Citation : 2025 Latest Caselaw 11477 ALL
Judgement Date : 14 October, 2025
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
RESERVED
AFR
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
WRIT A No. -11824 of 2025
Akhilesh Kumar Mishra
..Petitioners(s)
Versus
State of U.P. And 2 Others
..Respondents(s)
Counsel for Petitioners(s)
:
Seemant Singh
Counsel for Respondent(s)
:
Shivendra Kumar Singh, C.S.C., Hari Narayan Singh
Court No. -52
HON'BLE MRS. MANJU RANI CHAUHAN, J.
1. Heard Mr. Seemant Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Shivendra Kumar Singh, learned counsel for respondent no.2, Mr. Hari Narayan Singh, learned counsel for respondent no.3/BSA and learned Standing Counsel for the State-respondents.
2. The instant petition has been filed with the following prayers:-
"(i) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned office notification dated 06.08.2025 issued by the State Project Director, Uttar Pradesh Education for all Project Board whereby the petitioner has been repatriated to the post of Assistant Teacher in Primary School Hashkheda, Block- Machhrehta, District- Sitapur and further District Basic Education Officer, Aligarh has also been directed to relieve the petitioner to his original school at Sitapur.
(ii) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents not to interfere in the peaceful working of petitioner on the post of District Co-ordinator (Girls Education) at Project Director Office, Education for all, District Aligarh.
(iii) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the District Basic Education Officer, Aligarh, not to relieve the petitioner from the post of District Coordinator (Girls Education) at Project Director Office, Education for all, District Aligarh, on the basis of impugned order dated 06.08.2025 issued by the State Project Director, Uttar Pradesh Education for all Project Board."
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned office notification repatriating the petitioner to his original school at Sitapur is per se illegal, for the reason that the government order dated 26.05.2003, on the basis of which the impugned office notification has been passed by the State Project Director, Uttar Pradesh Education for All Project Board, is not at all applicable to the employees of U.P. Basic Education Board.
4. He further submits that petitioner has not been sent on deputation as a result of transfer rather the case of the petitioner is that he has been sent on deputation as a result of selection and appointment, though on a temporary basis.
5. The temporary appointment of petitioner on the post of District Coordinator at District- Aligarh is admittedly based on a selection in which petitioner came to be selected and appointed on the post of District Coordinator without there being any specified period. Even the advertisement/Notification dated 21.12.2019 does not prescribe the appointment of District Coordinators for a fixed period but only refers to a temporary basis, inasmuch as there was also no mention of deputation.
6. The appointment order dated 28.07.2020 refers to appointment on deputation, but no fixed period is mentioned, nor is there any reference to a government order or circular which may have prescribed any specific period of deputation. Further the appointment order dated 28.07.2020 clearly reflects that the respondents had proceeded to appoint the petitioner on the basis of notification/advertisement dated 21.12.2019, on deputation by selection and appointment.
7. The government order dated 29.08.2022, is appended to the covering letter dated 01.09.2025 supplied by the learned Chief Standing Counsel to the Hon'ble Court which reveals that the said government order cannot be applied with retrospective effect as the same would apply from the date of issuance i.e., 29.08.2022, meaning thereby the vacancies of District Coordinators as on 29.08.2022 has been directed to be filled up through outsourcing. As such it cannot include the vacancies on which District Coordinators like the petitioner were already working prior to his illegal removal from the post of District Coordinator at District- Aligarh.
8. He further submits that learned Chief Standing Counsel could not produce any government order or circular before the Hon'ble Court on the basis of which the selection and appointment of the petitioner on the post of District Coordinator at Aligarh has been made in which the specified period of time may have been given as such petitioner is entitled to continue on his respective post of District Coordinator (Girls Education) at Aligarh.
9. He further submits that learned Chief Standing Counsel has drawn the attention of the Hon'ble Court to the instructions dated 01.09.2025 in which the minutes of the meeting dated 10.10.2019 are given. In minute No.4/5 deals with the issue in question relating to the selection and appointment of District Coordinators in different districts as such the petitioner has meticulously gone through the minutes of meeting dated 10.10.2019 which starts from Page No.17 to Page No.21 in which the procedure of selection and appointment is given but according to the understanding of the petitioner no specified period of time for appointment on the post of District Coordinator is given.
10. So far as Agenda No.5, which continues from page No.21 to page No.22 is concerned, the petitioner finds that the period of contract which has been prescribed for one year (subject to renewal upon satisfactory work) but it relates only to District Coordinator (MIS) i.e., District Coordinator Management Information System which has to be filled up on contractual basis while the post of District Coordinator (Special Training), District Coordinator (Training), District Coordinator (Girls Education) and District Coordinator (Community Involvement) have to be filled up by deputation from the regular teachers working under U.P. Basic Education Board.
11. He further submits that no government order or circular has been issued on the basis of the aforesaid minutes of the meeting dated 10.10.2019 prescribing any specified period of time may have been given. Further, the State Project Director, Uttar Pradesh, Education for All Project Office and State Project Office, Lucknow issued a circular dated 30.12.2019 addressed to District Basic Education Officers of all districts of Uttar Pradesh in reference to advertisement dated 21.12.2019 issued by State Project Office, Lucknow directing the District Basic Education Officers to inspire the regular teachers working in the schools regulated by U.P. Basic Education Board to apply against the advertisement for appointment on the post of District Coordinator through the selection process. The State Project Director, Lucknow did not prescribe any fixed period of time for which the District Coordinators were required to be appointed.
12. Learned counsel for the petitioner, in support of his submissions, has relied upon the following judgments:-
(i) In the case of Ashok Kumar Ratilal Patel Vs. Union of India & Another, reported in (2012) 7 Supreme Court Cases 757, the Apex Court has held:-
In Paragraph No.6 deals with the terms and conditions for deputation has been given in which the period of deputation is of one year and extendable for a total period not exceeding 3 years on yearly basis and further in paragraph No.13 deals with the transfers on deputation which are ordinarily made as against equivalent post from one cadre to another and in paragraph No.14 deals with appointment (Recruitment) on deputation. A person who applies for appointment on deputation has an indefeasible right to be treated fairly and equally and once person is selected and offered with the letter of appointment on deputation, the same cannot be cancelled except on the ground of non suitability or unsatisfactory work and also in paragraph No.15 the Hon'ble Supreme Court holds that the present case is not a case of transfer on deputation it is a case of appointment on deputation for which advertisement was issued after due selection, the offer of appointment was issued in favour of the appellant and the respondents cannot refuse to accept the joining of most eligible selected candidate except on ground of unsuitability and unsatisfactory performance. The present case of the petitioner is at more better footing for the reason that there is no specified period of time as either provided in the notification/advertisement dated 21.12.2019 nor provided in the appointment order dated 28.07.2020, therefore petitioner shall continue to hold the post of District Coordinator at Aligarh subject to suitability and satisfactory performance.
(ii) The Apex Court in the case of State of Orrisa Vs. Orissa Khadi & Village Industries Board Karmachari Sangh & Another, reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC (28), has held:-
The employees of the Board cannot be at par with the employees of State Government for all purposes.
13. Learned counsel for the respondent no.2 has made following submissions:-
14. Learned counsel for the respondent no.2 submits that through a meeting of the Executive Council of the Parishad held on 19.07.2022, a decision was taken in pursuance of which the Project Director had issued an advertisement wherein an application were invited for appointment on temporary post of District Coordinator (Training), District Coordinator (Community Involvement) and District Coordinator (Girls Education) wherein an online applications were invited between 23.12.2019 to 05.01.2020 from eligible Assistant Teachers of Primary Schools run by U.P. Basic Education Board.
15. He further submits that the said advertisement inviting online applications was issued in pursuance of the decision taken by the Executive Council of the Board in the 52nd meeting dated 10.10.2019 for appointment on temporary basis on the post of District Coordinator (Training), District Coordinator (Community Involvement) and District Coordinator (Girls Education) on deputation and for further action, the Additional Chief Secretary, Basic Education, Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow had been authorized by the Executive Council of the Board.
16. He further submits that in pursuance of the decision of the Executive Council, online applications were invited and after completing the necessary formalities, selection and appointment through deputation were made to the posts of District Coordinator (Training), District Coordinator (Community Involvement) and District Coordinator (Girls Education).
17. He further submits that later on the Executive Council of the Board in its meeting held on 19.07.2022 had taken a decision to fill up the posts of District Coordinator (Training), District Coordinator (Community Involvement) and District Coordinator (Girls Education) through outsourcing and in pursuance of the said decision taken by the Executive Council in its meeting held on 19.07.2022, the Principal Secretary, Basic Education Department, U.P., Lucknow had issued a circular on 19.08.2022 addressed to the Director General, School Education, Uttar Pradesh an Director, State Project, Samagra Shiksha, Uttar Pradesh for making selection and appointment on the post of District Coordinator (Training), District Coordinator (Community Involvement) and District Coordinator (Girls Education) through an outsourcing agency, to be selected by means of GEM Portal in order to provide eligible candidates on a fixed honorarium.
18. He further submits that the petitioner who had applied online application in the year 2019-20 had been issued appointment letter dated 28.07.2020 wherein it was provided that the lien of the petitioner would remain with the parent department and that he would draw salary from his original school/district.
19. He further submits that the State Government, vide government order dated 26.05.2003 addressed to all Departments had already provided that the period of deputation shall not be increased in any case after expiry of 5 years and thereafter, the concerned employee must be repatriated to his parent Department.
20. He submits that Section 24 of Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 lays down the duties of teachers, in which the most important being to maintain regularity and punctuality in attending School and complete the curriculum. Section 24 of RTE Act, 2009 is being quoted herein below:-
Section 24 in The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009.24. Duties of teachers and redressal of grievances.
(1) A teacher appointed under sub-section (1) of section 23 shall perform the following duties, namely:-
(a) maintain regularity and punctuality in attending school;
(b) conduct and complete the curriculum in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 29;
(c) complete entire curriculum within the specified time;
(d) assess the learning ability of each child and accordingly supplement additional instructions, if any, as required;
(e) hold regular meetings with parents and guardians and apprise them about the regularity in attendance, ability to learn, progress made in learning and any other relevant information about the child; and
(f) perform such other duties as may be prescribed.
(2) A teacher committing default in performance of duties specified in sub-section (1), shall be liable to disciplinary action under the service rules applicable to him or her:Provided that before taking such disciplinary action, reasonable opportunity of being heard shall be afforded to such teacher.
(3) The grievances, if any, of the teacher shall be redressed in such manner as may be prescribed.
21. As per Rule 27 of the 1981 Rules, the primary duty of the Teacher is to teach in his school and complete the prescribed curriculum. The Rule 27 of the 1981 Rules is being quoted herein below:-
27. Prohibition of deployment of teachers for non-educational No Teacher shall be owned, controlled or substantially purpose. financed by funds provided directly or indirectly by the appropriate Government or by a local authority, shall ensure that vacancy of teacher in a School under its control shall not exceed then per cent, of the total sanctioned strength.
9. That from perusal of the Section-24 of the RTE Act, 2009 and Rule-27 of 1981 Rules, the primary duty of the petitioner is to maintain regularity and punctuality in the School and to complete the curriculum because his appointment on the post of District Coordinator was on temporary basis on deputation with lien protected in his original school and District, therefore, petitioner being a deputationist cannot seek any remedy in law against his repatriation order because a deputationist has no vested right to continue in the transferred department and he can be repatriated any time even before completion of his period, if any, mentioned in the deputation order and no relief can be claimed in teeth of Section 24 of RTE Act, 2009 r/w Rule 27 of 1981 Rules.
10. That the Coordinate Bench of this Hon'ble Court at Lucknow vide order dated 23.05.2025 passed in Writ (A) No. 6157 of 2024 (Shashank Sachan Vs. State of U.P. & Others), in Paragraph No. 23, 24, 25, 27, 29 & 30 are observed as follows:-
23. Now, I would like to deal with the case laws so cited by learned counsel for the parties. Paras-8, 12, 13, 14, 17 & 18 of the case in Re: Ashok Kumar Ratilal Patel (supra) read as under:-
"8.North Gujarat University in turn by letter dated 5th March, 2010 informed the 2nd respondent the approval of deputation given by the Executive Council of the North Gujarat University with further information that the appellant will be relieved on 17th March, 2010. The 2nd respondent was further informed that the present basic pay of the appellant is Rs. 19,100 in the pay scale of Rs. 16,400-450-20,900-500-22,400 and very shortly the same will be revised as per the 6th Pay Commission and will be fixed in Revised Pay Band+Academic Grade Pay of Rs.37,400 67,000+Rs.10,000. The 2nd respondent on receipt of the said letter issued the impugned letter dated 11th March, 2010 and withdrew the offer of appointment of the appellant on the ground that deputation from higher post to lower post is not admissible under rules."
12. On the other hand, according to the respondents, they having realised that the pay of the parent department of the appellant could not be paid as he was getting higher pay as Director in the North Gujarat University, the offer of deputation was withdrawn. It was further contended that a person getting higher scale of pay cannot be deputed against a lower scale of pay and the appellant has no right to claim his entitlement to the post of Director, AICTE.
13. Ordinarily transfers on deputations are made as against equivalent post from one cadre to another, one department to another, one organisation to another, or one Government to another; in such case a deputationist has no legal right in the post. Such deputationist has no right to be absorbed in the post to which he is deputed. In such case, deputation does not result into recruitment, as no recruitment in its true import and significance takes place as the person continues to be a member of the parent service.
14. However, the aforesaid principle cannot be made applicable in the matter of appointment(recruitment) on deputation. In such case, for appointment on deputation in the services of the State or organisation or State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, the provisions of Article 14 and Article 16 are to be followed. No 11 person can be discriminated nor it is open to the appointing authority to act arbitrarily or to pass any order in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. A person, who applies for appointment on deputation has indefeasible right to be treated fairly and equally and once such person is selected and offered with the letter of appointment on deputation, the same cannot be cancelled except on the ground of non- suitability or unsatisfactory work.
17. Going by the principles as referred to above, we are constrained to state that the High Court failed to appreciate the difference between "transfer on deputation" and "appointment on deputation" and erred in holding that the appellant has no right to claim entitlement to the post of Director. As the appellant was selected after due selection and was offered appointment on deputation, and, in absence of any valid ground shown by the respondents, we hold that the appellant has a right to join the post and the respondents were bound to accept his joining.
18. For the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order of withdrawal of appointment dated 11th March, 2010 and the order of the Division Bench of Gujarat High Court cannot be sustained and they are accordingly set aside. As the post of Director is vacant, in view of the interim order of this Court dated 9th May, 2011, we direct the 2nd respondent to accept the joining of the appellant for a period of one year on deputation which is to be counted from the date of his joining and other terms and conditions of deputation will remain same. The North Gujarat University is directed to relieve the appellant with further direction to 2nd respondent to accept the joining of the appellant within one week from the date of reporting by the appellant."
(emphasis supplied)
24. Para-6 of the case in re: Kunal Nanda (supra) reads as under:-"On the legal submissions also made there are no merits whatsoever.
It is well settled that unless the claim of the deputationist for permanent absorption in the department where he works on deputation is based upon any statutory Rule, Regulation or Order having the force of law, a deputationist cannot assert and succeed in any such claim for absorption. The basic principle underlying deputation itself is that the person concerned can always and at any time be repatriated to his parent department to serve in his substantive position therein at the instance of either of the departments and there is no vested right in such a person to continue for long on deputation or get absorbed in the department to which he had gone on deputation. The reference to the decision reported in Rameshwar Prasad vs. M.D., U.P. Rajkiya Nirman Nigam Ltd. And others [1999 (8) SCC 381] is inappropriate since, the consideration therein was in the light of statutory rules for absorption and the scope of those rules. The claim that he need not be a graduate for absorption and being a service candidate, on completing service of 10 years he is exempt from the requirement of possessing a degree need mention, only to be rejected. The stand of the respondent department that the absorption of a deputationist being one against the direct quota, the possession of basic educational qualification prescribed for direct recruitment i.e., a degree is a must and essential and that there could no comparison of the claim of such a person with one to be dealt with on promotion of a candidate who is already in service in that department is well merited and deserves to be sustained and we see no infirmity whatsoever in the said claim."
25. Paras-6 and 8 of the case in re: Mahesh Chandra Gautam (supra) (emphasis supplied) read as under:-"6. In my view, the contentions raised by the learned Counsels for the petitioners cannot be accepted. It is the prerogative of the employer to call back its employees sent on deputation. The employee, who has been sent on deputation and, in the present case, namely, petitioners have no right or lien on the deputation post. Even if period has been cut short, the petitioners have no right or claim on that post and they cannot stand before this Court and submit that they are entitled to continue on that post till the original period of deputation. In Hari Om Tripathi vs. Nideshak, Rajya Nagar Vikas Adhikaran, this Court held that the employee, who was sent on deputation could be reverted back to the parent department prior to the expiry of the stipulated period, since the employee cannot claim any right on the deputation post.
8. In the Kunal Nanda vs. Union of India, the Supreme Court held that a deputationist can always and at any time be repatriated to his parent department either at the instance of the borrowing Department or on the instance of the lending department. The Supreme Court further held that incumbent who had which has been posted had no vested right to continue on deputation or get absorbed in borrowing department. The Supreme Court held:-
'On the legal submissions made also there are no merits whatsoever. It is well settled that unless the claim of the deputationist for permanent absorption in the department where he works on deputation is based upon any statutory Rule, Regulation or Order having the force of law, a deputationist cannot assert and succeed in any such claim for absorption. The basic principle underlying deputation itself is that the person concerned can always and at any time be repatriated to his parent department to serve in his substantive position therein at the instance of either of the departments and there is no vested right in such a person to continue for long on deputation or get absorbed in the department to which he had gone on deputation'."
(emphasis supplied)
26. This Court in the case in re: Dinesh Kumar Singh (supra) has followed the aforesaid settled proposition of law.
27. Notably, para-9 in re: D.K. Yadav (supra), which has been discussed above, would not be applicable in the present case. So far as the fact and circumstances of the case in re: Ashok Kumar Ratilal Patel (supra) is concerned, notably the deputationist was selected on the post on deputation to the lower post from higher post, therefore such appointment was withdrawn/ cancelled by the Competent Authority but the Apex Court has held that a person who applies for appointment on deputation has an indefeasible right to be treated fairly and equally and once such person is selected and offered with the letter of appointment on deputation, the same cannot be cancelled except on the ground of non-suitability or unsatisfactory work. The facts and circumstances of the present case are altogether different inasmuch as the petitioners have not been selected on the post of District Coordinator on deputation having lower pay-scale and emoluments than they were having prior to their appointment, rather they all are getting some more incentive and their salary etc. is being paid by their parent department and their selection has not been cancelled, rather they have been repatriated to their parent department. Therefore, the direction of Apex Court giving in para-13 of the aforesaid judgment would be applicable whereby the general principles in respect of law of deputation has been defined. Hence, the present petitioners cannot get any benefit from the judgment of Ashok Kumar Ratilal Patel (supra) in the present case.
28. Hence, to sum up, the deputationists have got no indefeasible right to be retained in their borrowing department and they should be repatriated to their parent department where they have been maintaining their lien. The deputation appointment may not be of permanent nature so the deputationists should either be repatriated to their parent department as per terms and conditions of such appointment or in terms of the guidelines so prescribed under the Government Order or any circular etc. dealing such issue or even prior to the period so prescribed in their appointment order if the Competent Authority of the parent department or borrowing department is willing to do so following the due procedure of law.
29. In the light of what have been considered here-in-above including the case laws, I do not find any illegality or infirmity in the impugned order of repatriation dated 01.07.2024 and the relieving order dated 02.07.2024 as well as other similar orders under challenged in the bunch of writ petitions, so this bunch of writ petitions are dismissed being misconceived. The interim orders granted in the bunch of writ petitions are hereby vacated. The petitioners of this bunch of writ petitions are directed to submit their joining at their parent department pursuant to their repatriation orders.
30. Consequently, all the writ petitions of this bunch are dismissed.
22. The Hon'ble Division Bench in Special Appeal No. 192 of 2025 (Shashank Sachan Vs. State of U.P. & Others) vide its order dated 05.06.2025 has been pleased to observe as follows: -
As prayed on behalf of Shri Sarvesh Kumar Dubey, arguing counsel for opposite party, list this case tomorrow, i.e., 06.06.2025 as fresh. Interim orders, which are operating in writ petitions, shall continue to operate till tomorrow. Order Date:- 5.6.2025.
23. He next submits that the judgment and order dated 23.05.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Hon'ble Court at Lucknow in Writ (A) No. 6157 of 2024 (Shashank Sachan Vs. State of U.P. & Others) has not been stayed by the Hon'ble Division Bench in the Special Appeal and vide interim order dated 05.06.2025 the only relief which was given to the writ petitioners was that the interim orders which were operating in the writ petitions was directed to continue to operate. In the present writ petition, there is no interim order and the petitioner has deliberately disobeyed the order dated 06.08.2025 passed by Respondent No. 2 by which the petitioner had been repatriated to his original post of Assistant Teacher, Primary School Hans Khera, Macharhata, District Sitapur and therefore, the petitioner by failing to join as Assistant Teacher, in violation of Section 24 of the R.T.E. Act, 2009 and Rule 27 of 1981 Rules has caused serious academic loss to the students of the said school. Therefore, he is not entitled to any relief from this Hon'ble Court.
24. The Hon'ble Single Judge in Writ (A) No. 6157 of 2024 (Shashank Sachan Vs. State of U.P. & Others) in Paragraph No. 27, 29 & 30 has been pleased to clearly distinguish the ratio of judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ashok Kumar Ratilal Patel Vs. Union of India & Others reported in 2012(7) SCC 757 and holding the same is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case as the said judgment was in respect to the selection on the post of Director on deputation and not continuation thereof.
25. He lastly submits that petitioner has no indefeasible right to continue on deputation for an indefinite period, and by non-teaching in the original school will cause serious loss to the students and no relief should be given in violation of Section 24 of the R.T.E. Act and Rule 27 of 1981 Rules.
26. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
27. Before entering into merits of the case, it would be appropriate to understand certain terms like deputation, temporary, temporary appointment on deputation, deputation by appointment and deputation by transfer.
28. Interpretation of the Term Temporary:- The term temporary has not been defined in most statutory frameworks; however, its interpretation has been elucidated through judicial pronouncements. The word denotes something that is not permanent or enduring in nature but is meant to exist, operate, or continue for a limited duration or until the happening of a specified event.
29. It is a settled position of law that the expression temporary conveys a state of affairs intended to last for a time only, as distinguished from something intended to be permanent or of indefinite duration. It is well established that a temporary appointment does not confer any right of permanence merely by the passage of time or continuation of service.
30. Similarly, in the case of Director, Institute of Management Development, U.P. v. Pushpa Srivastava, (1992) 4 SCC 33, it was held that a person appointed on a temporary or ad hoc basis holds no right to continue once the term or purpose for which such appointment was made comes to an end. The tenure of a temporary arrangement, therefore, ceases automatically on expiry of the stipulated period or completion of the work.
31. Hence, from the above judicial exposition, it is evident that the term temporary signifies a transitory, provisional, and non-permanent condition which exists for a limited time or purpose, and which ceases automatically upon completion of that period or objective. It carries no vested right to continuity or regularization.
32. Interpretation of the Term Temporary in the Context of Deputation:- The expression temporary, when employed with reference to an appointment or selection made on deputation, denotes a limited, provisional, and non-permanent tenure that subsists only for the period specifically prescribed or until the occurrence of a particular event, such as the return of the incumbent or completion of the sanctioned term.
33. In the case of Kunal Nanda v. Union of India and another, (2000) 5 SCC 362, the Honble Supreme Court held that an employee on deputation holds no right to continue beyond the period of deputation and can be reverted to his parent cadre at any time, either on the expiry of the deputation term or at the discretion of the competent authority. The Court observed that deputation is by its very nature is temporary and does not create any lien or vested right to absorption in the borrowing department.
34. Similarly, in the case of State of Punjab and others v. Inder Singh and others, (1997) 8 SCC 372, it was reiterated that a deputationist continues to be an employee of the lending department and his placement in another department is merely a temporary arrangement made for administrative convenience. Continuance beyond the prescribed period does not alter the character of such appointment, which remains temporary and terminable at will.
35. The Honble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and another v. S.N. Maity and another, (2015) 4 SCC 164, clarified that even where a deputation is made through a selection process, the term temporary signifies that the appointment is for a fixed tenure or purpose and does not entitle the officer to claim permanence or absorption in the borrowing organization.
36. Therefore, in the legal context of temporary selection/appointment on deputation, the word temporary signifies a transitory tenure, operative only for the sanctioned period or until the administrative necessity subsists. Such an appointment neither alters the substantive position of the incumbent in the parent cadre nor creates any enforceable right to continue or to be regularized in the borrowing department.
37. Interpretation of the Term Deputation:- The term deputation has acquired a well-recognized connotation in service jurisprudence. Deputation essentially implies a temporary assignment or transfer of an employee from their parent department or cadre to another department, organization, or post, for a specific period and purpose, with the consent of the concerned authorities.
38. In Inder Singh (supra), the Honble Supreme Court observed that Deputation means service outside the cadre or outside the parent department. Deputation is a temporary assignment of the services of an employee from one department to another department or organization. The Court further clarified that the person so deputed continues to hold a lien in his parent department, and his service in the borrowing department is only for a limited duration unless absorbed with due approval.
39. Similarly, in Kunal Nanda (supra), it was held that the concept of deputation necessarily involves a tripartite consent of the lending authority, the borrowing authority, and the employee concerned. The Honble Court emphasized that An employee on deputation does not have any vested right to continue in the post of deputation or to seek absorption unless such right is conferred by statutory rules or by the terms of deputation itself.
40. From the cumulative reading of the aforesaid pronouncements, the legal position that emerges is that deputation is a temporary arrangement, not amounting to a permanent transfer. The employee remains, for all intents and purposes, an employee of the parent department and continues to hold a lien therein. The tenure of deputation is subject to the discretion of the lending and borrowing authorities and can be curtailed or extended in accordance with administrative exigencies.
41. Hence, the term deputation denotes a temporary assignment of duties beyond ones parent cadre or department, undertaken with mutual consent and without severance of the substantive relationship with the parent service.
42. In light of the judicial pronouncements and administrative interpretations, it is held that deputation signifies a temporary and consensual arrangement, distinct from absorption or transfer, and does not create any indefeasible right in favour of the deputed employee to claim continuation or permanent status in the borrowing department.
43. Interpretation of the Term Temporary Appointment on Deputation:- In service jurisprudence, the expression temporary appointment on deputation refers to an arrangement where an employee from one department, service, or cadre is appointed to another post in a different department or organization for a limited and specified period, without any substantive or permanent right to the post so held. Such an appointment is made either in exigencies of public service or for administrative convenience and does not confer any vested right upon the deputationist to continue or to claim absorption in the borrowing department.
44. The Honble Supreme Court in Kunal Nanda (supra), categorically held that The basic principle underlying deputation is that the person concerned can always and at any time be repatriated to his parent department to serve in his substantive position. There is no vested right in such a person to be absorbed in the department where he is on deputation.
45. Similarly, in Inder Singh (supra), the Court observed that Deputation is service outside the cadre or parent department, and the deputationist remains a member of his parent service. He does not acquire any legal right to be permanently absorbed in the post to which he has been deputed.
46. Further, in Rameshwar Prasad v. Managing Director, U.P. Rajkiya Nirman Nigam Ltd. and others, (1999) 8 SCC 381, it was held that a temporary deputation comes to an end either by efflux of time or upon recall by the lending department, and continuation beyond the sanctioned period does not create any substantive entitlement.
47. In the present context, therefore, a temporary appointment on deputation is merely an interim administrative measure wherein an employee discharges the duties of another post for a limited tenure, subject to recall at any time. It neither amounts to transfer nor confers any right of seniority, permanency, or regularisation. The tenure and terms of such deputation are strictly governed by the conditions stipulated in the order of deputation or the relevant service rules.
48. Hence, where an appointment has been made on a temporary deputation basis, it is to be understood as a tenure-based engagement, dependent upon administrative exigency and terminable at the will of the lending or borrowing authority, without any claim to continuation or absorption in the deputed post.
49. Deputation by Appointment:- In this category, an employee from one cadre/department is formally appointed to a post in another organization on a deputation basis. Such an appointment does not confer permanent rights in the borrowing department, as the lien continues to remain with the parent cadre. However, for the duration of deputation, the employee holds the status of an appointee in the deputed post, subject to the terms and conditions of deputation. It has been judicially recognized that deputation by appointment partakes of the character of a fresh appointment, albeit temporary in nature.
50. Deputation by Transfer:- In contradistinction, deputation by transfer is merely a temporary transfer of service from the parent department to the borrowing department. No formal appointment is made to the new post; the officer continues to be borne on the strength of the parent cadre and retains lien, seniority, and promotional avenues therein. It does not amount to a new appointment but is simply a change in the place and control of posting.
51. While in deputation by appointment, the deputed officer derives his authority to function from an order of appointment, in deputation by transfer his authority flows only from a transfer order.
52. Therefore, for purposes of seniority, promotion, and reversion, the legal consequences differ. An officer deputed by appointment cannot claim automatic absorption or seniority in the borrowing department, unless specifically provided. An officer deputed by transfer, however, continues as a full member of the parent service and reverts back upon completion of the deputation.
53. In the case of Inder Singh (supra), the Honble Supreme Court explained the nature of deputation as service outside the cadre, retaining lien in the parent department.
54. In the case of Kunal Nanda (supra), it was held that deputation does not confer any vested right of absorption, unless specifically provided by rules.
55. Deputation by appointment is a temporary appointment to another post. Deputation by transfer is a temporary transfer of services without fresh appointment.
56. The expression temporary, when employed in the context of service law, connotes a tenure which is not permanent or substantive in character. A temporary appointee holds the post at the pleasure of the appointing authority, either for a fixed term or until further orders, and acquires no indefeasible right to continue beyond such period. Such an appointment is essentially precarious and liable to be brought to an end in accordance with the rules governing the service. However, the protection of Article 311 of the Constitution of India is not wholly excluded in the case of a temporary employee. If the termination is punitive in nature or is founded upon allegations casting stigma, the safeguards of natural justice must necessarily be observed. Conversely, where the cessation of service is simpliciter on account of the temporary character of the appointment, no element of punishment can be inferred. Thus, in service jurisprudence, the word temporary must be understood as signifying a tenure of employment that is limited, uncertain and subject to termination, without conferring any claim for permanency, except where the rules or subsequent regularisation so provide.
57. It is a settled proposition of service jurisprudence that the expression temporary, when used in the context of deputation by appointment, is to be understood in its plain and ordinary sense, namely, that the arrangement is purely provisional in nature and does not create any vested right in favour of the incumbent.
58. A deputation made on a temporary basis is essentially a stop-gap arrangement, co-terminus with the exigency for which the appointment has been made, and is always subject to recall by the lending authority or termination by the borrowing authority at any stage. The continuance of the deputed employee in such capacity does not ripen into permanence merely by efflux of time, nor does it confer any claim of lien, seniority, or substantive right in the borrowing department unless specific rules provide otherwise.
59. Thus, the word temporary, in the context of deputation by appointment is to be construed as denoting a tenure that is fragile, transitory, and dependent upon administrative convenience, and the incumbent cannot be permitted to assert any right of continuance once the purpose of deputation stands exhausted.
60. It is an undisputed fact that the advertisement was for temporary sanctioned posts of;
(i) District Coordinator (Training),
(ii) District Coordinator (Community Involvement),
(iii) District Coordinator (Samudayik Sahbhagita)
(iv) District Coordinator (Girls Education)
The eligibility criteria required a minimum 55% of marks in post-graduation from a recognized university. The candidates having MBA/M.Ed/P.hD Degree from recognized universities were to given preference.
61. A degree/diploma/certificate in computers issued by any organization as recognized by the State, experience of three years of regular teaching in any school governed by Uttar Pradesh, Basic Shiksha Parishad. The maximum age prescribed was 45 years as on the date of advertisement. The salary admissible to the aforesaid District Coordinators was the same as that of the candidates who were selected in Basic Education Department.
62. From the aforesaid, it is clear that three years of teaching experience in a basic schools was required which means that the primary function of the candidates who were eligible for being appointed as District Coordinators was teaching.
63. As the advertisement itself specifies that the post of District Coordinators were temporary in nature, although the period was not mentioned in the advertisement but as per the understanding of this Court, taking into consideration the meaning of the terms as explained above, it is well settled in service jurisprudence that the term deputation signifies service outside the cadre or parent department, whereby the service of an employee are placed at the disposal of another department or organization either by way of appointment or by transfer. In both cases, the appointment whether the petitioner is deputed by way of transfer or by way of their appointment. It is a temporary arrangement and the person cannot claim any lien over the said post and can be reverted back of his parent department as and when required. The incumbent cannot permitted to assert any right of continuance once the purpose of deputation stands exhausted.
64. In the present case, the advertisement itself speaks that under the policy, the Shiksha Prayojan Parishad under the Samagra Shiksha Abhiyan (Community Involvement) had advertised the posts of District Coordinators. Thus, it was a policy matter which now has subsequently changed by decision of the Executive Council of the Parishad for taken decision to fill up the post of district coordinators through outsourcing and such candidates will be appointed on fixed honorarium, thus, with the changing policy for appointment of district coordinators the petitioners who were initially assistant teachers cannot claim a right to continue on the post of district coordinators as primary evidence is teaching as per the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009. Realizing this the Executive Council of the Parishad took a decision to change the recruitment policy and to appoint District Coordinators as decided by its meeting dated 19.07.2022 regarding which circulars have already been issued on 19.08.2022 to all concerned.
65. The similar controversy has already been decided by Lucknow Bench of this Court in the case of Satendra Kumar Maurya vs. State of U.P. Thru. Secy. Basic Education And 3 Others, Neutral Citation:2025:AHC-LKO:30734, wherein the Court after referring several judgements such as Ashok Kumar Ratilal Patel vs. Union of India and another reported in (2012) 7 SCC 757, Kunal Nanda vs. Union of India and another, reported in (2000) 5 SCC 362, Mahesh Chandra Gautam vs. State of U.P. & others, reported in 2005 SCC OnLine All 563, Dinesh Kumar Singh vs. State of U.P. & others, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine All 2326, and D.K. Yadav vs. J.M.A. Industries Ltd, reported in (1993) 3 SCC 259, has observed that deputationists have got no indefeasible right to be retained at the borrowing department as their lien is maintained in their parent department. In the present case, what is to say about maintaining the lien at the parent department, the petitioners are paid salary from their parent department and their lien has been maintained in their parent department. The Court has further observed that the deputationists have got no indefeasible right to be retained in their borrowing department and they should be repatriated to their parent department where they have been maintaining their lien. The deputation appointment may not be of permanent nature so the deputationists should either be repatriated to their parent department as per terms and conditions of such appointment or in terms of the guidelines so prescribed under the Government Order or any circular etc. dealing such issue or even prior to the period so prescribed in their appointment order if the Competent Authority of the parent department or borrowing department is willing to do so following the due procedure of law.
66. In view of the above discussion, this Court finds no merit, accordingly, dismissed.
(Mrs. Manju Rani Chauhan, J.)
October, 14, 2025
Rahul Goswami
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