Prakash Singh vs Indian Institute Of Management Lko. ...
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Allahabad High Court

Prakash Singh vs Indian Institute Of Management Lko. ... on 17 October, 2025

Author: Abdul Moin

Bench: Abdul Moin

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
 
 



 

 

 

 

 
Judgement reserved on :16.09.2025
 
Judgement delivered on : 17.10.2025
 
Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC-LKO:66009
 

 
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
LUCKNOW
 
WRIT - A No. - 10499 of 2024
 

 
Prakash Singh
 

 

 
..Petitioner(s)
 

 

 

 

 
Versus
 

 

 

 

 
Indian Institute of Management Lko. Thru. Board of Governor and another
 

 

 
..Respondent(s)
 

 

 
Counsel for Petitioner(s)
 
:
 
Akshat Kumar, 
 
Counsel for Respondent(s)
 
:
 
Anupras Singh, 
 

 

 
Court No. - 11 
 

 
HON'BLE ABDUL MOIN, J.

1. Heard Shri Vivek Raj Singh, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Shri Shantanu Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri J. N. Mathur, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Shri Anupras Singh, learned counsel for the respondents.

2. The instant writ petition has been filed praying for the following main reliefs:

(i) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the order dated 1.2.2023 as well as 16.3.2024 annexed as Annexure No. 1 and 2 respectively to this writ petition.

(ii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to allow the petitioner to work on the post of Professor, IIM Lucknow and pay him regular salary.

3. Bereft of unnecessary details the facts set forth by learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner was initially appointed as direct recruit as Assistant Professor in the Indian Institute of Management (hereinafter referred to as the IIM) on 31.12.2005. Thereafter he was appointed as Associate Professor on 17.02.2012 in the IIM. Subsequently, vide order dated 27.2.2017, a copy of which is annexure 8 to the writ petition, the petitioner was appointed as a Professor.

4. After departmental proceedings were initiated against him, a final order dated 1.2.2023, a copy of which is annexure 1 to the writ petition, was passed whereby the petitioner who was working on the post of Professor, has been imposed with of a penalty of reduction to the post of Associate Professor for a period of four years which would be a bar to his promotion to the post from which he has been reduced (i.e. Professor) during the period of penalty.

5. No arguments have been raised by learned counsel for the petitioner on any illegality or irregularity in the proceedings initiated against the petitioner which has led passing of the order impugned dated 1.2.2023.

6. However the petitioner has challenged the said order on the ground that once he had been directly appointed to the post of Professor consequently he cannot be reverted to the post of Associate Professor, as has been done by the respondents, vide order impugned dated 1.2.2023.

7. In this regard reliance has been placed on judgement of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Hussain Sasan Saheb Kaladgi vs State of Maharashtra 1988 4 SCC 168 and South Bengal State Transport Corporation vs Ashok Kumar Ghosh and others 2010 11 SCC 711.

8. Placing reliance on aforesaid judgements, the argument of Shri Vivek Raj Singh, learned Senior Advocate is that considering the fact that the petitioner had been appointed on the post of Professor in the IIM vide order dated 27.2.2017 consequently by means of order impugned dated 1.2.2023 he cannot be reverted to the post of Associate Professor in as much as his appointment to the post of Professor was as a direct recruit and it not being a case of promotion from the post of Associate Professor as such reversion to a post which the petitioner never held in the hierarchy i.e. the post of Associate Professor by means of impugned order is legally impermissible keeping in view the aforesaid judgements.

9. On the other hand, Shri J N Mathur, learned Senior Advocate for the respondents has supported the order impugned by contending that the said order has been passed in accordance with law and relevant rules.

10. Elaborating the same, the argument of Shri Mathur is there are no recruitment rules governing the recruitment in the IIM yet Norms for Internal Faculty Members Applying for Higher Promotions (hereinafter referred to as the Norms) have been issued, a copy of which is annexure 3 to the short counter affidavit filed by the respondents.

11. The argument of Shri Mathur is that the petitioner had been considered as an internal candidate for his promotion as a Professor and even though the appointment order as was issued to the petitioner indicates that the petitioner had been appointed as Professor in the IIM yet his entire period of service is also counted for the purpose of payment of retiral dues and other benefits and thus considering the Norms, the appointment of the petitioner as Professor can only be as promotion from the post of Associate Professor and thus the respondents have correctly passed the impugned order of punishment as the petitioner has been held guilty of the charges as levelled against him.

12. In this regard, Shri Mathur has placed reliance on judgements of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of P V Srinivasa Sastry and others vs Comptroller and Auditor General and others, 1993 (1) SCC 419, which, while considering its earlier judgment in the case of Nyadar Singh vs Union of India 1988 (4) SCC 170 has clarified the aforesaid proposition of law to hold that a person cannot be reverted to a lower post which he has never held and accordingly, as in this case the petitioner had earlier held the post of Associate Professor, as such the petitioner being reverted from the post of Professor to that of Associate Professor by means of order impugned is in accordance with law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of P V Srinivasa Sastry (supra).

13. In this regard Shri Mathur has also placed reliance on the averments contained in supplementary short counter affidavit dated 2.9.2025 more particularly the averments made in paragraphs 6 and 7 wherein it has been indicated that all retirement benefits with respect to faculty will be calculated based on initial date of joining on a regular position i.e. the post retiral dues of the petitioner will be calculated based on his initial date of joining on the post of Assistant professor which he joined on 6.3.2006 in pursuance to the appointment order dated 31.12.2005.

14. Shri Mathur has also placed reliance on averments contained in paragraph 5 of the said supplementary short counter affidavit to contend that in case the petitioner had not completed the probation period on the post of Professor at the time of his appointment vide order dated 27.2.2017 he would have been reverted back to the previous post from which he was promoted, to contend that even if the order of the petitioner as Professor indicates of he being appointed as Professor yet in case he did not complete the conditions prescribed in the said appointment order, he was not to be confirmed as specifically indicated in the said order and thus would have been reverted to the post of Associate Professor.

15. Placing reliance on Norms, the further argument of Shri Mathur is that Clause 12 of the Norms clearly provides for evaluation of internal candidates for selection to higher position of which clause 12(B) categorically provides that certain parameters for evaluating internal candidates shall be different from those for external candidates.

16. It is further argued that Clause 12(A) of the said norms also provide that faculty members of the institute wishing to be considered for higher position need to apply in response to the notification issued by the Dean which had been circulated to all persons vide email on 12.8.2016, a copy of which is annexure 1 to the short counter affidavit, which clearly indicated that the application were being invited for a higher position from internal faculty and in pursuance to which the petitioner had applied for the post of Professor in the IIM and the petitioner had been selected by considering him as an internal candidate.

17. Shri Mathur also argues that a perusal of the annexure 5 of the short counter affidavit, which are the minutes of the meeting of the faculty review committee held on 24.10.2016 for considering the application of the internal candidates, would indicate that various faculty members had applied for promotion from the post of Associate Professor which also contains the name of the petitioner at serial no. 3 of the said list.

18. Placing reliance on minutes of meeting of faculty review committee, a copy of which is annexure 7 to the short counter affidavit, Shri Mathur argues that after receiving the research dossiers of the petitioner as well as others for the post of Professor, the external experts had commented that research contribution of the petitioner is not up to the mark for his elevation to the position of Professor and thereafter, while issuing the appointment order, the petitioner was duly informed that he would only be confirmed upon certain stipulations being fulfilled.

19. Placing reliance on judgement of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan vs Fateh Chand Soni, 1996 (1) SCC 562 Shri Mathur argues that Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that in the literal sense, the word promote means to advance to higher position grade or honour and thus once the select committee has itself indicated after considering the candidature of the petitioner as internal candidate that he had been placed as Professor, as such the same would also amount to promotion.

20. Responding Shri Vivek Raj Singh, learned Senior Advocate has argued that for the post of Professor, both external and internal candidates had applied and that even as per the appointment orders that had been issued to the petitioner of various posts, the said orders indicated the same to be an appointment meaning thereby it was a fresh appointment and thus the petitioner could not validly be reverted to the post of Associate Professor by means of order impugned.

21. Further, placing reliance on the extract of service book, a copy of which is filed in supplementary rejoinder affidavit dated 1.9.2025, the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the service book duly indicates that the petitioner had been 'appointed' on the post of Professor and not 'promoted' and thus there cannot be any reversion to the post of Associate Professor from which he had never been promoted.

22. As regards the averments made in paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of the short counter affidavit dated 2.9.2025 the argument of Shri Vivek Raj Singh, learned Senior Advocate is that once as per the recruitment policy of the institute there is no provision of promotion in the IIM and even as per the e-mail sent by the Dean of IIM, Lucknow dated 8.1.2019 it has been clarified that there is no provision for promotion, consequently the appointment of the petitioner to a higher post can only be treated as an appointment and not a promotion.

23. He also argues that the date of initial joining is relevant only for the purpose of calculating the retiral benefits but in no way would calculation of retiral benefits change the nature of appointment of the petitioner from one of appointment to that of promotion.

24. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records.

25. From the arguments as raised by learned Senior Advocates appearing for both the parties as well as perusal of record it emerges that the petitioner was initially appointed as an Assistant Professor in the year 2005, was thereafter appointed as Associate Professor in the year 2012 and thereafter vide order dated 27.2.2017 he was appointed as a Professor. After departmental proceedings, the order impugned dated 1.2.2023 was passed whereby the petitioner has been imposed with a penalty of reducing him to the post of Associate Professor for a period of four years. The appeal / representation filed by the petitioner against the said order was also rejected vide order dated 16.3.2024.

26. The order of reversion dated 1.2.2023 is sought to be challenged on the ground that as the petitioner was "appointed" on the post of Professor and there was no element of promotion entailed in he being appointed as professor while he was earlier working as Associate Professor, consequently, he cannot be reverted to the post of Associate Professor. In this regard reliance has been placed on judgments ofHon'ble Supreme Court in the case ofHussain Sasan Saheb Kaladgi (supra) andAshok Kumar Ghosh (supra).

27. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case ofHussain Sasan Saheb Kaladgi (supra) has held as under:

"2. Before the High Court it was conceded by the learned Government Pleader that the appellant was appointed to the post of A.D.E.I. as a 'direct recruit' and that he was not a departmental promotee who had been promoted from the post of primary teacher to the post of A.D.E.I. This is abundantly clear from the following passage extracted from the judgment of the High Court:

Before us the learned Government Pleader conceded that the appointment of the plaintiff as A.D.E.I. appears to be a direct appointment and not a matter of departmental promotion. He may be ineligible in terms of requisite departmental service as a teacher, but he had the educational qualifications required for the post and he had directly applied for the post, though the application had to come through proper channel in view of the fact that the plaintiff was in service.

In view of this concession, the High Court should have straightway dismissed the appeal. A direct recruit to a post, it cannot be gainsaid, cannot be reverted to a lower post. It is only a promotee who can be reverted from the promotion post to the lower post from which he was promoted. These propositions are so elementary that the same are incapable of being disputed and have not been disputed. The High Court presumably realised that the matter was inarguable and there was no escape from the conclusion reached by the trial court. The High Court was however carried away by an irrelevant argument which had no bearing on the issue before the Court. What was argued before the High Court was that in any case his appointment was a temporary one and it could have been terminated as per the conditions of service applicable to him. Assuming that his appointment was a temporary one and it could have been so terminated, the fact remains that in point of fact no such power had been invoked and the services of the appellant had not been terminated at all. If his service had been so terminated under the relevant rule, the question could possibly have arisen as to whether or not such termination could have been lawfully made. No such termination having taken place, the existence of the rule was altogether irrelevant. The State had passed an order which clearly was unsustainable in view of the fact that the appellant was a direct recruit and there was no question of reverting him to any lower post. The High Court should not have allowed itself to be misled by the misleading argument regarding the service condition under which the services of the appellant could possibly have been, but were not in fact, terminated. The view taken by the High Court is thoroughly unsustainable. The appeal must, therefore, be allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the High Court must accordingly be set aside and the judgment and decree passed by the trial court must be restored. The parties will bear their costs throughout."

28. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case ofAshok Kumar Ghosh (supra) has held as under:

"20. We may next consider whether the punishment is permissible in service jurisprudence. It is well settled that while an employee can be reverted to a lower post or service, he cannot be reverted to a post lower than the post in which he entered service (See: Nyadar Singh vs Union of India - AIR 1988 SC 1979). Further it is also well settled that reversion to a lower post or service does not permit reversion to a post outside the cadre that is from regular post to a daily wage post. We are therefore of the view that the punishment inflicted on the delinquent employee not being one of the punishments enumerated in Regulation 36, is not permissible in law."

29. From perusal of the judgment ofHon'ble Supreme Court in the case ofHussain Sasan Saheb Kaladgi (supra) it emerges that theHon'ble Supreme Court has held that a direct recruit to a post cannot be reverted to a lower post and it is only a promotee who can be reverted from the promotion post to the lower post from which he was promoted.

30. LikewiseHon'ble Supreme Court in the case ofAshok Kumar Ghosh (supra) has also held that although it is well settled that an employee can be reverted to a lower post or service, he cannot be reverted to a post lower than a post in which he entered service.

31. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of P V Srinivasa Sastry (supra) while considering its earlier judgments in the case ofNyadar Singh (supra) has held as under:

"8. The expression "reduction in rank" in Article 311(2) has an obvious reference to different grades in service. Whenever there is a reduction in rank it implies reversion from a higher post to a lower post. Reversion from a higher post to a lower post may be under exigencies of situation or by way of punishment. The expression "reduction in rank" occurring in Article 311(2) covers only such reversions which are by way of punishment. The expression "reduction in rank", within the meaning of Article 311(2) as the expression itself suggests, means reduction from a higher to a lower rank or post. But whether in this process an officer can be reduced from a higher rank or a post to a rank to which he never belonged and to a post which he never held? It the power to reduce an officer by way of punishment to a rank which was never held by such officer is conceded, then a person directly appointed as Upper Division Clerk cannot only be reverted to the post of Lower Division Clerk, but even to the post of a Peon; an Engineer to the post of a Fitter, a Head-Master of a School to the post of an Accountant or Clerk in the said School. As such even while imposing the punishment of reduction in rank, the order must have nexus with the post held by the delinquent officer concerned, from which he had been promoted to the post from which he is being reverted. It such an officer had not held that post or was not member of that cadre then he cannot be reverted to a lower cadre to which he did not belong or to a lower rank which he did not hold at any stage."

(emphasis by the Court)

32. LikewiseHon'ble Supreme Court in the case ofNyadar Singh (supra) has held as under:

"28. There are, therefore, certain considerations of policy that might militate against such a wide meaning to be given to the power. In conceivable cases, the Government servant may not have the qualifications requisite for the post which may require and involve different, though not necessarily higher, skills and attainments. Here enter considerations of the recruitment-policy. The rule must be read in consonance PG NO 558 with the general principles and so construed the expression `reduction' in it would not admit of a wider connotation. The power should, of course, be available to reduce a civil servant to any lower time-scale, grade, service or post from which he had subsequently earned his promotion.

29. The Second, and perhaps equally relevant, consideration, is the anomaly that a pushing to its logical limits of such power might produce. In Srinivasa Sastry's case, (supra), the learned Judge of the Karnataka High Court visualised these anomalies thus.

". . . . . Acceptance of the contentions urged for the respondents would lead to incongruous and absurd results. To illustrate, could a Doctor be reduced in rank to the post of a Compounder, or an Engineer to the post of a Fitter, or a Teacher in a High School to the post of a Peon, or a Scientific Officer to the post of a ministerial officer, in the absence of any provision in the rules for the consideration of the case of the civil servant concerned, for promotion from the latter category to the former category? It appears to me that on a fair and proper construction of rule II (vi) of the Rules, the condition precedent for the exercise of power under that rule by way of imposing penalty of reduction in rank to a lower post is, that the higher post from which the concerned civil servant is sought to be reduced must be a promotional post in relation to the lower post to which he is sought to be reduced.

32. The point now is as to what orders are to be made in these appeals. Appellants in the two appeals have been reduced to posts lower than these to which they were initially directly recruited. As these penalties cannot be sustained in the view we take of the rule, in the normal course the penalties imposed would require to be set aside and the disciplinary authority directed to re-consider which other penalty which it would now choose to impose. But, we are of the opinion that it would be somewhat unfair that at this distance of time the matters are re-opened. We think, having regard to all the circumstances of the cases the orders that commend themselves appropriate in the two cases are in terms following:

(i) In the first of the appeals, appellant-Nyadar Singh, has, after the period of the reduction in rank has spent itself out, been restored to the original position. It would, therefore, be sufficient to set aside the penalty imposed on him and direct that the period of service in the PG NO 560 reduced post be treated as service in the post held by him prior to imposition of the penalty, subject to the condition, however, that the appellant shall not be entitled to any difference of salary for and during the period of reduction. In view of this, we think that the proceedings taken against him should come to an end and there is no need to remit the matter to the Disciplinary-Authority for selection and imposition of a fresh penalty.

(ii) In the case of M.J. Ninama the penalty of reduction in rank is set aside and he shall be restored to the post which he held before the imposition of the penalty. However, for the period, if any, served by him in the lower post pursuant to the penalty imposed on him, he shall not be entitled to the difference of salary. It will also not be necessary to remit his case for fresh consideration of the choice of the penalty having regard to the lapse of time."

(emphasis by the Court)

33. From perusal of the judgments in the case ofNyadar Singh (supra) and P V Srinivasa Sastry (supra) it clearly emerges thatHon'ble Supreme Court has held that a person cannot be reduced from higher rank or post to a rank to which he never belonged and to a post which he never held and that while imposing punishment of reduction in rank, the order must have nexus to the post held by the delinquent officer concerned from which he had been promoted to the post from which he is being reverted meaning thereby that a person can be reverted to a post from which he had been promoted or which he had held.

34. In order to consider as to whether the petitioner had been promoted from the post of Associate Professor to that of Professor the Norms which govern the recruitment to the IIM are to be considered.

35. From the Norms, it emerges that the same deal with internal faculty members applying for higher positions. The method of recruitment is provided in Clause 9 of which clause 9 (A) indicates the method of recruitment of a regular faculty.

36. Clause 11 pertains to the probation period which reads as under:

"11. PROBATION

(A) All regular faculty appointments at the institute shall have a period of probation. For fresh appointments given to the external candidates, the probation period will be two years. For internal candidates selected for a higher position, the probation period shall be one year.

(13) In the month during which the probationary period ends the faculty member will submit a report to Dean (Faculty) summarizing the academic contributions made him the period. Dean (Faculty) will compile the information along with the feedback reports from respective Programme Chairpersons and put up the recommendation to Director who will make the final decision and issue necessary orders.

Upon completion of the probation satisfactorily, the probationer may be confirmed / issued orders regarding satisfactory completion of probation, as the case may be. If the probationer has not completed the period of probation satisfactorily, the Director may extend period of the probation or discharge the probationer or terminate the services of the probationer as the case may be in accordance with relevant rules and orders"

37. Clause 12 of the Norms pertains to evaluation of internal candidates for selection of higher position which reads as follows:

"12. EVALUATION OF INTERNAL CANDIDATES FOR SELECTION OF HIGHER POSITION

(A) Faculty members of the Institute wishing to be considered for higher positions need to apply in response to the notification issued by the Dean (Faculty).

(B) Certain parameters for evaluating internal candidates shall be different from those for external candidates. For internal candidates the following parameters may be kept in view in addition to academic background and professional experience while evaluating his/her candidature:

(a) Average annual teaching load and the student feed from respective chairpersons on the courses taught in the Post Graduate level programmes

(b) Contribution to teaching and guidance in the Fellow Programme

(c) Research and publications

(d) Contribution to MDP activities (including their evaluation in terms of number of participants, feedback, as also surplus generation) and participation in consultancy activities

(e) Assignments of academic administration undertaken and the performance in such tasks.

(f) Any other criteria notified from time to tame

(C) The internal candidate(s) meeting the notified criteria will have to appear for selection interview by the Selection Committee constituted as per Sl. No. 9 (A)(7) when it is constituted for the Area. However they will be exempted from delivering a seminar.

(D) The proceedings of the Selection Committee would be approved by the Director."

38. From perusal of the Clause 11 of the Norms it emerges that all regular faculty appointment in the institute shall have a period of probation. For fresh appointments given to external candidates the probation period will be two years while for internal candidates selected for a higher position the probation period shall be one year. Thus a clear distinction with regard to probation has been drawn up with regard to external candidates vis a vis the internal candidates who have got a different probationary period.

39. Likewise clause 12(B) of the Norms clearly indicates that the parameters for evaluating internal candidates shall be different from those for external candidates. Clause (c) of Clause 12 clearly provides that the internal candidates will be exempted from delivering a seminar.

40. Annexure 1 of the short counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondents no. 1 and 2 dated 22.1.2025 is an e-mail that has been sent to the colleges by the Dean (Faculty) informing that the faculty colleges who are eligible and interested to apply for a higher position may submit the detailed CV to the office of the Dean (Faculty) by a particular date. Likewise the inter office memo sent by the petitioner dated 22.8.2016, a copy of which is annexure 2 to the aforesaid short counter affidavit, would indicate that the petitioner had submitted his application for a higher position. Thus it is clearly apparent that the petitioner had been treated as an internal candidate for the higher position of professor while working as associate professor and different norms are applicable for dealing with the cases / selection / appointment / placement of an internal candidate to a higher position vis a vis the external candidates.

41. This would also be apparent from a perusal of the appointment order of the petitioner dated 27.2.2017 which indicates that the petitioner was on probation and that his services could be terminated by giving him three months notice or salary in lieu thereof.

42. Paragraph 5 of the supplementary counter affidavit clearly indicates that in case the petitioner had not been confirmed on completion of probation he would have been reverted back to the previous post from where he was placed on a higher post meaning thereby that in case of non confirmation he would have been reverted as an Associate Professor.

43. Thus from perusal of the aforesaid discussion it is apparent that even though the appointment order of the petitioner as professor indicates that he was being appointed but the said appointment had all the elements of a promotion or placement in a higher grade / post by treating him as an internal candidate. Merely because the word "promotion" does not find place in the appointment order of the petitioner yet considering the Norms and paragraph 5 of thesupplementary counter affidavit indicating that in case of non confirmation he would have been posted back as an Associate Professor (and did not entail the termination of his appointment per se), as such the appointment on the post of professor can easily be termed as a placement to a higher post.

44. In this regard it would be apt to refer to the judgment ofHon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Fateh Chand Soni (supra) wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under :

"8. The High Court, in our opinion, was not right in holding that promotion can only be to a higher post in the Service and appointment to a higher scale of an officer holding the same post does not constitute promotion. In the literal sense the word 'promote' means "to advance to a higher position, grade, or honour". So also 'promotion' means "advancement or preferment in honour, dignity, rank, or grade". (See: Webster's Comprehensive Dictionary, International Edn., p. 1009.) 'Promotion' thus not only covers advancement to higher position or rank but also implies advancement to a higher grade. In service law also the expression 'promotion' has been understood in the wider sense and it has been held that "promotion can be either to a higher pay scale or to a higher post" (See: Union of India v. S.S. Ranade, SCC at p. 468.)"

(emphasis by the Court)

45. From perusal of the aforesaid judgement ofFateh Chand Soni (supra) it clearly emerges thatHon'ble Supreme Court has held that the word "promote" means "to advance to a higher position, grade or honour" and the word "promotion" means "advancement or preferment in honour, dignity, rank or grade." and thus promotion would not only cover advancement to higher position or rank but would also imply advancement to a higher grade. In this view of the matterHon'ble Supreme Court held that in service law the expression "promotion" has been understood in a wider sense and it has been held that promotion can either be to a higher pay scale or to a higher post.

46. In this regard it would also be apt to refer to judgement of Honble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India vs S S Ranade, (1995) 4 SCC 462 wherein even an order of promotion per se was not held by Honble Supreme Court to be an actual promotion rather only placement and Honble Supreme Court while placing reliance on an earlier judgement of Lalit Mohan Deb vs Union of India and others (1973) 3 SCC 862 laid down the proposition of law as has been followed in the case of Fateh Chand Soni (supra).

47. The respondents in the supplementary counter affidavit have also clearly indicated that the entire period of service rendered by the petitioner would be counted for the purpose of retirement benefits from his initial date of joining on the regular post i.e. with effect from 6.3.2006 when the petitioner joined as an Assistant Professor meaning thereby that there is continuity of service of the petitioner in the IIM, Lucknow and consequently his appointment to the post of Professor can only be termed as a promotion and thus this Court does not find any infirmity in the petitioner being reverted from the post of Professor to that of Associate Professor by means of the order impugned.

48. However considering the fact that a substantial period has lapsed since the order of punishment dated 1.2.2023 and also considering that the petitioner had been placed / promoted as Professor seeing his achievements accordingly it would be open for the respondents to re-consider the punishment of the petitioner in view of the substantial period of time having lapsed since the imposition of punishment.

49. The writ petition is dismissed subject to aforesaid observations.

Order Date: 17.10.2025

J. K. Dinkar