Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
M/S Sai Balaji Infra Structures vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh on 23 August, 2024
Author: R. Raghunandan Rao
Bench: R. Raghunandan Rao
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
***
+ WRIT PETITION NOs:13662, 13712 & 14803 of 2024
W.P.No.13662/2024
Between:
# M/s. Venkateswara Rao Kesanakurti
Residing at 57-9-27, Tillapudivari Lane,
Near Durga Temple, Jagannadhapuram,
Kakinada District, A.P. - 533002
... Petitioner
(and also in W.P.No.13712/2024)
AND
$ 1. The State of Andhra Pradesh rep. by its Principal Secretary, State
Tax Department, Secretariat Buildings, Velagapudi, Amaravati.
2. The Additional Commissioner (ST), Appellate Authority, Vijayawada,
NTR District, Andhra Pradesh.
3. The Assistant Commissioner (ST), Jagannaickpur Circle, Kakinada
District.
... Respondents
(and also in W.P.No.13712/2024)
W.P.No.14803/2024
Between:
# M/s. Sai Balaji Infrastructures,
Having its office at Andhra Pradesh - 523201
Rep. by its Authorised Signatory
Vahid Syed , R/o. 9/530/1,
Opp: Old IOC Petrol Bunk,
NTR Road, Addanki, Prakasam District.
... Petitioner
AND
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W.P.Nos.13662, 13712 & 14803/2024
$ 1. The State of Andhra Pradesh rep. by its Principal Secretary, State
Tax Department, Secretariat Buildings, Velagapudi, Amaravati.
2. The Additional Commissioner (ST), Appellate Authority, Vijayawada,
NTR District, Andhra Pradesh.
3. The Assistant Commissioner (ST), Jagannaickpur Circle, Kakinada
District.
... Respondents
Date of Judgment pronounced on : 23.08.2024
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE R. RAGHUNANDAN RAO
And
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE HARINATH.N
1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers : Yes/No
May be allowed to see the judgments?
2. Whether the copies of judgment may be marked : Yes/No
to Law Reporters/Journals:
3. Whether The Lordship wishes to see the fair copy : Yes/No
Of the Judgment?
RRR,J & HN,J
W.P.Nos.13662, 13712 & 14803/2024
*IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI
* HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE R. RAGHUNANDAN RAO
And
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE HARINATH.N
+ WRIT PETITION NOs:13662, 13712 & 14803 of 2024
% Dated: 23.08.2024
Between:
# M/s. Venkateswara Rao Kesanakurti
Residing at 57-9-27, Tillapudivari Lane,
Near Durga Temple, Jagannadhapuram,
Kakinada District, A.P. - 533002
... Petitioner
(and also in W.P.No.13712/2024)
AND
$ 1. The State of Andhra Pradesh rep. by its Principal Secretary, State
Tax Department, Secretariat Buildings, Velagapudi, Amaravati.
2. The Additional Commissioner (ST), Appellate Authority, Vijayawada,
NTR District, Andhra Pradesh.
3. The Assistant Commissioner (ST), Jagannaickpur Circle, Kakinada
District.
... Respondents
(and also in W.P.No.13712/2024)
Between:
# M/s. Sai Balaji Infrastructures,
Having its office at Andhra Pradesh - 523201
Rep. by its Authorised Signatory
Vahid Syed , R/o. 9/530/1,
Opp: Old IOC Petrol Bunk,
NTR Road, Addanki, Prakasam District.
RRR,J & HN,J
W.P.Nos.13662, 13712 & 14803/2024
... Petitioner
AND
$ 1. The State of Andhra Pradesh rep. by its Principal Secretary, State
Tax Department, Secretariat Buildings, Velagapudi, Amaravati.
2. The Additional Commissioner (ST), Appellate Authority, Vijayawada,
NTR District, Andhra Pradesh.
3. The Assistant Commissioner (ST), Jagannaickpur Circle, Kakinada
District.
... Respondents
! Counsel for the petitioners: Smt. Jyothi Ratna Anumolu
^Counsel for Respondents : Sri T.C.D. Sekhar, G.P. for Commercial Tax
<GIST :
>HEAD NOTE:
? Cases referred:
1. (2001) 8 SCC 470
2. (1976) 4 SCC 464
3. (2020) 17 SCC 692
4. (2008)3 SCC 70
5. (2009) 5 SCC 791
6. (2023) 118 GSTR 388 (Kerala = ILR 2023 (3) Kerala 480
7. Neutral Citation No.2023:DHC?2502-DB
8. (1963) SCC Online SC 122 = AIR 1964 SC 1099
RRR,J & HN,J
W.P.Nos.13662, 13712 & 14803/2024
APHC010264912024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3488]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
FRIDAY, THE TWENTY THIRD DAY OF AUGUST
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FOUR
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE R RAGHUNANDAN RAO
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE HARINATH.N
WRIT PETITION NOs:13662, 13712 & 14803 of 2024
Between:
Venkateswara Rao Kesanakurti ...PETITIONER
AND
The State Of AP and Others ...RESPONDENT(S)
Counsel for the Petitioner:
1. JYOTHI RATNA ANUMOLU
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1. GP FOR COMMERCIAL TAX
The Court made the following Common Order:
(Per Hon'ble Sri Justice R. Raghunandan Rao)
Heard Smt. Jyothi Ratna Anumolu, learned counsel appearing for
the appellants and Sri T.C.D. Sekhar, learned Government Pleader for
Commercial Taxes.
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W.P.Nos.13662, 13712 & 14803/2024
2. In all these writ petitions, the petitioners, being aggrieved by
the orders of the assessing authorities, had filed appeals, before the
appellate authorities, under section 107 of the Central Goods and Service
Tax Act. However, these appeals have been filed beyond the period of
limitation set out under the Act and the period of delay for which the
appellate authority is empowered, under section 107 (4), to condone.
These appeals were dismissed on the ground that they had been filed
beyond limitation and cannot be considered. Aggrieved by these orders of
dismissal, the petitioners have approached this court by way of these writ
petitions.
3. The orders impugned in the present batch of writ petitions
are as follows:
W.P.No. Proceedings No. Date of the
order
W.P.No.13662/2024 Special Appeal No. GST/KKD/721/ 12.02.2024
2023-24
W.P.No.13712/2024 Special Appeal No. GST/KKD/722/ 12.02.2024
2023-24
W.P.No.14803/2024 CTD Order No.DIN3731052440836 31.05.2024
4. Section 107 of the APGST Act reads as follows:
107. (1) Any person aggrieved by any decision or order
passed under this Act or the Central Goods and Services
Tax Act, 2017 by an adjudicating authority may appeal to
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such Appellate Authority as may be prescribed within three
months from the date on which the said decision or order is
communicated to such person.
(2) The Chief Commissioner may, on his own motion, or
upon request from the Commissioner of Central tax, call for
and examine the record of any proceeding in which an
adjudicating authority has passed any decision or order
under this Act or the Central Goods and Services Tax Act,
2017 for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality
or propriety of the said decision or order and may, by order,
direct any officer subordinate to him to apply to the
Appellate Authority within six months from the date of
communication of the said decision or order for the
determination of such points arising out of the said decision
or order as may be specified by the Chief Commissioner in
his order.
(3) Where, in pursuance of an order under sub-section (2),
the authorized officer makes an application to the Appellate
Authority, such application shall be dealt with by the
Appellate Authority as if it were an appeal made against the
decision or order of the adjudicating authority and such
authorized officer were an appellant and the provisions of
this Act relating to appeals shall apply to such application.
(4) The Appellate Authority may, if he is satisfied that the
appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting
the appeal within the aforesaid period of three months or six
months, as the case may be, allow it to be presented within
a further period of one month.
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5. Smt. Jyothi Ratna Anumolu, learned counsel appearing for
the petitioners would submit that even though Section 107 (4) empowers
the appellate authority to permit condonation of delay for a period of one
month beyond the statutory period of three months or six months
provided under Section 107(1) and (2), the provisions of Section 29(2) of
the Limitation Act, 1963 would permit the appellate authority to condone
the delay beyond the period provided under Section 107 (2) or (3).
6. The learned counsel also relies upon the judgments in Union
of India v. Popular Construction Co1; Commissioner of Sales Tax,
U.P. vs. Madan Lal Das & Sons, Bareilly2; Superintending Engineer /
Dehar Power House Circle Bhakra Bea Management Board (PW)
Slapper and Anr., vs. Excise and Taxation Officer, Sunder Nagar /
Assessing Authority3; Singh Enterprises vs. Commissioner of
Central Excise, Jamshedpur and Ors.,4; Commissioner of Customs
and Central Excise vs. Hongo India Private Limited and Anr., 5 and
Penuel Nexus Pvt. Ltd., vs. The Additional Commissioner
Headquarters (Appeals) and Ors.,6.
7. The learned Government Pleader for Commercial Taxes, on
the other hand, relying upon the judgments in Assistant Commissioner vs.
(2001) 8 SCC 470
(1976)4 SCC 464
(2020) 17 SCC 692
(2008)3 SCC 70
(2009) 5 SCC 791
(2023) 118 GSTR 388 (Kerala = ILR 2023 (3) Kerala 480
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Glaxo Smith and a judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi dated
20.03.2023 in The Commissioner of Income Tax (International
Taxation)-1, New Delhi vs. Brandix Mauritius Holdings Ltd.,7 in ITA
No.163 of 2023, would contend that there is an implied exclusion of
Section 5 of the Limitation Act and as such the appellate authority, under
Section 107 (4) of the CGST Act, does not have power to condone the
delay of filing of appeals beyond the additional period of one month.
Consideration of the Court:
8. Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 reads as follows:
29 (2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any
suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different
from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the
provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were
the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the
purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed
for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local
law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24
(inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent
to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special
or local law.
9. Any appeal filed under Section 107(1) or 107(2) of the
APGST Act would have to be filed either within three months or six
Neutral Citation No.2023:DHC?2502-DB
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W.P.Nos.13662, 13712 & 14803/2024
months respectively and the appellate authority would be entitled to
condone a further delay of one month beyond the period specified above.
10. The applicability of the provisions of Section 29(2) of the
Limitation Act, in relation to period of limitation, set out in special or local
laws, has been considered by a long line of decisions by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court.
11. The first judgment, of import, by the Hon'ble Supreme Court
is Vidyacharan Shukla vs. Khubchand Baghel and Ors.,8. In this case,
the election of the appellant, to the Lok Sabha in the third general
elections, was challenged before the Election Tribunal. Upon the election
petition being dismissed, the respondents had filed an appeal to the High
Court and the same came to be allowed. Aggrieved by the said decision
of the Hon'ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur, the appellant
had approached the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The only question, raised
before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, was the question of limitation. It was
the case of the appellant that the time for filing an appeal was 30 days
under Section 116-A(3) of the Representation of Peoples Act, 1951
whereas the appeal was filed beyond that period. It was admitted on both
sides, that certain time was taken for obtaining the certified copy of the
order of dismissal, and if this time was excluded, the appeal would be
within 30 days. The respondents contended that Section 12 of the
(1963) SCC Online SC 122 = AIR 1964 SC 1099
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Limitation Act required that the period taken for obtaining a certified copy
would have to be excluded. This raised the question of whether Section
12 of the Limitation Act could be pressed into service by the respondents.
12. A Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
delivered a judgment wherein four learned Judges delivered a majority
judgment while Justice K. Subba Rao, delivered a concurrent judgment.
However, there was a difference of opinion about the interpretation of
Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. At that point of time, Section 29 (2) of
the Limitation Act read as follows:
Section 29(2) Where any special or local law prescribes
for any suit appeal or application a period of limitation
different from the period prescribed there for by the First
Schedule the provisions of Section 3 shall apply, as if such
period were prescribed there for in that Schedule, and for
the purpose of determining any period of limitation
prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any
special or local law--
(a) the provisions contained in Section 4, Sections 9 to 18,
and Section 22 shall apply only insofar as, and to the,
extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such
special or local law; and
(b) the remaining provisions of this Act shall not apply.
13. Section 29(2) was analyzed, in both the majority and the
concurrent judgments to consist of two parts. The first part is said to have
ended with the words ―prescribed therefore in the schedule‖ and the
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W.P.Nos.13662, 13712 & 14803/2024
second limb is said to have commenced from ―and for the purpose of‖.
The difference of opinion arose as to whether the word ―and‖ should be
read to mean that the entire provision should be read as one whole or
whether the second limb was independent and controlled the first limb.
14. The Hon'ble Supreme Court considered an earlier judgment
of a Full Bench of the Allhabad High Court in Sehat Ali Khan vs. Abdul
Qavi Khan9, wherein the majority view was that the two parts of the sub-
section were independent of each other while the dissenting judgment
held that both should be read together as an integrated provision.
15. The majority judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
accepted the dissenting judgment of the Allahabad High Court, while the
learned Judge delivering the concurrent judgment, in the Hon'ble
Supreme Court, had accepted the view of the majority judgment of the
Allahabad High Court.
16. The difference in opinion, in the judgment of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court, need not detain us, as both came to the conclusion that
the appeal filed by the respondents, before the Hon'ble High Court of
Madhya Pradesh was within time, though for different reasons.
17. After this judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court again came
to consider the applicability of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act on the
ILR (1956) 2 ALL 252
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W.P.Nos.13662, 13712 & 14803/2024
U.P. Sales Tax Act, in Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. vs. Madan Lal
Das & Sons, Bareilly. In this case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court while
considering Section 10 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, which prescribed a
limitation, for filing a revision, had considered whether Section 12 of the
Limitation Act could be applied, for excluding the time taken for obtaining
certified copies. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, independent of the
judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vidyacharan Shukla vs.
Khubchand Baghel and Ors., held that Section 12 of the Limitation Act
would be applicable as the language of Section 10 of the U.P. Sales Tax
Act did not exclude the provisions of the Limitation Act.
18. Thereafter, the Hon'ble Supreme Court again considered the
question of the applicability of Section 29(2) to the provisions of the
Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. Section 18 of the
Kerala Lease Control Act prescribed a period of 30 days for filing an
appeal against an order of Rent Control Court. The said 30 days to be
computed, from the date of order of Rent Control Court. The Hon'ble
Supreme Court going through the provisions of Section 18 of the Kerala
Act, had held that the said provision merely stipulated a period of
limitation without going into the power of the Court to condone any delay
in filing of such appeal. In such circumstances, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court held that there is no express or implicit exclusion of the provisions
of the Limitation Act and consequently Section 5 of the Limitation Act
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W.P.Nos.13662, 13712 & 14803/2024
would be applicable and the appeals could be filed beyond the period of
limitation set out in the Kerala Act, provided sufficient cause is shown, in
terms of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
19. The question of applicability of Section 29(2) of the Limitation
Act to the provisions of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, was again
considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Popular
Construction Co. The Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the question
of whether an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 challenging an arbitral award, could be filed
beyond the period stipulated under Section 34 of the Act.
20. Under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, an application for
setting aside an arbitral award could be filed within three months from the
date on which the arbitral award is received by the applicant or the date
on which a request under Section 33 of the Arbitration Act has been
disposed of by the Arbitral Tribunal. The proviso to Section 34 (3)
permitted the applicant to file the application beyond the period of three
months. However, such application would have to be filed within a further
period of 30 days, if the Court was satisfied that the applicant was
prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the
aforesaid period of three months.
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21. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, after considering the judgment
of the Constitution Bench in Vidyacharan Shukla vs. Khubchand
Baghel and Ors., and other judgments, had held, following the judgment
of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain
Mishra10 that where the language of the legislation, excluded the applicability
of the provisions of the Limitation Act, by necessary implication, any benefit
under the provisions of the Limitation Act cannot be claimed. On that basis, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court had held, in that case, that the filing of the application
under Section 34 was beyond the time set out under Section 34 of the
Arbitration Act, and would not be maintainable.
22. In Consolidated Engineering Enterprises vs. Principal
Secretary, Irrigation Department and Ors.,11 the Hon'ble Supreme Court
considered the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, in relation to an
application made under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. In this case, an
application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act was made, to a Court,
against an arbitral award. Subsequently it was realized that the said Court did
not have jurisdiction and the application was moved before the competent
Court. This was objected by the respondent, on the ground that Section 14 of
the Limitation Act would not be applicable, in view of the judgment of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Popular Construction Co.,
excluding the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Hon'ble
Supreme Court held that, the language of Section 34 of the Arbitration
(1974) 2 SCC 133
(2008) 7 SCC 169 = 2008 SCC Online SC 618
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W.P.Nos.13662, 13712 & 14803/2024
Act, by implication, excluded the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation
Act. However, the said language cannot be extended to exclude the
provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, as the language in Section
34 does not lend itself to such exclusion.
23. In Superintending Engineer / Dehar Power House Circle
Bhakra Bea Management Board (PW) Slapper and Anr., vs. Excise
and Taxation Officer, Sunder Nagar / Assessing Authority, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering the applicability of Section 29(2)
to Section 45 of the Himachal Pradesh Value Added Tax Act. Section 45
of the Act provided for an appeal against an original order, within 60 days
or such extended period as the appellate authority may allow, for reasons
to be recorded in writing. The Hon'ble Supreme Court after considering
various judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, including the aforesaid
judgments, referred to above, had held that the provisions of Section 45
permitted filing of an appeal within 60 days or such more extended
period, as the appellate authority may allow, and had held that Section 45
read with Section 48 of the said Act nowhere expressly or by implication
exclude the applicability of the Limitation Act and had held that the
provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act would be applicable in
relation to filing of revisions under the Himachal Pradesh Value Added
Tax Act.
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W.P.Nos.13662, 13712 & 14803/2024
24. In the case of Singh Enterprises vs. Commissioner of
Central Excise, Jamshedpur and Ors., the Hon'ble Supreme Court
considered the applicability of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act to the
provisions of Section 35 of the Central Excise Act. Section 35 of the
Central Excise Act provided for an appeal to be filed, before the
Commissioner (Appeals), within 60 days from the date of communication,
of the decision against which the appeal is being filed. The proviso to
Section 35 permitted the Commissioner (Appeals), if he was satisfied that
sufficient cause is made out, to permit filing of an appeal within a further
period of 30 days beyond the statutory provisions of the Limitation Act. It
was held that, the affected party cannot invoke Section 5 of the Limitation
Act.
25. Though Section 29 (2) requires an express exclusion to be
found in the special or local law, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Union of
India v. Popular Construction Co. had held that where the language of
the legislation, excluded the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation
Act, by necessary implication, any benefit under the provisions of the
Limitation Act cannot be claimed. In view of this ratio, it is not necessary
that there should be an express exclusion of the provisions of section 4 to
24 of the limitation Act. An exclusion can also be inferred from the
language of the special or local law. A similar view taken by the Hon'ble
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W.P.Nos.13662, 13712 & 14803/2024
Supreme Court, in Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise &
Customs v. Hongo India (P) Ltd., is extracted below:
35. It was contended before us that the words ―expressly
excluded‖ would mean that there must be an express
reference made in the special or local law to the specific
provisions of the Limitation Act of which the operation is to be
excluded. In this regard, we have to see the scheme of the
special law which here in this case is the Central Excise Act.
The nature of the remedy provided therein is such that the
legislature intended it to be a complete code by itself which
alone should govern the several matters provided by it. If, on
an examination of the relevant provisions, it is clear that the
provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded,
then the benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to
supplement the provisions of the Act. In our considered view,
that even in a case where the special law does not exclude
the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an
express reference, it would nonetheless be open to the court
to examine whether and to what extent, the nature of those
provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and scheme of
the special law exclude their operation. In other words, the
applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act, therefore,
is to be judged not from the terms of the Limitation Act but by
the provisions of the Central Excise Act relating to filing of
reference application to the High Court.
26. There is another aspect of the matter that needs to be considered.
Would exclusion, by necessary implication, of one provision of any of Sections 4
to 24, automatically exclude all the other provisions? This has to be answered in
the negative, in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
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W.P.Nos.13662, 13712 & 14803/2024
Consolidated Engineering Enterprises vs. Principal Secretary, Irrigation
Department and Ors. The Hon'ble Supreme court, after considering the earlier
judgment in Union of India v. Popular Construction Co., excluding the
applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, in relation to appeals filed
under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, had held
that the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act are not excluded by
any of the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. This
different treatment, accorded to different provisions, makes it clear that
there has to be independent consideration of the question of exclusion of
each provision.
27. Where a special or local law, by express statement excludes
all or any of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, they cannot be applied
to any proceedings under such special or local law. Where such exclusion
is to deduced, by way of necessary implication, each provision would
have to be considered separately and exclusion of one provision would
not result in exclusion of the other provisions of section 4 to 24 of the
limitation Act.
28. In the present case, Section 107, which provides for an appeal
against orders passed under the APGST Act, stipulates that (A) an appeal,
under Section 107 (1), by a dealer against any order of an adjudicating
authority, can be filed within three months from the date on which the order is
communicated; (B) an appeal, under Section 107 (2), by an authority under the
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Act, against any order of an adjudicating authority, can be filed within six
months from the date on which the order of the Chief Commissioner directing
the filing of such an appeal is received by the said authority. Section 107 (4)
authorizes the appellate authority to receive such appeals, beyond the above
periods, if the appellate authority is satisfied that the appellant was prevented,
by sufficient cause, from presenting the appeal within the prescribed time.
However, this power to permit filing of appeals beyond the prescribed time is
restricted to condoning delay of one month only.
29. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, while considering similar provisions,
in Union of India v. Popular Construction Co and Singh Enterprises
vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jamshedpur and Ors., had held
that the restriction of the additional period, for which delay may be condoned, in
the special statute, effectively excluded Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
30. In Superintending Engineer / Dehar Power House Circle
Bhakra Beas Management Board (PW) Slapper and Anr., vs. Excise
and Taxation Officer, Sunder Nagar / Assessing Authority, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court was considering an open ended power to condone delay and
had held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act would be applicable.
31. Since the period of limitation available, under Section 107 of the
APGST Act, cannot be extended beyond the period stipulated therein, Section 5
of the Limitation Act would stand excluded.
32. The appellate authority under Section 107 of the APGST Act
would not have any power to condone the delay in filing an appeal, under
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Section 107 of the APGST Act, beyond the period of 30 days set out in Section
107(4) of the APGST Act.
33. Consequently, these Writ Petitions are dismissed. There shall
be no order as to costs.
34. Before parting with these cases, this court would also like to place
on record it's appreciation of the fair assistance extended by Ms. Jyothi Ratna
Anumolu and Sri T.C.D. Sekhar, the learned Government pleader for
Commercial Taxes.
As a sequel, pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand
closed.
________________________
R. RAGHUNANDAN RAO, J
_______________
HARINATH.N, J
Js.
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HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE R. RAGHUNANDAN RAO
And
HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE HARINATH.N
WRIT PETITIONER Nos.13662, 13712 &14803 of 2024
23rd August, 2024
Js.
