P.N.D.H.Rangaraju And 5 Others vs State Of A.P., And Another
2023 Latest Caselaw 4362 AP

     HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE DUPPALA VENKATA RAMANA
            CRIMINAL PETITION No.24809 of 2017
ORDER:

This Criminal Petition is filed by the petitioners/A.1 to A.6

under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for

short "Cr.P.C") seeking to quash the proceedings against them

in S.C.No.57 of 2015 on the file of the Court of Special Juge for

SC & ST Cases, Visakhapatnam, registered for the offence under

Sections 384 and 506 read with 34 and Section 3 of the

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of

Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short "the Act").

2. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners; learned

Assistant Public Prosecutor for the 1st respondent-State and the

learned counsel for the 2nd respondent.

3. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is as follows:

i) The 2nd respondent/complainant has filed a private

complaint under Section 190(1)(a) and 200 Cr.P.C. before the

learned IV Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate,

Visakhapatnam, against the petitioners alleging that on

09.03.2009 he purchased a Bajaj Pulsar Motorcycle at Varun

Bajaj showroom, Dondaparthi, Visakhapatnam for the cost of

Rs.69,095/- by paying Rs.22,109/- as down payment and

Rs.55,000/- was financed with Lakshmi Finance having its

office at D.No.10-50-22/1, Siripuram, Visakhapatnam. It is

stated that the 2nd respondent/complainant had to repay the

loan amount on monthly installments @ Rs.2,406/- for two

years and that he paid two installments @ Rs.2,406/- each for

April and May, 2009 to the said Lakshmi Finance and thereafter

he committed default in paying the loan installments.

ii) On 17.07.2009 when the 2nd respondent/de facto

complainant parked his motorcycle at VUDA complex, the

petitioner/A.5 and Mr.Vinod, who are the recovery agents of the

said Lakshmi Finance had taken away the motorcycle without

giving any seizure letter. After one month, the 2nd respondent/

de facto complainant offered to pay the due installments and he

wants to take away the vehicle. On that, the staff of Lakshmi

Finance sought time stating that the cash payment receipts

could not be traced out.

(iii) Again the 2nd respondent/de facto complainant

purchased Honda Stunner motorcycle bearing Registration

No.AP 31 VB 9540 in September, 2009 from Jupitar Honda

showroom, Daba Gardens, Visakhapatnam, by availing finance

with HDFC Bank. On 25.09.2009 when the motorcycle bearing

No.AP 31 VB 9540 was parked at Samatha Law Hostel,

A.U.Campus, the employees of Lakshmi Finance i.e.,

petitioners/A.1 to A.6 came there and extorted the new vehicle

from the custody of Mr.Jagan which belongs to the 2nd

respondent/de facto complainant for the reason that the 2nd

respondent/de facto complainant has not paid the installments

of his earlier motorcycle financed by Lakshmi Finance and used

abusive language. Immediately, the 2nd respondent/de facto

complainant approached Lakshmi Finance to settle the due

amounts and to return his new motorcycle. However, the staff of

Lakshmi Finance has not returned the motorcycle on the ground

that cash receipts were misplaced. It is stated that the 2nd

respondent/de facto complainant being a Schedule Caste

person, cannot do anything against the high handed extortions

and threatened him to implicate him in false cases, if the 2nd

respondent tries to take any legal action against them.

(iv) On 28.09.2010 around 12.00 noon, the 2nd

respondent/de facto complainant met the petitioners/A.1 and

A.2 and requested them to settle the dues and return his

Stunner motorcycle. On that, the 2nd petitioner/A.2 shouted

against him by using the words "Kulam Takkuva(Mala) Lanja

Kodukuvi, Mammalni Nuvvemi Chestavura" and the said incident

took place in the presence of his assistant Jagan and

Venugopala Rao. Immediately, he approached the III Town Police

Station and lodged a complaint with a request to take necessary

action against the petitioners/A.1 to A.6. The Police neither

responded nor registered the crime. While the matter stood

thus, the Lakshmi Finance filed a complaint against the 2nd

respondent/de facto complainant for the offence under Section

138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, for dishonour of the

cheque issued by him at the time of availing finance, and the

same was numbered as C.C.No.90 of 2011 on the file of the

Court of IV Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate,

Visakhapatnam.

(v) When the Police have not responded to his

complaint, the 2nd respondent filed the present private complaint

against all the petitioners/A.1 to A.6 requesting the learned IV

Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Visakhapatnam to

take cognizance for the offences stated above.

(vi) The learned IV Additional Chief Metropolitan

Magistrate, Visakhapatnam, recorded the statement of the

complainant and other witnesses, came to a conclusion that a

prima facie case is made out against the petitioners and has

taken cognizance for the offence under Sections 384 and 506

read with 34 IPC and Section 3 of the Act, and subsequently, the

case was numbered as PRC No.14 of 2014, committed to the

Court of Special Judge for SCs & STs Cases, Visakhapatnam,

and numbered as Sessions Case No.57 of 2015. Aggrieved by the

same, the petitioners/A.1 to A.6 filed the present petition

seeking to quash the proceedings against them in the above said

Sessions Case.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioners/A.1 to A.6 would

submit that the learned Committal Court has committed grave

error in taking cognizance against the petitioners/A.1 to A.6 as

no material is available in this case. He would further submit

that the 2nd respondent/de facto complainant, though pleaded

that he belongs to Scheduled Caste, has not filed his caste

certificate along with the complaint in proof of his caste and

therefore, no offence is made out against the petitioners.

Further, he would submit that even if the contents of the

complaint are taken into consideration, no case is made out

against the petitioners. He would further submit that there is no

enquiry with regard to the community of the accused and the

2nd respondent/de facto complainant or to which they belong.

Further, he would submit that on perusal of the complaint and

the committal order, there is no material to show that the

petitioners do not belong to Scheduled Caste or Schedule Tribe,

which is necessary ingredient to constitute the offence under the

Act and the complainant was intentionally insulted and

intimidated by them with an intent to humiliate by using his

caste within public view. He would further submit that in the

absence of the same, taking cognizance under the Act is not

sustainable in law. Further he submits that admittedly, the 2nd

respondent/de facto complainant purchased motorcycle from

Varun Bajaj Showroom by availing finance from the Lakshmi

Finance and executed a hypothecation agreement and has given

an undertaking that whenever he committed default in payment

of instalments, he has no objection to seize the said motorcycle.

Accordingly, the motorcycle was taken away by the financier.

He would further submit that the cheque dated 29.10.2010 was

issued by the 2nd respondent/de facto complainant to clear the

instalment due and when the said cheque was presented in the

bank, the same was returned with an endorsement "payment

stopped" and as such, M/s.Lakshmi Finance, represented by its

Constituted Attorney i.e., 1st petitioner/A.1 filed a complaint

against the 2nd respondent/de facto complainant under Section

138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and numbered as

C.C.No.9 of 2011 and as a counterblast, the 2nd respondent/de

facto complainant sought to be given a colour of criminal offence

to wreak vengeance against the petitioners, and filed the present

complaint, which does not meet the strict standard of proof

required to sustain a criminal accusation. Further he would

submit that the 2nd respondent/de facto complainant in order to

wreak vengeance, misused the Act and filed a false complaint for

settling the scores or to pressurize the petitioners to waive out

the installments. Therefore, he prayed to quash the criminal

proceedings against the petitioners/A.1 to A.6 in S.C.No.57 of

2015.

5. Learned Assistant Public Prosecutor vehemently opposed

the criminal petition. He would submit that the 2nd

respondent/de facto complainant is the victim of the offences

committed under the Act. The material available on record is

sufficient to make out a case against the petitioners/A.1 to A.6

and it should be subjected to the process of trial. He would

further submit that the Special Act to protect the people belong

to the Schedule Caste and Schedule Tribes has been brought

with the avowed object of protecting vulnerable mass of the

community, but the petitioners/A.1 to A.6 intentionally insulted

with an intention to humiliate the 2nd respondent/de facto

complainant by using his caste in public place and threatened

him with dire consequences. He would further submit that it is

not possible to ascertain the veracity of allegations at this stage

and the application for quashing the criminal proceedings under

Section 482 Cr.P.C., therefore, cannot sustain at this stage.

Further, he would submit that, no doubt, the 2nd respondent/de

facto complainant purchased the vehicle from Varun Bajaj

Showroom by availing finance from Lakshmi Finance and at that

time, they have obtained many cheques from him and one

among them was misused by filling later date and presented in

the bank for collection. He would further submit that the 2nd

respondent/de facto complainant anticipated the same and

issued instructions to the Bank to stop the payment. To wreak

vengeance against the 2nd respondent/de facto complainant,

they have filed a complaint for the offence under Section 138 of

Negotiable Instruments Act and therefore, the said cheque was

not issued by the 2nd respondent/de facto complainant in

discharge of his legally enforceable debt. Therefore, the matter

requires trial to ascertain the truth or otherwise of the said

allegations. He would submit that there is no merit in the

contention of the petitioners that there are no allegations

against these petitioners with regard to the commission of

offence and therefore, the petitioners/A.1 to A.6 cannot agitate

all these aspects and it can be considered only at the time of

trial, as it is not possible to ascertain the veracity of the

allegations at this stage. He, therefore, submits that the

application for quashing of charge sheet or criminal proceedings

under Section 482 Cr.P.C., cannot sustain. Hence, he would

pray for dismissal of the criminal petition.

6. The learned counsel for the 2nd respondent conceded with

the arguments advanced by the learned Assistant Public

Prosecutor.

7. Having perused the relevant facts and contentions raised

by the learned counsels for both the petitioners and the

respondents, in my considered opinion, the first and foremost

issue, which requires determination in the instant case is:

Whether the allegations made against the petitioners/A.1 to A.6 would attract the accusation against them and whether there are any merits in the criminal petition to allow?

POINT:

8. In State of Haryana & Others Vs. Ch.Bhajanlal and

Others1, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that in exercise of

extraordinary power conferred under Article 226 of Constitution

of India or the inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C, the

AIR 1992 SC 604

following categories of cases are given by way of illustration,

wherein, such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse

of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of

justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise

clearly defined and sufficiently channelized and inflexible guide,

myriad kinds of cases wherein, such power should be exercised.

The relevant guidelines at Para Nos.102 and 103 read as under:

"(1) where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused;

(2) where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code;

(3) where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or 'complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused;

(4) where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code;

(5) where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused;

(6) where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party;

(7) where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."

103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice.

9. As can be seen from the above guidelines, in support of

the contentions raised by the petitioners, that if the contents in

the complaint, taken on their face value, do not make out any

case against the petitioners, such complaint filed with an

ulterior motive deserves to be quashed.

10. The primary point arose on the ground of jurisdiction of

the learned IV Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate in

taking cognizance of a private complaint pertaining to the

offence under the Act, the learned Magistrate has no jurisdiction

to take cognizance and only the Special Court has jurisdiction to

take cognizance of the offence under the Act. No doubt, that the

Special Court under the Act is essentially a Court of Sessions

and it can take cognizance of the offence in accordance with the

provisions of the Amended Act.

11. Considering the above contention, there is no ambiguity

that only the Special Court constituted for the purpose of the

Act, is competent to take cognizance for the offence under

Scheduled Castes and Schedule Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities)

Act. In the present case, the learned IV Additional Chief

Metropolitan Magistrate, Visakhapatnam on 18.09.2012 took

cognizance of the offence under the Act.

12. Now, the question to be decided is, whether in a case

where the offences under the Act, the cognizance is taken by the

learned IV Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate,

Visakhapatnam and thereafter the case is committed to the

Special Court and cognizance is not straightway taken up by the

learned Special Court, whether entire criminal proceedings for

the offences under the Atrocities Act, 1989 can be said to have

been vitiated?

13. At this juncture, it is relevant to refer to Shantaben

Bhurabhai Bhuriya vs Anand Athabhai Chaudhari 2, wherein

the Hon'ble Apex Court held as follows:

"8.0. Therefore, the issue/question posed for the consideration of this Court is, whether in a case where cognizance is taken by the learned Magistrate and thereafter the case is committed to the learned Special Court, whether entire criminal proceedings can be said to have been vitiated considering the second proviso

2 2021 (3) ALT (Crl.) 480 (SC) : https://indiankanoon.org/doc/180041207/

to Section 14 of the Atrocities Act which was inserted by Act 1 of 2016 w.e.f. 26.1.2016?

8.1. While considering the aforesaid issue/question, legislative history of the relevant provisions of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, more particularly, Section 14 pre-amendment and post amendment is required to be considered. Section 14 as stood pre-amendment and post amendment reads as under:

"Section 14. Special Court (Pre amendment): For the purpose of providing for speedy trial, the State Government shall, with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the High Court, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify for each district a Court of Session to be a Special Court to try the offences under this Act" "Section 14. Special Court and Exclusive Special Court (Post amendment): (1) For the purpose of providing for speedy trial, the State Government shall, with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the High Court, by notification in the Official Gazette, establish an Exclusive Special Court for one or more Districts:

Provided that in Districts where less number of cases under this Act is recorded, the State Government shall, with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the High Court, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify for such Districts, the Court of Session to be a Special Court to try the offences under this Act;

Provided further that the Courts so established or specified shall have power to directly take cognizance of offences under this Act."

8.2................ While referring the matter to the Larger Bench three conflicting decisions one in the case of State of MP vs. Bhooraji and Ors. reported in (2001) 7 SCC 679, in the case of Moly and Anr. vs State of Kerala reported in (2004) 4 SCC 584 and in the case of Vidyadharan vs. State of Kerala reported in (2004) 1 SCC 215 were noted. In the case of Bhooraji (supra), it was held by this Court taking aid of Section 465(1) of the Code that when trial has been conducted by the Court of competent jurisdiction and a conviction has been recorded on proper appreciation of evidence, the same cannot be erased or effaced merely on the ground that there had been no committal proceeding and cognizance was taken by the Special Court, inasmuch as the same does not give rise to failure of justice. On the other hand, in the case of Moly (supra), it was held that

conviction by the Special Court is not sustainable if it has suo motu entertained and taken cognizance of the complaint directly without the case being committed to it and, therefore, there should be retrial or total setting aside of the conviction, as the case may be...................

58. In our considered opinion, because of the restricted role assigned to the Magistrate at the stage of commitment under the new Code, the non- compliance of the same and raising of any objection in that regard after conviction attracts the applicability of the principle of `failure of justice' and the convict-appellant becomes obliged in law to satisfy the appellate court that he has been prejudiced and deprived of a fair trial or there has been miscarriage of justice. The concept of fair trial and the conception of miscarriage of justice are not in the realm of abstraction. They do not operate in a vacuum. They are to be concretely established on the bedrock of facts and not to be deduced from procedural lapse or an interdict like commitment as enshrined under Section 193 of the Code for taking cognizance under the Act. It should be a manifestation of reflectible and visible reality but not a routine matter which has roots in appearance sans any reality. Tested on the aforesaid premised reasons, it is well nigh impossible to conceive of any failure of justice or causation of prejudice or miscarriage of justice on such non-compliance. It would be totally inapposite and inappropriate to hold that such non-compliance vitiates the trial." That thereafter, after observing the above, this Court overruled the objection relating to non- compliance of Section 193 of the Code, which eventually has resulted in directly entertaining and taking cognizance by the Special Judge under the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 and observed that it does not vitiate the trial and on the said ground alone, the conviction cannot be set aside or there cannot be a direction of retrial.

...........this Court concluded that the decision rendered in Moly (supra) and Vidyadharan (supra) have not noted the decision in Bhooraji (supra), a binding precedent, and hence they are per incuriam. ..............

9.2. In support of the above conclusion, the words used in second proviso to Section 14 are required to be considered

minutely. The words used are "Court so established or specified shall have power to directly take cognizance of the offences under this Court". The word "only" is conspicuously missing. If the intention of the legislature would have to confer the jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offences under the Atrocities Act exclusively with the Special Court, in that case, the wording should have been "that the Court so established or specified only shall have power to directly take cognizance of offences under this Act". Therefore, merely because now further and additional powers have been given to the Special Court also to take cognizance of the offences under the Atrocities Act and in the present case merely because the cognizance is taken by the learned Magistrate for the offences under the Atrocities Act and thereafter the case has been committed to the learned Special Court, it cannot be said that entire criminal proceedings have been vitiated .................

14. Therefore, in view of the principles laid down in the above

judgment, in the instant case, it appears that the learned IV

Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Visakhapatnam took

the cognizance of the complaint vide Order 18.09.2012 and

subsequently, the Act was amended and the requirement of the

committal of the case by a Magistrate has been moved away.

However, in the light of the above judgment, taking cognizance

by the learned IV Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate,

Visakhapatnam, and such irregularities do not vitiate the

proceedings.

15. In the instant case, the 2nd respondent/de facto

complainant on 09.03.2009 purchased Bajaj Pulsar motorcycle

at Varun Bajaj Showroom, Dondaparthi, Visakhapatnam by

availing finance from Lakshmi Finance and he paid two

instalments @ Rs.2,406/- per month for the months of April and

May, 2009 and subsequently, he committed default. When the

2nd respondent failed to repay the rest of the instalments, they

took the vehicle. Subsequently, the 2nd respondent purchased

another motorcycle i.e., Honda Stunner bearing Regn.No.AP 31

VB 9540 in September, 2009 by availing finance from HDFC

Bank Limited. After coming to know about the same, the

employees of Lakshmi Finance came to Samatha Law Hostel, AU

Campus on 15.09.2009 and took the vehicle from the custody of

Mr.Jagan, who was the assistant of the 2nd respondent/de facto

complainant, and even then, he has not paid the balance

installments. On 28.09.2010 the 2nd respondent/de facto

complainant met petitioners/A.1 and A.2 and requested them to

settle his dues and return the vehicle. On that petitioners/A.1

and A.2 abused him by using the words "kulam takkuva mala

lanja kodukuvi mammalni nuvvemi chestavura" and left the

place. Later, the 2nd respondent approached the Police and

presented a complaint for taking necessary action against them.

As the Police have not responded and as there was no action

from the Police on his complaint, he filed the present complaint

before the learned Magistrate on 12.10.2011 with a delay of one

year and one month.

16. As per the allegations in the present complaint, the

petitioners/A.1 and A.2 abused the 2nd respondent with caste

related words with a view to insult or humiliate him. The

legislative intent seems to be clear that every insult or

intimidation for humiliation to a person would not amount to an

offence under Section 3 of the Act. Basing on the facts and

circumstances of the case, this Court is of the view that little

hesitation in holding that even though the petitioners/accused

might have abused the 2nd respondent, such abuse by itself and

without anything more does not warrant subjecting the

petitioners to face the trial. But, as per the allegations in the

complaint at Para No.4, on 28.09.2010, the petitioner/A.2

shouted against the 2nd respondent by using the caste related

words as "kulam takkuva mala lanja kodukuvi mammalni

nuvvemi chestavura". Therefore, the present complaint filed by

the 2nd respondent is nothing but motivated and exaggeration in

order to cause harassment and the employees of Lakshmi

Finance i.e., Petitioners/A.1 to A.6 should not be roped in on the

basis of the omnibus allegations unless specific instances of

their involvement in the crime are made out. Further, on perusal

of the statements of the 2nd respondent and two more witnesses

recorded by the learned Magistrate and the complaint, there is

no mention either in the complaint or in the statements of the

witnesses that the accused persons are not the members of the

Schedule Caste or Schedule Tribe and the 2nd respondent was

intentionally insulted or intimidated by them by using caste

related remarks within public view.

17. At this juncture, it is relevant to refer to Gorige Pentaiah

Vs. State of A.P3, wherein, Hon'ble Apex Court held as follows:

"6. In the instant case, the allegation of Respondent 3 in the entire complaint is that on 27-5-2004, the appellant abused them with the name of their caste. According to the basic ingredients of Section 3(1)(x) of the Act, the complainant ought to have alleged that the appellant-accused was not a member of the Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and he (Respondent

3) was intentionally insulted or intimidated by the accused with intent to humiliate in a place within public view. In the entire complaint, nowhere it is mentioned that the appellant-accused was not a member of the Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and he intentionally insulted or intimidated with intent to humiliate Respondent 3 in a place within public view. When the basic ingredients of the offence are missing in the complaint, then permitting such a complaint to continue and to compel the appellant to face the rigmarole of the criminal trial would be totally unjustified leading to abuse of process of law."

18. Further, in the case of Mahendra Bhatt & Others Vs.

State of Uttarakhand & another4, Hon'ble Apex Court held as

follows:

"5. I find force in the argument put forth on behalf of the accused applicants inasmuch as a bare perusal of the FIR itself reveals that there is no mention whatsoever in the said FIR that the accused applicants are not the members of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe community and the complainant and

(2008) 12 SCC 531 4 (2018) SCC Online Utt 1022

his brother were intentionally insulted or intimidated with intent to humiliate them within public view."

19. In the light of the above judgments, on perusal of the

entire complaint allegations and the statements of the 2nd

respondent and the other two witnesses recorded by the learned

Magistrate would not disclose that the petitioners/A.1 to A.6 do

not belong to the Schedules Caste or Schedule Tribe. There was

no reference to the utterance of the petitioners/A.1 to A.6 during

the course of verbal altercation or to the caste to which the 2nd

respondent belongs. The legislative intent seems to be clear that

every insult or intimidation of humiliation to a person would not

amount to an offence under Section 3 of the Act and it may not

be sufficient to attract Section 3 of the Act unless such words

are laced with casteist remarks. Even during the course of

enquiry, the 2nd respondent/de facto complainant has not filed

any documentary evidence to show that he belongs to the

Scheduled Caste. On perusal of the complaint filed by him, he

did not mention his caste in the cause title, except he pleaded

one line in the complaint at Para 3 that he being a Scheduled

Caste. In support of the same, he ought to have filed his caste

certificate to show that he belongs to Scheduled Caste or

Scheduled Tribe and there is no enquiry with regard to the

community of the petitioners/A.1 to A.6 as to whether they

belong to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe or other than the

Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe.

20. In the light of the above discussion, the 2nd respondent in

order to wreak vengeance, the Act has been misused and the

motive of the 2nd respondent to file a complaint is apparent and

it does not disclose the material facts. Even the 2nd respondent

has not stated that on 28.09.2010 he was humiliated with caste

by the petitioners/A.1 to A.6, except the 2nd petitioner/A.2

humiliated him by using caste. Therefore, the criminal

proceedings initiated by the 2nd respondent are manifestly

attended with malafides. It has been maliciously initiated with

an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance due to personal

grudges against the petitioners/A.1 to A.6 under the threat to

either to return the vehicle by waiving the amount. The 2nd

respondent without any substance and material, which directly

indicates the mala fides in prosecuting criminal proceedings

against the petitioners/A.1 to A.6 so also by abuse of process of

the Court for settling the scores to pressurize the parties to

waive the instalment amount and return the vehicle, which

cannot be permitted in accordance with the principles of law.

Apart from that, much prior to filing of this complaint by the 2nd

respondent, M/s.Lakshmi Finance represented by its

Constituted Attorney i.e., 1st petitioner/A.1 filed a case for the

offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act

against the 2nd respondent for dishonour of the cheque, said to

have been issued by him to discharge the legally enforceable

debt and when the said cheque was presented for collection, it

was returned with an endorsement "payment stopped" and the

said complaint was taken on file by the learned IV Additional

Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Visakhapatnam and numbered

as C.C.No.90 of 2011. As a counterblast, to overcome the above

proceedings, the 2nd respondent filed the present complaint on

12.10.2011 with a delay of one year and one month from the

date of alleged incident i.e., 28.09.2010. The present complaint

is instituted with a mala fide intention for the purpose of

harassment against the petitioners/A.1 to A.6. Further, the

Special Act, to protect the people belong to the Scheduled Caste

or Scheduled Tribe, has been brought with an avowed object of

protecting vulnerable mass of the community and the same has

been misused by the 2nd respondent/de facto complaint just in

order to wreak the vengeance against the petitioners/A.1 to A.6.

In the instant case, the above provisions are misused, and that

cannot be viewed lightly. The possibility of misuse has been

visualized by the Hon'ble Apex Court for lodging false reports. In

view of the above discussion, it is settled law that when the

basic ingredients of the offence are missing in the complaint or

in the statements, permitting such a complaint to continue and

to compel the petitioners/accused to face the criminal trial

under Section 3 of the Act would be totally unjustified leading to

abuse of process of law.

21. Now, another point that would engage this Court's

attention is, whether the criminal proceedings against the

petitioners/A.1 to A.6 should be taken further in view of the

petitioners/A.1 to A.6 facing accusation of the offence under

Sections 384 and 506 read with 34 IPC.

22. Section 384 IPC reads as follows:

"384. Punishment for extortion.--Whoever commits extortion shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both."

Section 506 IPC reads as follows:

"506. Punishment for criminal intimidation.--Whoever commits the offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both;"

23. The petitioners/A.1 to A.6 invoked the jurisdiction of the

High Court by applying Section 482 Cr.P.C., and sought

quashing thereof as well as the criminal proceedings against

them on the ground that the allegations mentioned in the

complaint as well as the statements disclose no offence and the

present prosecution has been instituted with a mala fide

intention to cause harassment.

24. Bhajanlal's case was referred in support of the contention

that if the contents of the complaint are taken on their face

value do not make out any case against the petitioners, such

criminal proceedings initiated with an ulterior motive deserve to

the quashed.

25. In the instant case, as per the allegations in the

complaint, there is no mention that the petitioners/A.1 to A.6

put the 2nd respondent in fear or dishonestly induced him to

deliver the vehicle and similarly there was no mention that

petitioners/A.1 to A.6 threatened the 2nd respondent and put

him fear and taken away the vehicle. Both the incidents

happened in the presence of Mr.Jagan who is the assistant of

the 2nd respondent. But, said Jagan did not lodge any report.

On his behalf, the 2nd respondent lodged the present complaint,

which is nothing but a motivated and exaggerated. Therefore,

this Court does not find any ring of truth in the prosecution

case to allow the proceedings against the petitioners/A.1 to A.6.

Therefore, the 2nd respondent not only misused the provisions of

the Act and filed the false complaint with a delay of one year one

month. The delay alone cannot be the reason to quash the

proceedings, however, the delay can also be one among the

several factors, which would be taken seriously when the other

facts show that there is an abuse of process of the Court. The

delay would affect the spontaneity of the complainant's

statement and there are chances of exaggerations and initiated

criminal proceedings manifestly attended with mala fides and it

has been maliciously initiated with an ulterior motive to wreak

vengeance by misusing the Act and adding some Penal Sections,

though the allegations in the complaint would not be attracted

for the offences mentioned in the complaint and the Court

proceedings cannot be taken as a weapon to wreak vengeance.

26. It is a settled law that when basic ingredients of the

offences are missing in the complaint, then permitting such

complaint to continue and to compel the petitioners/Accused to

face the criminal trial under the above Section of Law would

totally unjustified and leading to abuse of process of the Court.

Therefore, in the absence of the basic ingredients of the offences

stated supra and the specific allegations compelling the

petitioners/A.1 to A.6 to face the trial for the above said offences

would not accord the spirit of law made in this regard.

27. On an overall consideration of the entire material placed

on record and the contentions urged before this Court by the

learned counsels, the law declared by the Hon'ble Apex Court in

the judgments referred to supra, it is suffice to conclude that the

contentions raised by the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent

are without any substance and the material produced before

this Court directly indicates the mala fides in prosecution of

criminal proceedings against the petitioners/A.1 to A.6 so also

by abuse of process of the Court.

28. In view of the foregoing discussion, I find that it is a fit

case to exercise inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C

to quash the proceedings against the petitioners/A.1 to A.6 in

S.C.No.57 of 2015 on the file of the Court of Special Judge for

SC ST Cases, Visakhapatnam, for the offence punishable under

Sections 384 and 506 read with 34 IPC and Section 3 of the

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of

Atrocities) Act, 1989.

29. Accordingly, the criminal petition is allowed and the

proceedings against the petitioners/A.1 to A.6 in S.C.No.57 of

2015 on the file of the Court of Special Judge for SC & ST

Cases, Visakhapatnam, for the offences punishable under

Sections 384 and 506 read with 34 IPC and Section 3 of the

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of

Atrocities) Act, 1989, are hereby quashed.

As a sequel, the miscellaneous petitions, pending if any,

shall stand disposed of.

JUSTICE DUPPALA VENKATA RAMANA

20.09.2023 DNS Mjl/* L.R.Copy to be marked

HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE DUPPALA VENKATA RAMANA

CRIMINAL PETITION No.24809 OF 2017

20.09.2023 DNS Mjl/* L.R.Copy to be marked

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH, AMARAVATI

**** CRIMINAL PETITION No.24809 of 2017 Between:

1. P.N.D.H. Rangaraju, S/o.P.Trimurthy Raju, Aged 45 years, Occ: General Manager, C/o. Varun Chambers, Balajinagar, Siripuram, Visakapatnam.

2. O. Ravi Kumar S/o.O.Apparao, Aged 42 years, Occ: Branch Manger, C/o Varun Bajaj Showroom Dondaoparthy(MVP Colony), Visakapatnam.

3. A Vamsi Krishna, S/o.A.Nagabhushana Rao, Aged 45 years, Occ: Recovery Manager, C/o Varun Chambers Balajinagar, Siripuram, Visakapatnam.

4. Reddy Ramesh Naidu, S/o.lakshmanudu, Aged 40 years, Occ:Executive, C/o. Varun Bajaj Showroom Dondaparthy, Visakapatnam.

5. P. Srinivasa Rao, S/o.P.Simhachalam, Aged 39 years, Occ:Recovery Executive, C/o. Varun Chambers, Balajinagar, Siripuram, Visakapatnam.

6. Akula Prem Kumar, S/o.A.Apparao, Aged 36 years, Occ: Executive, C/o. Varun Chambers, Balajinagar, Siripuram, Visakapatnam.

.... Petitioners/A.1 to A.6 And

1. State of Andhra Pradesh Represented by its Public Prosecutor.

2. Rayapati Sanuel John Dharma Raju, S/o.Late R/Paul Deva Raju, Occupation Advocate, R/o.D.No.9-6-21, Maddilapalem, Near Kalabharathi, Visakhapatnam.

       .                                           ... Respondents

DATE OF JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED: 20-09-2023





SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE DUPPALA VENKATA RAMANA

1. Whether Reporters of Local Newspapers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes/No

2. Whether the copies of judgment may be marked to Law Reporters / Journals? Yes/No

3. Whether His Lordship wish to see the fair copy of the Judgment? Yes/No

DUPPALA VENKATA RAMANA, J

* THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE DUPPALA VENKATA RAMANA

+ CRIMINAL PETITION No.24809 of 2017

% 20-09-2023

Between:

1. P.N.D.H. Rangaraju, S/o.P.Trimurthy Raju, Aged 45 years, Occ: General Manager, C/o. Varun Chambers, Balajinagar, Siripuram, Visakapatnam.

2. O. Ravi Kumar S/o.O.Apparao, Aged 42 years, Occ: Branch Manger, C/o Varun Bajaj Showroom Dondaoparthy(MVP Colony), Visakapatnam.

3. A Vamsi Krishna, S/o.A.Nagabhushana Rao, Aged 45 years, Occ: Recovery Manager, C/o Varun Chambers Balajinagar, Siripuram, Visakapatnam.

4. Reddy Ramesh Naidu, S/o.lakshmanudu, Aged 40 years, Occ:Executive, C/o. Varun Bajaj Showroom Dondaparthy, Visakapatnam.

5. P. Srinivasa Rao, S/o.P.Simhachalam, Aged 39 years, Occ:Recovery Executive, C/o. Varun Chambers, Balajinagar, Siripuram, Visakapatnam.

6. Akula Prem Kumar, S/o.A.Apparao, Aged 36 years, Occ: Executive, C/o. Varun Chambers, Balajinagar, Siripuram, Visakapatnam.

.... Petitioners/A.1 to A.6 And

1. State of Andhra Pradesh Represented by its Public Prosecutor.

2. Rayapati Sanuel John Dharma Raju, S/o.Late R/Paul Deva Raju, Occupation Advocate, R/o.D.No.9-6-21, Maddilapalem, Near Kalabharathi, Visakhapatnam.

... Respondents

! Counsel for Petitioners : M/s.Indus Law Firm

^ Counsel for Respondents : Asst.Public Prosecutor (State) Sri K.Simhachalam for R.2 < Gist:

> Head Note:

? Cases referred:

1. AIR 1992 SC 604

2. 2021 (3) ALT (Crl.) 480 (SC) :

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/180041207

3. (2008) 12 SCC 531

4. (2018) SCC Online Utt 1022 This Court made the following: