Gope Laxmichand Badlani vs Oriental Bank Of Commerce, New ...
2001 Latest Caselaw 615 Bom

JUDGMENT

S.J. Vazifdar, J.

1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Respondents waive service.

2. The petitioner was employed as a Chief Manager with respondent No. 1. Respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4 are the Deputy General Manager, General Manager and Chairman-cum-Managing Director of respondent No. 1. Respondent No. 2 was appointed by respondent No. 3 to conduct an enquiry into the charges levelled against the petitioner. In the enquiry proceedings he is referred to as the I. A. i.e. Investigating Authority. Respondent No. 3 acted as the Disciplinary Authority in respect of the proceeding under the Oriental Bank of Commerce Officer Employees (discipline and appeal) Regulations, 1982 (hereinafter referred to as "the Regulations"). Respondent No. 4 is the Appellate Authority under the said Regulations.

3. The petition challenges the findings of respondent No. 2 dated 19th March, 1999 holding the petitioner guilty of not discharging his duties with integrity, devotion and diligence; the order of respondent No. 3 dated 17-11-1999 upholding the charges levelled against the petitioner and dismissing him from the services of respondent No. 1 and the order dated 24th February, 2000 passed by respondent No. 4 rejecting the petitioners appeal against the order dated 17-11-1999. The petitioner has also impugned the directions dated 11-1-2000 issued by respondent No. 3 directing him to vacate his residential premises.

4. The impugned orders are unsustainable. They are in gross violation of the principles of natural justice. The situation is aggravated in that the rules of natural justice which were violated were required to be complied with even by the Regulations framed by respondent No. 1. The reasons, if they may be so described, given by respondent No. 2 for his findings which were upheld by respondent Nos. 3 and 4 are based on wholly erroneous principles of law.

5. The petitioner joined the services of respondent No. 1 in 1974. He was promoted as an Officer in 1979, as a Manager in 1982, as a Senior Manager in 1990 and as Chief Manager in 1994. The petitioner was elected as the General Secretary of the Maharashtra Region of the Oriental Bank Officers Association from 1993 and as the Assistant Secretary of the All India Officers Association in 1995.

6. On 14th August, 1997, the petitioner was issued a charge-sheet stating that it had been decided to hold an enquiry against him under Regulation 6. It is necessary to set out the statement of imputation of misconduct in full.

"Sh. G. L. Badlani, Chief Manager (under suspension) while posted and functioning as incumbent-in-charge at B/o Lamington Road, Mumbai during the period Aug. 82 to Feb. 87 had misappropriated an amount of Rs. 1.01 lac from SB A/c. No. 1106 of one Sh. Rakesh Kumar Malhotra. On 27-5-1986 Sh. G. L. Badlani by misusing his official position as Incumbent-in-charge at the branch had withdrawn an amount of Rs. 1.01 lac from SB A/c. No. 1106 of one Sh. Rakesh Kumar Malhotra by signing himself the withdrawal form in the name of Sh. Rakesh Kumar. After signing the aforesaid withdrawal form dated 27-5-1997, the same was also passed for payment by Sh. Badlani himself from the respective ledger account of the customer. Further investigations in the matter have established that the said withdrawal form dated 27-5-1986 bears the signature as Sh. Rakesh Kumar different from the specimen signature on branch record. It has further been established that the withdrawal form

dated 27-5-1986 was signed by Sh. Badlani himself in the name of Sh. Rakesh Kumar. Thus, Sh. G. L. Badlani had misappropriated an amount of Rs. 1.01 lac of a customer without his consent and authority."

7. The petitioner by his letter dated 8th September, 1997 contended that the charges were stale, relating to an incident over ten year ago and that there was no explanation for the delay. The petitioner further contended that the said charges were also the subject matter of a criminal complaint filed by the C.B.I. In the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chandigarh and hence the enquiry should be deferred till the disposal of the criminal complaint. The petitioner's application for inspection of certain documents was also turned down. The petitioner, therefore, filed a Writ Petition in this Court being Writ Petition No. 1909 of 1997 which came to be disposed of in terms of an order dated 15th December, 1997. However, the respondents agreed not to use the statements made by the petitioner in the departmental proceedings before the Criminal Court. The respondents also agreed to furnish the petitioner copies of the documents upon which they wanted to rely at the time of the enquiry.

8. As the petitioner's request to be defended by a lawyer at the enquiry was rejected, he filed another Writ Petition in this Court being Writ Petition No. 2019 of 1998 which was ultimately withdrawn by him.

9. We shall revert to what transpired at the enquiry proceedings in detail after narrating the facts and while dealing with the merits of the case. There is, however, one aspect which we may mention at this stage.

10. In accordance with Regulation 6(6) a Presenting Officer (P.O.) was appointed to present the case in support of the charges. Respondent No. 1 examined only one witness, Shri A.K. Agarwal. After the petitioner cross-examined A. K. Agarwal, he tendered a copy of the opinion of a handwriting expert (hereinafter referred to as "the petitioner's handwriting expert") and offered to present the handwriting expert for cross-examination. The P.O. chose not to cross-examine the petitioner's handwriting expert. Instead thereafter at the hearing held on 13-1-1999 the Presenting Officer tendered a copy of the opinion of another handwriting expert (hereinafter referred to as "the respondents" handwriting expert"). The petitioner objected to the production of the same at this belated stage. Respondent No. 2, however, took the same on record. The petitioner by his letter dated 15-1-1999 addressed to respondent No. 2 requested permission to cross examine the respondents handwriting expert. The petitioner rightly contended that no reliance could be placed on the document till the author thereof was made available for cross-examination.

At the next hearing held on 20th February, 1999 the petitioner reiterated his application to cross-examine the handwriting expert whose opinion had been taken on record. He had a right to do so under Regulation 6(13) and (14) to which we shall refer later. It is rather startling that respondent No. 2 without giving an opportunity to the petitioner to cross-examine the handwriting expert, abruptly closed the enquiry. Respondent No. 2 did not even deal with the petitioner's application for cross-examination of the respondents handwriting expert much less give any reasons for not granting the same.

11. The petitioner by the aforesaid letter dated 15-1-1999 objected to respondent No. 2 continuing to conduct the proceedings against him. The

petitioner alleged that very often the records of the proceedings were dictated by the Presenting Officer (P.O.) in the absence of respondent No. 2, thereby eliminating distinction between the Investigating Authority (LA.) and the P. O. After going through the entire record, we are unable to say that the petitioners objections were not justified. The petitioner advened to another important aspect of the matter to which we shall revert in greater detail later. He pointed out that R. K. Malhotra i.e. the Constituent of respondent No. 1 whose account was allegedly, unauthorisedly and fraudulently operated by the petitioner had on two consecutive days after the date of the disputed withdrawal withdrawn the balance amount in his account and closed the account. He further stated that R. K. Malhotra had till date not complained of any loss to him including the alleged loss of the sum of Rs. 1.01 lakhs.

12. Respondent No. 3 under cover of his letter dated 22nd March, 1999 forwarded to the petitioner the findings of respondent No. 2 dated 19th March, 1999. Respondent No. 2 held the petitioner guilty as charged and submitted his findings to respondent No. 3. By the said letter dated 22nd March, 1999 respondent No, 3 sought the petitioner's submissions or representations with regard to the findings dated 19th March, 1999. It is the findings in the report dated 19-3-1999 that really falls for our consideration as the subsequent impugned orders of respondent No. 3 upholding the charges and of respondent No. 4 dismissing the appeal therefrom merely affirm them without giving any reasons for doing so. We refer to these subsequent orders only to complete the narration of facts.

The petitioner by his letter dated 12th April, 1999 forwarded his submissions to respondent No. 3 as he was required to by the letter dated 22nd March, 1999. These submissions are in great detail but have unfortunately not even been considered either by respondent No. 3 or by respondent No. 4.

Respondent No. 3 by his letter dated 17-11-1999 merely stated that he concurred with the findings of the enquiring authority i.e. respondent No. 2 and upheld the charges levelled against the petitioner. The letter does not disclose any reasons for respondent No. 3 having concurred with the findings of respondent No. 2. By the said letter, respondent No. 3 stated that the petitioner deserved strict punishment for his misconduct and ordered the petitioner's dismissal from the services of respondent No. 1 with immediate effect.

The petitioner under the cover of his letter dated 6th December, 1999 filed an appeal before respondent No. 4. Respondent No. 1 by a letter dated 24th Feb. 2000 informed the petitioner that his appeal had been rejected. The findings of the Enquiry officer as well as orders dated 17th November, 1999 and 24th February, 2000 are impugned in this petition.

13. During the pendency of the above Appeal, respondent No. 1 had by a letter dated 11-1-2000 called upon the petitioner to vacate the flat allotted to him failing which respondent No. 1 stated that the petitioner would have to pay the commercial rate of rent at Rs. 50,000/- per month w.e.f. January, 2000. Being aggrieved by the same, the petitioner filed Writ Petition No. 186 of 2000 in this Court. The writ petition was disposed of by an order of a Division Bench dated 9-2-2000 which recorded the statement of the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 1 that the petitioner would not be evicted from his

quarters during the course of his departmental appeal and that respondent No. 1 would not insist upon the payment of occupation charges at the rate of Rs. 50,000/-. In view of the same, the petition was not pressed.

14. Mr. Harish Jagtiani, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, assailed the decision making process leading to the impugned orders. We proceed to deal with the main grounds of challenge in all but one of which, we have found considerable force.

15. Mr. Jagtiani submitted that respondent No. 2 wrongly relied upon the report of the respondents' handwriting expert and also wrongly rejected the report of the petitioner's handwriting expert. Mr. Jagtiani also submitted that respondent No. 2 wrongly refused to grant the petitioner an opportunity to cross-examine the respondents' handwriting expert. He submitted that as a result, the impugned orders are contrary to the rules of natural justice and also contrary to the said Regulations. We are in agreement with his submissions.

16. Before proceeding to deal with this aspect of the matter, it is necessary to recall that the charge against the petitioner, which required the assistance of handwriting experts was that:--

"On 27-5-1986 Shri G. L. Badlani (petitioner) had misused his official position as incumbent-in-charge of the branch and had withdrawn an amount of Rs. 1.01 lac from SB A/c. No. 1106 of one Shri R. K. Malhotra by signing himself the withdrawal form in the name of Shri Rakesh Kumar."

The issue, therefore, was : whether in fact the petitioner had forged the account holder's signature on the withdrawal form. In other words whether the withdrawal form had been signed by the account holder or whether the petitioner had forged his signature thereon.

17. The petitioner produced the report of a handwriting expert which supported his case that he had not forged the signature of the account holder on the withdrawal form. This report was taken on record during the proceedings held on 29th December, 1998. The minutes of the meeting establish that the petitioner offered the handwriting expert whose report he relied upon for cross examination by the Presenting Officer of respondent No. 1. The Presenting Officer reserved his right to cross examine the handwriting expert after presentation of the case of the defence i.e. the petitioner. Respondent No. 2 curiously permitted this course of action. The Presenting Officer ought to have completed his cross-examination before the parties presented their final case. Compared to what followed, this was but a minor irregularity which need not detain us further. What is important is that the P. O. did not cross-examine the petitioner's handwriting expert. Respondent No. 2 does not even discuss or examine this report in any manner. He has, as is evident from his findings, not even looked at this report/opinion. Realizing the effect of this, in the affidavit in reply filed on behalf of the respondents, it is now contended that the petitioner did not examine the handwriting expert and therefore the question of the P. O. cross-examining him did not arise. This argument is a clear afterthought and dishonest. Firstly the petitioner's handwriting expert's opinion was taken on record and the P. O. in fact reserved his rights to cross-examine the handwriting expert. Secondly neither did the P. O. examine his handwriting expert.

Respondent No. 2, however, based his finding of forgery against the petitioner on the basis of the opinion of the respondents handwriting expert.

18. This brings us to the further submission of Mr. Jagtiani viz. the refusal of respondent No. 2 to afford the petitioner the opportunity of cross-examining him. Clauses (13) and (14) of Regulation 6 relating to petitioner's right of cross-examination are as follows :--

"6(13) On the date fixed for the inquiry, the oral and documentary evidence by which the articles of charge are proposed to be proved shall be produced by or on behalf of the disciplinary authority. The witnesses produced by the Presenting Officer shall be examined by the Presenting Officer and may be cross examined by or on behalf of the officer employee. The Presenting Officer shall be entitled to re-examine his witnesses on any points on which they have been cross-examined, but not on a new matter, without the leave of the inquiring authority. The inquiring authority may also put such questions to the witnesses as it thinks fit.

(14) Before the close of the case, in support of the charges, the inquiring authority may, in its discretion, allow the Presenting Officer to produce evidence not included in the charge-sheet or may itself call for new evidence or recall or re-examine any witness. In such case the officer employee shall be given opportunity to inspect the documentary evidence before it is taken on record, or to cross-examine a witness, who has been so summoned. The inquiring authority may also allow the officer employee to produce new evidence, if it is of opinion that the production of such evidence is necessary in the interests of justice."

19. The P. O. on 13-1-1999 submitted a handwriting expert's opinion from the Government Examiner of Questioned documents, Bureau of Police Research and Development (Ministry of Home Affairs), Government of India, Railway Board Building, Shimla ("the respondents handwriting expert"). This report apparently opined that the petitioner had forged the signature of the account holder on the withdrawal form. The petitioner objected to the P. O. producing the report at a late juncture after the petitioner had closed his evidence. Respondent No. 2, however, accepted the report. In paragraph 6(x) of the affidavit in reply, it is falsely stated that the petitioner did not object to the presentation of the respondent's handwriting expert's opinion. The petitioner had objected to the same before and even after the same was taken on record as is evident from the evidence. Respondent No. 2 further held that if the petitioner had any other submission to make in defence he may do so. At the hearing held on 20th April, 1999 the petitioner justifiably submitted that he was entitled to cross-examine the respondents handwriting expert and that he was entitled to see the original report.

20. The Presenting Officer's response to this request is only less startling then the manner in which respondent No. 2 decided the petitioner's application to cross-examine the Government Handwriting Examiner. The unsustainability of both is best demonstrated in their own words. The response of the P. O. to the petitioner's application to cross-examine the Government handwriting Examiner was as under :--

'The original report of the Government Examiner of Questioned Documents was not submitted to the bank and is in fact on record in a criminal case which is being faced by Shri G.L. Badlani. Accordingly, this is best evidence available for being produced in the inquiry. As regards, the contention of the C. O. for the cross-examination of the Government Examiner who has given the report for the purpose of comparison of signatures, the same is uncalled for in the inquiry as none of us is a handwriting expert."

Respondent No. 2 at the hearing did not even deal with the petitioners application. He has given no reasons whatsoever for rejecting the same. He has not even stated for what reason and on what ground he accepted this totally unsustainable submission of the P.O. In response to the petitioner's application for cross-examination and the Presenting Officers above response to the same, the following is the only order passed by respondent No. 2.

"The statement given by the C. O. (Charge sheeted Officer i.e. the petitioner) and the P. O. have been considered and accordingly 1 hereby close the inquiry."

21. In his finding dated 19-3-1999, this is how respondent No. 2 has dealt with the matter.

"On the basis of preponderances of probability I tend to accept the contentions of the P.O. that by considering both documents, the balance of convenience is more in favour of accepting the opinion of the Government Examiner of Questioned documents i.e. Exhibit M-8 as it is from an independent and more reliable authority whereas Shri Mahesh Wagh is a paid-handwriting expert engaged by Shri G. L. Badlani." Firstly, respondent No. 2 once again does not give any reasons why he not only rejected but did not even deal with the petitioner's application for cross-examining the respondent's handwriting expert. Respondent No. 2 has relied upon the respondent's handwriting expert's opinion to hold against the petitioner. Though the strict rules of the law of evidence may not apply to domestic enquiries, it is an elementary principle that no such document can be relied upon against a party without giving him an opportunity of cross-examining the author thereof. There is no presumption in law entitling a judicial authority to accept a report of a Government employee without affording the opposite party an opportunity of assailing the same. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. T. R. Verma, while dealing with a case where a person's services had been terminated observed as under :--

"Stating it broadly and without intending it to be exhaustive, it may be observed that rules of natural justice require that a party should have the opportunity of adducing all relevant evidence on which he relies, that the evidence of the opponent should be taken in his presence, and that he should be given the opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses examined by that party, and that no materials should be relied on against him without his being given an opportunity of explaining them."

This case does not fall within the exceptions to the rule permitting a party to cross-examine witnesses where evidence is sought to be relied upon against him.

Moreover, as mentioned above, Regulations 6(13) and 6(14) mandatorily provided the petitioner's right to cross-examine the respondents handwriting witness. He was denied this right. It was the only method by which the parties could establish the correctness or otherwise of the opinions of the handwriting experts.

22. Nor is there any presumption in law that expert evidence is to be disregarded or given less weightage merely because the expert is engaged professionally and paid a fee by a party. The only manner in which an expert's opinion can be assailed is by adducing evidence by cross-examination or otherwise. The report of the handwriting expert tendered by the petitioner has not been questioned or doubted by the respondents or the P. O. at any stage of the proceedings in any manner whatsoever. The P. O. declined the offer to cross-examine the petitioner's handwriting expert. Merely because respondent No. 1 or a Government organisation is not required to pay another Government servant fees for his opinion, there is no presumption that the Government expert's opinion is entitled to greater weightage. Nor is there any presumption that for the same reason a Government expert's opinion is to be treated as correct. If this was the law, it would lead to disastrous consequences not in this matter but every matter where citizens are arraigned against statutory bodies, the Government or State controlled entities such as respondent No. 1. Private parties will never be able to defend themselves in the face of an opinion of a Government expert. Respondent No. 2 has not even bothered to apply his mind and ascertain for himself as to whether the opinion of the Government expert is correct or not.

23. In the circumstances the findings of respondent No. 2 dated 19th March, 1999 are unsustainable in any view of the matter. We are constrained to observe that no reasonable person could possibly have come to such a conclusion.

24. We could have upheld these submissions of Mr. Jagtiani by a mere reference to the breach of Regulation 6(13) and (14) by respondent No. 2. We have, however, set out the proceedings in some detail, only to indicate the unfair approach adopted by respondent No. 2 against the petitioner thereat. This becomes clearer as we go further.

25. The next ground on which the petitioner has been held guilty as charged is that the petitioner did not produce the account holder Shri Rakesh Kumar as his witness. Once again it is necessary to quote the finding of respondent No. 2 in this regard which is as under :--

"In this context it is also noted that Shri Rakesh Kumar has not been produced by Shri G. L. Badlani as a defence witness which would have been the simplest to do in case there were no hanky panky and the withdrawal had indeed been made by the said Shri Malhotra R.K. who was account holder of SB Account No. 1106 at Lamington Road Branch.

Accordingly, on this count also I hold Shri G. L. Badlani guilty of not discharging his duties with integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence."

We fail to understand how the petitioner could be held responsible for his not having produced the account holder as his witness. The allegation against him is that he unauthorisedly and fraudulently operated the account holders account.

The burden was clearly on the respondents to prove the charges levelled against

the petitioner. Even assuming that the account holder had complained about any fraudulent withdrawal of amounts from his account, the petitioner could never be held responsible for not producing him as his witness. The charge against the petitioner must be proved by the respondents. The petitioner was not required to prove his innocence. The respondents were required to prove his guilt.

26. It is pertinent to note that the account holder himself has never made any grievance or complaint that his account had been unauthorisedly operated and that as a consequence thereof he was put to a loss of the said sum of Rs. 1.01 lakhs. This aspect of the matter has been repeatedly brought to the attention of the respondents by the petitioner including in his final statement tendered on 11-1-1999. The petitioner has clearly stated that no complaint from the account holder R. K. Malhotra has been produced. What is even more disturbing is the concerted conduct on the part of respondent No. 2 and the Presenting Officer to thwart any investigation into this very important aspect of the matter. But even this is not as disturbing as the fact that none of the impugned orders even deal with this aspect of the matter. There was considerable evidence regarding the same. Submissions were admittedly made on this issue. But the respondents did not think it necessary to so much as make even a passing reference on the issue.

27. We must now consider in what circumstances for what reasons and most important on what basis this inquiry was initiated after eleven years.

By his letter dated 2-11-1998 the petitioner called upon respondent No. 3 to make available the copy of any statement/complaint from the account holder alleging misappropriation from his account. No such statement/complaint was produced. Instead in the affidavit in reply a very curious stand is taken. The respondents have contended that:--

"There was no need of a complaint of the account holder as there was all the material which raised grave doubts about the bona fides of the said account."

Firstly this averment does not make much sense. We will read the averment of the respondents leniently and liberally to mean that the respondents did not consider the absence of a complaint from the account holder as material as the investigations carried out by the respondents indicated the petitioners guilt.

28. Firstly we are at a loss to understand as to what investigations were carried out by the respondents which led them to believe that the petitioner had forged the account holders signature and fraudulently withdrawn the amount. And eleven years later of that. Admittedly there was no complaint from the account holder. Admittedly on 28th May, 1986 i.e. the day after the alleged fraudulent withdrawal by the petitioner, the account holder withdrew an amount of Rs. 50,000/- and on 29th May, 1986 withdrew the entire balance of Rs. 50,385/-. It is inconceivable that the account holder would not have known that he had been defrauded. It is equally inconceivable that the account holder would not have complained of the same. The present show cause notice is dated 14th August. 1997, i.e. more than 11 years after the alleged incident. In these circumstances, we would have expected some explanation for this belated enquiry and charge-sheet, There is none. There is no explanation as to what transpired during this eleven year period which prompted the inquiry. Secondly

the petitioner had all along requested the production of certain Officers of the respondents who would have been key witnesses in an enquiry of the present nature. They were never produced. We shall revert to the importance of the respondents having failed to produce them as management witnesses a little later. At this stage it is important to note that the petitioner by his letter dated 2nd November, 1998 requested the respondents to supply him with copies of statements of witnesses recorded earlier. To this, the P. O. stated as under:--

"Further I would like to place on record that management is not relying upon any statement of any witness recorded earlier nor does it have any such statement with it on record. As such the question of supplying the same to the C. O. (i.e. the petitioner) does not arise."

The account holder, as seen above, has not made any complaint. The management has admitted that it does not have any statement of any witnesses on record. On what basis was this investigation initiated after more than 11 years.

There was not even an attempt to answer this aspect of the matter. We are left with this uncomfortable feeling that the investigation itself was commenced after 11 years for some oblique purpose undisclosed by the respondents.

29. This brings us to Mr. Jagtiani's grievance that respondent Nos. 2 and 3 obstructed the cross-examination by the petitioner, enabling the Presenting Officer to thereby deflect important issues, that respondent No. 2 failed to even refer to the evidence much less assess the same and that respondent No. 2 has failed to give any reasons for his findings. It is necessary to refer to Clause 21(i) of Regulation No. 6 which reads as under :--

"(21) (i) On the conclusion of the enquiry the inquiring authority shall prepare a report which shall contain the following :--

 (a)     a gist of the articles of charge and the statement of the imputations of misconduct of misbehaviour; 
 

 (b)     a gist of the defence of the officer employee in respect of each article of charge; 
 

 (c)     an assessment of the evidence in respect of each article of charge; 
 

 (d)     the findings on each article of charge and the reasons therefor." Even in the absence of Regulation 6(21), the findings of respondent No. 2 would have had to conform to the requirements thereof as they are but the rules of natural justice.   
 

In the affidavit in reply, it is rightly submitted that it is not for us to reappreciate the evidence/findings of fact. We hasten to add that we are not reappreciating either the findings or the evidence. In this case there has been a deliberate avoidance of a reference to the material facts. In these circumstances a reference to the facts by us was not an exercise in re-appreciating the findings/evidence. It was an exercise necessary to ascertain whether the decision making process has been just, fair and proper whether the facts/evidence had at all been considered while arriving at the decisions. We examined the evidence to ascertain whether the respondents had refused or neglected to take into account matters which they ought to have taken into account. We were also persuaded to do so as the charge against the petitioner was one of serious misconduct. Therefore and also in view of our earlier findings against the respondents, it was

necessary for us to ascertain whether procedural fairness in other respects as well, was observed. We however do not propose to deal with this aspect inasmuch detail as we were invited to by Mr. Jagtiani, as our above findings are sufficient to set aside the findings dated 19-3-1999 and the impugned orders.

30. We find considerable force in the submissions of Mr. Jagtiani that the findings dated 19-3-1999 are not only contrary to the rules of natural justice but also contrary to the express provisions of Regulation 6 (21)(i)(b), (c)and (d). The findings dated 19-3-1999 do not deal with various important aspects raised by the petitioner regarding the non-production of material documents and witnesses necessary to establish the petitioner's alleged guilt. There is also an absence of even a passing reference to important submissions of the petitioner. On crucial aspects which would go to establish the guilt or innocence of the petitioner, the cross-examination has been unfairly obstructed.

Regulation 6(21)(1)(d) is a salutary provision, making a reasoned order obligatory. Reported cases have upheld the importance of reasoned orders on various grounds. This case highlights one of them : It ensures that the decision is reached according to law and is not a result of caprice, whim or fancy. Mahabir Prasad Santosh Kumar v. State of U.P. and Ors., . The obligation to give reason is a healthy discipline for all those who exercise power over others (Wade on Administrative Law 7th Edition page 542.)

31. This leaves us with one further finding against the petitioner which was not really pressed before us with any degree of seriousness. Admittedly the main grounds against the petitioner were those dealt with above. The findings dated 19-3-1999 stated that the withdrawal on 27th May, 1986 had been signed in the place for the signature of the account holder as Rakesh Kumar and as per normal banking practice in case the same has been compared with the specimen signature the withdrawal could not have been authorised. This finding is not supported by any reasons. More important, it does not even take into consideration the evidence before respondent No. 2. Further it does not even deal with the submission of the petitioner reproduced by respondent No. 2 in the findings dated 19-3-1999 itself. It was the petitioner's case that he was not responsible for tallying the signature on the withdrawal slip with the specimen signatures and that this was the duty of the Officer in charge of the Savings Bank Department at the Branch. The Cross-examination of the management witness by the petitioner in this regard has also not been considered by the Enquiry Officer.

33. There is considerable force in the submission of Mr. Jagtiani, that each of these aspects vitiates the entire proceedings. We have no hesitation in holding that each of these aspects, taken together certainly does, viewed as a whole, starting from the unexplained delay in commencing the enquiry, the patently unsustainable approach adopted by respondent No. 2 in disallowing the petitioner to cross-examine the respondents handwriting expert as well as the equally unsustainable reliance upon the opinion of the respondents handwriting expert and rejection of the petitioner's handwriting expert's opinion on specious grounds, the unfair obstruction by respondent No. 2 to the cross examination on crucial matters by the petitioner, the complete avoidance of dealing with important issues in the findings of 19-3-1999 and the absence of reasons on important aspects of the matter leaves us with no option but to quash and set

aside the impugned orders. We do so on the grounds that there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice and the provisions of the Regulations. The decision making process was unfair and contrary to law and the Regulations.

33. Mr. Jagtiani submitted that the manner in which the entire proceedings had been conducted established that the proceedings and the decisions thereon were taken mala fide and with a view to victimise the petitioner for his activities as the General Secretary of the Maharashtra Region of the Oriental Bank Officers Association from October, 1993 and the Assistant Secretary of the All India Officers Association in 1995. In view of the overall circumstances of the case, we are unable to say that Mr. Jagtiani's submission is without force.

34. Mr. Jagtiani also challenged the impugned orders on the ground that the petitioner was not permitted to be represented by a lawyer. We are unable to agree with Mr. Jagtiani. Regulation 6(7) of the said Regulations expressly states that the officer-employee may not engage a legal practitioner for the purpose of an enquiry, unless the Presenting Officer appointed by the disciplinary authority is a legal practitioner or the disciplinary authority, having regard to the circumstances of the case so permits. Moreover, a Writ Petition challenging the denial for one petitioner to be represented by a lawyer was withdrawn by the petitioner.

35. Unfortunately the decision of respondent No. 4 in appeal does not take the matter any further. The petitioner himself was only informed that his appeal had been rejected. There are no reasons for the rejection. We cannot part with with this judgment without expressing strongly our view that appellate authorities have an important task and responsibility while dealing with appeals especially such as the present case when not merely a person's livelihood but his reputation is at stake. They must apply their minds and give the matter their anxious consideration before rendering their decision. They are not mere rubber stamps qua the findings of the inquiring Authority or the Disciplinary Authority. We assume that respondent No. 4 was not required to give reasons. Looking at the overall picture and the extent of the infirmities in the decisions and the decision making process, we are not sure that respondent No. 4, while dismissing the petitioner's Appeal, discharged his duties responsibly.

36. In the circumstances, we pass the following order. Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer Clause (a). The respondents shall pay to the petitioner the costs of this petition fixed at Rs. 5,000/-. Certified copy expedited.