Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati

Samyuktha Enterprises vs The Stae Of Ap on 26 September, 2023

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                                                                                  NV,J
                                                           W.P.No.37517 of 2022 & batch



     THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE VENKATESWARLU NIMMAGADDA


               WRIT PETITION Nos.37517, 37518, 37547,
                   37676, 37685 and 38522 of 2022

COMMON ORDER:-


1.    All these six writ petitions are filed under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India by different petitioners, claiming identical relief, as

such, I find it expedient to decide all the six writ petitions by common order,

since the issue involved in all the writ petitions is one and the same.

W.P.No.37517 of 2022 is taken as leading case.


2.    W.P.No.37517     of 2022    is filed to     declare the action of the

Respondents 2 to 5, in not releasing the balance amount of Rs.1,17,677/-

pertaining to purchase order No.RGUKT/Proc/RKV/Ladder/2015, dated

23.04.2015 issued by the Respondent No.2 even after supplying and

installing of the required product in good condition by the Petitioner-Firm as

illegal, arbitrary, unjust, violation of Rights guaranteed in Articles 14, 19,

21 and 300-A of the Constitution of India.

3. The Petitioner-Firm deals with supplying of tech infrastructure and

allied products pertaining to technology. The petitioner sent a quotation on

18.04.2015 for Rs.4,70,710/-. Thereafter the respondent-University

approved the quotation and asked for supplying of the products and its

services.

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4. The 2nd respondent has issued purchase Order

No.RGUKT/Proc/RKV/Ladder/2015, dated 23.04.2015 wherein the

respondent-university agreed on the amount that the petitioner quoted an

amount of Rs.4,70,710/-. Out of the total quotation amount of

Rs.4,70,710/-, only 75% of the amount has been released and the rest of

25% is not being released even after making umpteen number of requests.

The inaction of the respondents in holding of the purchase order amount of

25% even after completion of more than 7 years is questioned.

5. A common counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of Respondent

Nos. 2 to 5, refuting the material allegations mode by the petitioner. They

argue, among other points, that the Tower Ladder Price quoted exceeds the

prevailing market rate. Following negotiations, payment for the Tower

Ladder was agreed to be made pending proper approval from the competent

authority. Although the initial price quoted was higher, the petitioner

consented to receive 50% of the total purchase order amount on 18.07.2017.

But, in the month of December 2018, the petitioner approached the then

administrators once and requested for payment for the outstanding amount.

In December 2018, an additional 25% of the quoted amount for the Tower

Ladder, along with other supplied items, was paid to the petitioner.

Consequently, a total of 75% (Rs.3,53,032/-) out of the total amount

(Rs.4,70,710/-) specified in the purchase order was remitted to the

petitioner. After thorough negotiations with the petitioner and the

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acceptance of the negotiated rate of 75% out of the total amount, which

exceeded the prevailing market price for the Tower Ladder supplied by the

petitioner, the claim for the remaining 25% out by the petitioner is

unjustified and illegal. In fact, the petitioner has relinquished the right to

seek the remaining 25% of the total amount of Rs.4,70,710/- due to the full

and final settlement reached through negotiations between the parties.

Therefore, the question of paying the outstanding 25% (Rs.1,17,677.50/-) as

per the purchase order does not arise, and requested to dismiss the writ

petition

6. The petitioner has submitted a reply affidavit in response to the

counter-affidavit filed by respondents 2 to 5. In this reply, the petitioner

refutes the allegations and asserts that the respondents are obligated to

settle the outstanding balance amount in accordance with the terms

specified in the purchase order.

7. Respondents 2 to 5 have submitted an additional counter-affidavit,

asserting that the petitioner had initially refused negotiations. The relevant

correspondence from the institute clearly indicates that negotiations were

required due to the petitioner's prices exceeding prevailing market rates. The

institute determined the payable amount basing upon the market price of

the produce and after having negotiations with the petitioner's firm, for

which the petitioner accepted and signed payment vouchers at the finance

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office, RGUKT-RK Valley, by receiving 50% payment for various supplied

items under different firms.

8. Subsequently, the internal committee and executive committee of

RGUZKT RK Valley expressed concerns that the petitioner's prices for all

supplied items were significantly higher rate than prevailing market rates,

which other firms also supplied. Payments to the petitioner's firm personnel

were made through bank cheques from the finance section, complying the

petitioner's acceptance of the 50% payment out of total claimed amount as

part of negotiations

9. Further, the petitioner approached RGUKT-RK Valley administration

seeking additional payment for the supplied items. The administration

deliberated on the request and decided to offer 25%, 15%, or 10% of the

amount for items supplied by the petitioner's firms. The petitioner's

personnel signatures were present on all payment documents for these

items. By accepting partial payment, the petitioner indicated their

acceptance of the negotiated price. Enclosed resolutions demonstrate the

decision to pay additional 25%, 15%, or 10% for the supplied items, and all

relevant documents substantiate the petitioner's acceptance of these

payments. The institute never committed to a 100% payment after partial

payments. Despite repeatedly accepting negotiated terms, the petitioner

persists in seeking further payment, which the institution finds

inappropriate and unacceptable. Furthermore, the petitioner's firms, lacking

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credibility and genuineness, no longer exist at the addresses provided

during submission of quotation submission. Returned registered post letters

serve as proof of the firms' lack of credibility. Thus, the petitioner's request

for additional payment is deemed unwarranted, and requested dismissal of

the writ petition.

10. During hearing, Sri Ch. Venkatraman learned counsel for the

petitioner submits that, the inaction of the respondent authorities in not

releasing the balance amount has kept the firm in financial loss, as such it

is effecting the business. Moreover, the firm has never breached any terms

and conditions incorporated by the respondent-university at purchase order

eversince from the date of supply to installing of the products in the

respondent-campus, but the respondent-university is intentionally delaying

the due amount without any reasonable cause. The respondent-university

has released all the due amount to the similarly placed suppliers like the

Firm, but the firm balance amount of 25% is still kept on hold and not

releasing the same despite their legal notices and emails, as such the Firm

rights are being violated.

11. On the other hand, learned Standing Counsel for RGUKT-IIIT would

submit that, since the amount claimed by the petitioner was disputed by the

respondents by filing counter affidavit as well as additional counter affidavit

by filing documentary proof, as such the claim of the petitioner is not

tenable under extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court and he is available

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with alternative remedy as per terms of purchase order. Hence the writ

petition is liable to be dismissed.

12. Heard Sri Ch. Venkatraman, learned counsel for the petitioner,

learned Government Pleader for Higher Education and Sri Pithani Chandra

Sekhar Reddy, learned Standing Counsel for RGUKT-IIIT, YSR Kadapa

District.

13. It is an admitted settled law that this Court cannot decide the

disputed question of fact while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of

the Constitution of India, in view of the law declared by the Apex Court in

DLF Housing Corporation Private Limited v. Delhi Municipal

Corporation1, where the Supreme Court held as follows:

"17. Thus in these proceedings under Article 226 the Court has been called upon to decide disputed questions of fact and law relating to the precise nature and extent of right, title and interest of the parties in the plots in question. Even the basic documentary evidence, such as the orders granting the sanctions, the conditions of the sanctions and the agreements in which they are said to have been incorporated, were not produced before the pronouncement of judgment in the High Court. Even the questions of law relating to the validity and effect of Regulation 5 (3) could not be properly decided in the absence of proof or admission of such primary facts.

The High Court also felt this difficulty in reaching the finding that a fiduciary relationship in the nature of a trust came into existence in regard to the user of these open sites. It conceded that this matter

AIR 1976 SC 386

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was being considered "in the abstract without reference to the facts of any case", and had to leave undetermined the exact nature of the trust that had come into being and the person or persons in whom the beneficial interest in these open sites was supposed to vest under such trust-Nevertheless, it concluded that "the petitioners had by their own conduct and operation of law ceased to be the full and complete owners of the plots and held them only as trustees." This "conduct" of the petitioners according to the High Court consisted of the acts of making applications for sanction of the lay- out plans to the Authority and the execution of the requisite agreements. But the evidence of those agreements and the terms and conditions of the sanctions were conspicuous by their absence from the record. Again in the absence of relevant material on the record, the High Court found it difficult to record a categorical finding as to whether the provisions of Regulation 5(3) (iv) were only optional and could be waived, or had in fact been waited by the Authority while granting sanction of the layout plans in case of any of these six colonies in question.

18. In our opinion, in a case where the basic facts are disputed, and complicated questions of law and fact depending on evidence are involved the writ court is not the proper forum for seeking relief. The right course of the High Court to follow was to dismiss the writ petition on this preliminary ground, without entering upon the merits of the case. In the absence of firm and adequate factual foundation, it was hazardous to embark upon a determination of the points involved. On this short ground while setting aside the findings of the High Court, we would dismiss both the writ petition and the appeal with costs. The appellants may if so advised, seek their remedy by a regular suit."

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14. Recently, the Division Bench of the Supreme Court in Radha Krishan

Industries v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Others2 summarized the following six

principles governing the exercise of writ jurisdiction by the High Court in the

presence of an alternate remedy, despite availability of efficacious alternative

statutory remedy under the Act.

"28. The principles of law which emerge are that:

(i) The power under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue writs can be exercised not only for the enforcement of fundamental rights, but for any other purpose as well;

(ii) The High Court has the discretion not to entertain a writ petition. One of the restrictions placed on the power of the High Court is where an effective alternate remedy is available to the aggrieved person;

(iii) Exceptions to the rule of alternate remedy arise where a. the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of a fundamental right protected by Part III of the Constitution;

b. there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice; (c) the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction; or c. the vires of a legislation is challenged;

(iv) An alternate remedy by itself does not divest the High Court of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution in an appropriate case though ordinarily, a writ petition should not be entertained when an efficacious alternate remedy is provided by law;

(v) When a right is created by a statute, which itself prescribes the remedy or procedure for enforcing the right or liability, resort must be had to that particular statutory remedy before invoking the discretionary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution. This

2 2021 SCC OnLine SC 334

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rule of exhaustion of statutory remedies is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion; and

(vi) In cases where there are disputed questions of fact, the High Court may decide to decline jurisdiction in a writ petition. However, if the High Court is objectively of the view that the nature of the controversy requires the exercise of its writ jurisdiction, such a view would not readily be interfered with."

15. The same principles were reiterated by the Full Bench of the Apex

Court in M/s. Magadh Sugar & Energy Limited v. The State of Bihar3.

16. This Court, exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226

of the Constitution of India, is not empowered to arbitrate the contested

legal matters between the parties. In the present case, there exists a

disagreement concerning the payment amount between the petitioner and

the respondents. It is essential to note that the respondents never

acknowledged the petitioner's claimed amount, but instead, they raised

objections, asserting that the petitioner had quoted prices exceeding the

market rates for the goods supplied under the awarded contract. Given the

disputes concerning the contract's value, this Court cannot make a

determination at this juncture due to its limited jurisdiction. This issue