Khubiram S/O Bodalram Sharma And ... vs Resident Deputy Collector And ...
2004 Latest Caselaw 695 Bom

JUDGMENT

B.R. Gavai, J.

1. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Resident Deputy Collector, Amravati dated 17-5-1991 thereby partly allowing the appeal of the respondent No. 2 and granting permission to the respondent No. 2 under Clause 13(3)(iv), (viii) and (ix) of the Rent Control Order to issue quit notice to the petitioners, the petitioners approached this Court by way of present petition.

2. The facts in brief out of which the present petition arises are as under :--

That the respondent No. 2 herein preferred an application under Clause 13(3)(i), (ii),(iv), (viii) and (ix) of the C. P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as the "Rent Control Order"). It was the contention of the respondent No. 2 in his application that the non-applicants therein were given premises for running a hotel only. It was further averred that the non-applicants are using the premises for pan shop. It was thus complained that the non-applicants are using part of the premises for purposes other than for which it was leased out. Insofar as Clause 13(3)(viii) and (ix) are concerned, it was contended that due to acts of destruction of the non-applicants/tenants, the MCH No. 385 was damaged. It was further averred that the tenants are causing nuisance and thereby causing injury, danger, annoyance to the health of the other tenants and to the property of the applicant. Insofar as Clause 13(3)(i) and (ii) are concerned, it was contended that the non-applicants have not paid municipal taxes from 1-10-1967 and as such the non-applicants were in arrears of rent for Rs. 5906=25.

3. By a subsequent amendment, it was averred that the non-applicants were using the said premises for video-parlour and therefore, it amounted to change of user.

4. The petitioners filed their written statement denying the allegations. Insofar as Clause 13(3)(i) and (ii) are concerned, the petitioners submitted that the monthly amount of rent of Rs. 180/- was inclusive of all municipal taxes and as such, the petitioners were not liable to pay municipal taxes. It was thus submitted that the petitioners were not in arrears of rent. Insofar as Clause 13(3)(iv) is concerned, it was admitted that the non-applicants/petitioners were using some portion of the said premises for running a pan-shop but it was denied that thereby they were using the said premises for other purposes than that for which the same was leased out. It was asserted that the said premises were being used by the non-applicants for their hotel business as well as for their pan-shop and that the premises were in fact taken on lease for doing both the businesses. It was, therefore, submitted that the respondent No. 2/applicant was not entitled to permission under Clause 13(3)(iv) of the Rent Control Order.

5. Insofar as Clause 13(3)(viii) and (ix) are concerned, the non-applicants denied that due to the acts of destruction, the non-applicants have damaged the said MCH No. 385 and thereby caused injury, danger, annoyance to the health of other tenants and to the property of the applicant. Subsequent to the amendment to the application, the written statement also came to be amended thereby stating therein that the exhibition of the video-show was helpful and needed for attracting the customers in view of the public craze to see video shows in hotel. It was submitted that by exhibition of video in the hotel premises, the purpose of lease was not changed.

6. Both the parties adduced the evidence. The photostat copy of the agreement was also placed on record. The learned Rent Controller had also during the pendency of the proceedings visited the said premises for spot inspection. The learned Rent Controller after considering the material on record and hearing the parties was pleased to reject the application of the respondent No. 2 on all the grounds. Insofar as the Clause 13(3)(i) and (ii) are concerned, the Rent Controller found that in the agreement itself, it was stipulated that the monthly rent of Rs. 180/- was inclusive of municipal taxes. The learned Rent Controller, therefore, found that the contention of the respondent No. 2 that the municipal taxes were to be paid separately was devoid of substance and as such, the respondent No. 2 was not entitled for grant of permission under Clause 13(3)(i) and (ii) of the Rent Control Order.

7. Insofar as the Clause 13(3)(iv) was concerned, the Rent Controller found that the clause in the agreement provided that the tenant was at liberty to use the block for his business purpose only. The learned Rent Controller found that since the respondent No. 2 was doing the business of hotelling there and running a pan-shop and exhibiting T. V. and video shows in his hotel, the suit premises were not put to use for any other purpose than for which it were leased out and as such, the applicant was not entitled for grant of permission under Clause 13(3)(iv) of the Rent Control Order.

8. Insofar as Clause 13(3)(viii) and (ix) are concerned, the learned Rent Controller referred to his spot inspection. The learned Rent Controller observed that there was some damage to the plaster in the slab at the point just below the suit premises but he, however, found that it was so minor that there was nothing like causing injuries, danger, etc. He further found that there was no evidence that cracks and damage of plaster was caused because of acts of non-applicants. Thus, on this count also, the learned Rent Controller was pleased to reject the permission.

9. Being aggrieved by the order dated 11-12-1987 rejecting the permission on all counts, the respondent No. 2 went in appeal before the learned R.D.C. The learned R.D.C. vide his order dated 17-5-1991 was pleased to confirm the findings of the learned Rent Controller insofar as Clause 13(3)(i) and (ii) were concerned. However, insofar as the findings under Clause 13(3)(iv), (viii) and (ix) are concerned, he reversed the findings and granted permission under these clauses. The learned R.D.C. found that the business of video was not included in the agreement of lease. He found that running of video business amounted to use for the purposes other than the one for which it was leased out and as such, the respondent No. 2 was entitled to permission under Clause 13(3)(iv) of the Rent Control Order.

10. Insofar as Clause 13(3)(viii) and (ix) are concerned, learned R.D.C. found that from the spot note drawn by the Rent Controller itself it can be found that the petitioners are not handling the suit premises carefully, as a result of which there is percolation of water and falling of bricks and plaster, damaging the suit premises. As such, the learned R.D.C. granted permission under Clause 13(3)(viii) and (ix) of the Rent Control Order also.

11. Being aggrieved by the order dated 17-5-1991, partly allowing the appeal of the respondent No. 2, the petitioners approached this Court by way of present petition.

12. Heard Shri M. G. Bhangde, learned Counsel for petitioners, Smt. N. S. Jog, learned Assistant Government Pleader for respondent No. 1 and Shri S. R. Deshpande, learned Counsel for respondent No. 2.

13. Shri Bhangde, learned Counsel for petitioners, submitted that the learned appellate Court grossly erred in partly allowing the appeal and granting permission to the respondent No. 2 to issue quit notice under Clause 13(3)(iv), (viii) and (ix) of the said Order. Insofar as Clause 13(3)(iv) is concerned, he submitted that in the agreement itself it was provided that the petitioners/tenants were entitled to use the suit premises for their business purposes. He submits that as such, the petitioners could use the shop for carrying out any of their businesses. In the alternative, he submitted that assuming without admitting that the business premises were let out for hotel and pan-shop purpose, still holding of video exhibitions therein would not amount to change of user for the purpose other than for which it was let out. He submitted that holding of video shows was complementary to running of hotelling business and as such, there was not much variation for the purpose for which the suit premises were being used. He relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Gurdial Batra v. Raj Kumar Jain , Shri Bhangde also relied on the judgment of Mohan Lal v. Jai Bhagwan .

14. Insofar as Clause 13(3)(viii) and (ix) are concerned, Shri Bhangde submitted that it is necessary for the applicant to state in the application as to what acts or omissions on the part of the tenant are such which cause or are likely to cause injury, danger, annoyance or offence to the sense of sight, smell or hearing or which is or may be dangerous to the life or injurious to the health of a neighbour or to property. He submitted that in the application bare allegation is made that the tenants are causing nuisance, thereby causing injury, danger, annoyance to the health of other tenants and to the property of the applicant. He submitted that no acts or omissions on the part of the tenants which in the opinion of the respondent No. 2 amounted to causing injury, danger, annoyance to the health of other tenants or to the property of the applicant were given in the application. He, therefore, submitted that the permission granted on this count by the learned Rent Controller was contrary to the explanation appended to Clause 13(3)(ix) and as such, the permission on this ground ought not to have been granted. In support of this proposition, he relied on the judgment of this Court in the case of Vinodkumar Atmaramji Choudhary v. Resident Deputy Collector, Amravati and Anr. reported in 1998(1) MH.L.J. 632.

15. Shri S. R. Deshpande, in his reply, submitted that the learned R.D.C. has rightly granted permission under Clause 13(3)(iv), (viii) and (ix) of the Rent Control Order. He further submitted that the learned R.D.C. ought to have granted permission under Clause 13(3)(i) and (ii) also. He submits that the tenant was required to pay municipal taxes separately. Since he has not done so, he was in arrears of huge amount and, therefore, permission ought to have been granted under Clause 13(3)(i) and (ii) of the said Order. Insofar as the permission under Clause 13(3)(iv) is concerned, he submitted that the premises were let out for the purpose of hotel business only. However, the petitioners thereafter have installed a pan-thela on the Ota and as such this amounted to change of user. He submits that initially what was let out was only the premises for running a hotel along with an open Ota. According to Shri Deshpande, installation of pan-stall on the open Ota amounts to change of user. He further submits that using of the said premises for video-shows was totally impermissible inasmuch as it amounted to drastic change of user. He relied on the judgment of this Court in the case of Abdul Sattar Abdul Rahim v. Mulchand Upashya Koshti and Ors. reported in 7979 Mh.L.J. 726. He submits that in the said case this Court held that if the premises were let out for handloom, then even if a person instead of handloom installs powerloom, the same would amount to change of purpose within the meaning of Clause 13(3)(iv). Insofar as Clause 13(3)(viii) and (ix) are concerned, he submitted that in the spot inspection note itself it can be seen that there was leakage and cracks and that the place was damaged. He, therefore, submitted that his case squarely fell under Clause 13(3)(viii) and (ix) of the Rent Control Order.

16. After the matter was heard at length yesterday and judgment was dictated in part, Shri S. R. Deshpande, learned Counsel has today sought leave of the Court to address the Court again. Normally, after the matter is fully heard and the Court has already dictated the judgment in part, such a request ought not to have been accepted. However, in the interest of justice, this Court has permitted Shri Deshpande to address the Court.

17. Shri Deshpande submits that the reliance placed by Shri Bhangde on the judgments of Mohan Lal v. Jai Bhagwan and Gurdial Batra v. Raj Kumar Jain is misplaced inasmuch as the Apex Court in a later judgment in the case of M. Arul Jothi and Anr. v. Lajja Bal (deceased) and Anr. has distinguished the aforesaid judgments. He submits that in the case of M. Arul Jothi the Apex Court has held that when the premises are let out for a particular business purpose and restriction is imposed for carrying out any other business, then the premises cannot be put to use for the purposes of any other business. According to Shri Deshpande, in the present case, the premises were let out only for the business of the petitioners, which business even according to the petitioners, is hotelling and pan-thela and as such, the use of the premises for video-shows amounted to change of user. He, therefore, submits that the permission under Clause 13(3)(iv) is liable to be upheld.

18. In the background of the rival submissions, the questions that arise for consideration in the present case are as to whether the petitioners were in arrears of rent, as to whether premises are being put to use for a purpose other than for which it were let out as contemplated under Clause 13(3)(iv) and whether the respondent No. 2 has proved that he was entitled to permission under Clause 13(3)(viii) and (ix) due to the acts and omissions of the present petitioners which were dangerous to the life or injurious to the health of the neighbouring tenants or the premises.

19. Insofar as grant of permission under Clause 13(3)(iv) is concerned, it will be necessary to refer to the agreement of monthly lease executed between the petitioners and the respondent No. 2. At this stage, it may also be pertinent to note that the petitioners were originally the sub-tenants. Vide the agreement dated 30-9-1967 he was inducted as tenant on monthly rent of Rs. 180/-. Clause 5 of the said agreement reads as under :--

"That the tenant is at liberty to use the Block for his business purposes only."

Thus, from the agreement it can be seen that, the tenant was at liberty to use the block for his business purposes only. It is pertinent to note that nowhere in the agreement it is mentioned as to for what business purposes the block was rented out. Shri Deshpande, learned Counsel seeks to place reliance on the averments made in the written statement. As already pointed out, initially the allegation made in the application before the Rent Controller was that "the premises were given for running hotel only. However, the petitioners/non-applicants were using the premises for pan-shop and as such, it was a change of user." In reply to this allegation, the petitioners have admitted that the non-applicants are using the said premises for running a hotel and pan-bidi shop business. It is asserted in the written statement that since beginning of the tenancy, the non-applicant was using the said premises for hotel as well as pan-shop and as such, there was no change of user. By a subsequent amendment dated 16-2-1987, the respondent No. 2 added words "and video sales and shops" in paragraph 4. As a consequence of the amendment to the application the petitioner amended his written statement on 19-8-1987. The said amended paragraph 3(a) reads as under :--

"3(a) : It is submitted that the shop premises were taken for business purposes on lease and the non-applicants are running hotel business therein. The exhibition of the Video shows is helpful and needed for attracting the customers in view of the present public craze to see Video shows while hotelling. Thus, by exhibition of Video shows in the hotel premises, the purpose of tenancy or lease is not changed."

The averments made in the written statement will have to be read in context to the averments made in the application. The averments made in the written statement cannot be read in isolation. It can thus be seen that the petitioner has specifically stated in paragraph 3(a) that "It is submitted that the shop premises were taken for business purposes on lease". It is thus clear that the stand of the petitioners was in consonance with paragraph 5 of the agreement of lease dated 30-9-1967. Reading of paragraph 5 of the agreement of lease with paragraph 3(a) of the written statement of the non-applicants/petitioners would reveal that the tenants were at liberty to use the block for their business purposes only. I am, therefore, unable to find any restriction on the tenant to carry out any other business than the business of hotelling as submitted by the learned Counsel for the respondent No. 2.

20. In the case of Mohanlal, cited supra, Their Lordships of the Apex Court reproduced the words of Lord Diplock in Duport Steels Ltd. v. Sirs as under :--

"My Lords, at a time when more and more cases involving the application of legislation which gives effect to policies that are the subject of bitter public and parliamentary controversy, it cannot be too strongly emphasised that the British Constitution, though largely unwritten, is firmly based on the separation of powers : Parliament makes the laws, the judiciary interpret them. When Parliament legislates to remedy what the majority of its members at the time perceive to be a defect or a lacuna in the existing law (whether it be the written law enacted by existing statutes or the unwritten common law as it has been expounded by the judges in decided cases), the role of the judiciary is confined to ascertaining from the words that Parliament has approved as expressing its intention what that intention was, and to giving effect to it. Where the meaning of the statutory words is plain and unambiguous it is not for the judges to invent fancied ambiguities as an excuse for failing to give effect to its plain meaning because they themselves consider that the consequences of doing so would be inexpedient, or even unjust or immoral. In controversial matters such as are involved in industrial relations there is room for differences of opinion as to what is expedient, what is just and what is morally justifiable, to what is expedient, what is just and what is morally justifiable. Under our Constitution it is Parliament's opinion on these matters what is paramount."

While agreeing with the said observations of Lord Diplock, the Apex Court in the said case held that the meaning of the expression must be found in the felt necessities of the times. The Apex Court, therefore, held that in the background of the purpose of rent legislation and inasmuch as in the said case the change of user would not cause any mischief or detriment or impairment of the shop in question and could be called an allied business in the expanding concepts of departmental stores, there is no change of user to attract the mischief of Section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Rent Act in question. It is pertinent to note that the clause of the Rent Act which fell for consideration for the Apex Court was almost similar to the one which arises for consideration in the present case. In the said case, the shop was initially let out for the purpose of liquor vend but subsequently it was used for the business of general merchandise. As already stated hereinabove, the Apex Court found that there was no change of user.

21. In the ease of Gurdial Batra, cited supra, the premises were initially let out for the business of repairing of cycles and rickshaws but, however, side by side the tenant had also used the same premises for selling televisions for about 7 months. The Apex Court after considering the various pronouncements on the issue observed thus :--

"6. Letting of a premises can broadly be for residential or commercial purpose. The restriction which is statutorily provided in Section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act is obviously one to protect the interests of the landlord and is intended to restrict the use of the landlord's premises taken by the tenant under lease. It is akin to the provision contained in Section 108(o) of the Transfer of Property Act dealing with the obligations of a lessee. That clause provides :

The lessee may use the property and its products, if any, as a person of ordinary prudence would use them if they were of his own; but he must not use or permit another to use the property for a purpose other than that for which it was leased .......

A house let for residential purpose would not be available for being used as a shop even without structural alteration. The concept of injury to the premises which forms the foundation of Clause (b) is the main basis for providing Clause (b) in Section 13(2)(ii) of the Act as a ground for the tenant's eviction. The Privy Council in U Po Naing v. Burma Oil Co. adopted the same consideration. The Kerala High Court has held that premises let out for conducting trade in gold if also used for a wine store would not amount to an act destructive of or permanently injurious to the leased property. Similarly, the Bombay High Court has held that when the lease deed provided for user of the premises for business of fret work and the lessee used the premises for business in plastic goods, change in the nature of business did not bring about change of user as contemplated in Section 108(c) of the Transfer of Property Act.

7. The landlord parts with possession of the premises by giving a lease of the property to the tenant for a consideration. Ordinarily, as long as the interest of the landlord is not prejudiced, a small change in the user would not be actionable.

8. In this case, the premises was let out for running of a repair shop. Along with, the repair business, sale of televisions was temporarily carried on. We do not think this constituted a change of user within the meaning of Section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act so as to give a cause of action to the landlord to seek eviction of the tenant."

22. Thus, in the aforesaid case, the Apex Court found that though initially the premises were let out for carrying out the business of running a cycle and rickshaw repairing shop, selling of television sets therein did not amount to change of user. This Court while considering the similar provision under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging, House Rates Control Act in the case of Dattatraya Ramchandra Sapkal v. Gulabrao Tukaram Bhosale reported in 1978 Mh.L.J. 545 found that though initially the premises were let out for carrying out the business of fret-work, but its subsequent use for plastic business did not attract the mischief of provisions of Section 13(1)(a) of the Bombay Rent Act.

23. In the case of M. Arul Jothi relied upon by Shri Deshpande, there was a specific clause in the agreement of lease which reads thus:

"......shall be used by the tenant only for carrying on his own business dealing in radios, cycles, fans, clocks and steel furniture and for non-residential purposes and the tenant shall not carry on any other business than the abovesaid business."

It can thus be seen from the said clause that the tenant was to carry on his own business dealing in radio, cycles, fans, clocks and steel furniture and for non-residential purposes and that he was not to carry on any other business other than the abovesaid business. It can thus be seen from the said clause that it was specifically mentioned as to for what business the premises would be used and the lease agreement specifically prohibited the premises to be used for any other purposes than the one enumerated in the agreement of lease. As already discussed hereinabove, in the facts of the present case, upon reading the clause in the agreement of lease and the averments of the written statement it cannot be said that there was a prohibition for user of the said premises for any other business than the business of hotelling.

24. The Apex Court itself in the case of M. Arul Jothi has held that in the cases of Mohanlal and Gurdial Batra, there was no clause which prohibited the use for any other purposes than for the purpose for which it was let out. The Apex Court, therefore, on the facts of the case held that since there was a specific restriction in the agreement of lease for carrying out any other business than the business enumerated in the clause, there was a change of user so as to attract the mischief of Section 10(2)(ii)(b) of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. In my view, the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of M. Arun Jothi would not be applicable to the facts of the present case but as already stated above, the case would be covered by the law laid down by the Apex Court in Mohanlal and Gurdial Batra, cited supra.

24a. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court, the judgment of this Court in the case of Abdul Sattar Abdul Rahim, cited supra, relied by Shri Deshpande, learned Counsel for respondent No. 2, will have to be held as not a good law. In that view of the matter, I find that the permission granted by the learned R. D. C. under Clause 13(3)(iv) of the Rent Control Order is not sustainable in law.

25. Insofar as permission under Clause 13(3)(viii) and (ix) is concerned, it will be necessary to refer to the said Clauses which read as under :--

"(viii) that the tenant has committed or is committing such acts of waste as are likely to impair materially the value or utility of the premises; or

(ix) that the tenant has committed a nuisance,

Explanation.-- For the purpose of this item nuisance means any act or omission which causes or is likely to cause injury, danger, annoyance or offence to the sense of sight, smell or hearing or which is or may be dangerous to life or injurious to the health of a neighbour or to property."

The learned R.D.C. has granted the permission under Clause 13(3)(viii) and (ix) of the Rent Control Order on the ground that in the spot inspection it has been found that there was some percolation of water and falling of bricks and plaster thereby damaging the suit premises. As can be seen that Sub-clause (viii) provides that the permission under Sub-clause (viii) can be granted when the tenant has committed or is committing such acts of waste as are likely to impair materially the value or utility of the premises. From the pleadings made in the application, it is not pointed out as to what acts of waste have been committed by the tenants which are likely to impair materially the value or utility of the premises. Not only this, but even the learned R.D.C. in its order has not observed as to what acts of tenants are likely to impair materially the value or utility of the premises.

26. Insofar as the permission under Sub-clause (ix) is concerned, the Explanation provides that for the purpose of this item the nuisance means any act or omission which causes or is likely to cause injury, danger, annoyance or offence to the sense of sight , smell or hearing or may be dangerous to life or injurious to health of a neighbour or to property. This Court had an occasion to deal with this clause in the case of Vinodkumar Atmaramji Choudhary v. Resident Deputy Collector, Amravati and Anr. reported in 1998(1) Mh.L.J. 632.

"For making out a case of actionable nuisance, thus, under Clause 13(3)(ix) of the Rent Control Order, 1949, the landlord is required to plead and give details of the act or acts on the part of the tenant which cause or likely to cause injury, danger, nuisance or offence to the sense of sight, smell or hearing which is dangerous to life or injurious to the health of a nighbour or to property. In other words, anything done by the tenant which affects the rights of others, endangers life, violates loss of decency or obstructs comfortable and reasonable use of property may amount to nuisance within the meaning of this clause. But at the same time, it cannot be said that every inconvenience, discomfort or annoyance is sufficient to constitute a nuisance. No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to the circumstances or the acts or omission which would constitute nuisance and every case is required to be decided on its own peculiar facts as to whether the act or omission complained of constitutes nuisance or not. Explanation appended to Clause 13(3)(ix) of the Rent Control Order, 1949 is only illustrative and not exhaustive, because the term 'nuisance' is incapable of giving exhaustive definition. To constitute nuisance or actionable nuisance under Clause 13(3)(ix) of the Rent Control Order, 1949, the act or omission must be real and not fanciful or imaginary......."

It can thus be seen that to attract the mischief of Clause (ix), the landlord has to make out a specific case as to which acts or omissions on the part of the tenant are causing or likely to cause injury, danger, annoyance or offence to the sense of sight, smell or hearing or which may be dangerous to life or injurious to the health of a neighbour or to property. The applicant has averred in paragraph No. 5 of his application as under :--

"5. That there is MIH No. 385 which is known as 'Ladani' just below the M.H. No. 381, i.e. the premises in question. The said M. H. No. 385 is given on rent to one Prabhadevi Ratanlal Goyaneka. That due to the acts of destructions, the non-applicants tenants the M. C. H. No. 385 is damaged and impairs materially the value and the utility of the premises. The tenants are causing nuisance thereby are causing injury, danger, annoyance to the health of the other tenants and to the property of the applicant."

It can thus be seen that except a bald statement that due to the acts of destruction of the non-applicant tenant, the MCH House No. 385 is damaged and impairs materially the value and utility of the premises and that the tenants are causing nuisance thereby causing injury, danger, annoyance to the health of the other tenants and to the property of the applicant, the respondent No. 2 has not pleaded anything else. Leave aside giving details, he has not even whispered as to what acts and omissions on the part of the petitioners/tenants are of such a nature as to attract the mischief of Clause (ix) of the said Order. In my view, the present case is squarely covered by the law laid down by this Court in the case of Vinodkumar, cited supra. Consequently, the permission granted by the learned R.D.C. under Sub-clause (viii) and (ix) must also fail.

27. That takes us to the last ground raised by Shri Deshpande, learned Counsel for respondent No. 2 Shri Deshpande submitted that though the respondent has not filed a writ petition challenging the non-grant of permission under Clause 13(3)(i) and (ii) of the Rent Control Order, still he is entitled to make a request for grant of permission under the said clauses. For seeking permission under Clause 13(3)(i) and (ii), Shri Deshpande submitted that the municipal taxes were to be paid separately and since the petitioners have not paid the municipal taxes, they were in arrears of huge amount. To appreciate this submission on behalf of Shri Deshpande, it will be necessary to refer to the averments made in agreement of lease. Paragraph No. 2 of the said agreement reads as under:--

"2. The tenants Shri JIYARAM BODALRAM SHARMA and Shri KHUBIRAM BODALRAM SHARMA agreed to take on monthly lease the premises bearing Municipal Committee House No. 381 with passage being part of the building called "MALWIYA BHAWAN" No. 2 in Ward No. 18 (old) and New Ward No. 24, situated at Amravati Peth Amravati, Pre. Badnera, Tq. And Dist. Amravati infront of Cotton Market Road, Amravati Plot No. 21/40 Sheet No. 56-A out of Malwiya Bhawan this one Block only, belonging to the landlord Shri SHRIRAM SHALIGRAM MALWIYA on a monthly rent and as monthly tenant of Rs. 180/- (Rs. One Hundred and Eighty only) with Municipal Committee Taxes and will be paid by tenant payable in advance on or before 5th of every month regularly to the Landlord. The Landlord shall give receipt of the same after encashment of the cheque if the cheque is given. The monthly tenancy of the tenant shall commence from the 1st of October, 1967, according to English calendar month."

Thus, it can be seen from the agreement of lease itself that the rent of Rs. 180/-was inclusive of the municipal committee taxes. In that view of the matter this submission of Shri Deshpande must also fail.

28. In the result, the petition is allowed. The permission granted by the learned Resident Deputy Collector vide order dated 17-5-1991 under Clause 13(3)(iv), (vii) and (ix) of the Rent Control Order is set aside. Rule is accordingly made absolute with no order as to costs.