enquiry report dated 29/1/2003 came to be submitted to the court does prima facie makes out a case in favour of petitioner except for the issue of demand of bribe of Rs. 2000/-by the A.C.P. through his staff police constable Mr.Karade. Mr.B.T. Nighinglova, Joint Commissioner of Police, Nagpur in his report itself has mentioned that the concerned A.C.P. who was conferred with the powers of Executive Magistrate Kotwali Division has been transferred and so also his staff and all the ACPs in charge of the Division, who are conferred and vested with powers of Executive Magistrate under the Commissionerate are instructed to strictly adhere to provisions of Chapter VIII of Code. The Respondent/State was kind enough to immediately respond to the interim orders passed by this Court from time to time and also filed affidavit of the then principal Secretary (Spl.), Government of Maharashtra, Home Department that they would streamline the procedure and exercise of powers by the Executive Magistrate and special Executive Magistrate under Chapter VIII of the code. But as suggested by this Court in the case of Surendra v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. 2001 (4) Mh.L.J.601, the Government is, however, of the opinion that considering the present scenario and the law and order situation it may not be feasible to revert back to the 1980's position and entrust this powers to judicial magistrate. The State has also, in the affidavit filed by the then Commissioner of Police Shri Jayant Umaranikar referred to the Circular dated 28th April, 2003 which provides for guidelines to the Executive Magistrate and Special Executive Magistrate while dealing with Chapter Case i.e. proceedings under Chapter VIII of the Code so as not to violate fundamental rights of citizens as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The same has been reiterated by the subsequent affidavit filed by the present Commissioner of Police. This court has been assured that in future the proceedings under Chapter VIII of the Code would be conducted in proper order. Respondent No. 2/The Commissioner of Police in his affidavit dated 22/3/2006 has also taken cognizance of the fact that the office of the Special Executive Magistrate and Executive Magistrate functioned till late hours in night and has noted that said officer would function in accordance with the guidelines issued by the Government of Maharashtra vide Circular dated 28/4/2003 and those instructions have been issued to all the ACPs vide Circular dated 20/3/2006 to conduct and hold their courts only during working hours and further to take prior permission from concerned Zonal Deputy Commissioner of Police, if there is any urgent case to be dealt with after working hours and in that case subsequently send the report to the Commissioner of Police stating the reason holding proceedings after office hours (the said circular is annexed as Annexure R-2). In view of the fact that the commitment made by the Commissioner of Police in his affidavit dated 22/3/2006 is on solemn affirmation, we accept it as an undertaking given to this Court and make it clear that in future if any violation of the undertaking takes place, this Court would take serious cognizance of such breach in addition to directing the State to initiate appropriate action against the persons found guilty of misuse of the powers vested in them under Chapter VIII of the Code.

15. We only propose to forewarn Police Offices vested with powers under Chapter VIII of the Code that they should also remember that the party against whom proceedings are initiated under Chapter VIII of the Code is entitled to forthwith receive copy of the order which may result in curtailing their liberty before they are remanded to judicial custody, either for their failure to execute necessary bond with or without sureties or at the conclusion of the proceedings, as it has come to our notice, on going through the present state of affairs in the office of Special Executive Magistrate Kotwali Division, that the staff functioning in the office of Special Executive Magistrate, Kotwali Division are careless in issuing certified copy of such orders which are amenable to revisional, appellate and writ jurisdiction of the courts and though such orders as a matter of practice are in printed forms depriving a person of certified copy of such orders, is nothing but an attempt on the part of the court of Special Executive Magistrate and its staff to deprive them of procedural justice.

16. By way of illustration, proceedings initiated by Shri Dhamke the present Special Executive Magistrate against one Pramod Dinakrrao Samarth vide Chapter Proceedings No. 64 of 2006 and interim order under Section 116(3) of the code was placed on record. It came to be passed in a proceedings initiated under Section 110 of the Code, which are all in printed form, clearly indicating that the orders under Section 111 of the Code as well as 116(3) of the Code have been passed by the Special Executive Magistrate without application of mind, as the proceedings initiated under Section 110 of the Code is not maintainable against said Pramod Dinkarrao Samarth for the simple reason that it does not confirm and meet the requirements of Section 110 of the Code. It is in this proceedings that an application for grant of certified copy was made by the counsel for the accused on 22/3/2006 and there is an endorsement from the office of Special Executive Magistrate, Kotwali Division, Nagpur that copies would be delivered within three days. Such practice deserves to be highly deprecated.

17. Assistant Commissioner of Police Shri Dhamke, who is the Special Executive Magistrate of Kotwali Division was personally present in the court and the learned Additional Public Prosecutor Smt.Neeta Jog on seeking instructions from him assured this Court that he will forthwith discontinue this practice of passing orders in printed form and further assured the court that certified copies of the order would be forthwith furnished to the person or his Advocate, who are appearing in his court and in future he will take all the necessary precautions to see that there is no violation of any right statutory or procedural of a citizen who is facing any proceedings in his court. We hope that such assurance given to the court would be followed in letter and spirit not only the by the Special Executive Magistrate of Kotwali Division but all divisions in the city of Nagpur so that miscarriage of justice is avoided and persons are not left at the mercy of the whims and caprice of the Police Officers, who are conducting chapter proceedings as Special Executive Magistrates.

18. In so far as grievance of Advocate Mr.Nayak is concerned, we have taken serious note of the same. We would like to bring it to the notice of the State the concept, object and scope of life and personal liberty as enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India by quoting the observation of Shri K.Ramaswamy, J. in the case of Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, . His Lordship while dealing with the constitutional validity of the draconian law i.e. Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 observed as under - .The right to life with human dignity of person is a fundamental right of every citizen for pursuit of happiness and excellence. Personal freedom is a basic condition for full development of human personality. Article 21 of the Constitution protects right to life which is the most precious right in a civilised society. The trinity i.e. liberty, equality and fraternity always blossoms and enlivens the flower of human dignity. One of the gifts of democracy to mankind is the right to personal liberty. Life and personal freedom are the prized jewels under Article 19 conjointly assured by Arts. 20(3), 21 and 22 of the Constitution and Article 19 ensures freedom of movement. Liberty aims at freedom not only from arbitrary restraint but also to secure such conditions which are essential for the full development of human personality. Liberty is the essential concomitant for other rights without which a man cannot be at his best. The essence of all civil liberties is to keep alive the freedom of the individual subject to the limitations of social control envisaged in diverse articles in the chapter of Fundamental Rights Part III in harmony with social good envisaged in the Directive Principles in Part IV of the Constitution. Freedom cannot last long unless it is coupled with order. Freedom can never exist without order. Freedom and order may coexist. It is essential that freedom should be exercised under authority and order should be enforced by authority which is vested solely in the executive. Fundamental rights are the means and the directive principles are essential ends in a welfare state. The evolution of the State from Police State to a Welfare State is the ultimate measure and accepted standard of democratic society which is an avowed constitutional mandate. Though one of the main functions of the democratic Government is to safeguard liberty of the individual, unless its exercise is subject to social control, it becomes anti-social or undermines the security of the State. The Indian democracy wedded to rule of law aims not only to protect the fundamental rights of its citizens but also to establish an egalitarian social order. The individual has to grow within the social confines preventing his unsocial or unbridled growth which could be done by reconciling individual liberty with social control. Liberty must be controlled in the interest of the society but the social interest must never be overbearing to justify total deprivation of individual liberty. Liberty cannot stand alone but must be paired with a companion virtue; virtue and morality; liberty and law; liberty and justice; liberty and common good; liberty and responsibility which are concomitants for orderly progress and social stability. Man being a rationale individual has to live in harmony with equal rights of others and more differently for the attainment of antithetic desires. This intertwined network is difficult to delineate within defined spheres of conduct within which freedom of action may be confined. Therefore, liberty would not always be an absolute licence but must arm itself within the confines of law. In other words there can be no liberty without social restraint. Liberty, therefore, as a social conception is a right to be assured to all members of a society. Unless restraint is enforced on and accepted by all members of the society, the liberty of some must involve the oppression of others. If liberty be regarded a social order, the problem of establishing liberty must be a problem of organising restraint which society controls over the individual. Therefore, liberty of each citizen is borne of and must be subordinated to the liberty of the greatest number, in other words common happiness as an end of the society, lest lawlessness and anarchy will tamper social weal and harmony and powerful courses or forces would be at work to determine social welfare and order. Thus, the essence of civil liberty is to keep alive the freedom of the individual subject to the limitation of social control which could be adjusted according to the needs of the dynamic social evolution. The modern social evolution is the growing need to keep individual to be as free as possible, consistent with his correlative obligation to the society. According to Dr.Ambedkar in his closing speech in the Constituent Assembly, the principles of liberty, equality and fraternity are not to be treated as separate entities but in a trinity. They form the union or trinity in the sense that to divorce one from the other is to defeat the very purpose of democracy. Liberty cannot be divorced from equality. Equality cannot be divorced by liberty. Nor can equality and liberty be divorced from fraternity. Without equality, liberty would not produce supremacy of law. Equality without liberty would kill individual initiative. Without fraternity, liberty and equality would not become a natural course of things. Courts, as sentinel on the qui vive, therefore must strike a balance between the changing needs o the society for peaceful transformation with orders and protection of the rights of the citizen. One of the functions of the State is to maintain peace and order in the society. As its part, State is not only the prosecutor of the offender but also the investigator of crime. To facilitate such investigation police has been given wide powers to arrest the suspect without warrant, interrogate him in custody search and seize incriminating material, to collect the evidence and to prosecute the offender. Deprivation of dignity of person, self-respect and inviolable right to life, would only be within the prescribed limits set down by laws; assiduously supervised by courts; and executive excesses strictly be limited. Excessive authority without liberty is intolerable. Equally excessive liberty without authority and without responsibility soon becomes intolerable. Lest the freedoms and fundamental rights become sacrificial objects at the altar of expediency. Unrestricted liberty makes life too easy for criminal and too difficult for law-abiding citizens. In a free society too many crooks blatantly break the law, blight young lives, traffic in drugs and freely indulge in smuggling and claim fundamental rights to exploit weak links of law, indulge in violence and commercial camouflage. Our values are drastically eroded because many a man with no more moral backbone than a chocolate eclair claim the freedom and free action which results inevitably in increasing the members of violent criminals. In the midst of clash of interest, the individual interest would be subservient to social interest, yet so long as jubi jus, ibi remedium is available the procedure prescribed and the actions taken thereon by then law-enforcement authority must be the test of the constitutional mandates..

19. We hope . this is sufficient to remind the State of the sacrosanct fundamental rights particularly under Article 21 of Constitution of India and that it will take all steps to protect it and would take all necessary preventive steps so that life and personal liberty of a citizen is not trampled by the Police Officers, who are vested with powers of Special Executive Magistrate/Executive Magistrate to conduct proceedings under Chapter VIII of the Code. Further, we may add the observations of Hidayatullah, J in respect of another right vested in a citizen under Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India by quoting His Lordship's observation in the case of State of M.P. v. Shobharam, wherein His Lordship has observed -

When our Constitution lays down in absolute terms a right to be defended by one's own counsel, it cannot be taken away by ordinary law and it is not sufficient to say that the accused who was so deprived of this right, did not stand in danger of losing his personal liberty. If he was exposed to penalty, he had a right to be defended by counsel. If this were not so then instead of providing for punishment of imprisonment, penal laws might provide for unlimited fines and it would be easy to leave the man free but a pauper. And to this end without a right to be defended by counsel. If this proposition were accepted as true we might be in the Middle Age. The Criminal Procedure Code allows the right to be defended by Counsel but that is not a guaranteed right. The framers of the constitution have well thought of this right and by including the prescription in the Constitution have put it beyond the power of any authority to alter it without the Constitution being altered. A law which provides differently must necessarily be obnoxious to the guarantee of the Constitution. There is nothing in the worth of the Constitution which permits any authority to alter this condition even on grounds of public interest as is the case with the guaranteed rights in Article 19. Not by a niggling argument be lessened the force of the declaration so explicit in its terms or whittle down its meaning by a specious attempt at supposed harmony between rights which are not interdependent. There are three rights and each stands by itself. The first is the right to be told the reason of the arrest as soon as an arrest is made, the second is the right to be produced before a Magistrate within twenty-four hours and the third is the right to be defended by a lawyer of one's choice. In addition there is the declaration that no person shall be deprived of his personal liberty except by procedure established by law. The declaration is general and insists on legality of the action. The rights given by Article 22(1) and

20 are absolute in themselves and do not depend on other laws. There is no force in the submission that if there is only a punishment of fine and there is no danger to personal liberty the protection of Article 22(1) is not available. Personal liberty is invaded by arrest and continues to be restrained during the period a person is on bail and it matters not whether there is or is not a possibility of imprisonment. A person arrested and put on his defence against a criminal charge, which may result in penalty, is entitled to the right to defend himself with the aid of counsel and any law that take away this right offends against the Constitution."

20. Advocate Mr.Nayak's grievance as highlighted in his petition is that his client was discouraged and deprived from engaging legal practitioner of his choice from appearing before the court of Special Executive Magistrate, Kotwali Division is a clear cut breach of Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India. The State and its functionaries should learn to respect an Advocate who represents his client to seek justice for him and to assist the Court in dispensing justice. If the courts of Special Executive Magistrate and its staff finds it inconvenient, if a person engages a legal practitioner of his choice, may be for various reasons and one of them which is spelt out in the petition i.e. to come in the way of the court and its staff extorting money from a person against whom proceedings are initiated, it not only obstructs the course of justice but also pollutes the same and is nothing short of contempt of court. In the enquiry conducted by Joint Commissioner of Police, as per report the Special Executive Magistrate and its staff stands exonerated of the allegations of extortion of money though the evidence given by Advocate Nayak and his client confirms to the allegations made in the petition that a sum of Rs. 2000/-were demanded from client of Advocate Nayak to settle the case rather than contest the proceedings initiated by him by engaging legal practitioner of his choice which was his legal right. The report cuts a very sorry figure in the manner in which proceedings are conducted in the court of Special Executive Magistrate. We are conscious of the fact that it is very difficult to prove these allegations but it is equally true that such allegations cannot be said to be unfounded.

21. Taking into consideration that the State and the Commissioner of Police has assured this Court that in future such occasion would not arise and they have taken necessary steps to prevent such practices, we find that almost all the prayers made by the petitioners are complied with and so far as claim of compensation made by the petitioner for the ill-treatment meted out to him by respondent No. 3 it can be left open and if the petitioner feels it proper, he may take appropriate steps, as observed by this Court in the case of Deelip Bhikaji v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. 2003(2) Mh.L.J.629.

22. In so far as the reliefs claimed in Criminal Writ Petition No. 293 of 2003 are concerned, the petitioners had already approached the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Amravati under Section 123(2) and (3) of Criminal Procedure Code which granted them relief of reducing the quantum of bond from Rs. 25000/-to Rs. 15000/-, probably by this time the proceedings must have come to an end and, therefore, the petition has become infructuous. Therefore, in our view no relief can be granted as sought for. These two petitions , therefore, stand disposed of. Rule is made absolute accordingly.