Citation : 2023 Latest Caselaw 1625 AP
Judgement Date : 23 March, 2023
1
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE D.V.S.S.SOMAYAJULU
and
HON'BLE SMT JUSTICE VENKATA JYOTHIRMAI PRATAPA
I.A.No.1 of 2023
in / and
WRIT PETITION No.39085 of 2022
ORDER: (per D.V.S.S.Somayajulu, J)
I.A.No.1 of 2023 is filed to amend the prayer in the
Writ Petition. Since no objection is raised by the learned
counsel appearing for the respondents, this application is
allowed. Office is directed to make necessary amendment to
the prayer in the Writ Petition.
2) This Writ Petition is filed in the nature of Habeas
Corpus seeking declaration that a preventive detention order,
dated 07.09.2022, passed by the 2nd respondent and the
consequential order of approval and confirmation, dated
01.11.2022, passed by the 1st respondent, have been
contrary to law and to direct the respondents to release the
petitioner's son viz., Shaik Imran S/o Late Maqbul forthwith.
3) This Court has heard Sri V. Nitesh, learned
counsel for the petitioner and Sri Sayed Khadar Masthan,
learned counsel representing learned Additional Advocate
General appearing for the respondents.
4) Learned counsel for the petitioner points out that
the detenu is the son of the writ petitioner. The orders of
detention were passed on 07.09.2022 under the A.P.
Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits,
Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and
Land Grabbers Act, 1986 (for short "Act No.1 of 1986") on
the ground that he is a dangerous criminal with a
voluminous criminal record. It is pointed out that the first
case referred to in the detention order was ended in acquittal
in March, 2020 and the order of detention was passed on
07.09.2022, which is more than 1 ½ years later. The next
two cases referred to are cases of bind over under Section
110 Cr.P.C. and the 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th cases are relating to
alleged offecnes under the A.P. Prohibition Act. Learned
counsel submits that merely because of a person is
bootlegger he cannot be charged under the Act 1 of 1986,
particularly when there is no threat to public security etc. It
is also submitted that the detention order was passed when
the detenu was under custody in Crime No.144 of 2022 (case
No.6). Learned counsel submits that the petitioner's
activities do not affect public order or cause danger to public
health; that two of the cases which are "bound over" cases
cannot be called as crime and lastly when the detenu was
under custody the order was passed contrary to the settled
criminal law without recording the fact that he is likely to
commit similar crimes if he is released. He relies upon the
cases reported in Dharmendra Suganchand Chelawat and
another v Union of India and others1and Surya Prakash
Sharma v State of U.P. and Others2 in support of his
contention. He also relies upon the Division Bench judgment
of this Court reported in Mohammed Fayaz Ali v The Chief
Secretary, Government of A.P. and Ors., 3.
5) In reply to this learned counsel appearing for the
respondents argues the matter at length and states that the
order was passed after considering all the material on record
as the writ petitioner is a habitual offender and he is acting
in a manner detrimental to the public interest. The public
analyst report clearly shows that the action of the detenu is
likely to cause harm to the public since adulterated material
is being sold. It is also pointed out that the order notices the
(1990) 1 SCC 746
1994 Supp (3) SCC 195
Manu/AP/0059/2009
fact that he is maintaining a gang in Nandyal area and,
therefore, he is prejudicial to the interest of the public.
6) Learned counsel further justifies the orders and
states that public safety is more important than individual
safety and the detrimental effect of the activities by the sale
of adulterated illicit liquor etc., is a clear and visible danger.
He submits that the authority need not wait till the
adulteration results in actual harm and can issue such order
to prevent the danger. Therefore, he prays that the Writ
should be dismissed.
7) This Court after considering the submissions
made notices that the majority of the offences i.e., four out of
seven offences in this case are offences under the A.P.
Prohibition Act. The likelihood of grave and widespread
danger to life or public health is not visible from a reading of
the order. The danger, in the opinion of this court, should be
grave and also widespread. The fact that the detenu is
dealing in illicit liquor and it is likely to affect or harm or
cause a danger to the general public or a section of the
general public is also not borne out by record. The Division
Bench judgment of this Court passed in W.P.No.5469 of
2022 clearly applies to the facts and circumstances of the
case. The Division Bench considered all the aspects and
pronounced the reasoned order which mandates the
recording of danger to the public harm and public safety
based upon tangible materials for justifying the detention.
Such material is conspicuously lacking.
8) The first case in which the detenu is charged
ended in acquittal long prior to the passing of the impugned
order. Therefore, the clear and proximate danger or
continuity test also applies and this is not considered in the
order of detention of a person.
9) Lastly, the case law cited by the learned counsel
for the petitioner are clearly applicable to the facts and
circumstances of the case. In Dharmendra Suganchand
Chelawat case (1 supra) the accused was in custody in the
order of detention was passed. In paragraph 21 the following
was held:
"21. The decisions referred to above lead to the conclusion that an order for detention can be validly passed against a person in custody and for that purpose it is necessary that the grounds of detention must show that (i) the detaining authority was aware
of the fact that the detenu is already in detention; and (ii) there were compelling reasons justifying such detention despite the fact that the detenu is already in detention. The expression "compelling reasons" in the contest of making an order for detention of a person already in custody implies that there must be cogent material before the detaining authority on the basis of which it may be satisfied that (a) the detenu is likely to be released from custody in the near future, and (b) taking into account the nature of the antecedent activities of the detenu, it is likely that after his release from custody he would indulge in prejudicial activities and it is necessary to detain him in order to prevent him from engaging in such activities."
10) This was followed in Surya Prakash Sharma
case (2 supra). A coordinate Division Bench of this Court in
the case of Mohammed Fayaz Ali (3 supra) noted the
submissions that to attract the definition of Goonda the
detenu must have been habitually committing the offences
under Chapter 16, 17 and 22 of IPC. In the case on hand, as
noted earlier, the first offence ended in acquittal long prior to
the detention order. The subsequent offences are not
offences under Chapters 16, 17 or 22 of IPC. It cannot be
said that the detenu is, therefore, habitually committing
offences.
11) In addition, the Division Bench also noticed that
a sole case registered with serious offences cannot be a basis
for satisfaction that the petitioner is a "habitual offender".
The Bench relied upon Dwarika Prasad case4 to hold that
even if one of the grounds or reasons which lead to the
subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority is non-
existent or misconceived or irrelevant, the order of detention
would be invalid.
12) In the opinion of this Court all the judgments
relied upon by the leaned counsel for the petitioner are
clearly applicable to the facts of the case. The conclusions
reached by the authority are not backed up by clear and
cogent material. Irrelevant facts are considered for arriving
at conclusions. Last but not the least merely arraying him
as bootlegger is not enough to classify him as a "Goonda"
unless and until the detrimental effect on the public health
or grave danger to the public health etc., from his activity is
tangible and visible.
Manu/SC/0127/1974 = 1975 CriLJ221
13) Since none of these elements are present the Writ
Petition is allowed, the 4th respondent is directed to release
the detenu, who is in central prison, Kadapa, and he is
directed to be set at large immediately, unless he is required
in another crime. There shall be no order as to costs.
14) Consequently, Miscellaneous Applications
pending in these Writ Petitions, if any, shall stand closed.
__________________________ D.V.S.S.SOMAYAJULU, J
______________________________________ VENKATA JYOTHIRMAI PRATAPA, J
Date:23.03.2023 Ssv
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