Canara Bank Staff Union And Ors. vs Canara Bank And Ors.
2004 Latest Caselaw 307 Bom

JUDGMENT

A.M. Khanwilkar, J.

1. Heard Mr. Singh for the petitioners and Mr. Rele for the Respondent No. 1. Respondent No. 2 has been served. However, none appears for Respondent No. 2. It is agreed that Respondent No. 2 is a formal party. In the circumstances, matter is taken up for final disposal with the consent of counsel appearing for the contesting parties. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith, by consent. Learned counsel for Respondent No. 1 waives notice.

2. This Writ Petition takes exception to the Judgment and Order passed by the Authority under Section 33-C(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, The Regional Labour Commissioner (C) Mumbai, dated September 4, 2003 in proceedings/application No. M16 (1)/2000-CON. It is not necessary to burden this Judgment with all the events that have led to the filing of this petition. Suffice it to observe that the respondent No. 2 Authority has rejected the application preferred by the Petitioners under Section 33-C(1) of the Act only on the ground that the Award pressed into service on behalf of the Petitioners does not finally determine the due amount and also because the Management was disputing the amount as calculated by the petitioners. This is the only reason which made the respondent No. 2 to reject the application under Section 33-C(1) of the Act filed by the Petitioners, as according to him no adjudication can be made in the nature of the present proceedings to arrive at the amount which is due and payable to the petitioners.

3. Mr. Singh appearing for the petitioners has relied on the decisions of the Supreme Court in case of Kays Construction Company (Pvt.) Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. . In case of Sawatram Ramprasad Mills Company Limited v. Baliram Ukandaji & Anr. as well as Fabril Gasosa v. Labour Commissioner and Ors. . According to the learned counsel for petitioners these decisions were produced before the Authority below, but are not even adverted to in the impugned decision. It is contended that from the aforesaid decisions it is well settled that the Authority is obliged to determine the amount even in an application under Section 33-C(1) of the Act. Learned counsel contends that from the findings as can be culled out from the award between the parties the factual position was not in dispute and the Authority could have determined the amount on the basis of the said admitted and established facts. On the other hand learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 contends that no fault can be found with the view taken by the respondent No. 2 while rejecting the application as filed by the petitioners because the Award does not finally determine the amount due and payable to the petitioners and also because the Management was disputing the calculations submitted on behalf of the petitioners. He further submits that the Management was disputing the calculations submitted on behalf of the petitioners for more than one reason, including that the workmen did not work for the number of days as claimed by them and if that is the nature of dispute, the same cannot be adjudicated by the Authority while considering application under Section 33-C(1) of the Act.

4. Having considered the rival submissions and after perusing the relevant records with the assistance of the counsel appearing for the parties, to my mind, the only reason noted by the respondent No. 2 to reject the application preferred by the petitioner under Section 33-C(1) of the Act is that the Award nowhere determines the amount due to the petitioners and also because the calculations submitted by the petitioners was disputed by the Management. No other reason can be culled out from the decision which is subject matter of challenge. It is apposite to reproduce the relevant portion of the Order passed by the Respondent No. 2. The same is thus:

"The contents of the award clearly establishes the fact that nowhere the due amount is determined. Though the Union has calculated the amount the same is disputed by the management as such answer to the said question is, amount is disputed by the management and hence required to be determined and the amount to be calculated as an equivalent value of certain benefits granted by the Tribunal and incidentally there is a dispute regarding the computation of such benefits in terms of money."

5. I find substance in the grievance made on behalf of the petitioners that the Respondent No. 2 has clearly failed to apply the settled legal position. Reliance was rightly placed on the aforesaid three decisions of the Supreme Court on behalf of the Petitioners to contend that even in an application under Section 33-C(1) of the Act, it is open to the Authority to determine the amount due and payable to the workmen, especially on the basis of admitted facts which arc relevant for deciding the claim under Section 33-C(1) of the Act. Going by the Award which is pressed into service, it is seen that certain facts are held to be established; and finding recorded in the Award in that behalf will bind both the parties. The Respondent No. 2 can surely decide the matter on the basis of those established facts so as to determine the amount, in terms of the ratio of the aforesaid three decisions.

6. However, it appears that the Respondent No. 2 was also impressed by the fact that the Respondent No. 1 was disputing the calculations submitted on behalf of the petitioners. According to the petitioners, the Respondent No. 1 was only disputing the quantum of the amount claimed. Whereas, now it is contended on behalf of the Respondent No. 1 that the Respondent No. 1 has disputed the quantum on the basis of several reasons including the fact that the workmen have not worked for the number of days as claimed by them. However, there is no material on record, atleast brought to my notice, to support the argument that such grievance was made before the Respondent No. 2. Assuming that such a contention was raised on behalf of the Management, the Respondent No. 2 will be obliged to consider even that aspect of the matter in accordance with law.

7. In the circumstances, the appropriate course, to my mind, is to set aside the decision impugned in this Writ Petition and to relegated the parties before the respondent No. 2 for fresh adjudication of the application as filed by the Petitioners under Section 33-C(1), in accordance with the law. All contentions will have to be and are left open.

8. While parting, I may however, observe that the Respondent No. 2 shall bear in mind the fact that this is the second time this Court is required to remand the proceedings. The Respondent No. 2 therefore, shall take all precautions to ensure that no contention is left undecided so as to obviate grievance to be made by the parties later on before this Court, as and when proceedings are brought before this Court.

9. In the circumstances, this Writ Petition succeeds. The impugned decision is set aside and the subject application is restored to the file of the Respondent No. 2. The Respondent No. 2 is directed to decide the subject application afresh on its own merits in accordance with law I as expeditiously as possible, in any case, within three months from today.

10. Parties to appear before Respondent No. 2 on April 5, 2004 and no fresh notice will be given. It is agreed that no notice regarding the date of hearing on April 5, 2004, before the Respondent No. 2 will be insisted upon. The respective parties to appear before Respondent No. 2 on April 5, 2004 at 11.00 a.m. and file their pleadings and records as may be advised to enable the Respondent No. 2 to finally dispose of the application on that day itself or some other convenient date within the specified time.

11. Parties to act on the copy of this Order duly authenticated by the Associate of this Court.