General Manager U.P. Region Food ... vs Union Of India Thru. Secy. Deptt. Of ...
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Allahabad High Court

General Manager U.P. Region Food ... vs Union Of India Thru. Secy. Deptt. Of ... on 8 September, 2025

Author: Pankaj Bhatia

Bench: Pankaj Bhatia

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
 
 


Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC-LKO:53718
 

 
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
LUCKNOW 
 
WRIT - C No. - 7375 of 2025   
 
   General Manager U.P. Region Food Corporation Of India Lko. And Another    
 
  .....Petitioner(s)   
 
 Versus  
 
   Union Of India Thru. Secy. Deptt. Of Labour And Employment New Delhi And 2 Others    
 
  .....Respondent(s)       
 
   
 
  
 
Counsel for Petitioner(s)   
 
:   
 
Anurag Verma   
 
  
 
Counsel for Respondent(s)   
 
:   
 
A.S.G.I., Dinesh Kumar Singh (D.K.Singh)   
 
     
 
 Court No. - 6
 
   
 
 HON'BLE PANKAJ BHATIA, J.      

1. Counter affidavit filed today in Court is taken on record.

2. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri Dinesh Kumar Singh, learned counsel for respondent no.3.

3. Present petition has been filed challenging the order dated 24.07.2025 in the form of advice to conduct typing test for every three months for confirmation of the persons represented by Union and there would be no coercive action taken by the management during the period and provision of Section 33 of Industrial Disputes Act shall be followed.

4. Contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that an advertisement was issued for recruitment of various posts in FCI, which is contained in Annexure - 2. My attention is drawn with regard to the prescriptions contained in the advertisement for appointment of AG - III (Hindi) wherein it was stated that the major work of the AG - III would be translation from English to Hindi and vice versa and possession of skill for Hindi Typing would also be required. To assess the same, Hindi Typing with speed of 30 words per minute will be tested during the period of probation and confirmation of probation shall be subject to the candidate qualifying the prescribed typing test.

5. It is stated that in pursuance to the said advertisement, various applications were received and a few people were selected. One of the appointment letter issued on 30.01.2024 is on record in which it was stated that the candidate would be on a probation for a period of one year from the date of appointment which may be extended for a further period not exceeding one year at the discretion of the appointing authority.

6. It is stated that subsequently, directions were issued for conducting the typing test and based upon which a few of the candidates appeared in the typing test and few of them qualified. It is stated that once again a typing test was conducted in which few of the candidates were qualified and substantial number of candidate could not qualify. It is stated that before any action could be taken in respect of the said probationers, the union moved an application before the Regional Labour Commissioner seeking urgent intervention in the matter of probation termination of AG - III employees in FCI North Zone without training support. In the said communication, which is on record as Annexure - 11, it was stated that many of the employees who were appointed on probation could not clear the test owing to lack of clarity and in the absence of training or support, and requests were made to immediately stop any termination process until the matter is duly heard, initiate the conciliation proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act and for issuance of appropriate directions to FCI management for training, skill support and re-evaluation mechanism. A stand was also taken that probationers were being victimized on account of post-recruitment procedural changes.

7. On the basis of the said application, conciliation proceedings were initiated and during the process of conciliation, order impugned was passed on 24.07.2025 advising the management to conduct the typing test for every three months for confirmation of the probation and no coercive action taken be taken during the period and provision of Section 33 of Industrial Disputes Act which were directed to be followed. It was also recorded that the management representative present today was not willing to settle the dispute as per law and it was deemed necessary to call for well competent authority to appear in the conciliation proceedings.

8. The said order/advice is under challenge.

9. Contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the said order could not have been passed as the industrial dispute was yet to arise as no action was taken against the probationers. He further argues that although there was no specification in the appointment order, the terms and conditions mentioned in the advertisement were implicit. He further argues that the prescription for conducting the typing test subsequent to the issuance of appointment letter could have been done in view of the need and the nature of the work to be performed by the AG - III. He, thus, concludes his argument by arguing that for all the reasons argued above, the order impugned cannot be sustained and is liable to be quashed.

10. Learned counsel for respondent no.3 has filed a counter affidavit. In the said counter affidavit one of the main objection is that the writ petition at this stage is not maintainable for the reason that the conciliation officer/board has not been impleaded as a respondent in the writ petition; he further argues that no writ of certiorari can be issued against the efforts taken by the conciliation board and to that extent, the writ petition is not maintainable; he further argues that in any case the efforts of the conciliation board are to solve the disputes for which no writ would lie.

11. He further argues that the interim or final verdict given in conciliation proceedings cannot amount to verdict or even decision affecting the rights of the parties. It is further argued that the nature and function of the conciliation board/officer is neither judicial nor quasi-judicial nor adjudicatory nor directory in nature and only has substantive and persuasive effect for the parties to come to an amicable settlement.

12. Reliance is placed upon judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of Shri Nand Kishore v. Dilshad Public School and Anr.; 2022/DHC/005424 wherein the following has been observed in Paragraphs 12 & 13:

"12. In order to answer this question, Scheme of the ID Act will require examination. The duties and power of the Conciliation Officer under the ID Act are circumscribed by Section 12 of the ID Act and he has no power to transgress beyond the said statutory provision. It is clear from the provisions of Section 12 that a Conciliation Officer is not empowered to adjudicate upon disputes between the management and the workman and can only assist the parties to arrive at an amicable settlement and take steps in furtherance thereto using what may be called his power of persuasion. On failure of settlement talks between the parties, the Conciliation Officer is required to send a report to the Appropriate Government under Section 12(4), setting forth the steps taken to arrive at a settlement together with the reasons why the settlement could not be arrived at. If the parties arrive at a settlement, then the Conciliation Officer shall send a report to the Appropriate Government along with a memorandum of settlement signed by the parties. If on consideration of the report under Section 12(4), the Appropriate Government is satisfied that a case for reference is made out, it may refer the case to the Board/Labour Court/Tribunal, as the case may be.

13. Therefore, it is only the appropriate Government, who is competent to decide whether the dispute(s) is to be referred to the Industrial Tribunals set up under the Act and insofar as Conciliation Officer is concerned, his role is that of a mediator and no more. It has been held in various judgments that Conciliation Officer does not discharge judicial or quasi-judicial functions and his acts are merely administrative in nature. Relevant it is to note that even if the Conciliation Officer brings about a settlement and records the same, the report so rendered is not an award, defined under the ID Act as an interim or final determination of an industrial dispute by a Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal. From the scheme of the ID Act, by no stretch of imagination can it be said that the functions of a Conciliation Officer are akin to that of an Industrial Tribunal or a Labour Court. Looking at the industrial unrest that usually takes place in management-workman dispute, Legislature has provided a machinery for settlement of disputes but certainly without any powers to the Conciliation Officer to adjudicate upon them. The only and avowed object and purpose for this machinery under the Act is to provide a step to attempt to bring an end to the disputes and differences between the rival parties so that the disputes do not travel to Labour Courts or Industrial Tribunals. In East India Ceramics and others (supra), the Madras High Court has ruled as follows:

45. The Conciliation Officer is not vested with the powers to adjudicate on industrial dispute, but he can try to persuade the parties to come to a fair and amicable settlement, besides he has to exercise his resourcefulness and power of persuasion to try to induce and persuade the parties to come to a fair and amicable settlement. The Conciliation Officer is not competent to decide the various points in issue between the opposing parties of adjudicate the dispute. The functions of the Conciliation Officer under S. 12 is not of either judicial or quasi-judicial nature. If it is to be held quasi-judicial or judicial function, then in connection with whatever he does under S. 12 or other provisions of the Act or Rules, the formalities of a judicial trial would have to be observed. The duties, which the Conciliation Officer performs are only administrative and are purely incidental to industrial adjudication as has been held by the Apex Court in Jaswant Sugar Mills, Ltd., Meerut v. Lakshmi Chand (cited supra).

46. The Conciliation Officer is not exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers or authority nor he is a quasi-judicial or judicial authority, but he is a pure and simple administrative functionary. Even where a Conciliation Officer refused to take a dispute for conciliation after his being satisfied with the action of management in regard to the promotion in a particular case was bona fide his order could not be interfered with by the High Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction as has been held by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Paints Employees' Union v. M.D. Nail [1966 I L.L.J. 579].

47.Thus the Conciliation Officer namely, the first respondent not being quasi-judicial authority nor he exercises a judicial or quasi-judicial function, no question of issue of prohibition prayed for would arise.

xxx xxx xxx

49. In addition to the said aspect it is to be pointed out that the first respondent Conciliation Officer merely holds a conciliation and sends a report or persuade the parties to arrive at some settlement and beyond that he has no power or authority to adjudicate.

50. The writ of prohibition will lie in cases as to matters which are judicial in nature. In S. Govinda Menon v. Union of India [A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1274], the Apex Court analysing the case after law held thus:

"The jurisdiction for grant of a writ of prohibition is primarily supervisory and the object of that writ is to restrain Courts or inferior Tribunals from exercising a jurisdiction which they do not possess at all or else to prevent them from exceeding the limits of their jurisdiction. In other words, the object is to confine Courts or Tribunals of inferior or limited jurisdiction within their inferior or limited jurisdiction within their bounds. It is well settled that the writ of prohibition lies not only for excess of jurisdiction or for absence of jurisdiction but the writ also lies in a case of departure from the rules of natural justice (see Halsbury's Laws of England, Third Edn., Vol. II, Page. 114). It was held for instance by the Court of Appeal in King v. North [1927 I KB. 491], that as the order of the Judge of the consistory Court of July 24, 1925 was made without giving the vicar an opportunity of being heard in his defence, the order was made in violation of the principles of natural justice and was, therefore, an order made without jurisdiction and the writ of prohibition ought to issue. But the writ does not lie to correct the course, practice or procedure of an inferior tribunal, or a wrong decision on the merits of the proceedings. It is also well established that a writ of prohibition cannot be issued to a Court or an inferior Tribunal for an error of law unless the error makes it go outside its jurisdiction (See Reginaa v. Comptroller-General of Patents and Design [1953 (2) W.L.R. 760], and Parisienne Basket Shoes Proprietary, Ltd. Whyte59 C.L.R. 369]. A clear distinction must, therefore, be maintained between want of jurisdiction and the manner in which it is exercised. If there is want of jurisdiction then the matter is coram non judice and a writ of prohibition will lie to the Court or inferior Tribunal forbidding it to continue proceedings therein in excess of its jurisdiction.""

13. Reliance is also placed upon judgment of Orissa High Court in the case of Pratap Chandra Mohanty v. Union of India & Anr.; (1971) 2 LLJ 196 ORI, wherein the following was observed in Paragraph 7:

"7. It would thus follow that in the instant case which is not an industrial dispute relating to a public utility service, the Conciliation Officer had a discretion vested in him under the statute either to hold conciliation proceedings or not. The Conciliation Officer explored the possibility of a settlement by asking the parties for joint deliberations. These were preliminary to the actual conciliation proceeding. As has been held in the Madras High Court in the case of Workmen of V.M. Bus Service v. Labour Officer, Madras & Anr., (1970) 2 Lab LJ 95 (Mad):

?The statute confers a discretion on the conciliation officer to decide whether he should hold conciliation proceedings or not. However, sub-section (4) of that section (Section 12) is relied upon on behalf of the petitioner - Union to urge that the conciliation officer has got to send a report to the Government setting forth the steps taken by him for ascertaining the facts and circumstances relating to the dispute and for bringing about a settlement thereof, together with a full statement of such facts and circumstances, and the reasons on account of which, in his opinion, a settlement could not be arrived at and therefore there is an obligation cast on him to hold conciliation proceedings. This sub-section will apply only where the conciliation proceedings are held and no such settlement is arrived at. It cannot apply where the conciliation proceedings have not been held. To such a case, only sub-section (1) of Section 12 applies. As that sub-section confers a discretion on the conciliation officer to decide whether he shall hold conciliation proceedings or not, there is no room for the issue of a writ of mandamus in this case.?

14. In the light of the said, it is argued that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed.

15. Considering the submissions made at the Bar and recorded above, it is fairly well settled that the Industrial Disputes Act is a socio beneficial legislation enacted for promoting harmony in between the management and the employees and prescribes for investigation and settlement of industrial disputes. Section 12 of the said Act prescribes for the duties of the conciliation officer, which reads as under:

"12. Duties of conciliation officers.?(1) Where an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, the conciliation officer may, or where the dispute relates to a public utility service and a notice under Section 22 has been given, shall, hold conciliation proceedings in the prescribed manner.

(2) The conciliation officer shall, for the purpose of bringing about a settlement of the dispute, without delay, investigate the dispute and all matters affecting the merits and the right settlement thereof and may do all such things as he thinks fit for the purpose of inducing the parties to come to a fair and amicable settlement for the dispute.

(3) If a settlement of the dispute or of any of the matters in dispute is arrived at in the course of the conciliation proceedings the conciliation officer shall send a report thereof to the appropriate Government or an officer authorised in this behalf by the appropriate Government together with a memorandum of the settlement signed by the parties to the dispute.

(4) If no such settlement is arrived at, the conciliation officer shall, as soon as practicable after the close of the investigation, send to the appropriate Government a full report setting forth the steps taken by him for ascertaining the facts and circumstances relating to the dispute and for bringing about a settlement thereof, together with a full statement of such facts and circumstances, and the reasons on account of which, in his opinion, a settlement could not be arrived at.

(5) If, on a consideration of the report referred to in sub-section (4), the appropriate Government is satisfied that there is a case for reference to a Board, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, it may make such reference. Where the appropriate Government does not make such a reference it shall record and communicate to the parties concerned its reasons therefor.

(6) A report under this section shall be submitted within fourteen days of the commencement of the conciliation proceedings or within such shorter period as may be fixed by the appropriate Government:

Provided that, subject to the approval of the conciliation officer, the time for the submission of the report may be extended by such period as may be agreed upon in writing by all the parties to the dispute."

16. On a plain reading of Section 12 coupled with the judgment of the Delhi High Court explaining the scope of Section 12, it is clear that the role of the conciliation officer is to endeavour to make the efforts for settlement of the disputes; no powers are vested with the conciliation officer to issue directions of the nature as have been done vide order dated 24.07.2025 even if it is presumed to be advice as is recorded in the said order.

17. The other submission of learned counsel for respondent no.3 that a writ petition would not lie as conciliation officer has not been impleaded merits rejection for the sole reason that the functions of a conciliation officer are neither quasi-judicial nor adjudicatory in nature and even if they were adjudicatory in nature, it is fairly well settled that the adjudicatory authority is not to be impleaded as a respondent [See: Airport Economic Regulatory Authority of India v. Delhi International Airport Ltd. & Ors.; 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2923].

18. The other submission that a writ would not lie against the advice given by the conciliation officer, it is no doubt true that a writ of prohibition would not lie, however, if the order exceeds the jurisdiction vested in the conciliation officer as prescribed under Section 12 of the Industrial Disputes Act, the same would certainly be amenable to writ jurisdiction of this Court.

19. In view thereof, objections of learned counsel for respondent no.3 are rejected.

20. Finding the impugned order dated 24.07.2025 in the form of advice/directions to be transgressing the well laid down limits of the conciliation proceedings under Section 12 of the Act, the same cannot be sustained and is quashed.

21. It is, however, observed that the conciliation officer may continue to make endeavour for conciliation in accordance with law. However, he would not be empowered to issue any direction of the nature issued in the order dated 24.07.2025.

22. Present petition stands allowed in above terms.

(Pankaj Bhatia,J.)

September 8, 2025

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