Hemant Kumar Garg vs Pulkit Garg on 16 April, 2026

Author: Yogendra Kumar Srivastava

Bench: Yogendra Kumar Srivastava





HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
 



 

 

 

 

 
AFR
 

 
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
MATTERS UNDER ARTICLE 227 No. - 3816 of 2026
 

 
Hemant Kumar Garg
 

 

 
..Petitioner(s)
 

 

 

 

 
Versus
 

 

 

 

 
Pulkit Garg
 

 

 
..Respondent(s)
 

 

 
Counsel for Petitioner(s)
 
:
 
Rishabh Agarwal, Shashank Singh
 
Counsel for Respondent(s)
 
:
 

 

 

 
Court No. - 35 
 

 
HON'BLE DR. YOGENDRA KUMAR SRIVASTAVA, J.

Heard Sri Rishabh Agarwal, learned counsel for the petitioner.

2. The present petition has been filed seeking to assail the order dated 02.01.2026 passed by the Rent Tribunal/Additional District Judge, Court No.26, Agra in Rent Appeal No. 07 of 2026.

3. The brief facts giving rise to the present petition are that the respondent filed an application under Section 10 of the U.P. Regulation of Urban Premises Tenancy Act, 2021 seeking determination and enhancement of rent, asserting that the tenanted premises had been purchased by him and that the petitioner, being a tenant under the previous owner, had defaulted in payment of rent. The petitioner, upon appearance, disputed the relationship of landlord and tenant as well as the respondents title and raised objections regarding maintainability.

4. The Rent Authority, Agra, by order dated 24.11.2025, passed in Case No. 1196 of 2024 under Section 10(1) of the U.P. Act No. 16 of 2021, revised the rent payable by the tenant. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner preferred Rent Appeal No. 07 of 2026. While entertaining the appeal, the Rent Tribunal, by the impugned order dated 02.01.2026, took note of the Munsarims report indicating that 50 percent of the amount due under the impugned order had been deposited. The Tribunal thereafter directed the appellant-tenant to continue depositing 50 percent of the revised rent, i.e., Rs. 22,500/- per month (out of Rs. 45,000/-), by the 7th of each succeeding month, and granted interim protection.

5. Assailing the said direction, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the proviso to Section 35(1) of the U.P. Act No. 16 of 2021 to contend that the requirement of deposit stands satisfied once 50 percent of the amount due as on the date of filing of the appeal is deposited, and that no further direction for continuous deposit during pendency of the appeal could have been imposed. It is urged that the direction in effect enforces the impugned order and renders the appeal illusory.

6. The core question that arises for consideration is whether the requirement of pre-deposit under the proviso to Section 35(1) of the U.P. Act No. 16 of 2021 is confined to a one-time deposit calculated up to the date of filing of the appeal, or whether it extends to a continuing obligation covering recurring liabilities accruing during the pendency of the appeal.

7. The submission necessitates consideration of the scope and import of Section 35 of the U.P. Act No. 16 of 2021. Section 35(1) provides for a statutory appeal against an order passed by the Rent Authority. It reads as follows:

35. Appeal.

(1) Any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Rent Authority may prefer an appeal along with a certified copy of such order to the Rent Tribunal within the local limits of which the premises is situated, within a period of thirty days from the date of that order:

Provided that no appeal shall lie unless the appellant has deposited fifty per cent of the entire payable amount under the impugned order of the rent authority."

8. The proviso, thus, engrafts a clear and mandatory condition precedent for the maintainability of an appeal. The legislative intent is explicitan appellant seeking to avail the statutory remedy must first comply with the requirement of depositing 50 percent of the entire amount payable under the impugned order.

9. The language employed in the proviso is clear and peremptory, making the requirement of pre-deposit a condition precedent to the very maintainability of an appeal. The right of appeal being a creature of statute, it is well within the legislative competence to condition its exercise, and such conditions are required to be strictly complied with.

10. It is, by now, well settled that the right of appeal is not an inherent right but a statutory creation, and it is always open to the legislature, while conferring such a right, to impose conditions for its exercise. The requirement of pre-deposit, as a condition precedent for the maintainability of an appeal, has consistently been upheld as a valid legislative device to regulate the exercise of the appellate remedy. In Anant Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Gujarat1, it was authoritatively held that such a condition does not take away the right of appeal but merely regulates its exercise so as to balance the right of the appellant with the interest of the successful party. This principle has been reiterated in Vijay Prakash D. Mehta v. Collector of Customs2, wherein it was observed that the right of appeal is neither an absolute right nor an essential ingredient of natural justice, and being statutory in nature, it can be circumscribed by conditions in its grant. The consistent judicial view, as reflected in Gujarat Agro Industries Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad3 and Har Devi Asnani v. State of Rajasthan4, is that such conditions are mandatory, and non-compliance renders the appeal not maintainable. In M/s Tecnimont Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Punjab5, the Court further emphasized that pre-deposit requirements, particularly in fiscal statutes, are designed to safeguard the interests of the successful party and cannot be diluted through interpretative processes.

11. Thus, the requirement of pre-deposit operates as a threshold bar to the very maintainability of an appeal and ensures that the appellate remedy is not invoked merely to obstruct or delay the enforcement of lawful orders.

12. A similar exposition of the law is to be found in Prathama U.P. Gramin Bank v. Union of India6, wherein, upon a comprehensive survey of precedents, it was held that the right to appeal being a creature of statute can be qualified by imposing a condition of pre-deposit, and where such requirement is couched in mandatory terms, the appellate authority is left with no discretion to entertain an appeal in the absence of compliance. It was further held that such a condition does not render the remedy illusory but merely regulates its exercise and ensures that the statutory right is not abused to the prejudice of the party in whose favour the order has been passed.

13. The nature and effect of a proviso in a statutory provision is also well settled. Ordinarily, a proviso is engrafted to qualify, carve out an exception to, or impose a condition upon the main enactment, which but for the proviso would have operated in a wider field. As explained in authoritative precedents including S. Sundaram Pillai v. V.R. Pattabiraman7 and Shah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills v. Subbash Chandra Yograj Sinha8, a proviso may, depending upon its language, either qualify the main provision or, in certain cases, assume the character of a substantive enactment imposing an independent condition. Where a proviso is couched in mandatory terms, particularly employing expressions such as no appeal shall lie unless, it operates as a substantive restriction on the right conferred under the main provision and must be strictly complied with. The proviso to Section 35(1), therefore, is not merely procedural in nature but constitutes a legislative mandate conditioning the very maintainability of the appeal, and must be construed in a manner that furthers its object rather than dilutes its effect.

14. The expression entire amount payable under the impugned order is of wide amplitude and admits of no artificial truncation. It cannot be read in a constricted manner so as to confine it merely to the amount quantified up to the date of filing of the appeal. The phrase is to be interpreted contextually and must take its colour from the nature of the liability created by the impugned order.

15. In the present case, the order impugned before the appellate authority is one revising rent, which gives rise to a recurring and continuous liability accruing month after month. Therefore, the amount payable under the impugned order would not be a static figure but a dynamic and ongoing obligation.

16. The crucial expression occurring in the proviso is entire amount payable under the impugned order. The word entire cannot be rendered otiose or confined by an artificial limitation. The expression must be construed in a manner that accords with the nature of the liability created by the impugned order. Where the order gives rise to a one-time liability, the computation may not present difficulty; however, where the liability is inherently recurring, as in the case of revised rent payable month to month, the amount payable cannot be frozen at a particular point of time, namely the date of filing of the appeal. It represents a continuing obligation which accrues periodically.

17. The interpretation suggested by the petitioner, if accepted, would result in freezing the statutory obligation at the stage of filing of the appeal, thereby enabling the appellant to avoid compliance with the recurring liability during pendency of the appeal. It would result in the landlord being deprived of even 50 percent of the revised rent during pendency of appeal, despite a lawful adjudication in his favour. Such an interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the proviso and render the expression entire amount payable redundant in the context of continuing liabilities.

18. The legislative intent underlying the provision is not only to ensure that the appeal is pursued with seriousness but also to safeguard the interest of the party in whose favour the order has been passed, pending adjudication. The rationale underlying such provisions has been emphasized by the Supreme Court in M/s Tecnimont Pvt. Ltd., wherein it has been observed that conditions of pre-deposit are intended to strike a balance between the right of appeal and the need to protect the successful party.

19. At this juncture, it would be apposite to note that provisions requiring pre-deposit as a condition for maintaining an appeal are not unknown to statutory jurisprudence. Similar stipulations are found in fiscal statutes as well as rent control legislations. The consistent judicial approach in interpreting such provisions has been that they are mandatory in nature and are intended to balance the right of appeal with the need to secure the decretal or adjudicated amount.

20. In the context of fiscal statutes, courts have repeatedly held that pre-deposit requirements are conditions attached to the statutory right of appeal and must be strictly complied with. Such provisions are intended to discourage frivolous challenges and to protect the interest of the successful party pending adjudication. Likewise, under rent control legislations, provisions requiring deposit of rent during pendency of proceedings have been interpreted to impose a continuing obligation upon the tenant, particularly where the liability is recurring. The rationale underlying such interpretation is that a tenant, while availing the benefit of stay or pendency of proceedings, cannot be permitted to withhold payment of rent, thereby causing undue prejudice to the landlord.

21. Viewed in this backdrop, the proviso to Section 35(1) must be construed in a manner that advances the legislative intent and preserves the balance between the rights of the parties. The condition of pre-deposit, though coming into operation at the stage of filing of the appeal, necessarily extends to ensuring continued compliance in respect of liabilities that accrue during pendency of the appeal. The statutory requirement of pre-deposit is not exhausted upon a one-time deposit made at the time of filing but subsists so long as the liability under the impugned order continues to operate. Any other interpretation would not only defeat the statutory mandate but would also lead to manifest inequity.

22. Rent law jurisprudence consistently recognizes that rent is a recurring obligation, and a tenant cannot retain possession while withholding payment. The principle that a litigant cannot enjoy the benefit of pendency of proceedings while avoiding corresponding obligations is well entrenched.

23. From the foregoing discussion, the following principles emerge:

23.1 Pre-deposit under the proviso to Section 35(1) of the U.P. Act No. 16 of 2021 is mandatory in nature and operates as a condition precedent to the very maintainability of an appeal; the right of appeal being statutory, its exercise remains subject to strict compliance with such condition.

23.2 The expression entire amount payable under the impugned order is of wide amplitude and must receive a purposive construction; it is not to be confined to the amount quantified as on the date of institution of the appeal, but extends to the whole liability arising from the impugned order in its true character.

23.3 Where the impugned order gives rise to a recurring or continuing liability, including but not limited to payment of revised rent on a monthly or periodic basis, the statutory requirement of deposit necessarily takes within its fold such continuing accruals, and cannot be restricted to a one-time computation.

23.4 The obligation of pre-deposit under the proviso, in cases involving recurring or continuing liability, is not exhausted by the initial deposit made at the time of filing of the appeal; it remains a subsisting and dynamic requirement that endures so long as the liability under the impugned order continues to accrue during the pendency of the appeal.

23.5 Any interpretation, in the context of such recurring liability, which confines the deposit to the amount due as on the date of filing would render the expression entire amount payable otiose and defeat the legislative intent of securing the beneficiary of the impugned order against non-payment during the pendency of appellate proceedings.

23.6 The object underlying the proviso is twofold, namely, to ensure that the remedy of appeal is invoked with due seriousness and to safeguard the interest of the party in whose favour the order has been passed; the provision, therefore, embodies a legislative balance between the right of appeal and the obligation to secure compliance.

23.7 The appellate authority, while entertaining an appeal, is empowered to issue appropriate directions to ensure continued compliance with the statutory requirement of deposit, including directions for periodic deposit in cases of recurring liability, so as to effectuate the mandate of the proviso.

23.8 A direction requiring deposit of fifty percent of the recurring liability during pendency of the appeal is neither extraneous to the statutory scheme nor an imposition of an additional condition, but is in furtherance of and incidental to the enforcement of the statutory requirement itself.

23.9 Such a direction does not amount to execution of the impugned order, inasmuch as it does not compel full compliance therewith, but only mandates partial deposit in terms of the statute, and operates as a regulatory measure governing the continuation of the appeal and the grant of interim protection.

23.10 The grant of interim protection in appeal is inherently conditional and can be validly made subject to compliance with the requirement of continued deposit, the same constituting a balanced and equitable arrangement between the parties.

23.11 Non-compliance with the requirement of continued deposit, in cases of recurring liability, would disentitle the appellant from claiming equitable relief and may legitimately invite consequences, including vacating of interim protection or dismissal of the appeal in accordance with law.

23.12 The proviso to Section 35(1) must be construed in a manner that advances the object of the enactment, prevents abuse of the appellate process, and ensures that a litigant does not retain the benefit of possession or pendency of proceedings without discharging the corresponding statutory obligation, even if to a limited extent.

23.13. The statutory mandate of pre-deposit under Section 35(1), in its application to recurring liabilities, is continuous in operation and enforceable throughout the pendency of the appeal, and any direction issued by the appellate authority to secure such compliance is legally sustainable and within jurisdiction.

24. The direction issued by the Rent Tribunal requiring the appellant to deposit 50 percent of the revised rent on a monthly basis is, therefore, not an additional or extraneous condition, but a logical extension of the statutory mandate contained in the proviso to Section 35(1). It is in consonance with the statutory scheme and an operational mechanism to ensure continued compliance with the condition precedent embodied in the proviso to Section 35(1).

25. The contention that such a direction amounts to execution of the impugned order is misconceived. The Tribunal has not directed payment of the entire revised rent but only 50 percent thereof, strictly in conformity with the statutory requirement. The grant of interim protection is conditional upon such compliance and is in the nature of an equitable arrangement to balance competing interests.

26. The supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is confined to cases of patent illegality, perversity, or jurisdictional error. The impugned order does not suffer from any such infirmity. On the contrary, it reflects a correct and purposive construction of the statutory provision and a balanced exercise of jurisdiction.