Allahabad High Court
Ram Chandra And Others vs State Of U.P. on 8 September, 2025
Author: Vivek Kumar Birla
Bench: Vivek Kumar Birla
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC:157265-DB
Reserved On:- 23.5.2025
Delivered On.:-08.09.2025
In Chamber
Case :- CRIMINAL APPEAL No. - 616 of 1984
Appellant :- Ram Chandra And Others
Respondent :- State of U.P.
Counsel for Appellant :- P.N.Misra,Pawankumar Dubey
Counsel for Respondent :- Dg.A.
Hon'ble Vivek Kumar Birla,J.
Hon'ble Jitendra Kumar Sinha,J.
(Per: Hon'ble Jitendra Kumar Sinha, J.)
1. Heard Sri Pawan Kumar Dubey, learned counsel for the surviving appellant nos. 4 and 6, namely, Gaya Singh and Ram Milan and Shri Ghanshyam, learned AGA for the State.
2. By way of this appeal appellants have challenged their conviction under sections 302/149, 147 IPC and their sentence for imprisonment for life under section 302/149 IPC and rigorous imprisonment for one year under section 147 IPC by the learned 7th Additional Sessions Judge, Shahjahanpur in Session Trial No. 428 of 1983.
3. The prosecution case in brief is that one Ram Singh gave an oral report to the police station Jalalabad that one Jhabbu father-in-law of Rishi Pal was murdered six years ago and his father Pothi Singh was implicated in that case of murder and he had been acquitted by the Court and at that time Kalyan, Ram Chandra, Ram Pal and Ram Milan who were with his father at that time had changed their side at the time of election of Pradhanship and had joined the other party.
4. He further stated that his father had extended help to one Lallu in the election and as a result of this Kalyan and his party members grew jealous of his father. He further stated that on the same day at about 3:30 P.M. his father had left for house of Ram Lal Nai, resident of village Naya Gaon for attending a feast. He along with his uncle Man Singh who was also going to attend the said feast and they were about 20 paces behind the father of the informant. It is further stated that when his father reached near the gate of Ram Lal one Ram Chandra stopped his father near the Mango tree when his father asked why he was stopping him then Ram Chandra lifted his father by wrapping his arms around the neck and chest area and Rishi Pal, Net Ram, Kalyan, Ram Pal, Gaya Singh, Ram Milan, Balbir armed with lathies and Rajendra armed with Bhala (a pointed weapon) who were standing there came near father and started beating him.
At this informant and his uncle Man Singh raised alarm and sought for help then Pati Ram, Tara, Raj Pal and Prem who had come as guests and people of other villages reached there and Rishi Pal exhorted the other accused persons to kill his father and all of named accused persons started beating his father with lathi and bhala'. The father of the informant fell down after receiving injuries and all the accused persons left the place towards south after leaving father of informant in injured condition and further fled away towards West. It is further stated that when informant and other persons went to see the injured, the informant found his father in an unconscious condition and he could not bring his father to the police station due to fear of the accused persons. He further stated that his father was lying at the place of occurrence and the family members were around him.
5. On the above oral information, the case was registered against Ram Chandra, Rishi Pal, Net Ram, Kalyan, Gaya Singh, Ram Pal, Balbir, Ram Milan and Rajendra under sections 147/308/504 IPC. The first information report was lodged bearing Case Crime no. 84 of 1983.
6. After the death of injured, the case was converted under section 304 IPC. The investigating officer of the case conducted investigation and submitted charge sheet against eight persons under sections 147/304/504 IPC, namely, Ram Chandra, Gaya Singh, Kalyan, Ram Milan, Ram Pal, Balbir, Rishi Pal and Net Ram.
7. Learned Magistrate took cognizance of the offence and committed the case to the court of session for trial. The trial stood transferred to the 7th Additional Sessions Judge, Shahjahanpur.
8. Learned Additional Sessions Judge framed charge under section 147 IPC against accused Ram Chandra, Gaya Singh, Kalyan, Ram Pal, Balbir, Ram Millan, Rishi Pal and Net Ram and learned trial judge also framed charge under section 302 r/w 149 IPC against accused Ram Chnadra, Gaya Singh, Ram Pal, Balbir, Ram Milan, Rishi Pal, and Net Ram. Accused Rajendra was charged under section 148 IPC and 302 IPC r/w Section 149 IPC.
9. The prosecution in order to bring home the charge against the accused persons examined Ram Singh as P.W. 1 Man Singh as P.W. 2 SI Sarovar Singh as P.W. 3, Head constable Muneshwar Dayal as P.W. 4, Constable Rajendra Singh as P.W. 5, Dr. K.M.L. Khanna as P.W. 6.
10. The prosecution has also proved documentary evidence, as FIR- Ex.Ka.1, Recovery memo of Shoes- Ex.Ka 7, Recovery memo of Blood Stained and Normal Soil- Ex.Ka 8, P.M. Report- Ex.Ka.12, Panchayatnama- Ex.Ka.2, Charge Sheet- Ex.Ka.9 and Site Plan with Index Ex.Ka 6.
11. P.W. 6 Dr. K.M.L Khanna conducted the post mortem of the deceased Pothi Singh and found the following injuries on the person of the deceased:-
A. Abraided contusion 2 cm x 0.5 cm in size on the left side of top of head.
B. Contusion 4 cm x 2 cm on the right side of face 1 cm in front pinna of right ear.
C. Contusion 4 cm x 2.5 cm in size on the right side of face just below right eye.
D. Multiple contusion in an area 8 cm x 4 cm in size on the right shoulder.
E. Multiple contusions in an are 10 cm x 6 cm in size on the left shoulder and upper part left side back.
F. Abrasion 2 cm x 1 cm in size on the lower part front of neck.
G. Lacerated wound 3 cm x 1cm x bone deep 2 cm above left elbow with fracture lower part of left humerus with a contusion 4 cm x 2.5 cm around an adjacent to it.
H. Lacerated wound 2 cm x 1 cm x bone deep 2-1/2 cm below and behind left elbow.
I. Contusions 4 cm x 2.5 cm on the back of middle third of left fore arm.
J. Contusion 2 cm x 1 cm in size 1 cm below injury no.9.
K. Contusion 3 cm x 2 cm on the back of the left hand.
L. Lacerated wound 1-1/2 cm x cm x bone deep on the distal phalanx of left index finger with fracture distal and adjacent phalansial bone of same finger a contusion 3 cm x 1 cm size covering front of distal an adjacent phalanx of left ring middle and index finger of left palm.
M. Contusion 5 cm x 3 cm insize on the back of right hand and wrist with fracture lower part right radius and ulna.
N. Lacerated wound deep x cm x bone deep in the between area of right middle and ringer finger on the back of right hand.
O. Contusions 6 cm x 2 cm in size on the front of upper part of right upper arm.
P. Contusions 1 cm x 1 cm in size on the back of left fore arm in middle third.
Q. Contusions multiple in an area of 12 cm x 8 cm in size on the back of left hip.
R. Multiple contusions in an area of 6 cm x 2 cm in size the right hip.
S. Abraided contusion 8cm x 6 cm in size on the front, outer and lower part right knee with fracture upper part of right tebial bone.
T. Multiple contusion in an area of 8 cm x 3 cm in size on outer and front of right lower leg.
U. Contusion 3 cm x 1 cm in size on the left knee.
V. Lacerated wound 3 cm x 2 cm x bone deep with fracture tibia and fibula under neath 6 cm below left knee on the left lower legs front middle.
W. Contusion 5 cm x 4 cm in size on the calf of the left leg.
X. Contusion 5 cm x 4 cm in size on and above midial malleolus of left lower leg.
Y. Contusion 3 cm x 2 cm in size on the right medial malleolus.
Internal examination NAD the brain was pale right and left lump were pale. 100 grams of pulpy material was found.
12. After closure of the prosecution evidence the statement of the appellants were recorded under section 313 Cr.P.C. in which they stated that they have been implicated in this case due to enmity. In defence the accused persons have examined Lek Pal Singh, Advocate.
13. After hearing the arguments of the prosecution and the defence, the learned trial judge has passed the judgement and order impugned. The grounds taken in the appeal are that the conviction of the appellants is against the weight of evidence and sentence is too severe.
14. The appeal stood abated against appellant nos. 1,2,3 and 7, naemly, Ram Chandra, Ram Pal, Balbir and Net Ram vide order dated 19.2.2024 and appeal in respect of appellant no. 5 Rishipal vide order dated 20.3.2025. The appeal now survives in respect of appellant nos. 4 Gaya Singh and appellant no.6 Ram Milan.
15. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that incident is said to have taken place at 15.30 P.M. on 10.5.1983 and the first information report has been lodged at about 19 P.M. i.e. after about 3 and 1/2 hours and the first information report under section 308 IPC which shows that till the lodging of the first information report the deceased was alive. The case was converted under section 304 IPC at 20:30 after the information was received by the police that injured Pothi Singh had died.
16. Learned counsel further submitted that presence of the eye witnesses P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 at the place of occurrence is highly doubtful and the incident has not taken place in the manner as alleged. He further contended that DW1 Lek Pal Singh has deposed to the effect that the deceased was present at the district court Shahjahanpur at 2 P.M. on the said date in connection with verification of bail bonds.
17. It is further argued that the deceased was a person of criminal antecedent and as per prosecution story he was accused in murder case of father-in-law of accused Rishi Pal. Learned counsel further argued that there was also enmity between accused persons and informant side due to election of Pradhanship and it is the prosecution case that the deceased had extended help to Lallu in the said election and the accused persons were supporters of some other candidate. It is further argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that one of the accused Rajendra has been acquitted by the learned trial court on the same set of evidence whereas trial against Kalyan stood abated due to his death during trial.
18. Learned counsel further argued that there are material contradictions in the testimony of P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 and their conduct is also unnatural. He refers to the testimony of P.W.1 and P.W. 2 and submitted that P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 are contradictory in the testimony regarding the mother of the informant visiting the place of occurrence after it took place whereas P.W. 1 has stated in his testimony that his mother, after the incident, reached the place of occurrence and started crying by clinging on the dead body of his father whereas P.W. 2 has stated that after the incident the mother of the informant reached the place of occurrence but she did not go near the body of her husband rather she stood at a distance. P.W. 2 has also stated that the mother of the informant and wife of the deceased did not touch the body of the deceased. Learned counsel further argued that the conduct of P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 is also unnatural as when the accused persons left the place of occurrence they did not try to get any medical attention to the injured and they left the injured at the place of occurrence itself. Learned counsel further submitted that this is highly unnatural conduct on the part of a person not to arrange any medical attention to the injured father of P.W. 1 and injured brother of P.W. 2.
19. Learned counsel further submitted that at this point presence of P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 at the place of occurrence is highly doubtful and they are not eye witnesses, therefore, their testimonies are not worth believable.
20. It is further submitted that P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 have stated in their testimonies that the house of informant was only about 2- 3 houses away from the place of occurrence and it is quite unnatural that if an alarm is raised, nobody would come from his house as P.W. 2 himself stated that when he raised alram it was audible in the village.
21. Learned counsel further submitted that testimonies of P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 are full of contradictions and they are not the eye witnesses. They have reached the place of occurrence after lapse of considerable time of the occurrence.
22. Learned counsel further submitted that though the incident is true but the surviving appellants are not responsible for the alleged occurrence and they are liable to be acquitted.
23. On the other hand, learned AGA for the State has supported the judgement and order impugned and has submitted that P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 are eye witnesses and their testimonies are worth believable and their evidence has been corroborated by the medical evidence of P.W. 6 who has conducted the post mortem of the deceased. It is further contendedby the learned AGA that motive for the commission of offence as alleged by the prosecution has been proved as it was enmity during the election of Pradhanship.
24. Learned AGA further submitted that the deceased was an accused for murder of father-in-law of one of the accused Rishi Pal, on this ground also, the accused persons were inimical towards the deceased. It is further submitted that the enmity is double edged weapon which cuts both ways which can also be cause of false implication. It is further submitted that in this case enmity is cause of commission of offence.
25. Learned AGA further submitted that learned trial court has rightly appreciated the evidence available on record and judgement of conviction and order of sentence impugned do not call for any interference and appeal deserves to be dismissed.
26. In a recent judgment of Dheer Singh and Others vs State of U.P. , 2025 (4) ADJ 791, a co-ordinate Bench of this Court, of which one of us (Vivek Kumar Birla, J.) was a member has considered the law as to why a realistic approach to be adopted by Criminal Courts, which appreciating evidence in Criminal trial. The law in respect of injured, related and interested witness was also considered extensively, paragraph nos.22 to 35 whereof reads as under:-
22. In Krishna Mochi and others vs. State of Bihar, (2002) 6 SCC 81, the Hon'ble Apex Court laid emphasis on realistic approach to be adopted by the criminal courts while appreciating evidence in criminal trial, paragraph 32 whereof is quoted as under:
"32. The court while appreciating the evidence should not lose sight of these realities of life and cannot afford to take an unrealistic approach by sitting in an ivory tower. I find that in recent times the tendency to acquit an accused easily is galloping fast. It is very easy to pass an order of acquittal on the basis of minor points raised in the case by a short judgment so as to achieve the yardstick of disposal. Some discrepancy is bound to be there in each and every case which should not weigh with the court so long it does not materially affect the prosecution case. In case discrepancies pointed out are in the realm of pebbles, the court should tread upon it, but if the same are boulders, the court should not make an attempt to jump over the same. These days when crime is looming large and humanity is suffering and the society is so much affected thereby, duties and responsibilities of the courts have become much more. Now the maxim "let hundred guilty persons be acquitted, but not a single innocent be convicted" is, in practice, changing the world over and courts have been compelled to accept that "society suffers by wrong convictions and it equally suffers by wrong acquittals". I find that this Court in recent times has conscientiously taken notice of these facts from time to time........."
(Emphasis supplied)
23. In Masalti vs. State of U.P., AIR 1965 SC 202, Hon'ble Apex Court in paragraph 14 observed as under:
14. But it would, we think, be unreasonable to contend that evidence given by witnesses should be discarded only on the ground that it is evidence of partisan or interested witnesses. ... The mechanical rejection of such evidence on the sole ground that it is partisan would invariably lead to failure of justice."
(Emphasis supplied)
24. In Darya Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1965 SC 328, the Hon'ble Apex Court has also taken the view that related witness does not necessarily mean or is equivalent to an interested witness. A witness may be called interested only when he or she derives some benefit from the result of litigation; a decree in a civil case, or in seeing a person punished in a criminal trial, paragraph 6 whereof is quoted as under:
6. On principle, however, it is difficult to accept the plea that if a witness is shown to be a relative of the deceased and it is also shown that he shared the hostility of the victim towards the assailant, his evidence can never be accepted unless it is corroborated on material particulars."
25. In Appabhai and another vs. State of Gujarat, AIR 1988 SC 696, the Hon'ble Apex Court in paragraph 11 observed as under:
"11.........Experience reminds us that civilized people are generally insensitive when a crime is committed even in their presence. They withdraw both from the victim and the vigilante. They keep themselves away from the Court unless it is inevitable. They think that crime like civil dispute is between two individuals or parties and they should not involve themselves. This kind of apathy of the general public is indeed unfortunate, but it is there everywhere whether in village life, towns or cities. One cannot ignore this handicap with which the investigating agency has to discharge its duties. The court, therefore, instead of doubting the prosecution case for want of independent witness must consider the broad spectrum of the prosecution version and then search for the nugget of truth with due regard to probability if any, suggested by the accused. The Court, however, must bear in mind that witnesses to a serious crime may not react in a normal manner. Nor do they react uniformly. The horror stricken witnesses at a dastardly crime or an act of egregious nature may react differently. Their, course of conduct may not be of ordinary type in the normal circumstances. The Court, therefore, cannot reject their evidence merely because they have behaved or reacted in an unusual manner....."
(Emphasis supplied)
26. Similar view has been taken in State of A.P. vs. S. Rayappa and others, (2006) 4 SCC 512 wherein it has been observed that it is now almost a fashion that public is reluctant to appear and depose before the court especially in criminal cases and the cases for that reason itself are dragged for years and years, paragraph 6 whereof is quoted as under:
6......by now, it is a well-established principle of law that testimony of a witness otherwise inspiring confidence cannot be discarded on the ground that he being a relation of the deceased is an interested witness. A close relative who is a very natural witness cannot be termed as interested witness. The term interested postulates that the person concerned must have some direct interest in seeing the accused person being convicted somehow or the other either because of animosity or some other reasons."
(Emphasis supplied)
27. In Pulicherla Nagaraju @ Nagaraja Reddy v. State of AP, (2006) 11 SCC 444, the Hon'ble Apex Court in paragraph 16 has held as under:
16. In this case, we find that the trial court had rejected the evidence of PW1 and PW2 merely because they were interested witnesses being the brother and father of the deceased. But it is well settled that evidence of a witness cannot be discarded merely on the ground that he is either partisan or interested or closely related to the deceased, if it is otherwise, found to be trustworthy and credible. It only requires scrutiny with more care and caution, so that neither the guilty escape nor the innocent wrongly convicted. If on such careful scrutiny, the evidence is found to be reliable and probable, it can be acted upon. If it is found to be improbable or suspicious, it ought to be rejected. Where the witness has a motive to falsely implicate the accused, his testimony should have corroboration in regard to material particulars before it is accepted."
(Emphasis supplied)
28. In Satbir Singh and others vs. State of U.P., (2009) 13 SCC 790, the Hon'ble Apex Court in paragraph 26 held as under:
26. It is now a well-settled principle of law that only because the witnesses are not independent ones may not by itself be a ground to discard the prosecution case. If the prosecution case has been supported by the witnesses and no cogent reason has been shown to discredit their statements, a judgment of conviction can certainly be based thereupon ...... "
(Emphasis supplied)
29. In Jayabalan vs. U.T. of Pondicherry, 2010 (68) ACC 308 (SC), the Hon'ble Apex Court in paragraph 21 held as under:
21. We are of the considered view that in cases where the court is called upon to deal with the evidence of the interested witnesses, the approach of the court, while appreciating the evidence of such witnesses must not be pedantic. The court must be cautious in appreciating and accepting the evidence given by the interested witnesses but the court must not be suspicious of such evidence. The primary endeavour of the court must be to look for consistency. The evidence of a witness cannot be ignored or thrown out solely because it comes from the mouth of a person who is closely related to the victim."
(Emphasis supplied)
30. In Dharnidhar vs. State of U.P., (2010) 7 SCC 759, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that there is no hard and fast rule that family members can never be true witnesses to the occurrence and that they will always depose falsely before the Court. It will always depend upon the facts and circumstances of a given case, paragraphs 12 and 13 whereof is quoted as under:
12. There is no hard and fast rule that family members can never be true witnesses to the occurrence and that they will always depose falsely before the Court. It will always depend upon the facts and circumstances of a given case. In the case of Jayabalan v. U.T. of Pondicherry [(2010)1 SCC 199], this Court had occasion to consider whether the evidence of interested witnesses can be relied upon. The Court took the view that a pedantic approach cannot be applied while dealing with the evidence of an interested witness. Such evidence cannot be ignored or thrown out solely because it comes from a person closely related to the victim. The Court held as under:
" 23. We are of the considered view that in cases where the court is called upon to deal with the evidence of the interested witnesses, the approach of the court, while appreciating the evidence of such witnesses must not be pedantic. The court must be cautious in appreciating and accepting the evidence given by the interested witnesses but the court must not be suspicious of such evidence. The primary endeavour of the court must be to look for consistency. The evidence of a witness cannot be ignored or thrown out solely because it comes from the mouth of a person who is closely related to the victim.
13. Similar view was taken by this Court in Ram Bharosey v. State of U.P. [AIR 2010 SC 917], where the Court stated the dictum of law that a close relative of the deceased does not, per se, become an interested witness. An interested witness is one who is interested in securing the conviction of a person out of vengeance or enmity or due to disputes and deposes before the Court only with that intention and not to further the cause of justice. The law relating to appreciation of evidence of an interested witness is well settled, according to which, the version of an interested witness cannot be thrown over- board, but has to be examined carefully before accepting the same.
14. In the light of the above judgments, it is clear that the statements of the alleged interested witnesses can be safely relied upon by the Court in support of the prosecution's story. But this needs to be done with care and to ensure that the administration of criminal justice is not undermined by the persons, who are closely related to the deceased. When their statements find corroboration by other witnesses, expert evidence and the circumstances of the case clearly depict completion of the chain of evidence pointing out to the guilt of the accused, then we see no reason why the statement of so called `interested witnesses' cannot be relied upon by the Court."
(Emphasis supplied)
31. In a very recent judgement rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in Baban Shankar Daphal and others vs. The State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC Online SC 137 in respect of testimony of witness which should not be discarded merely because of relation with victim, the Hon'ble Apex Court has, in paragraphs 27 and 28, held as under:
27. One of the contentions of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the eyewitnesses to the incident were all closely related to the deceased and for prudence the prosecution ought to have examined some other independent eyewitness as well who were present at the time of the unfortunate incident. This was also the view taken by the Trial Court, but the High Court has correctly rejected such an approach and held that merely because there were some more independent witnesses also, who had reached the place of incident, the evidence of the relatives cannot be disbelieved. The law nowhere states that the evidence of the interested witness should be discarded altogether. The law only warrants that their evidence should be scrutinized with care and caution. It has been held by this Court in the catena of judgments that merely if a witness is a relative, their testimony cannot be discarded on that ground alone.
28. In criminal cases, the credibility of witnesses, particularly those who are close relatives of the victim, is often scrutinized. However, being a relative does not automatically render a witness "interested" or biased. The term "interested" refers to witnesses who have a personal stake in the outcome, such as a desire for revenge or to falsely implicate the accused due to enmity or personal gain. A "related" witness, on the other hand, is someone who may be naturally present at the scene of the crime, and their testimony should not be dismissed simply because of their relationship to the victim. Courts must assess the reliability, consistency, and coherence of their statements rather than labelling them as untrustworthy.
(Emphasis supplied)
32. In a recent judgement rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in Shahaja @ Shahajan Ismail Mohd. vs. State of Maharashtra, (2023) 12 SCC 558 has observed that the appreciation of ocular evidence is a hard task and has summed up the judicially evolved principles for appreciation of ocular evidence in a criminal case, paragraphs 29 and 30 whereof is quoted as under:
29. The appreciation of ocular evidence is a hard task. There is no fixed or straight-jacket formula for appreciation of the ocular evidence. The judicially evolved principles for appreciation of ocular evidence in a criminal case can be enumerated as under:
29.1 While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the approach must be whether the evidence of the witness read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the Court to scrutinize the evidence more particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witness and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken as to render it unworthy of belief.
29.2. If the Court before whom the witness gives evidence had the opportunity to form the opinion about the general tenor of evidence given by the witness, the appellate court which had not this benefit will have to attach due weight to the appreciation of evidence by the trial court and unless there are reasons weighty and formidable it would not be proper to reject the evidence on the ground of minor variations or infirmities in the matter of trivial details.
29.3 When eye-witness is examined at length it is quite possible for him to make some discrepancies. But courts should bear in mind that it is only when discrepancies in the evidence of a witness are so incompatible with the credibility of his version that the court is justified in jettisoning his evidence.
29.4. Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of the case, hyper technical approach by taking sentences torn out of context here or there from the evidence, attaching importance to some technical error committed by the investigating officer not going to the root of the matter would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole.
29.5. Too serious a view to be adopted on mere variations falling in the narration of an incident (either as between the evidence of two witnesses or as between two statements of the same witness) is an unrealistic approach for judicial scrutiny.
29.6. By and large a witness cannot be expected to possess a photographic memory and to recall the details of an incident. It is not as if a video tape is replayed on the mental screen.
29.7. Ordinarily it so happens that a witness is overtaken by events. The witness could not have anticipated the occurrence which so often has an element of surprise. The mental faculties therefore cannot be expected to be attuned to absorb the details.
29.8. The powers of observation differ from person to person. What one may notice, another may not. An object or movement might emboss its image on one person's mind whereas it might go unnoticed on the part of another.
29.9. By and large people cannot accurately recall a conversation and reproduce the very words used by them or heard by them. They can only recall the main purport of the conversation. It is unrealistic to expect a witness to be a human tape recorder.
29.10. In regard to exact time of an incident, or the time duration of an occurrence, usually, people make their estimates by guess work on the spur of the moment at the time of interrogation. And one cannot expect people to make very precise or reliable estimates in such matters. Again, it depends on the time-sense of individuals which varies from person to person.
29.11. Ordinarily a witness cannot be expected to recall accurately the sequence of events which take place in rapid succession or in a short time span. A witness is liable to get confused, or mixed up when interrogated later on.
29.12. A witness, though wholly truthful, is liable to be overawed by the court atmosphere and the piercing cross examination by counsel and out of nervousness mix up facts, get confused regarding sequence of events, or fill up details from imagination on the spur of the moment. The sub- conscious mind of the witness sometimes so operates on account of the fear of looking foolish or being disbelieved though the witness is giving a truthful and honest account of the occurrence witnessed by him.
29.13. A former statement though seemingly inconsistent with the evidence need not necessarily be sufficient to amount to contradiction. Unless the former statement has the potency to discredit the later statement, even if the later statement is at variance with the former to some extent it would not be helpful to contradict that witness.[See Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat, 1983 Cri LJ 1096 : AIR 1983 SC 753, Leela Ram v. State of Haryana, AIR 1999 SC 3717, and Tahsildar Singh v. State of UP, AIR 1959 SC 1012]
30. To put it simply, in assessing the value of the evidence of the eye- witnesses, two principal considerations are whether, in the circumstances of the case, it is possible to believe their presence at the scene of occurrence or in such situations as would make it possible for them to witness the facts deposed to by them and secondly, whether there is anything inherently improbable or unreliable in their evidence. In respect of both these considerations, the circumstances either elicited from those witnesses themselves or established by other evidence tending to improbabilise their presence or to discredit the veracity of their statements, will have a bearing upon the value which a Court would attach to their evidence. Although in cases where the plea of the accused is a mere denial, yet the evidence of the prosecution witnesses has to be examined on its own merits, where the accused raise a definite plea or puts forward a positive case which is inconsistent with that of the prosecution, the nature of such plea or case and the probabilities in respect of it will also have to be taken into account while assessing the value of the prosecution evidence."
(Emphasis supplied)
33. Paragraph 48 of Pahalwan Singh and others vs. State of U.P., 2020 (6) ALJ 166 is quoted under:
"48. Thus, in view of aforementioned decisions of the Supreme Court, it is now a settled position of law that the statements of the interested witnesses can be safely relied upon by the court in support of the prosecution story. But this needs to be done with care and to ensure that the administration of criminal justice is not undermined by the persons who are closely related to the deceased. When their statements find corroboration by other evidence, expert evidence and the circumstances of the case clearly depict completion of the chain of evidence pointing out to the guilt of the accused, then there is no reason as to why the statement of so-called 'interested witnesses' cannot be relied upon by the Court. It would be hard to believe that the close relatives shall leave the real culprit and shall implicate innocent persons falsely simply because they have enmity with the accused persons.
(Emphasis supplied)
34. Insofar as the testimony of injured witness is concerned, this Court in Kaptan Singh vs. State of UP, 2020 (1) ADJ 106 (DB) has, in paragraph 20, observed as under:
20. Close scrutiny of the evidence shows that the statements of (PW-1) Vimla Devi and (PW-2) Ram Singar Pandey are clear, cogent and credible. Theyhave been subjected to cross-examination, but they remained stick to the prosecution version and no such fact, contradiction or inconsistency could emerge, so as to create any doubt about their testimony. Keeping in view the fact that after incident, deceased as well as injured were taken to hospital and were admitted there and that on the same night deceased Ram Niwas Rao has succumbed to injuries, it is apparent that the first information report of the incident was lodged without any undue delay. Version of (PW-1) Vimla Devi finds corroboration from testimony of (PW-2) Ram Singar Pandey and is fully consistent with medical evidence. It is also to be kept in mind that (PW-2) Ram Singar Pandey has himself sustained injuries in the same incident. In Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab, (2009) 9SCC 719, the Supreme Court reiterated the special evidentiary status accorded to the testimony of an injured accused. The fact that the witness sustained injuries at the time and place of occurrence, lends support to his testimony that he was present during the occurrence. In case, the injured witness is subjected to lengthy cross-examination and nothing can be elicited to discard his testimony, it should be relied upon. Similar view was expressed in the case of Krishan v. State of Haryana, (2006) 12 SCC 459. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal Nos. 513-514 of 2014 Baleshwar Mahto and another v. State of Bihar and another, decided on 9.1.2017, has reiterated the law as under :
''28. The question of the weight to be attached to the evidence of a witness that was himself injured in the course of the occurrence has been extensively discussed by this Court. Where a witness to the occurrence has himself been injured in the incident, the testimony of such a witness is generally considered to be very reliable, as he is a witness that comes with a built-in guarantee of his presence at the scene of the crime and is unlikely to spare his actual assailant(s) in order to falsely implicate someone.
''Convincing evidence is required to discredit an injured witness.''[Vide Ramlagan Singh v. State of Bihar [(1973) 3 SCC 881:1973 SCC (Cri) 563:AIR 1972 SC 2593], Malkhan Singh v. State of U.P. [(1975) 3 SCC 311 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 919 : AIR 1975 SC 12], Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab [(1983) 3 SCC 470 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 681], Appabhai v. State of Gujarat [1988 Supp SCC 241 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 559 : AIR 1988 SC 696], Bonkya v. State of Maharashtra [(1995) 6 SCC 447 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 1113], Bhag Singh [(1997) 7 SCC 712 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 1163], Mohar v. State of U.P. [(2002) 7 SCC 606 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 121] (SCC p. 606b-c), Dinesh Kumar v. State of Rajasthan [(2008) 8 SCC 270 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 472], Vishnu v. State of Rajasthan [(2009) 10 SCC 477 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 302], Annareddy Sambasiva Reddy v. State of A.P. [(2009) 12 SCC 546 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 630] and Balraje v. State of Maharashtra [(2010) 6 SCC 673 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 211] 29. While deciding this issue, a similar view was taken in Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab [(2009) 9 SCC 719 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 107], where this Court reiterated the special evidentiary status accorded to the testimony of an injured accused and relying on its earlier judgments held as under: (SCC pp. 726-27, paras 28-29) ''28. Darshan Singh (PW 4) was an injured witness. He had been examined by the doctor. His testimony could not be brushed aside lightly. He had given full details of the incident as he was present at the time when the assailants reached the tubewell. In Shivalingappa Kallayanappa v. State of Karnataka [1994 Supp (3) SCC 235 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1694] this Court has held that the deposition of the injured witness should be relied upon unless there are strong grounds for rejection of his evidence on the basis of major contradictions and discrepancies, for the reason that his presence on the scene stands established in case it is proved that he suffered the injury during the said incident.
In State of U.P. v. Kishan Chand [(2004) 7 SCC 629 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 2021] a similar view has been reiterated observing that the testimony of a stamped witness has its own relevance and efficacy. The fact that the witness sustained injuries at the time and place of occurrence, lends support to his testimony that he was present during the occurrence. In case the injured witness is subjected to lengthy cross-examination and nothing can be elicited to discard his testimony, it should be relied upon (vide Krishan v. State of Haryana [(2006) 12 SCC 459 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 214]). Thus, we are of the considered opinion that evidence of Darshan Singh (PW 4) has rightly been relied upon by the Courts below.''
30. The law on the point can be summarised to the effect that the testimony of the injured witness is accorded a special status in law. This is as a consequence of the fact that the injury to the witness is an inbuilt guarantee of his presence at the scene of the crime and because the witness will not want to let his actual assailant go unpunished merely to falsely implicate a third party for the commission of the offence. Thus, the deposition of the injured witness should be relied upon unless there are strong grounds for rejection of his evidence on the basis of major contradictions and discrepancies therein.'' In this very judgment, relationship between the medical evidence and ocular evidence was also discussed, based on number of earlier precedents, as under: ''33. In State of Haryana v. Bhagirath [(1999) 5 SCC 96 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 658] it was held as follows: (SCC p. 101, para 15) ''15. The opinion given by a medical witness need not be the last word on the subject. Such an opinion shall be tested by the Court. If the opinion is bereft of logic or objectivity, the Court is not obliged to go by that opinion. After all opinion is what is formed in the mind of a person regarding a fact situation. If one doctor forms one opinion and another doctor forms a different opinion on the same facts it is open to the Judge to adopt the view which is more objective or probable. Similarly if the opinion given by one doctor is not consistent with probability the Court has no liability to go by that opinion merely because it is said by the doctor. Of course, due weight must be given to opinions given by persons who are experts in the particular subject.'' In Shivalingappa Kallayanappa v. State of Karnataka, 1994 Supp (3) SCC 235 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1694, the Court has held that the deposition of the injured witness should be relied upon unless there are strong grounds for rejection of his evidence on the basis of major contradictions and discrepancies, for the reason that his presence on the scene stands established in case it is proved that he suffered the injury during the said incident.
It has been held that law on the point can be summarised to the effect that the testimony of the injured witness is accorded a special status in law. This is as a consequence of the fact that the injury to the witness is an inbuilt guarantee of his presence at the scene of the crime and because the witness will not want to let his actual assailant go unpunished merely to falsely implicate a third party for the commission of the offence. Thus, the deposition of the injured witness should be relied upon unless there are strong grounds for rejection of his evidence on the basis of major contradictions and discrepancies therein."
(Emphasis supplied)
35. In a recent judgement rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in Neeraj Sharma vs. State of Chhattisgarh, (2024) 3 SCC 125 in respect of importance of injured witness in a criminal trial, the Hon'ble Apex Court has, in paragraphs 22 and 23, held as under:
22. The importance of injured witness in a criminal trial cannot be over stated. Unless there are compelling circumstances or evidence placed by the defence to doubt such a witness, this has to be accepted as an extremely valuable evidence in a criminal Trial.
23. In the case of Balu Sudam Khalde v. State of Maharashtra 2023 SCC OnLine SC 355 this Court summed up the principles which are to be kept in mind when appreciating the evidence of an injured eye-witness. This court held as follows:
"26. When the evidence of an injured eye-witness is to be appreciated, the under-noted legal principles enunciated by the Courts are required to be kept in mind:
(a) The presence of an injured eye-witness at the time and place of the occurrence cannot be doubted unless there are material contradictions in his deposition.
(b) Unless, it is otherwise established by the evidence, it must be believed that an injured witness would not allow the real culprits to escape and falsely implicate the accused.
(c) The evidence of injured witness has greater evidentiary value and unless compelling reasons exist, their statements are not to be discarded lightly.
(d) The evidence of injured witness cannot be doubted on account of some embellishment in natural conduct or minor contradictions.
(e) If there be any exaggeration or immaterial embellishments in the evidence of an injured witness, then such contradiction, exaggeration or embellishment should be discarded from the evidence of injured, but not the whole evidence.
(f) The broad substratum of the prosecution version must be taken into consideration and discrepancies which normally creep due to loss of memory with passage of time should be discarded."
27. As per the prosecution case the incident is said to have taken place at 3:30 P.M. on 10.5.1983 whereas the first information report was lodged at 19 hours on the same day under section 147, 308, 504 IPC. The case was converted to section 304 IPC at 20:30 on 10.5.1983 on receipt of the information regarding death of the injured Pothi Singh.
28. The prosecution has produced two witness P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 who are said to be eye witness of the occurrence P.W. 1Ram Singh is son of the deceased whereas P.W. 2 Man Singh is real brother of the deceased.
29. P.W. 1 Ram Singh and P.W. 2 Man Singh have supported the prosecution case in their examination-in-chief however P.W. 1 has stated in his cross examination that accused Rajendra (who has been acquitted by the trial court) gave blow of Bhala to the deceased whereas P.W. 2 has stated in his cross examination that he did not see anyone giving blow of Bhala to the deceased.
30. P.W. 1 has further stated that Rajendra had assaulted his father, the deceased, by Bhala using it as lathi which means that Rajendra had given blow of Bhala to the deceased from the blunt part of the instrument. P.W. 1 has stated that he saw that accused Rajendra had given a blow by Bhala by using it as lathi but it was not stated by him before the Investigating Officer in his statement recorded under section 161 Cr.P.C.
31. From the above it is evident that this witness has made material improvements in his statement before the trial court regarding use of the Bhala as a weapon by accused Rajendra.
32. As per the prosecution story the specific role has been assigned to Ram Chandra of catching hold of the deceased Pothi Singh and assault by Bhala to accused Rajendra and rest of the other accused persons including surviving appellant nos. 4 and 6 have been assigned the role of beating the deceased by lathies.
33. P.W. 1 has stated in his cross examination that on hearing the noise of quarrel his mother had reached the place of occurrence and she started crying after clinging on the body of his father.
34. P.W. 2 has stated that the mother of P.W. 1 and wife of the deceased reached the place of occurrence after the incident but she did not go near the body of the deceased and she did not touch his body. The testimonies of P.W.1 and P.W. 2 are contradictory to each other on this point that wife of the deceased reached the place of occurrence after the incident was over. From the statement of P.W. 2 it is highly unnatural that wife of the deceased did not even touch his body when she reached there. It is unbelievable that wife of the injured person did not go near the injured and touch his body.
35. Even the conduct of P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 is highly unnatural and they have stated that they did not make any effort to rush the injured Pothi Singh to nearby hospital or to arrange any medical aid to him as the injured was surviving till lodging of the FIR i.e. for about three and half hours. P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 have further stated that after the incident was over people of the village and nearby places assembled there. It is also highly unbelievable that none of them tried to arrange any medical attention to the deceased Pothi Singh who was alive for about three and half hours after the incident.
36. P.W. 2 has stated in his cross examination that house of the deceased was at a distance of about two houses away from the place of occurrence and as per his testimony he had raised alarm which could have been heard in middle of the village, so it is highly unbelievable that a person who is being beaten near his house and no body from his house comes for his rescue, even P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 have stated that they did not try to save the deceased. In cross examination P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 have stated that they even did not go to their house to collect some weapon like lathi in order to save the deceased from the attack of assailants.
37. From the above discussion the conduct of P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 is highly unnatural which raises doubt that they were present at the place of occurrence when the incident took place.
38. It is admitted case of the prosecution that enmity between the deceased and the accused person was cause of the incident as the deceased was an accused in the murder of father-in-law of one of the accused Rishi Pal, who was acquitted by the court. Further the prosecution story also points to the fact that there was enmity between the accused persons and the deceased regarding election of Pradhanship.
39. D.W. 1 Advocate Lek Pal Singh has deposed to the effect that on the date of occurrence the deceased was present in the District Court Shahjahanpur at 2 P.M. for verifying the surety bonds.
40. We have also noticed, ante-mortem injuries received by the deceased and as per testimony of P.W. 6 as many as 25 injuries were found on the person of the deceased and all the injuries were caused by the hard and blunt substance.
41. Other witnesses P.W. 3 and P.W. 4 are formal witnesses and P.W. 5 is investigating officer of the case. Prosecution has not produced the wife of the deceased as witness as she could have been the natural witness.
42. We find from the over all appreciation of the evidence that prosecution has failed to prove presence of P.W. 1 and P.W. 2 so called eye witnesses on the place of occurrence.
43. We find also that apart from the above there is no other eye witness to the place of occurrence in view of the above, we find that prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond the shadow of reasonable doubt.
44. We find from the over all appreciation of the evidence that the prosecution has failed to prove its case against the surviving appellants beyond the shadow of reasonable doubt.
45. In view of the above, appellants deserve to be acquitted of the charge as framed against them and the appeal deserves to be allowed.
46. Appeal is allowed. The conviction and sentence passed by the learned trial court in Session Trial No. 428 of 1983 in respect of surviving appellant no. 4 Gaya Singh and appellant no. 6 Ram Milan is hereby set aside.
47. As appellants are already on bail, they need not surrender and sureties are discharge forthwith.
48. Let a copy of this order be communicated by the Registrar (Compliance) to the Chief Judicial Magistrate concerned for compliance within a week.
49. The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Shahjahanpur is also directed to send his compliance report within two months to this Court.
50. The trial court record be sent to the concerned Court forthwith.
Order Date :- 8.9.2025
SY
