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M/S. Adani Ports And Special ... vs The Vishakhpatnam Port Trust
2022 Latest Caselaw 1116 AP

Citation : 2022 Latest Caselaw 1116 AP
Judgement Date : 3 March, 2022

Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
M/S. Adani Ports And Special ... vs The Vishakhpatnam Port Trust on 3 March, 2022
                                  1




          * HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE D.V.S.S. SOMAYAJULU

               + WRIT PETITION No.455 of 2022

                        % 3rd March, 2022


# M/s Adani Ports and Special Economic Zone Ltd., and
another
                                                        ... Petitioners..
AND

$ The Vishakhapatnam Port Trust
                                                    ... Respondent.


! Counsel for the Petitioners              : Sri A. Satya Prasad
                                             Senior Counsel
                                             Sri V. Harish


^ Counsel for the respondent               : Sri P. Raghuram
                                             Senior Counsel
                                             Sri Raviteja Padiri
                                             Standing counsel


< Gist:

> Head Note:


? Cases referred:
1) 2018 SCC Online 8269
2) Civil Appeal Nos.4862-4863 of 2021
3) Civil Appeal No.1949 of 2019
4) (2008) 16 SCC 215
                                 2




      HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE D.V.S.S.SOMAYAJULU
              WRIT PETITION No.455 of 2022
ORDER:

With the consent of all the learned senior counsels and

the learned standing counsel for the respondent-

Visakhapatnam Port Trust the Writ Petition itself is heard.

The Writ Petition is filed by the petitioners seeking a Writ

of Mandamus declaring the action of the respondent in

disqualifying the petitioner from participating further in tender

No.IM&EE/MOF/Mech-WQ-7&8/2021, dated 04.10.2021 as

illegal, violative of principles of natural justice etc.

This Court has heard Sri A. Satya Prasad, learned senior

counsel appearing for the petitioners and Sri P. Raghuram,

learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent-

Visakhapatnam Port Trust.

PETITIONER'S CASE:

Learned counsel for the petitioner Sri Satya Prasad

points out that the petitioner is a company which wanted to

participate in a tender bearing No.IM&EE/MOF/Mech-WQ-

7&8/2021, for mechanization of WQ 7 & WQ 8 Berths. The

said tender involved a multi stage process. The first stage was

the qualification stage (RFQ stage). The bidders who qualified

at this stage were entitled to participate in the second stage,

which is the bidding stage (RFP). The petitioner was

disqualified at the first stage itself on the ground that they did

not disclose certain important material facts. Learned senior 3

counsel points out that this decision of disqualifying the

petitioner is not communicated to the petitioner, and that after

a caveat was filed and a notice of caveat was served on the

petitioner, they realized the fact that they were disqualified.

Learned senior counsel submits that the procedure adopted by

respondent Visakhapatnam Port Trust is totally wrong. It is

submitted that the ground on which the petitioner was

disqualified is also not legally and factually tenable. Hence, he

prayed for an appropriate order.

Learned senior counsel drew the attention of this Court

to clause 2.2.2 of the tender conditions which describe the

technical, financial and the O&M experience of the bidder.

Learned senior counsel submits that the petitioner has fulfilled

and met all the stipulations of Clause 2.2.2. Learned counsel

submits that an entity called AVCTPL is a 100% subsidiary of

the petitioner. The rejection of the petitioner's present bid by

VPT was on the ground that the earlier contract between the

said AVCTPL and VPT was terminated and this fact was not

disclosed. Learned counsel submits that the caveat petition

filed revealed (in paragraph 4 and 6) that Clause 2.2.8 of the

bid condition was not fulfilled in the present case. Learned

senior counsel argues that clause 2.2.8 is not applicable to the

facts and circumstances of the case as AVCTPL has terminated

the contract and not vice versa. Relying upon paragraphs 9 to

11 of the writ affidavit, senior counsel argues that it is the

AVCTPL which terminated the agreement and not VPT. 4

Learned senior counsel also argues that the petitioner has

faithfully and diligently disclosed all the particulars. He also

argues that Annexure-I / Appendix-I, contains the following

Clause 7 -

"7. A statement by the Applicant and each of the Members of its Consortium (where applicable) or any of their Associates disclosing material non-performance or contractual non-compliance in past projects, contractual disputes and litigation/arbitration in the recent past is given below (Attach extra sheets, if necessary)."

Learned senior counsel, therefore, argues in line with

paragraph 11 of his writ affidavit that they have disclosed all

the facts, arbitrations and there is no concealment of facts. He

submits that the action of the respondent-VPT should be set

aside for the following reasons -

(A) That these clauses of bid are not contravened / there

is no concealment and

(B) That the respondent port trust did not intimate the

rejection by a letter or document as required.

The learned senior counsel relying upon Atlanta

Limited v Union of India1 argues that Clause 2.2.8 confers

unbridled power on the respondent and therefore it is arbitrary

and unreasonable.

RESPONDENTS SUBMISSIONS:

In reply to this, learned senior Counsel for VPT Sri

P.Raghuram argues that there is clear concealment of facts, as

1 2018 SCC Online 8269 5

the contract with the coal terminal (AVCTPL) was also

terminated by the VPT. He also submits that an arbitration

was invoked basing on the non-performance of the contract,

/failure to perform the contract and there are serious

allegations leading to claims and counter claims. Learned

senior counsel also argues that the clause 2.2.8 clearly deals

with the disqualification as mentioned in the clause itself. He

points out that no injustice is caused to the petitioner by the

communication through the caveat. Admittedly, he points out

that on 05.01.2022 a letter was also addressed to the petitioner

informing them that their bid cannot be accepted due to

termination of the earlier contract of the AVCTPL termination.

He also argues that basing on Clause 2.7 and 2.7.3 of the bid

document that the right to reject the bid is available with the

respondent. They can reject the bid or annul the process

without assigning any reason whatsoever. This power is not

available both before the bid is accepted and after the bid is

accepted as per Clause 2.7.3, if there is a material

misrepresentation, material concealment facts or false

information. Learned senior counsel also argues that the right

of an employer to choose whom he wishes to enter into a

contract cannot be taken away and that the past experience

with the contractor / associates is a relevant factor to be taken

into account by the State or the respondent. He points out that

when the subsidiary's contract was terminated and this fact is

not disclosed, VPT was within its right in refusing to enter into 6

further dealings with the petitioner. He points out that this is

an essential condition of the contract. Relying upon the

judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Uflex Ltd.,

v Government of Tamilnadu & Ors.,2 learned senior counsel

argues that judicial review in such matters is permissible if

there is arbitrariness, irrationality, unreasonableness, bias,

mala fides in the decision making process. He points out that

in these limited circumstances the Court can interfere. It is his

contention that none of these factors are actually evident or

present. He also argues that the words of a tender document

must be given their own meaning and necessary importance.

He contends that the same cannot be overlooked or ignored by

the Court. The principles of judicial review as per the learned

senior counsel are limited to reviewing the decision making

process alone. Terms of the tender are fixed by domain experts

and therefore he submits that the issue should be left to the

experts. In conclusion, learned senior counsel submits that

there is no mistake committed by the respondent-VPT.

COURT:

The long term alliance failed at the very beginning itself

due to the alleged non-disclosure of clear details by the bidder.

In the opinion of this Court what needs to be

considered for a decision in this case are Clauses 2.2.8, 2.7.1.,

2.7.3 and Clause 7 in Annex-I, which are extracted hereunder

:

2 Civil Appeal Nos.4862-4863 of 2021 7

"2.2.8: An Applicant including any Consortium Member or Associate should, in the last 3 (three) years, have neither failed to perform on any contract, as evidenced by imposition of a penalty by an arbitral or judicial authority or a judicial pronouncement or arbitration award against the Applicant, Consortium Member or Associate, as the case may be, nor has been expelled from any project or contract by any public entity nor have had any contract terminated by any public entity for breach by such Applicant, Consortium Member or Associate. Provided, however, that where an Applicant claims that its disqualification arising on account of any cause or event specified in this Clause 2.2.8 is such that it does not reflect (a) any malfeasance on its part in relation such cause or event; (b) any willful default or patent breach of the material terms of the relevant contract; (c) any fraud, deceit or misrepresentation in relation to such contract; or (d) any rescinding or abandoning of such contract, it may make a representation to this effect to the Authority for seeking a waiver from the disqualification hereunder and the Authority may, in its sole discretion and for reasons to be recorded in writing, grant such waiver if it is satisfied with the grounds of such representation and is further satisfied that such waiver is not in any manner likely to cause a material adverse impact on the Bidding Process or on the implementation of the Project.

- 2.7.1: Notwithstanding anything contained in this RFQ, the Authority reserves the right to accept or reject any Application and to annul the Bidding Process and reject all Applications/ Bids, at any time without any liability or any obligation for such acceptance, rejection or annulment, and without assigning any reasons therefor. In the event that the Authority rejects or annuls all the Bids, it may, in its discretion. invite all eligible Bidders to submit fresh Bids hereunder.

.....

- 2.7.3: In case it is found during the evaluation or at any time before signing of the Concession Agreement or after its execution and during the period of subsistence thereof, 8

including the concession thereby granted by the Authority, that one or more of the pre-qualification conditions have not been met by the Applicant, or the Applicant has made material misrepresentation or has given any materially incorrect or false information, the Applicant shall be disqualified forthwith if not yet appointed as the Concessionaire either by issue of the LOA or entering into of the Concession Agreement, and if the Applicant/SPV has already been issued the LOA or has entered into the Concession Agreement, as the case may be, the same shall, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained therein or in this RFQ, be liable to be terminated, by a communication in writing by the Authority to the Applicant, without the Authority being liable in any manner whatsoever to the Applicant and without prejudice to any other right or remedy which the Authority may have under this RFQ, the Bidding Documents, the Concession Agreement under applicable law.

Annexure-1 Clause-7: A statement by the Applicant and each of the Members of its Consortium (where applicable) or any of their Associates disclosing material non-performance or contractual non-compliance in past projects, contractual disputes and litigation / arbitration in the recent past is given below (Attach extra sheets, if necessary)."

It is clear after considering the detailed submissions

made that there was an earlier contract between the

respondent VPT and AVCTPL and there are disputes with

regard to the same. The said AVCTPL is a 100% subsidiary of

the petitioner. This is admitted in the pleadings. A small

written note, which is filed by the petitioners, also clearly

shows that on 08.10.2020 the said AVCTPL alleging that force

majeure continued for more than 120 days sought mutual

termination of the agreement. Thereafter, on 21.10.2021

AVCTPL sent its own termination notice. Visakhapatnam Port 9

Trust in turn issued consultation notice under that contract on

03.10.2020 alleging failure to achieve minimum guaranteed

contract. AVCTPL disputed this stating that there is force

majeure intimation. VPT sent a consultation notice on

23.11.2020 and thereafter gave a notice of termination on

26.12.2020. The matter is now under arbitration before the

three Hon'ble former judges of the Supreme Court of India.

These are the facts that are disclosed from the written note

itself.

Clause 7 of the Annexure thus assumes importance

now. It clearly states that there should be a disclosure about

any non-performance or contractual non-compliance in past

projects along with contractual disputes and litigation /

arbitration. In fact, the said clause itself states that the extra

sheets are to be attached to the bid document to disclose these

facts. As can be seen from the pleading in the affidavit itself

(para 11 of the writ affidavit) the petitioner in this case merely

disclosed that there is an arbitration pending between the said

AVCTPL and VPT but did not disclose anything about the

termination; the non-performance or contractual non-

compliance etc., in the earlier contract (Clause 2.2.8 read with

Clause 7 of Annexure-I).

Apart from that it is argued that Clause 2.2.8 is not

dealing with "disqualification". Clause 2.2.8 has already been

reproduced earlier. It is in two parts. Part (a) deals with failure

to perform and as evidenced by an order passed by a judicial 10

authority, arbitrator, tribunal award etc. It also talks of the

expulsion of the applicant and consortium member or associate

from any contract or project or the termination of a contract by

a public entity for any breach by the applicant consortium or

association. Clause, 2.2.8 also has a proviso which states that

if the applicant feels that this "disqualification on account of

an event" specified under 2.2.8 is such that it does not reflect

the malfeasance, willful default or the rescinding or remanding

etc., of any such contract, it may make representation to the

authority which can consider the same. Therefore, the

submission on behalf of the petitioner that 2.2.8 and the failure

to disclose these material facts is not a disqualification cannot

be accepted by this Court. The clause is clear and if the

applicant has been expelled from any project or if its contract

has been terminated by any public entity for breach, then the

applicant can make a representation, if it is of the opinion that

such termination etc., is not valid or correct and the

respondent has discretion to decide whether the same is a

ground for disqualification or not. Clause 2.28 therefore is held

to apply to disqualification also.

In addition, this Court also notices that Clause 2.7 gives

the right to the respondent to accept or reject any bid without

assigning any reasons. This power may appear on a first blush

to be an unbridled power. As per the law State action must be

based on reasons only otherwise it would be arbitrary. In the

case on hand, it is a fact that the reasons for disqualification 11

"do exist" but the same was not actually communicated to the

petitioner through a formal notice. It is only through the caveat

that the petitioner is made aware of the reasons for the

disqualification. The fact also remains that the Writ Petition

has been filed on 05.01.2022 and the disqualification was also

communicated to the petitioner by the letter of the CME on

05.01.2022. In the opinion of this Court, the respondent Port

Trust should have communicated the reasons by a formal

letter/notice. The reasons for the failure to formally

communicate are given in paragraph 15 of the counter

affidavit. In the opinion of this Court, this could have been

handled better and a formal communication would have been

communicated, but the mere failure to communicate this

through a formal letter will not enure the benefit of the

petitioner. In the opinion of this Court the petitioner is getting

a "post decisional" hearing and no prejudice per se is caused to

the lack of formal communication. In fact, the Writ itself does

not strictly allege any prejudice due to this non-

communication.

As per the settled law on the subject, this court, in

contractual and tender matters, should look into the decision

making process only. The law is well settled and need not be

reproduced again. Even the case law relied upon by the learned

counsel by the respondent is clear. In paragraph 2 of the Uflex

ltd., (1 supra) following is laid down:

12

"2. The judicial review of such contractual matters has its own limitations. It is in this context of judicial review of administrative actions that this Court has opined that it is intended to prevent arbitrariness, irrationality, unreasonableness, bias and mala fide. The purpose is to check whether the choice of decision is made lawfully and not to check whether the choice of decision is sound. In evaluating tenders and awarding contracts, the parties are to be governed by principles of commercial prudence. To that extent, principles of equity and natural justice have to stay at a distance.

This court also considers that paragraph 15 of

Vidarbha Irrigation Development Corporation v M/s Anoj

Kumar Garwala3 which is to the following effect is also very

important -

"15) It is clear even on a reading of this judgment that the words used in the tender document cannot be ignored or treated as redundant or superfluous - they must be given meaning and their necessary significance. Given the fact that in the present case, an essential tender condition which had to be strictly complied with was not so complied with, the appellant would have no power to condone lack of such strict compliance. Any such condonation, as has been done in the present case, would amount to perversity in the understanding or appreciation of the terms of the tender conditions, which must be interfered with by a constitutional court."

If the current case is viewed against the backdrop of

these two cases and other leading judgments on the subject,

the right of the respondent to choose its own contractual

partners cannot be ignored and for this purpose the past

experience that the respondent had with its intending bidders

3 Civil Appeal No.1949 of 2019 13

and their consortiums, associates etc., cannot be totally

overlooked. If it is for this reason alone that the bid document

contains detailed clauses asking the intending bidders to

disclose clearly the imposition of penalty, existing disputes etc.,

between the bidder and its consortium members, associates

etc. The track record of the bidder, its associate members, its

associates, consortium members etc., are matters of great

importance particularly for such long term contracts with huge

investments and consequently huge consequences for delay

etc. This Court cannot lose sight of the fact that the port has to

function 24x7 and 365 days in a year. It is for this reason the

Clause 7, (which is reproduced earlier) requires the bidder to

disclose the earlier disputes, litigations, material non-

performance etc., by the bidder, its associates, consortium

members etc. Clauses 2.2.7 and 2.2.8 which are also

reproduced earlier deal with these similar issues. Clause 2.2.7

is of particular significance, because it clearly states that if any

contract has been terminated the same should be mentioned

clearly and brought to the notice of the respondent. This is not

merely limited to the applicant but also includes within its

ambit the applicant, associates, its consortium members etc.

The proviso is in 2.2.8 which clearly states that if in the opinion

of the applicant such a disqualification is not a material fact, it

can also make an application to the respondent Port Trust

stating that the same is not a very material fact and that it

should be ignored. This was not done by the petitioner. 14

Apart from that Clause 2.7.3 to which this court's

attention has also been drawn is also applicable. This clause

gives special powers to the respondent Port to disqualify an

applicant during the process of evaluation / before signing the

concession agreement, if any materially incorrect or false

information has been given by a prospective bidder /

prospective concessionaire. This clause also empowers VPT to

terminate the agreement after the agreement was signed / work

is awarded notwithstanding anything contained in the terms if

the concessionaire / applicant has made a material

misrepresentation or has given material incorrect or false

information. A reading of this clause which confers power of a

wide amplitude makes it clear that if material

misrepresentation is there, incorrect information, false

information etc., are there the bid can be rejected before it is

signed and the contract can also be terminated after it is signed

on this sole ground alone. This is the importance attached to

correct and clear disclosure under this bid /tender document

and it clearly underscores the need for a full and complete

disclosure.

The freedom in the joints or fair play in the joints means

that a statutory authority like the respondent should have the

right to choose with whom it would enter into contracts subject

to a proper decision making process etc. It is for this reason

these clauses are mentioned with clarity in the bid document. 15

Only if the respondent acts in an arbitrary manner and if its

decision is vitiated by mala fide arbitrariness, irrationality, bias

etc., a constitutional court can interfere. But if the action is

not vitiated by arbitrariness, irrationality, unreasonableness,

bias or mala fides, this Court cannot exercise the power under

Article 226 to interfere. The principles of equity and natural

justice have to stay at a distance and commercial prudence or

the commercial market intelligence of the respondent should

be allowed to have its own free play. Even if there is a

procedural aberration the Courts should lightly interfere.

In Siemens Public Communication Networks (P) Ltd.

v Union of India4 it was held as follows:

"40. On examining the facts and circumstances of the present case, we are of the view that none of the criteria has been satisfied justifying Court's interference in the grant of contract in favour of the appellants. When the power of judicial review is invoked in the matters relating to tenders or award of contracts, certain special features have to be considered. A contract is a commercial transaction and evaluating tenders and awarding contracts are essentially commercial functions. In such cases principles of equity and natural justice stay at a distance. If the decision relating to award of contracts is bona fide and is in public interest, courts will not exercise the power of judicial review and interfere even if it is accepted for the sake of argument that there is a procedural lacuna."

In the opinion of this Court arbitrariness, irrationality,

unreasonableness, bias and mala fides are matters which have

to be clearly pleaded and proved and demonstrated before this

4 (2008) 16 SCC 215 16

Court can interfere. If the present case is examined against the

backdrop of the settled law on the subject, this Court is of the

opinion that the action of the respondent cannot be faulted. In

the counter affidavit filed the respondent has justified its

action. In paragraphs 9 to 13 the respondent has clearly stated

that with consortium member VCTPL (an associate of the

petitioner) an agreement was entered into. There are

allegations of breaches against the said consortium Member in

not achieving the minimum guarantee that was promised in

the previous contract. After issuing consultation notices the

said contract was terminated. It is also clearly mentioned that

as a counter blast to the said consultation notice AVCTPL

issued notice of termination. If the note filed by the petitioners

themselves is examined, it is clear that on 03.10.2020

respondent-VPT issued a consultation notice to AVCTPL on

03.10.2020. On 08.10.2020 AVCTPL rejected the same stating

that the force measure conditions were continuing since long

and, therefore, they sought for mutual termination of the

agreement. On 21.10.2021 AVCTPL sent a termination notice

for the contract with VPT (respondent). VPT in turn had sent a

termination notice on 26.12.2020. VPT informed the AVCTPL

that the contract was terminated with effect from 23.04.2021.

The counter, the caveat and the note filed by the petitioner

make these facts clear. Clause 7 of the appendix of Annexure-

I clearly states that bidders should disclose if there is material

non-performance or contractual non-compliance in the past 17

projects, apart from contractual disputes and representations.

Each member of the consortium should disclose this fact. In

the opinion of this Court clause 2.2.8 also enjoins upon the

petitioner to disclose the termination of the contract of an

associate by the VPT. In fact, in the counter affidavit these

facts have been clearly pleaded but the petitioners have not

chosen to file any rejoinder against the same or by

controverting the same. In the opinion of this Court, mere

disclosure of the pendency of an arbitration does not meet the

mandatory requirements or the essential condition of this term.

Any contractual non-performance or contractual non-

compliance in past projects should have been disclosed with

clarity. Clauses 2.2.8/2.7.3 of the bid document are clear.

They are clearly applicable to the facts and circumstances of

this case. The failure of the petitioner to disclose the same is

rightly noticed by the VPT.

In the light of the above discussion, this Court is of the

opinion that the decision making process leading to a

disqualification of the petitioner cannot be found fault with.

This Court does not find any arbitrariness; irrationality; bias;

mala fides either. Their failure to disclose the termination of

the contract of their 100% owned subsidiary in October, 2021

and the VPTs termination in December, 2020 / March, 2021 is

a clear case of furnishing materially incorrect, false

information. Allegation of material non-performance; 18

contractual non-compliance etc., are present from both sides

in the earlier contract.

The petitioner who has chosen to participate in this bid

cannot question the terms of the tender and say that arbitrary

power is conferred on the respondents to disqualify the bidders.

Therefore, for all of the above reasons this Court holds

that the petitioner has not made out any ground for

interference.

The Writ Petition is dismissed. No costs.

Consequently, the Miscellaneous Applications

pending, if any, shall stand closed.

__________________________ D.V.S.S.SOMAYAJULU, J Date:03.03.2022

Note: LR copy be marked.

B/o Ssv 19

HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE D.V.S.S.SOMAYAJULU

WRIT PETITION No.455 of 2022 Date:03.03.2022 ssv

 
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