Shri V.S. Gajul, Being Ex-Junior ... vs The Honourable District Judge And ...
2003 Latest Caselaw 328 Bom

JUDGMENT

R.M. Lodha, J.

1. Upset by the order dated 29.01.1992 whereby the petitioner has been dismissed from service and rejection of his administrative appeal. The petitioner has filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

2. The petitioner who was working as junior clerk in the Court of Civil Judge, Junior Division and Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Mohol was served with the chargesheet on 16.02.1991. The charges against the petitioner, in substance, were:

(i) He was directed to maintain daily-diary and to produce the same before the presiding officer. However, he neglected those directions and disobeyed the orders of the superiors;

(ii) He was habitual late-comer and inspite of warning there was no improvement;

(iii) He remained absent at the time of flag-hoisting ceremony on 15.8.1990 and

(iv) His behaviour with his co-workers was hostile.

The Inquiry Officer was appointed and after following reasonable procedure and giving the petitioner full opportunity of filing reply, production of documents and oral evidence, the Inquiry Officer in his report dated 30.07.1991 held that all the charges against the petitioner were proved. Though the petitioner prayed for supply of copy of Inquiry report, the Disciplinary Authority did not furnish copy of the said report, but along with the final order on 29.01.1992 awarding the punishment of dismissal from service, the Disciplinary Authority forwarded copy of Inquiry report as well to the petitioner. Aggrieved by the dismissal order dated 29.01.1992, the petitioner appears to have filed writ petition before this Court being Writ Petition No. 2511/1992. This Court did not entertain the said writ petition and converted the same is administrative appeal and we are informed that the said administrative appeal was also rejected necessitating the filing of present writ petition.

3. Mr. Sanjay Kshirsagar, learned counsel for the petitioner, principally raised two contentions before us. His first contention was that in the light of law laid down by the Supreme Court in Union of India and Ors. v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, , it was incumbent upon the Disciplinary Authority to furnish the Inquiry report to the petitioner. Having not done that, the rules of natural justice were violated and the petitioner cannot be said to have been afforded adequate opportunity in the disciplinary proceedings. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that denial of copy of Inquiry report before dismissal order has caused tremendous prejudice to the rights of the petitioner and, therefore, the disciplinary proceedings are vitiated. In support of this contention, Mr. Kshirsagar, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Union of India and Ors. v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, and Five Judge Constitution Bench judgment of the Apex Court in Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad, etc. etc. v. B. Karunakar, etc. etc., . The second contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that even if the charges levelled against the petitioner are held to be proved as has been found by the Inquiry Officer and Disciplinary Authority, the punishment of dismissal is grossly disproportionate. According to Mr. Kshirsagar, for the charges proved: (a) that for the period of 18 days the petitioner failed to submit daily diary to the presiding officer; (b) that the petitioner was late for about 7 days in a span of two years and (c) that the petitioner was hostile to co-workers some-times, the punishment of dismissal cannot be justified. Highlighting the principle of proportionality, the learned counsel relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in on of India and Anr. v. G. Ginayutham (Dead) by LRs., and Om Kumar and Ors. v. Union of India, A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 3689. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in the light of the aforesaid infirmities the petitioner is not average if the disciplinary proceedings are restored against the petitioner and matter is reconsidered by the disciplinary authority in accordance with law from the stage the copy of Inquiry report was forwarded by the Disciplinary Authority to the petitioner.

4. On the other hand, Mr. Vanarase, learned A.G.P. invited our attention to the reply affidavit filed on behalf of respondents 1 and 2 and submitted that Inquiry Officer submitted his report after considering all the facts brought before him in the Inquiry and on the basis of existing rules at the relevant time, the petitioner was not entitled to the supply of Inquiry report. The learned A.G.P. submitted that the charges levelled against the petitioner are fully proved and on overall assessment of the misconduct proved, the punishment of dismissal was awarded which does not call for any interference.

5. One thing is clear that prior to the dismissal order, the copy of Inquiry report was not supplied to the petitioner. Admittedly the copy of the Inquiry report was sent to the petitioner along with dismissal order. What is its legal effect is the question before us. The respondents have raised the plea that the existing Rules then did not require furnishing of copy of inquiry report to delinquent. In Mohd. Ramzan Khan (supra) this legal position has been considered and in paragraphs 13 and 15 of the report, the Supreme Court held thus:

"13. Several pronouncements of this Court dealing with Article 311(2) of the Constitution have laid down the test of natural justice in the matter of meeting the charges. This Court on one occasion has stated that two phases of the inquiry contemplated under Article 311(2) prior to the 42nd amendment were judicial. That perhaps was a little stretching the position. Even if it does not become a judicial proceeding, there can be no dispute that it is a quasi-judicial one. There is a charge and denial followed by an inquiry at which evidence is led and assessment of the material before conclusion is reached. These facts do make the matter quasi-judicial and attract the principles of natural justice. As this Court rightly pointed out in the Gujarat case , the disciplinary authority is very often influenced by the conclusions of the Inquiry Officer and even by the recommendations relating to the nature of punishment to be inflicted. With the Forty-Second Amendment, the delinquent officer is not associated with the disciplinary inquiry beyond the recording of evidence and the submissions made on the basis of the material to assist the Inquiry Officer to come to his conclusions. In case his conclusions are kept away from the delinquent officer and the Inquiry Officer submits his conclusions with or without recommendation as to punishment, the delinquent is precluded from knowing the contentions thereof although such material is used against him by the disciplinary authority. The report is an adverse material if the Inquiry Officer records a finding of guilt and proposes a punishments far as the delinquent is concerned. In a quasi-judicial matter, if the delinquent is being deprived of knowledge of the material against him though the same is made available to the punishing authority in the matter of reaching his conclusion, rules of natural justice would be affected. Prof. Wade has pointed out:

"The concept of natural justice has existed for many centuries and it has crystallised into two rules: that no man should be judged in his own cause; and that no man should suffer without first being given a fair hearing. They (the Courts) have been developing and extending the principles of natural justice so as to build up a kind of code of fair administrative procedure to be obeyed by authorities of all kinds. They have done this once again, by assuming that Parliament always intends powers to be exercised fairly."

15. Deletion of the second opportunity from the scheme of Article 311(2) of the Constitution has nothing to do with providing of a copy of the report to the delinquent in the matter of making his representation. Even though the second stage of the inquiry in Article 311(2) has been abolished by amendment, the delinquent is still entitled to represent against the conclusion of the Inquiry Officer holding that the charges or some of the charges are established and holding the delinquent guilty of such charges. For doing away with the effect of the enquiry report or to meet the recommendations of the Inquiry Officer in the matter of imposition of punishment, furnishing a copy of the report becomes necessary and to have the proceeding completed by using some material behind the back of the delinquent is a position not countenanced by fair procedure. While by law application of natural justice could be totally ruled out or truncated, nothing has been done here which could be taken as keeping natural justice out of the proceedings and the series of pronouncements of this Court making rules of natural justice applicable to such an inquiry are not affected by the 42nd amendment. We, therefore, come to the conclusion that supply of a copy of the inquiry report along with recommendations, if any, in the matter of proposed punishment to be inflicted would be within the rules of natural justice and the delinquent would, therefore, be entitled to the supply of a copy thereof. The Forty-Second Amendment has not brought about any change in this position."

6. The Apex Court, thus, in unequivocal terms rules that the delinquent is entitled to supply of copy of inquiry report along with the recommendations, if any, of proposed punishment to be inflicted and infraction thereof would be in breach of rules of natural justice. In paragraph 18 of the report, the Supreme Court observed thus:

"18. We make it clear that wherever there has been an Inquiry Officer and he has furnished a report to the disciplinary authority at the conclusion of the inquiry holding the delinquent guilty of all or any of the charges with proposal for any particular punishment or not, the delinquent is entitled to a copy of such report and will also be entitled to make a representation against it, if he so desires, and non-furnishing of the report would amount to violation of rules of natural justice and make the final order liable to challenge hereafter."

7. The view in Ramzan Khan's case has been affirmed and re-iterated by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in B. Karunakar (supra). It was held therein that the delinquent is entitled to copy of inquiry report before any decision is taken by the Disciplinary Authority regarding guilt or innocence and refusal to furnish copy of inquiry report amounts to denial of reasonable opportunity. In paragraph 7 of the report, the Apex Court held thus:

"7. What emerges from the above survey of the law on the subject is as follows:

Since the Government of India Act, 1935 till the 42nd Amendment of the Constitution, the Government servant had always the right to receive report of the Inquiry Officer/authority and to represent against the findings recorded in it when the Inquiry Officer/authority was not the disciplinary authority. This right was however, exercisable by him at the second stage of the disciplinary proceedings viz., when he was served with a notice to show cause against the proposed penalty. The issuance of the notice to show cause against the penalty necessarily required the furnishing of a copy of the inquiry officer's report since, as held by the Courts, the right to show cause against the penalty also implied the right to represent against the findings on the charges. This was considered to be an essential part of the reasonable opportunity incorporated earlier in Section 240 (3) of the GOI Act and later in Article 311(2) of the Constitution as originally enacted. The right to receive the Inquiry Officer's report and to show cause against the findings in the report was independent of the right to show cause against the penalty proposed. The two rights came to be confused with each other because as the law stood prior to the 42nd Amendment of the Constitution, the two rights arose simultaneously only at the stage when a notice to show cause against the proposed penalty was issued. If the disciplinary authority after considering the Inquiry Officer's report had dropped the proceedings or had decided to impose a penalty other than that of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank, there was no occasion for issuance of the notice to show cause against the proposed penalty. In that case, the employee had neither the right to receive the report and represent against the finding of guilt nor the right to show cause against the proposed penalty. The right to receive the report and to represent against the finding recorded in it was thus inextricably connected with the acceptance of the report by the disciplinary authority and the nature of the penalty proposed. Since the 42nd Amendment of the Constitution dispensed with the issuance of the notice to show cause against the penalty proposed even if it was dismissal, removal or reduction in rank, some courts took the view that the Government servant was deprived of his right to represent against the findings of guilt as well. The error occurred on account of the failure to distinguish the two rights which were independent of each other.

While the right to represent against the findings in the report is part of the reasonable opportunity available during the first stage of the inquiry viz., before the disciplinary authority takes into consideration the findings in the report, the right to show cause against the penalty proposed belongs to the second stage when the disciplinary authority has considered the findings in the report and has come to the conclusion with regard to the guilt of the employee and proposes to award penalty on the basis of its conclusions. The first right is the right to prove innocence. The second right is to plead for either no penalty or a lesser penalty although the conclusion regarding the guilt is accepted. It is the second right exercisable at the second stage which was taken way by the 42nd Amendment.

The reason why the right to receive the report of the Inquiry Officer is considered an essential part of the reasonable opportunity at the first stage and also a principle of natural justice is that the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer form an important material before the disciplinary authority which along with the evidence is taken into consideration by it to come to its conclusions. It is difficult to say in advance, to what extent the said findings including the punishment, if any, recommended in the report would influence the disciplinary authority while drawing its conclusions. The findings further might have been recorded without considering the relevant evidence on record, or by misconstruing it or unsupported by it. If such a finding is to be one of the documents to be considered by the disciplinary authority, the principles of natural justice require that the employee should have a fair opportunity to meet, explain and controvert it before he is condemned. It is the negation of the tenants of justice and a denial of fair opportunity to the employee to consider the findings recorded by a third party like the Inquiry Officer without giving the employee an opportunity to reply to it. Although it is true that the disciplinary authority is supposed to arrive at its own findings on the basis of the evidence recorded in the inquiry, it is also equally true that the disciplinary authority takes into consideration the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer along with the evidence on record. In the circumstances, the findings of the Inquiry Officer do constitute an important material before the disciplinary authority which is likely to influence its conclusions. If the Inquiry Officer were only to record the evidence and forward the same to the disciplinary authority, that would not constitute any additional material before the disciplinary authority of which the delinquent employee has no knowledge. However, when the Inquiry Officer goes further and records his findings, as stated above, which may or may not be based on the evidence on record or are contrary to the same or in ignorance of it, such findings are in additional material unknown to the employee but are taken into consideration by the disciplinary authority while arriving at its conclusion. Both the dictates of the reasonable opportunity as well as the principles of natural justice, therefore, require that before the disciplinary authority comes to its own conclusions, the delinquent employee should have an opportunity to reply to the Inquiry Officer's findings. The disciplinary authority is then required to consider the evidence, the report of the Inquiry Officer and the representation of the employee against it.

It will thus be seen that where the Inquiry Officer is other than the disciplinary authority, the disciplinary proceedings break into two stages. The first stage ends when the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions on the basis of the evidence, Inquiry Officer's report and the delinquent employee's reply to it. The second stage begins when the disciplinary authority decides to impose penalty on the basis of its conclusions. If the disciplinary authority decides to drop the disciplinary proceedings, the second stage is not even reached. The employee's right to receive the report is thus, a report of the reasonable opportunity of defending himself in the first stage of the inquiry. If this right is denied to him, he is in effect denied the right to defend himself and to prove his innocence in the disciplinary proceedings.

The position in law can also be looked at from a slightly different angle. Article 311(2) says that the employee shall be given a "reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of the charges against him". The findings on the charges given by a third person like the Inquiry Officer, particularly when they are not borne out by the evidence or are arrived at by overlooking the evidence or misconstruing it, could themselves constitute new unwarranted imputations. What is further, when the proviso to the said Article states that "where it is proposed after such inquiry to impose upon him any such penalty such penalty may be imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and it shall not be necessary to give such person any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed", it in effect accepts two successive stages of differing scope. Since the penalty is to be proposed after the inquiry, which inquiry in effect is to be carried out by the disciplinary authority (the Inquiry Officer being only his delegate appointed to hold the inquiry and to assist him), the employee's reply to the Inquiry Officer's report and consideration of such reply by the disciplinary authority also constitute an integral part of such inquiry. The second stage follows the inquiry so carried out and it consists of the issuance of the notice to show cause against the proposed penalty and of considering the reply to the notice and deciding upon the penalty. What is dispensed with is the opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed and not of opportunity of making representation on the report of the Inquiry Officer. The latter right was always there. But before the 42nd Amendment of the Constitution, the point of time at which it was to be exercised had stood deferred till the second stage viz., the stage of considering the penalty. Till that time, the conclusions that the disciplinary authority might have arrived at both with regard to the guilt of the employee and the penalty to be imposed were only tentative. All that has happened after the 42nd Amendment of the Constitution is to advance the point of time at which the representation of the employee against the Inquiry Officer's report would be considered. Now, the disciplinary authority has to consider the representation of the employee against the report before it arrives at its conclusion with regard to his guilt or innocence of the charges.

Hence it has to be held that when the Inquiry Officer is not the disciplinary authority, the delinquent employee has right to receive a copy of the Inquiry Officer's report before the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions with regard to the guilt or innocence of the employee with regard to the charges levelled against him. That right is a part of the employee's right to defend himself against the charges levelled against him. A denial of the Inquiry Officer's report before the disciplinary authority takes its decision on the charges is a denial of reasonable opportunity to the employee to prove his innocence and is a breach of the principles of natural justice.

Hence the incidental questions raised above may be answered as follows:

(i) Since the denial of the report of the Inquiry Officer is a denial of reasonable opportunity and a breach of the principles of natural justice, it follows that the statutory rules, if any, which deny the report to the employee are against the principles of natural justice and, therefore, invalid. The delinquent employee will, therefore, be entitled to a copy of the report even if the statutory rules do not permit the furnishing of the report or are silent on the subject.

(ii) The relevant portion of Article 311(2) of the Constitution is as follows:

"(2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an enquiry in; which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges."

Thus the article makes it obligatory to hold an inquiry before the employee is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank. The Article, however, cannot be construed to mean that it prevents or prohibits the inquiry when punishment other than that of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank is awarded. The procedure to be followed in awarding other punishments is laid down in the service rules governing the employee. what is further, Article 311(2) applies only to members of the civil services of the Union or an all India service or a civil service of a State or to the holders of the civil posts under the Union or a State. In the matter of all punishments both Governments servants and other are governed by their service rules. Whenever, therefore, the service rules contemplate an inquiry before a punishment is awarded, and when the Inquiry Officer is not the disciplinary authority the delinquent employee will have the right to receive the Inquiry Officer's report notwithstanding the nature of the punishment.

(iii) Since it is the right of the employee to have the report to defend himself effectively, and he would not know in advance whether the report is in his favour or against him, it will not be proper to construed his failure to ask for the report, as the waiver of his right. Whether, therefore, the employee asks for the report or not, the report has to be furnished to him.

(iv) In the view that we have taken, viz., that the right to make representation to the disciplinary authority against the findings recorded in the inquiry report is an integral part of the opportunity of defence against the charges and is a breach of principles of natural justice to deny the said right, it is only appropriate that the law laid down in Mohd. Ramzan Khan's case (supra) should apply to employees in all establishments whether Government or non-Government, public or private. This will be the case whether there are rules governing the disciplinary proceeding or not and whether they expressly prohibit the furnishing of the copy of the report or are silent on the subject. Whatever the nature of punishment, further, whenever the rules require an inquiry to be held, for inflicting the punishment in question, the delinquent employee should have the benefit of the report of the Inquiry officer before the disciplinary authority records its findings on the charges levelled against him. Hence question (iv) is answered accordingly.

(v) The next question to be answered is what is the effect on the order of punishment when the report of the Inquiry Officer is not furnished to the employee and what relief should be granted to him in such cases. The answer to this question has to be relative to the punishment awarded. When the employee is dismissed or removed from service and the inquiry is set aside because the report is not furnished to him, in some cases the non-furnishing of the report may have prejudiced him gravely while in other cases it may have made no difference to the ultimate punishment awarded to him. Hence to direct reinstatement of the employee with backwages in all cases is to reduce the rules of justice to a mechanical ritual. The theory of reasonable opportunity and the principles of natural justice have been evolved to uphold the rule of law and to assist the individual to vindicate his just rights. They are not incantations to be invoked nor rites to be performed on all and sundry occasions. Whether infact, prejudice has been caused to the employee or not on account of the denial to him of the report, has to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case. Where, therefore, even after the furnishing of the report, no different consequence would have followed, it would be a pervasion of justice to permit the employee to resume duty and to get all the consequential benefits. It amounts to rewarding the dishonest and the guilty and thus to stretching the concept of justice to illogical and exasperating limits. It amounts to an "unnatural expansion of natural justice" which in itself is antithetical to justice.

Hence, in all cases where the Inquiry Officer's report is not furnishing to the delinquent employee in the disciplinary proceedings, the courts and Tribunals should cause the copy of the report to be furnished to the aggrieved employee if he has not already secured it before coming to the Court/Tribunal, and give the employee an opportunity to show how his or her case was prejudice because of the non-supply of the report. If after hearing the parties, the Court/Tribunal comes to the conclusion that non-supply of the report would have made no different to the ultimate findings and the punishment given, the Court/Tribunal should not interfere with the order of punishment. The Court/Tribunal should not mechanically set aside the order of punishment on the ground that the report was not furnished as is regrettably being done at present. The courts should avoid resorting to short-cuts. Since it is the Courts/Tribunals which will apply their judicial mind to the question and give their reasons for setting aside or not setting aside the order of punishment, (and not any internal appellate or revisional authority), there would be neither a breach of the principles of natural justice nor a denial of the reasonable opportunity. It is only if the Court/Tribunals find that the furnishing of the report would have made a difference to the result in the case that it should set aside the order of punishment. Whereafter following the above procedure, the Courts/Tribunals sets aside the order of punishment, the proper relief that should be granted is to direct reinstatement of the employee with liberty to the authority/management to proceed with the inquiry, by placing the employee under suspension and continuing the inquiry from the stage of furnishing him with the report. The question whether the employee would be entitled to the back-wages and other benefits from the date of his dismissal to the date of his reinstatement if ultimately ordered should invariably be left to be decided by the authority concerned according to law, after the culmination of the proceedings and depending on the final outcome. If the employee succeeds in the fresh inquiry and is directed to be reinstated, the authority should be at liberty to decide according to law how it will treat the period from the date of dismissal till the reinstatement and to what benefits, if any and the extent of the benefits, he will be entitled. The reinstatement made as a result of the setting aside of the inquiry for failure to furnish the report should be treated as a reinstatement for the purpose of holding the fresh inquiry from the stage of furnishing the report and no more, where such fresh inquiry is held. That will also be the correct position in law......"

8. Adverting to the facts in the present case in the light of the aforesaid legal position, it would be seen that chargesheet was served upon the petitioner on 16.02.1991 along with the dismissal order only. It is admitted that upon conclusion of the Inquiry the report was submitted by the Inquiry Officer to the Disciplinary Authority on 29.07.1991. The service of chargesheet and the report submitted by the Inquiry Officer to the Disciplinary Authority, thus, were after the law was authoritatively laid down by the Supreme Court in Mohd. Ramzan Khan on 20.11.1990. Irrespective of existing rules, in the light of the law laid down by the Supreme Court, the petitioner was entitled to supply of copy of inquiry report which was not done and, obviously therefore, there was breach of principles of natural justice and the petitioner can be said to have not been given reasonable opportunity in the disciplinary proceedings. The question then is, what is the effect of non-supply of inquiry report to the petitioner despite law having been clearly laid down by the Supreme Court. In B. Karunakar, the Supreme Court dealt with this aspect in sub-paragraph (v) of paragraph 7 of the report. It was observed while dealing with this question that the Courts and Tribunals should cause the copy of the report to be furnished to the aggrieved employee if he has not already secured it before coming to the Court/Tribunal and give the employee an opportunity to show cause how his or her case was prejudiced because of non-supply of report. In so far as present case is concerned, along with the order of dismissal, the Disciplinary Authority did forward the copy of the inquiry report to the petitioner. So petitioner was possessed with the copy of the Inquiry report before approaching this Court and therefore we wanted to know the prejudice caused to the petitioner for want of supply of inquiry report before dismissal order. The learned counsel for the petitioner highlighted the prejudice said to have been caused to the petitioner because of non-supply of the report by submitting that certain diaries were considered by the Inquiry Officer for the first time in his report which were never shown to the petitioner. Had the inquiry report been supplied to the petitioner before the final decision was taken, the petitioner would have shown the Disciplinary Authority that some of the material relied upon by the Inquiry Officer was never shown to the petitioner which vitiated the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer. The leaned counsel also submitted as regards the charge No. 4 pertaining to hostile attitude of the petitioner towards co-workers that the co-workers in their oral evidence stated before the Inquiry Officer that petitioner's behaviour was proper and if the copy of inquiry report was supplied to the petitioner he would have shown to the Disciplinary Authority that the inference drawn by the Inquiry Officer that the petitioner has won over such employee (co-workers) was misplaced. The learned counsel for the petitioner also submitted that the findings recorded by the Inquiry officer were inconsistent with the evidence led and if the copy of the inquiry report had been submitted to the petitioner, the petitioner would have shown before the Disciplinary Authority that the findings of the Inquiry Officer could not be acted upon. Taking these aspects into consideration, we are of the view that it cannot be ruled out that non-supply of inquiry report to the petitioner caused prejudice to him. We do not intend to deal with this aspect at length as in our consideration view the petitioner has been able to make out the case of prejudice for want of supply of inquiry report. Besides that, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the punishment of dismissal awarded to the petitioner for the charges proved is grossly disproportionate also cannot be said to be frivolous. As noted by us above that non-supply of inquiry report has caused prejudice to the petitioner and the matter requires reconsideration by the Disciplinary Authority and, therefore, the aspect of proportionality of punishment too, deserves to be reconsidered. The proposal of the learned counsel for the petitioners was fair that the petitioner does not seek back-wages now and in the light of the observations made by the Apex Court in B. Karunakar, particularly Clause (v) of paragraph 7, the petitioner be placed under suspension and enquiry be continued from the stage the inquiry report was submitted to him on 29.01.1992.

9. We, accordingly, dispose of writ petition by following order:

(i) The order of dismissal dated 29.01.1992 passed by the Disciplinary Authority (District Judge, Solapur) is set aside.

(ii) The Disciplinary Authority shall now proceed with the inquiry from the stage the inquiry report was forwarded to the petitioner on 29.01.1992.

(iii) The petitioner shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension from today.

(iv) All questions relating to consequential benefits are kept open for consideration by Disciplinary Authority and shall be subject to the final order that may be passed by him.

(v) Since the disciplinary proceedings are quite old, the Disciplinary Authority is expected to conclude disciplinary proceedings expeditiously and preferably within six months from the date of receipt of this order.

10. No costs.

Certified copy expedited.