M/S. Chowdary Brothers, vs The Joint Commissioner Ct
2022 Latest Caselaw 9501 AP

    IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI

                                  ****

WRIT PETITION No.4103 OF 2021 Between:

M/s. Chowdary Brothers, N.H.5, Near Sai Baba Temple, Kovur, SPSR Nellore District, Rep. by its Managing Partner P. Ravi Kumar. --- Petitioner.

And

1. The Joint Commissioner (CT), Legal, O/o.The Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, D.No.5-59, R.K.Spring Valley Apartments, Bandar Road, Edupugallu Village, Kankipadu Mandal, Vijayawada - 521151, A.P.

2. The Joint Commissioner (ST), Nellore 15/505, CT Complex, R.R. Street, Nellore-1, Nellore District, A.P.

3. The Deputy Commercial Tax Officer No.II, Kavali, Vaddipalem, Kavali-524201, Nellore District, A.P.

4. The Commercial Tax Officer, Kavali Circle, Vaddipalem, Kavali - 524201, Nellore District, A.P.

5. The State of Andhra Pradesh, Rep. by the Principal Secretary to the Government, Revenue (CT) Department, A.P. Secretariat Buildings, Velagapudi, Guntur District A.P. --- Respondents.

DATE OF ORDER PRONOUNCED : 09.12.2022

SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:

HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE C. PRAVEEN KUMAR

AND

HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE A.V.RAVINDRA BABU

1. Whether Reporters of Local Newspapers may be allowed to see the order? Yes/No

2. Whether the copy of order may be marked to Law Reporters/Journals? Yes/No

3. Whether Their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the order? Yes/No

__________________________ C. PRAVEEN KUMAR, J

_________________________ A.V.RAVINDRA BABU, J

* HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE C. PRAVEEN KUMAR AND * HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE A.V.RAVINDRA BABU

+ WRIT PETITION No.4103 OF 2021 % 09.12.2022

# Between:

M/s. Chowdary Brothers, N.H.5, Near Sai Baba Temple, Kovur, SPSR Nellore District, Rep. by its Managing Partner P. Ravi Kumar. --- Petitioner.

And

1. The Joint Commissioner (CT), Legal, O/o.The Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, D.No.5-59, R.K.Spring Valley Apartments, Bandar Road, Edupugallu Village, Kankipadu Mandal, Vijayawada - 521151, A.P.

2. The Joint Commissioner (ST), Nellore 15/505, CT Complex, R.R. Street, Nellore-1, Nellore District, A.P.

3. The Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, No.II, Kavali, Vaddipalem, Kavali-524201, Nellore District, A.P.

4. The Commercial Tax Officer, Kavali Circle, Vaddipalem, Kavali - 524 201, Nellore District, A.P.

5. The State of Andhra Pradesh, Rep. By the Principal Secretary to the Government, Revenue (CT) Department, A.P. Secretariat Buildings, Velagapudi, Guntur District A.P. --- Respondents.

! Counsel for the Petitioner : Sri G. Narendra Chetty

^ Counsel for Respondents : Sri Y.N.Vivekananda

< Gist:

> Head Note:

? Cases referred:

1) AIR 1960 AP 171:1959 10 STC 524 AP

2) (2013) 56 APSTJ 175 (AP)

3) AIR 2006 SC 1383:2006 (S) STR 161 SC

4) (1990) 77 STC 182 (AP)

5) (2009) 22 VST 70 (Gau)

6) (2008) 16 VST 381 (All)

7) (2015) 82 VST 560 (Bom)

8) WP No.44908/2016, Dt.06.04.2017

9) AIR 2003 SC 2736

This Court made the following :

HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE C. PRAVEEN KUMAR AND HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE A.V.RAVINDRA BABU

WRIT PETITION No.4103 OF 2021

ORDER: (Per Hon'ble Sri Justice A.V.Ravindra Babu)

This Writ Petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of

India, came to be filed by the petitioner for the following relief:

".......... to issue an appropriate Writ, Order or Direction, more in the nature of Writ, Order or Direction, more particularly in the nature of MANDAMUS holding that the impugned Suo Motu Revision Order passed by the First Respondent vide CTD Order No.JCO866, dated 13-02-2020, for the Tax Periods 2011-12 to 2014-15, when the suo motu revision powers were already exercised by the Second Respondent, is without jurisdiction, partly barred by limitation, and even on merits contrary to law and not sustainable and illegal and consequently set aside the same and pass other order or orders ............"

2. The facts, which are germane to deal with the present

Writ Petition, are as follows:

The petitioner is a Registered Dealer on the rolls of the

fourth respondent doing business in Petrol, Diesel and

Lubricants. The petitioner is engaged in another business viz.,

providing service of transportation of oils and fuels for Oil

Marketing Companies such as M/s. Hindustan Petroleum

Corporation Limited (M/s.HPCL), Mumbai by utilizing the

petitioner's own fleet of vehicles and also by engaging other

vehicles. As the amounts received as consideration for the

services rendered are not liable to tax, they came to be recorded

in the books of accounts while disclosing in Profit and Loss

account of the Corporation. While so, relating to the tax period

from April, 2011 to November, 2015, third respondent, on an

authorization given by the Deputy Commissioner (Commercial

Tax), Nellore conducted audit on the petitioner and passed an

assessment order on 19.02.2016, which has become final.

However, the second respondent, in exercise of suo motu powers

of Revision, under Section 32(2) of the Andhra Pradesh Value

Added Tax Act, 2005 (for short, 'the VAT Act'), issued pre-

revision show-cause notice, dated 03.11.2006, proposing to

impose VAT on 'Lorry Hire Charges' as revealed in the Profit and

Loss account of the petitioner under Section 4(8) of the VAT Act,

at the rate of 14.5%. However, after considering the objections

filed by the petitioner, the Joint Commissioner (ST), Nellore

dropped the proceedings. The said order of dropping the

proceedings came to be passed on 20.10.2017. After the said

order is passed by the Joint Commissioner (ST) Nellore, the first

respondent herein who is the Joint Commissioner (CT), Legal,

Vijayawada, in exercise of suo motu powers under Section 32(2)

of the VAT Act, issued pre-revision show-cause notice, dated

11.12.2018, proposing to revise the proceedings of the second

respondent. After considering the objections raised by the

petitioner, an order came to be passed on 13.02.2020 imposing

tax from the years 2011-12 to 2014-15. Challenging the said

order, the present Writ Petition came to be filed.

3. None of the respondents filed any counter but opposed

the same on instructions received.

4. Now the point that arises for consideration is, whether the

impugned order, dated 13.02.2020, passed by the first

respondent is liable to be set-aside as without jurisdiction,

barred by limitation, not sustainable and illegal under the law

and facts?

5. Sri G. Narendra Chetty, learned counsel for the petitioner,

would contend that the impugned order passed by the Joint

Commissioner (CT), Legal is illegal and it cannot stand to the

test of legal scrutiny. The said Authority has no power under

Section 32 of the VAT Act to pass the impugned order, for the

reason that there cannot be an order passed by two Officers

invoking the same provision, in respect of the same transaction.

According to him, when there was an order already passed by

the second respondent, dated 20.10.2017, under the purported

exercise of the powers of Revision, the impugned order, dated

13.02.2020, to revise the earlier order passed under same

provision is not valid in the eye of law. In support of his plea, he

would rely upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court in

Mannepalli Venkatanarayana v. The State of Andhra

Pradesh and others1. He would further contend that the Joint

Commissioner (ST), Nellore by virtue of the order, dated

20.10.2017, after issuing revision show-cause notice and after

considering the objections raised by the petitioner, dropped

further proceedings by relying upon the two memos issued by

the Government. The Joint Commissioner (CT), Legal who

passed the impugned order did not consider the said two

memos issued by the Government. The petitioner was paying

salary to his helpers and taxes etc., in respect of the bills and in

the absence of any material to show that the rights of the

vehicles have been transferred, it cannot be held that there was

any transfer of right to use the vehicles by M/s.HPCL.

1 AIR 1960 AP 171:1959 10 STC 524 AP

6. He would further contend that the impugned order was

passed beyond the period of limitation. It is urged that when the

original assessment order was passed on 19.02.2016, basing on

the Profit and Loss account of M/s.HPCL, a revision show-cause

notice was issued and, considering the objections raised by the

petitioner, further proceedings were dropped. Under the guise of

Revision in the impugned order, the first respondent evidently

made an assessment afresh as such it is barred by limitation.

7. He would further rely upon the letter issued by M/s.HPCL

to the effect that there was payment of service tax on the

consideration received. Learned counsel for the petitioner would

further rely upon a Division Bench judgment of the Composite

High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Agarwal

Industries Limited v. The Commissioner of Commercial

Taxes2 to contend that the impugned order is barred by

limitation.

8. He would rely upon a decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court

in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited and others v. Union of

India and others3 to contend that once the petitioner paid

Service Tax, he cannot be again subjected to VAT also.

(2013) 56 APSTJ 175 (AP)

AIR 2006 SC 1383: 2006 (S) STR 161 SC

9. He would further rely upon a Division Bench decision of

the Composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in

Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited v. Commercial Tax Officer,

Company Circle, Visakhapatnam4, a decision of High Court of

Gauhati in Indian Oil Corporation Limited v. Commissioner

of Taxes, Assam and others5, a decision of High Court of

Allahabad in Commissioner, Trade Tax, U.P. Lucknow v.

Nand Transport Company6, a decision of High Court of

Bombay in The Commissioner of Sales Tax Maharashtra

State v. General Cranes Near Pitroda Lautomobiles Works7

to contend that as the petitioner utilized his own fleet of vehicles

and also by engaging other vehicles in providing service of

transportation of oil and fuels for oil marketing companies and

paid service tax, it cannot be inferred that there was any

transfer of right in favour of the oil companies to use the goods.

He would further rely upon a Division Bench decision of the

High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of Telanga

and the State of Andhra Pradesh in Transcocean Offshore,

International Ventures Limited v. Union of India and

(1990) 77 STC 182 (AP)

(2009) 22 VST 70 (Gau)

(2008) 16 VST 381 (All)

(2015) 82 VST 560 (Bom)

others8 in support of his contention that Section 4(8) of the VAT

Act cannot be made applicable to the case on hand. It is for the

revisional authority to substantiate applicability of Section 4(8)

of VAT Act to the case of the petitioner, which the respondents

failed to do so. At any rate, the impugned order cannot stand to

the test of legal scrutiny as such Writ Petition is liable to be

allowed.

10. Sri Y.N.Vivekananda, learned Government Pleader for

Commercial Tax, appearing for the respondents, would contend

that the scheme of Section 32 of the VAT Act, clearly postulates

on its plain reading that the order passed in exercise of the

powers under Section 32 of the VAT Act can be revised by a

superior officer. Section 32(1) of the VAT Act contemplates

exercise of power of revision by the Commissioner insofar as the

order passed by his subordinates is concerned. Section 32(2) of

the VAT Act contemplates conferring even such powers on the

subordinates of the Commissioner and even under Section 32(2)

of the VAT Act, the subordinates to the Commissioner can as

well exercise the powers under Section 32(1) of the VAT Act. So,

the contention of the petitioner that there cannot be any

revision against the orders of revision cannot stand in view of

WP No.44908/2016, Dt.06.04.2017

Section 32 of the VAT Act. The decision of this Court in

Mannepalli Venkatanarayana (first supra), stood on a

different footing, where the vires of Rule 31(5) of the Andhra

Pradesh General Sales Tax Rules, 1957 was challenged, which

came in conflict with Sections 19 and 20 of the APGST Act. He

would further submit that the contention of the petitioner that

the impugned order is barred by limitation cannot stand to any

reason because within four years, as contemplated under

Section 32(3) of the VAT Act, the impugned order was passed.

The very exercise of powers under the revisional authorities

were to scrutinize the assessment file and the impugned order

shows that the Joint Commissioner (CT), Legal having looked

into the assessment file and having scrutinized the file, passed

the said order. Even on factual aspects it cannot be concluded

that the impugned order is hit under limitation. The petitioner

is also raising disputed question of facts, which cannot be gone

into in this Writ Petition. Having undertaken to produce the

original agreements or copies of agreements before the Joint

Commissioner (CT), Legal, he failed to substantiate his

contentions and it is not a case where there is any violation of

the principles of natural justice or where the powers were

exercised without any provision of law by the Joint

Commissioner (CT), Legal and in such a scenario the Writ

Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not

maintainable. It is further urged that the petitioner has

alternative remedy of Appeal even under the VAT Act as such

the Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed on that score as well.

11. Firstly, we will take up as to whether the contention of

petitioner that as second respondent has already exercised the

suo motu powers of revision under Section 32(2) of the VAT Act,

exercise of such powers again by the first respondent, is

permissible under law?

12. Section 32 of the VAT Act reads as follows:

"32. Revision by Commissioner and other prescribed authorities:- (1) The Commissioner may suo moto call for and examine the record of any order passed ;or proceeding recorded by any authority, officer or person subordinate to him under the provisions of the Act, including sub-section (2) and if such order or proceeding recorded is prejudicial to the interests of revenue, may make such enquiry, or cause such enquiry to be made and subject to the provisions of the Act, may initiate proceedings to revise, modify or set aside such order or proceeding and may pass such order in reference thereto as he thinks fit. (2) Powers of the nature referred to in sub-section (1) may also be exercised by the Additional Commissioner, Joint Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner and Assistant

Commissioner in the case of orders passed or proceedings recorded by the authorities, officers or persons subordinate to them:

Provided that the power under sub-section (1) or (s) shall not be exercised by the authority specified therein in respect of any issue or question, which is the subject matter of an appeal before or which was decided on appeal by the Appellate Tribunal under Section 33:

Provided further that this restriction is not applicable in respect of other issues or questions, which are not the subject matter of an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal. (3) In relation to an order of assessment passed under the Act, the powers conferred by sub-sections (1) and (2) shall be exercisable only within a period of four years from the date on which the order was served on the dealer."

,

13. A plain reading of Section 32(1) of the VAT Act shows that

the Commissioner may suo moto call for and examine the record

of any order passed or proceeding recorded by any authority,

officer or person subordinate to him under the provisions of the

Act, including sub-section (2), if such order or proceeding is

prejudicial to the interests of the revenue. Further, a reading of

same also shows that in Section 32(2) of the VAT Act, the

powers of revision are also conferred on Additional

Commissioner, Joint Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner and

Assistant Commissioner in case of orders passed or proceedings

recorded by the authorities, officers or persons subordinate to

them. The powers under Section 32(2) are to be exercised by

the subordinates to the Commissioner. The exercise of powers

under Section 32(2) are no other than the revisional powers

akin to the powers conferred on the Commissioner. There is no

denial of the fact that the authorities under the VAT Act are

vested with the powers to make assessment etc., So, the word

used in Section 32(1) 'including sub-section (2)' substantially

contemplates the revisional powers conferred on the authorities

under Section 32(2) of the VAT Act. So, it goes without saying

that the Commissioner is empowered to revise the orders passed

under Section 32(2), which are no other than the revisional

powers conferred on the subordinates. Apart from these, insofar

as Section 32(2) is concerned, the authorities mentioned therein

are empowered to exercise the powers of revision under Section

32(1) of the VAT Act. So, when the Commissioner is vested with

the power under Section 32(1), to revise the orders under

Section 32(2), the same powers are conferred on the authorities

mentioned in Section 32(2) to revise the orders passed by the

subordinates to them. So, the contention of learned counsel for

the petitioner that when the second respondent has already

exercised the powers of revision, the first respondent has no

power again to revise the said order cannot stand to the prima-

facie scrutiny. It is not the case of the petitioner that the Joint

Commissioner (CT), Legal, Office of the Commissioner,

Commercial Taxes is not superior to the Joint Commissioner

(ST). Having regard to the above, the very contention raised by

the petitioner that the first respondent cannot revise the order

of the second respondent cannot stand to any reason.

14. The decision in Mannepalli Venkatanarayana (first

supra) shows that, initially, while Sections 19 and 20 of the

APGST Act deals with the powers of Appeal and Revision, the

Government introduced Rule 31(5) conferring wider power on

the revisional authority which could be exercised by Officer

prescribed in the notification. The above Rule 31(5) was said to

be in conflict with Sections 19 and 20(2) of the APGST Act. So,

accordingly the vires of Rule 31(5) was challenged before the

Hon'ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh. Dealing with the same,

the Hon'ble High Court held that Rule 31(5) is ultra vires of the

rule making power of the Government and is therefore invalid as

such any action taken in exercise of that Rule cannot be

sustained.

15. The factual matrix in the above case is that in the year

1954-55 the petitioners therein submitted returns which was

assessed to tax. Later, the concerned Deputy Commissioner of

Commercial Taxes issued notice to them proposing for

reassessment on the premise of escaped turnover under Rule

31(1) R/w. Rule 31(5) of A.P. General Sales Tax Rules for which

the petitioners filed their objections questioning the jurisdiction

of the Officer and later filed the Writ Petition before the Hon'ble

High Court of Andhra Pradesh. Literally, the factual matrix, as

narrated in the above said citation, does not reveal that there

was any re-assessment by the revisional authorities in exercise

of the powers of Revision and again that was sought to be

revised. Even the facts thereof are distinguishable from the

present scenario.

16. It is the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner

that, as per the said decision, there is no power for the

authorities to exercise the revisional jurisdiction more than

once. At this juncture, we would like to make it clear that

Section 20 Sub-sections (1) and (2) of APGST Act is akin to

Section 32(1) and (2) of AP VAT Act. The Hon'ble High Court of

Andhra Pradesh in Mannepalli Venkatanarayana (first supra)

dealing with the contention raised by the petitioner that the

assessment was already revised by the competent authority and

that it was not contested by the learned Government Pleader,

made an observation that the said contention need not detain

them any further as they held that Rule 31(5) is ultra vires of

the Rule making power of the Government. In our considered

view, the petitioner cannot claim any strength basing on the

above said decision. Further, as dealt with earlier, a reading of

Section 32(1) and (2) shows that the contention of learned

counsel for the petitioner in this regard is untenable.

17. Turning to the contention of learned counsel for the

petitioner that the impugned order is barred by limitation in

view of Agarwal Industries (second supra), we are not

persuaded to accept same for the reason that in the above

authority, the order of assessment by the Deputy Commissioner

(CT), Legal was passed on 15.03.2003 and then show-cause

notice proposing revision was issued on 11.05.2009 i.e. after six

years from the date of order of assessment.

18. Coming to the case on hand, the original assessment

order made by the third respondent was on 19.02.2016. The

order of second respondent after revisional show-cause notice

was on 20.10.2017. The impugned order under challenge, which

is dated 13.02.2020, is undoubtedly within the period of four

years from 19.02.2016. Learned counsel for the petitioner would

contend strenuously that as the original assessment order

passed by the third respondent did not deal with the

transportation charges, the impugned order would amount to

making fresh assessment which is barred by limitation. It is

very difficult to accept such contention for the reason that the

second respondent after perusing the proceedings recorded by

the first respondent, scrutinized the assessment file and found

that the dealer disclosed lorry charges in the Profit and Loss

account for the years 2011-12 to 2014-15 and issued show-

cause notice proposing revision. It is altogether a different

aspect when the second respondent had closed the proceedings

on considering the objections filed by the dealer. Later, the first

respondent revised the said order of the second respondent. So,

the very object of looking into the assessment file is only to find

out whether such an order is prejudicial to the interests of

revenue. In that view of the matter, the contention of learned

counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order would

amount to fresh assessment, which is barred by limitation, is

untenable.

19. In Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited (third supra), the

question before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was the nature of

transaction by which mobile phone connections are enjoyed as

to whether is it a sale or is it a service or is it both? The facts in

the above decision are distinguishable from the present case on

hand. In A.P. VAT Act, Section 4(8) reads as follows:

"Every VAT dealer who transfers the right to use goods taxable under the Act for any purpose whatsoever, whether or not for a specified period, to any lessee or licensee for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration, in the course of his business shall, on the total amount realized or realizable by him by way of payment in cash or otherwise on such transfer of right to use such goods from the lessee or licensee pay a tax for such goods at the rates specified in the Schedules."

20. Whether the VAT dealer transferred the right to use the

vehicles of him to the oil company or not is a question of fact

and if the petitioner has suffered with any adverse findings in

the impugned order, he ought to have challenged these factual

aspects by filing an Appeal before the appellate authority but

not by way of this Writ Petition under Article 226 of

Constitution of India. Apart from that, the first respondent in

the impugned order opined that the self serving certificate

issued by the Oil Company, as regards collection of service tax

cannot be taken as a valid document, when the same is

disputed by the respondents. Hence, the petitioner cannot rely

upon the above to support his contention.

21. In Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited (fourth supra), it was

held that the agreement has to be read as a whole in order to

determine the nature of the transaction to ascertain the

effective control of the machinery was in the use of the

contractor or that of the company.

22. In Indian Oil Corporation Limited (fifth supra), it was

held that the question relating to the transfer of right to use any

goods is essentially a question of fact which has to be

determined having regard to the terms of contract wherein the

transfer is made.

23. In Commissioner, Trade Tax, U.P. Lucknow (sixth

supra), the Transport Company owned tankers entered into an

agreement with the Indian Oil Corporation for transportation of

petroleum products from one place to another and the assessing

authority levied tax on the ground that there was transfer of

right to use the tankers.

24. In Commissioner of Sales Tax Maharashtra State

(seventh supra), the Tribunal dealing with Sections 2(4) and

2(10) of Maharashtra Sales on Transfer of Right to Use Any

Goods for Any Purpose Act, 1985 looked into the agreement and

elaborately dealt with the issue and the Appeal filed by the

Commissioner of Sales Tax, Maharashtra was dismissed.

25. In Transocean Offshore, International Ventures

Limited (eighth supra), there was a copy of the agreement,

dated 16.04.2010, entered into by the petitioner and it shows

that the contract was for charter hire of 'jack up rigs'

26. As evident from the impugned order, when the first

respondent issued a show-cause notice to revise the order of the

second respondent, the petitioner filed objections and he was

given opportunity of personal hearing twice. It shows that the

agreement entered into by the Dealer with the Oil Companies for

supply of fleet to determine the nature of the transaction was

not submitted for verification. Further, as per the objections

filed by the petitioner, he claimed to have submitted copies of

the agreement but they are not available on record. Further, on

18.02.2019, at the time of hearing, the petitioner agreed to

submit the agreement copies along with the payment receipts

but, in spite of opportunity given, the dealer failed to do so.

Ultimately, the first respondent passed an order, confirming the

revision proposals in part and dropping the proceedings in part.

27. As pointed out earlier, various authorities relied upon by

learned counsel for the petitioner show that in those particular

cases the dealers relied upon agreements in writing and

submitted the same. Now, according to the writ petitioner, there

was no transfer of right to use the goods as contemplated under

Section 4(8) of the A.P. VAT Act. Except questioning the

authority of the first respondent to revise the order of the

second respondent and the plea that order is barred by

limitation, the rest of the points raised are disputed question of

facts. Hence, the proper remedy for the petitioner would be to

avail the remedy of Appeal in terms of Section 33 of the VAT Act.

The material on record shows that the petitioner did not file the

Appeal on the ground that filing of Appeal would make him to

deposit 25% of the disputed tax. This cannot be a ground to file

a Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, before this

Court.

28. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Chand Ratan v. Durga

Prasad and others9, while dealing with scope of Article 226 of

AIR 2003 SC 2736

the Constitution of India held that when a right or liability is

created by a statue, which itself prescribes the remedy or

procedure for enforcing the right or liability, resort must be had

to that particular statutory remedy before seeking the

discretionary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution. This

rule of exhaustion of statutory remedies is no doubt a rule of

policy, convenience and discretion and the Court may in

exceptional cases issue a discretionary writ of certiorari, where

there is complete lack of jurisdiction for the officer or authority

or Tribunal to take the action or there has been a contravention

of fundamental rights or there has been a violation of principles

of natural justice or where the Tribunal acted under a provision

of law, which are ultra vires. Then notwithstanding the existence

of an alternative remedy, the High Court can exercise its

jurisdiction to grant relief.

29. For the aforesaid reasons, we see no merit in the Writ

Petition and the same is liable to be rejected.

30. In the result, the Writ Petition is dismissed. No order as to

costs.

As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending, if any,

shall stand closed.

_______________________________ JUSTICE C. PRAVEEN KUMAR

_______________________________ JUSTICE A.V.RAVINDRA BABU

Date: 09.12.2022 Dsh