Vinayak Mahadeorao Dhongdi And ... vs State Of Maharashtra And Ors.
2005 Latest Caselaw 767 Bom

JUDGMENT

Rebello F.I., J.

1. The matter was on board for hearing on civil applications. At the request of learned Counsel the petition itself has been heard and is being finally disposed off.

2. The petitioners have formulated their submissions as under :

(i) When under the provisions of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 the new Committee is elected, duly constituted and has entered into office under Section 73-G(2), and the office has commenced, could the order appointing an Administrator under Section 110-A(iii) made superseding the Committee (previous) breath life or come to an end.

(ii) Whether the order dated 27th October, 2004 passed by this Court permitting the first meeting to be held should be given its full effect and whether the said order entrenches upon the statutory provisions of the Co-operative Societies Act which is destructive of the rule of law and which has to be brought in 'conformity with the provisions of the Act.

3. Few facts may now be set out :- The Board of Directors of the respondent No. 4 was elected on 15th January, 1997 and its term expired on 15th January, 2002. On 7th May, 2002 the 2nd respondent in exercise of his powers under Section 110-A(iii) of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, hereinafter referred to as the Act, superseded the Board of Directors and appointed an Administrator for a period of six years. It appears that the election programme for election of the new board was already issued and the polling for electing the members of the new board was fixed for 17th May, 2002. On 14th May, 2002 the State Government i.e., the respondent No. 1 by an order issued under Section 73-IB postponed the holding of elections for a period of six months. On 16th May, 2002 a petition came to be filed impugning both the orders. An interim order came to be passed on 16th May, 2002 permitting the polls to be held, but restraining the declaration of the results. Rule was issued on 29th October, 2002. On that date the learned Bench of this Court also directed that the results of the elections be declared, but further observed that handing over charge by the Administrator to the elected board would depend upon the subsequent orders that may be passed by the Department from time to time. On 25th December, 2002, the S.D.O., Wardha issued a notice conveying a meeting of the newly elected board on 30th November, 2002. By further order dated 29th November, 2002 passed by the Additional Commissioner, the respondent No. 2, the order dated 25th December, 2002 came to be cancelled.

4. Civil Application came to be filed being Civil Application No. 6607 of 2004. The relevant prayer clause in the Civil Application read as under :-

2) direct the respondents to elect a representative of the Wardha District Central Co-operative Bank in the meeting of the Board of Directors on the Maharashtra State Co-operative Bank Ltd., Mumbai, to represent Wardha District Central Co-operative Bank Ltd.

Or in the alternative direct the respondents to hold Special General Body Meeting to elect a representative of Wardha District Central Cooperative Bank on Maharashtra State Co-operative Bank Ltd., Mumbai, pending disposal of the instant pending.

5. Civil Application No. 2877 of 2005 by respondent No, 3, Reserve Bank of lndia was for modification of the order dated 27th October, 2004 passed in Civil Application No. 6607 of 2004. The modifications sought were to the order dated 27th October, 2004 passed in Civil Application No. 6607 of 2004 to allow the Administrator to represent the respondent No. 4 in the Maharashtra State Cooperative Bank as its member. We may also set out that by order dated 27th October, 2004 the learned Bench considering the earlier order passed noted that though the Board has been constituted, the Administrator is still in charge. In paragraph 12 of the reply filed by the respondent No. 3, Reserve Bank of India they objected to the Board electing a representative and set out that they would not have objection to depute any representative from the bank elected by the general body. It was also pointed out that when the Board is superseded and not in existence representation on the said Co-operative Bank has to be made by the Administrator. It was further reiterated that Reserve Bank of India may consider the position of continuation of Administrator after the next inspection. The learned Division Bench noted that the State Government had not filed any reply. The learned Bench then proceeded to grant prayer Clause (2) of the application. The Court was, however, pleased to observe as under :-

It is made clear that this order shall not create any enquiry in favour of respondent No. 4, petitioners or newly elected board of directors. It is also made clear that petitioners, respondent No. 4 or newly elected board of directors will not be entitled to say that by virtue of relief granted to elect representative, the newly elected board came into existence and, therefore, automatically appointment of the Administrator ceases to operate.

6. We may now advert to some of the pleadings of the petition. There is no dispute that the order came to be passed under Section 110-A(iii) of the Act by the respondent No. 2 pursuant to the direction issued by respondent No. 3 and consequent appointment of Administrator to replace the Board of Directors of respondent No. 4. Consequent to the appointment of the Board of directors, the respondent No. 1 by taking recourse to the provisions of Section 73-IB of the Act postponed the election to the Managing Committee. The respondent No. 4 is a specified society within the to Section 73-G(2) of the Act. It is then pointed out that the election process commence with the Collector of the District taking steps after 31st March, 2002 to hold elections. The order averments need not be adverted to, considering the contentions advanced. Suffice it to say that the order dated 7th May, 2002 superseding the Board of Directors and appointing Administrator and the order dated 14th May, 2002 have been impugned on various grounds. The subsequent orders extending the appointment of Administrator have also been challenged.

7. On behalf of the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 a reply has been filed by the Divisional Joint Registrar, Co-operative Societies Shri Anil Shankar Pant. It is pointed out that the process for elections had commenced when in the meanwhile a special report from Special Auditor, Co-operative Societies, Wardha dated 4th May, 2002 and the audit report of District Central Co-operative Bank Ltd., Wardha for the year 2001-2002 and the report of NABARD was received by the respondents and it was noticed that the bank was under serious financial irregularities and acts of misfeasance, malpractices and misutilisation of funds were committed by the Board of Directors of District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd., Wardha to the tune of Rs. 25.00 crore as noticed by the auditor. Moneys were invented without following the norms and procedure of R.B.I., directives and thereby financial loss to the extent of Rs. 28,30,32,7207- was inflicted on respondent No. 4. Under these circumstances the Reserve Bank of India respondent No, 3 issued a requisition and pursuant to that the Board of Directors of the respondent No. 4 was removed by order dated 7th May, 2002. A criminal complaint has also been filed. As a grave situation had arisen which compelled the removal of the board the respondent No. 1 was required to postpone the elections. Holding of elections and coming into existence of newly elected board would have definitely created hurdles in the legal actions initiated by the respondents and also created hurdle in the police investigation. The financial irregularities and misutilisation of funds committed by the Board of Director were so grave and the magnitude of the amount involved was so glaringly high that it become necessary for the respondents to take immediate steps to remove the Board of Directors of the respondent No. 4. It is pointed out that Administrator took charge on 7th May, 2002. Most of the Directors of the existing board also were contesting candidates in the ensuring elections and about 13 existing directors have been elected unopposed and as such majority would have found place in the newly elected board. The Directors who have been removed on account of grave and glaring financial irregulations committed by them, would again come into power as Board of Directors of the respondent No. 4. Action under Section 88 of the Act has also been initiated by the Divisional Joint Registrar. The order to postpone the elections was passed to protect the interest of depositors, the members of the public and in the public interest considering the power conferred by the State Government, under Section 73-IB of the Act. It is also pointed out that provisions of Section 110-A(iii) does not contemplate a notice or personal hearing. The provisions empowered the Registrar to take immediate steps for removal of the Board of Director, if the Reserve Bank of India so requires. That was done by the Reserve Bank of India by letter dated 6th May, 2002 to initiate action under Section 110-A(iii) of the Act.

8. The respondent No. 3, Reserve Bank of India has also filed reply. It is set out that the petitioners have no locus to challenge the order of supersession which was passed by respondent No. 2 on the requisition dated 6th May, 2002 issued by respondent No. 3 to respondent No 2. The request was issued in public interest. The various explanations given are set out in the said reply. It is also pointed out that the respondents have advised the Commissioner for co-operation and Registrar of Co-operative Societies to consult the respondent No. 3 before any action is taken to terminate the continuance of Administrator. Reference is then made to the Special Scrutiny Report dated 23rd April, 2002 by the NABARD, from which the respondent No. 3 was satisfied that the affairs of the respondent No. 4 were being conducted in a manner detrimental to the interest of the depositors and prejudicial to the public interest. A loss of Rs. 25.00 crore has bene occasioned to the respondents by way of a clear loan without any security granted to Home Trade Limited and had become a bad debt. Reference is also made to the provisions of Section 56 of the Banking Regulation Act and the powers conferred on respondent No. 3 therein. In exercise of the power pursuant to report sent by NABARD the respondent No. 3 had to make further inspection. In inspection it was found that the investments were not bona fide transactions and were only paper deals. No security had ever been purchased or sold by the respondent No. 4 at all and all the alleged transactions have been entered into contrary to the directives of the respondents No. 3. It is also pointed out that whilst passing the order superseding the Board of Directors and appointing an Administrator pursuant to directions issued by the respondent No. 3 there is no requirement of hearing or notice to the respondent No. 4 or Board of Directors. It is, therefore, prayed that the petition be dismissed. That reply was filed on 22nd January, 2003.

9. It is not necessary to refer to other facts considering the two contentions urged. The petitioners Counsel has given up the challenge to order passed by respondent No. 2 under Section 110-A(iii) of the Act. Section 110-A(iii) reads as under :-

110-A. Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in the case of an insured Cooperative Bank. -

(i) ...

(ii) ...

(iii) if so required by the Reserve Bank of India in the public interest or for preventing the affairs of the bank being conducted in a manner detrimental to the interests of the depositors or for securing the proper management of the bank, an order shall be made by the Registrar for the super session (removal) of the Committee and the appointment of an Administrator therefore for such period or periods, not exceeds five years in the aggregate, as may from time to time be specified by the Reserve Bank oflndia, and the Administrator so appointed shall, after the expiry of his term of office, continue in office until the day immediately preceding the date of the first meeting of the new Committee.

The nature of the power and the order issued under Section 110-A came up for consideration before this Court in Mahendra Husanji v. State of Maharashtra 1992 Mh.L.J. 1142 (Sic. 1442). Considering the provisions of Sub-section (3) of Section 110-A the learned Division Bench held that the Reserve Bank of India can issue directions only when the situation contemplated by Section 110-A of the Act exists. The directions issued are binding on the Registrar. The matter was also considered in L.V. Sasmile v. State of Maharashtra 1992 C.T.J. 729. The matter again came up for consideration in Ishwardas Premkumar Chorudiya and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. . That judgment was pronounced by one of us (Rebello, J.). The issue for consideration was whether a show cause notice or hearing or opportunity to show cause was necessary if Reserve Bank of India had given direction to the Registrar. The Court held that the Registrar while issuing an order under Section 110-A(iii) of the Act was not bound to issue a show cause notice or give a hearing or an opportunity to show cause. It is thus clear that no relief could have been granted in respect of the order impugned and as pointed out earlier the learned Counsel on behalf of the petitioners fairly submitted that once the direction is issued by R.B.I. It is binding on respondent Nos. 1 and 2.

It is thus clear that the challenge to order dated 7th May, 2002 being devoid of any merit, the reliefs prayed for in the petition and the contentions now urged must now be considered.

10. The submissions as now urged are basically based on the interim orders passed by this Court during the pendency of the petition. The first such interim order is dated 16th May, 2002. Pursuant to appointment of Administrator an order was issued on 14th May, 2002 postponing the elections. The learned Single Judge while passing the order on 16th May, 2002 was pleased to observe as under :-

The effect and operation of the order passed by the respondent No. 1 dated 14-5-2002, postponing the election to the Managing Committee of respondent No. 4 bank for a period of six months is stayed and respondent No. 6 is directed to proceed with the polling to the election of Managing Committee of respondent No. 4 bank, scheduled to be held on 17th May, 2002. After the polling is completed, no further steps such as counting or declaration of the result will be taken by the Collector, without obtaining a further order of this Court.

Pursuant to this order elections were held. The matter then came up before the learned Division Bench of this Court for admission on 29th October, 2002 while admitting the petition an order was passed. The operative part of the order of this Court reads as under :-

Assuming for the sake of argument that if at all this order of appointment of Administrator is further extended if it is so permissible in law, then in that case even if the results of the elections are allowed to be declared is not going to make any change as at the most the elected persons will again remain without charge and the Administrator may continue until further orders as whatsoever may be proposed to. As on today, we are not to dilate on those consequences but we contemplate a case that if assuming that period of Administrator is not further extended, then it would be in the fitness of things that there has to be a body to take over the charge from the Administrator and, therefore, in our opinion it will be appropriate in the fitness of things that the Collector is directed to declare the results of the elections held on 17-5-2002.

We make it clear that this order be not read as merely because the results of the election are allowed to be declared, the Administrator has no hand over the charge to the elected body straightway and the same will depend upon the subsequent orders that may be passed by the Department from time to time. Needless to mention that the results be declared earliest possible within a week's time from today.

From the annexures to the petition it will be clear that the period of Administrator has been extended and by amendment those orders were also sought to be challenged.

The Petitioner thereafter moved Civil Application No. 6607 of 2004 which came to be disposed of by order dated 27th October, 2004. It was as on 27th October, 2004 that the Administrator is still incharge. After narrating the effect of the present orders and the reply filed by the Reserve Bank of India, paragraph 5 of the order of this reads as under :-

5. In so far as the State Government is concerned, though the State Government is served, it has not filed any reply opposing application for appointment of the Administrator. In our view, the board already having been constituted by two earlier orders, it would not be just and fair if Board of Directors of the respondent No. 4 bank is not permitted to elect their representative to the Maharashtra State Co-operative Bank. In view of the aforesaid position, since there is no serious opposition from the respondent No. 3 as well as from the State Government for granting relief in terms of prayer Clause (2) of the Civil Application. Civil Application granted in terms of prayer Clause (2), Civil Application stands disposed of with no order as to costs.

It is made clear that this order shall not create any equity in favour of respondent No. 4, petitioners or newly elected Board of Director. It is also made clear that petitioner, respondent No. 4 or newly elected Board of Director will not be entitled to say that by virtue of relief granted to elect a representative, the newly elected board came into existence and, therefore, automatically appointment of the Administrator ceases to operate.

11. The contentions urged on behalf of the petitioners will have to be seen in the light of these interim orders passed by this Court during the pendency of the petition.

Dealing with the first contention as reproduced earlier, the question would be whether there is a new Committee duly constituted and which has entered into office according to law and in these circumstances the order appointing Administrator under Section 110-A(iii) made superseding the Committee (previous) breathes life or come to an end. As we have noted earlier the power under Section 110-A of the Act is a power conferred, on the Registrar, if required by the Reserve Bank of India, to make an order Administrator thereon for such period or periods not exceeding 5 years in the aggregate and the Administrator so appointed shall after expiry of his term of office continue in office until immediately preceding the date of the first meeting of the new Committee. Considering the fact that the Administrator was appointed on 7th May, 2002 it was open to the Registrar to make an order appointing the Administrator for a period not exceeding 5 years which period if subsequent orders are issued would be expiring only on 6th May, 2007. We have also referred to the facts consequent to which the Administrator came to be appointed. The main reason for appointment of the Administrator as explained by R.B.I., was investment of Rs. 25.00 crore of the bank by the then previous Board of Directors without following the procedure and the directives issued by the Reserve Bank of India from time to time and causing loss to the bank in the said amount. NABARD, who had carried out inspection noted the malfunctioning of the bank. Section 73-IB empowers the State Government apart from what is set out therein for such other reasons that it is not in public interest to hold elections notwithstanding anything contained in the Act, Rules or Bye-laws for reasons to be recorded in writing to postpone the elections of any of the society or class of societies for a period not exceeding six months at a time which period may further be extended so, however, that the total period shall not exceed one year in the aggregate. When the order was issued under Section 73-IB there was already an order issued by the Registrar in exercise of his power under Section 110-A of the Act appointing an Administrator for a period of six months at the first instance. It was thus open under the powers empowered under Section 73-IB for the State Government to postpone the elections. The expression used in 'such other reasons' as in the opinion of the State Government are exceptional and it is not in the public interest not to hold the elections to any society. Considering the grave nature of charges against the elected Board of Directors it was open to the State Government to have issued the notification dated 14th May, 2002 postponing the elections for a period of six months, thus atleast for a period as and upto 13th November, 2002 no elections could have been held. We do not find that the order dated 14th May, 2002 could not have been made in exercise of powers under Section 73-IB. The order would disclose that there was material available to the State Government to form its opinion. Once that be the case the interim order passed by the Court directing holding of elections on 16th May, 2002 being only an interim arrangement it is not possible to accept the contention as urged on behalf of the petitioners that a new Committee has entered into office under Section 73-G(2) of the Act. As long as there was an order under Section 110-A and Section 73-IB, it was not open to this Court to allow holding of the elections. It is only in the event that the term of the Administrator was not extended for the reason that the grounds for appointment of an Administrator no longer subsist could a notice be issued for holding of elections and/or if the period of 5 years had expired. We are, clearly therefore of the opinion that the petitioners in law have never entered into office as holding of elections was purely pursuant to an interim order and subject to the final order in the petition. Even the order of this Court dated 27th October, 2004 made it clear that the petitioners could not raise the contention that the newly elected board came into existence and that automatically the appointment of Administrator ceases to operate. The earlier order of 29th October, 2002 was dependent on whether the appointing authority was competent or not. The first contention must, therefore, be rejected.

12. We then come to the next contention. That contention will have to be considered in the context of the order dated 27th October, 2004. The submission is thus : the order of 27th October, 2004 should be given full effect unless it entrenches upon the statutory provisions of the Co-operative Societies Act which is destructive of the rule of law and which has to be brought in conformity with the provisions of the Act. Section 110-A of the Act begins with a non obstante clause, "notwithstanding anything contained in this Act". The process of election had been set into motion before the order dated 7th May, 2002 was passed and the elections were scheduled for 17th May, 2002. The consequence of the order passed appointing Administrator would be that such an Administrator shall continue in office for the period appointed and until the date preceding the date of first meeting of the new Committee. In other words until elections are held to the society which is a specified society in terms of Section 73-G of the Act. The Act nowhere provides for the holding of elections during the period when the Administrator was appointed pursuant to the powers conferred under Section 110-A(iii) as the very basis of the order is that there are grave defects in functions of the society which must be set right. There was also an order passed under Section 73-IB postponing elections which we have held was within the power of the respondent No. 1 and, therefore, valid. If it is construed that the elections must be held in spite of the Administrator being in office this would be destructive of the provisions of Section 110-A itself. As pointed out earlier it begins with a non obstante clause. An order of the Court to be given effect more so its interim order must be within its jurisdiction meaning thereby in conformity with the statutory provisions. The order permitted the elections to be held was based on a prima facie view. Once the order passed under Section 110-A(iii) and Section 73-IB are upheld the interim order will have to be vacated and all consequential acts based thereon. The petition will be restored to the position when the petition was filed or the interim order was passed. It is open to this Court in the exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction to restore the position so as to bring it in conformity with the provisions of the Act.

Bearing this in mind let us now consider the judgments relied upon on behalf of the petitioner. Reliance was placed in the judgment of Madamanchi Ramappa and Anr. v. Muthaluru Bojjappar . The issue before the Apex Court was whether an appeal would lie to it under Article 133(3) of the Constitution of India from the judgment, decree, or final order of one Judge of a High Court. The Apex Court noted that it was the consistent practice of the Supreme Court not to encourage applications for special leave against the decisions of the High Court rendered in second appeals, but in cases where the petitioners for special leave against the second appellate judgments delivered by a Single Judge of the High Court are able to satisfy the Supreme Court that in allowing a second appeal, the High Court has interfered with questions of fact and has thus contravened the limits prescribed by Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure the Supreme Court would intervene. This is on the basis that the High" Court rendering a decision if it contravenes the express provisions of Section 100, it would inevitably introduce in such decisions an element of disconcerting unpredictabilitity which is usually associated with gambling, and that is an approach which judicial process must constantly and scrupulously endeavour to avoid. In our opinion this judgment atleast can be of no assistance to the petitioners before this Court as what we are considering is whether the order permitting the holding of election when there was a subsisting order under Section 73IB of the Act was within jurisdiction.

Next reliance was placed in the judgment in A.P. Christains Medical Educational Society v. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Anr. . In that case the appellants contended that they were a minority and based on that admitted students to professional collegiate courses. The appellants had also applied to Osmania University, the Hyderabad Central University and eight other Universities to grant affiliation to their colleges. The appellants were asked by the Registrar, Osmania University to submit an application in the prescribed form. The appellants informed the University that being a minority they had a right to establish their own educational institution under Article 30 of the Constitution and there was no need to get permission of the State Government and if permission was necessary the Central Government had granted permission. Sixty students were admitted to M.B.B.S., course in defiance of the conditions laid down by the University. As the appellants did not satisfy the conditions for affiliation they were informed that the affiliation could not be granted without obtaining feasibility report of the Screening Committee. The other aspects need not be referred to. Suffice it to say that the State Government refused permission to start a Medical College whereupon a petition came to be filed in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh to quash the refusal of permission by the Government of Andhra Pradesh and to direct the University to grant affiliation based on the fundamental right guaranteed under Section 30(1) of the Constitution. The petition was dismissed, against which an appeal was preferred before the Apex Court. It was suggested before the Apex Court that directions be issued to University to protect the interest of the students. The contention was rejected in the following words :-

We do not think that we can possibly accede to the request made by Shri Venugopal on behalf of the students. Any direction of the nature sought by Shri Venugopal would be in clear transgression of the provisions of the University Act and the Regulations of the University. We cannot by our flat direct the University to disobey the statute to which it owes its existence and the Regulations made by the University itself. We cannot imagine anything more destructive of the rule of law than a direction by the Court to disobey the laws.

Next we may refer to the judgment in the case of Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v. Union of India 1997 S.C.C. 635. The Apex Court was considering whether the High Court in granting relief under Article 226 could ignore the law. The Apex Court answered the issue in the following words :-

The writ petition would naturally be considered and disposed of in the light of and in accordance with the provisions of Section 11-B. This is for the reason that the power under Article 226 has to be exercised to effectuate the regime of law and not for aborgating it. Even while acting in exercise of the said constitutional power, the High Court cannot ignore the law nor can it override it. The power under Article 226 is conceived to serve the ends of law and not to transgress them.

The last judgment cited was in the case of M.C. Mehta v. Katnal Nath and Ors. 1999(1) Bom.C.R. (S.C.)765 : 2000(5) SCALE 69. The issue before the Apex Court was the scope of Article 142 of the Constitution of India. While nothing that the scope had been considered in several decisions and referring to those decisions, the position of law was summarised thus:

This power exists as a separate and independent basis of jurisdiction apart from the statutes. The Court further observed that though the powers conferred on the Court by Article 142 are curative in nature, they cannot be construed as powers which authorise the Court to ignore the substantive rights of a litigant. The Court farther observed that this power cannot be used to "supplant" substantive law applicable to the case or cause under consideration of the Court. Article 142, even with the width of its amplitude, cannot be used to build a new edifice where none existed earlier, by ignoring express statutory provisions dealing with a subject and thereby achieve something indirectly which cannot be achieved directly.

This observations were quoted by the Apex Court from the judgment in Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India .

13. The question, therefore, from the law laid down in these judgments is that it is not open to a Court to make an order or pass such judgment which may amount to be destructive of the rule of law. Contra, if the order is with jurisdiction then the Court would enforce the order. In these circumstances are the petitioners entitled to contend that the order of this Court dated 27th October, 2004 permitting holding of the first meeting should be given full effect to. As we have noted earlier, there is nothing in the order dated 27th October, 2004 to so hold apart from by way of an interim arrangement whereby it can be said that this Court permitted the first meeting of the Board of Directors but subject to what is set out in the later part of its order. If the later part of the order which we have reproduced above is considered, the Court had specifically stated that it will not be open to the newly elected Board of Directors to contend that by virtue of a relief granted to elect a representative that the newly elected of the Administrator ceases to operate. The submission, therefore, made based on an assumption that the meeting of the board had taken place, in our opinion, is misplaced. It was purely an interim direction for appointment of a representative to the apex body pursuant to an order of the Court which would necessarily mean it would be subject to the final order in the writ petition. From a reading of the judgments and their ratio decided it would be clear that it was not within the jurisdiction of the Court either to order holding of elections by way of interim arrangement or for that matter by the order dated 29th October, 2004 to declare the results of the elections considering the jurisdiction of this Court on consideration of Section 110-A(iii). When the Court passed an order on 29th October, 2002 the order postponing the elections subsisted though stayed by the interim order of this Court dated 16th May, 2002. Allowing the petitioners to assume office in the face of an order under Section 110-A itself would be destructive of the rule of law and beyond the Court's jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as it would defect the provisions of law. The petitioners, therefore, had no right enter into office or for that matter to contend that the first meeting of the Board of Directors have taken place. The second submission must also be rejected.

14. Having said so the petition will have to be dismissed and rule discharged. However, in the meantime pursuant to the interim order of this Court dated 27th October, 2004 a member has been elected to represent the bank on the apex body. Application by Reserve Bank of India, respondent No. 3 was to modify the order and allow the Administrator to represent the respondent No. 4 in the Maharashtra State Co-operative Bank as its member. Considering the fact that there is a member elected we see no purpose in recalling that order to that extent. Suffice it to say that the said member will act as a representative of the Administrator on the apex body and would be subject to directions issued by the Administrator in the matter of his functioning in the apex body.

15. For all the aforesaid reasons rule discharged. In the circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs.

Civil Applications also stand disposed off accordingly.