Sayed Mohd. Hamza Alias Mohd. Hamza And ... vs State Of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Home Lko. ...
2025 Latest Caselaw 12453 ALL

Allahabad High Court

Sayed Mohd. Hamza Alias Mohd. Hamza And ... vs State Of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Home Lko. ... on 13 November, 2025

Author: Abdul Moin

Bench: Abdul Moin

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
 
 


Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC-LKO:72579-DB
 

 
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
LUCKNOW 
 
CRIMINAL MISC. WRIT PETITION No. - 10575 of 2025   
 
   Sayed Mohd. Hamza Alias Mohd. Hamza And Others    
 
  .....Petitioner(s)   
 
 Versus  
 
   State Of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Home Lko. And Others    
 
  .....Respondent(s)       
 
   
 
  
 
Counsel for Petitioner(s)   
 
:   
 
Bhup Chandra Singh, Banwari Lal   
 
  
 
Counsel for Respondent(s)   
 
:   
 
G.A.   
 
     
 
 Court No. - 11
 
   
 
 HON'BLE ABDUL MOIN, J.  

HON'BLE MRS. BABITA RANI, J.

1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned A.G.A. for the respondents-State as well as Shri Vikas Vikram Singh, Advocate who files vakalatnama on behalf of respondent No.4.

2. This is second writ petition being filed before this Court after the earlier petition having been dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to avail appropriate remedies.

3. Preliminary objection has been taken by the learned counsel appearing for respondent No.4 that as the earlier petition namely Criminal Misc Writ Petition No.8641 of 2025 In Re Sayed Mohd. Hamza Alias Mohd. Hamza & Ors vs State of U.P. & Ors had been withdrawn by the learned counsel for the petitioner with liberty to pursue other remedies that may be available to him which was permitted by this Court vide order dated 09.10.2025, a copy of which is Annexure-1 to the petition, consequently the second petition i.e. the instant petition being filed by the petitioner before this Court would not be maintainable. In this regard, reliance has been placed on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M.C. Ravi Kumar versus D.S. Velmurugan : AIR 2025 SC 3387.

4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner while responding to the said preliminary objection states that earlier petition had been withdrawn by him on account of learned A.G.A. indicating that certain other provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2021 and the Pre-conception and Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 have been introduced and as such the instant petition would be maintainable.

5. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the record, it emerges that earlier the petitioner had approached this court praying for quashing of the FIR dated 04.06.2025 vide FIR No.0221 of 2025, as fairly stated by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn on the statement of the learned counsel for the petitioner in order to pursue other remedies that may be available to him. Again raising a challenge to the same FIR, instant petition has been filed.

6. Whether once a petition has been withdrawn in order to pursue other remedies a second petition would be maintainable for the same cause of action before the same court is no longer res integra having been considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M.C. Ravikumar (supra).

7. For the sake of convenience, relevant observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M.C. Ravikumar (supra) is reproduced below:-

"4.6. The accused-respondents filed the first quashing petition before the High Court seeking the quashing of the aforesaid complaint. The said petition came to be dismissed by the High Court vide speaking order dated 22nd December, 2021. The accused-respondents after waiting for 6 months preferred a second quashing petition before the High Court seeking the quashing of the very same complaint i.e., Criminal Complaint No. 1828 of 2019.

4.7. The High Court vide final judgment and order dated 13th September, 2022 allowed the second quashing petition and quashed entire proceedings of Criminal Complaint No. 1828 of 2019 filed by the appellant-complainant. The said order of High Court is the subject matter of challenge in this appeal by special leave.

???...

13. This Court in catena of judgments has held that it is not open to an accused person to raise one plea after the other, by repeatedly invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC, though all such pleas were very much available to him even at the first instance. We may hasten to add that there is no sweeping rule to the effect that a second quashing petition under Section 482 CrPC is not maintainable and its maintainability will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. However, the onus to show that there arose a change in circumstances warranting entertainment of a subsequent quashing petition would be on the person filing the said petition. In this regard, we may gainfully refer to the observations made by this Court in the case of Bhisham Lal Verma v. State of UP, which are extracted below for ready reference:?

?11. ?? Though it is clear that there can be no blanket rule that a second petition under Section 482 Cr. P.C. would not lie in any situation and it would depend upon the facts and circumstances of the individual case, it is not open to a person aggrieved to raise one plea after the other, by invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 Cr. P.C., though all such pleas were very much available even at the first instance. Permitting the filing of successive petitions under Section 482 Cr. P.C. ignoring this principle would enable an ingenious accused to effectively stall the proceedings against him to suit his own interest and convenience, by filing one petition after another under Section 482 Cr. P.C., irrespective of when the cause therefor arose. Such abuse of process cannot be permitted.?

(Emphasis Supplied)

14. Furthermore, we are of the opinion that the order passed by the High Court in the second quashing petition amounted to review (plain and simple) of the earlier order passed by the co-ordinate bench of the High Court in the first quashing petition, since there was admittedly no change in circumstances and no new grounds/pleas became available to the accused-respondents, after passing of the order of dismissal in the first quashing petition. The order passed by the High Court is in gross disregard to all tenets of law as Section 362 CrPC expressly bars review of a judgment or final order disposing of a case except to correct some clerical or arithmetical error.

15. This Court has time and again held that the High Courts while exercising their inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC cannot override a specific bar laid down by other provisions of CrPC, i.e., to say that the High Court is not empowered to review its own decision under the purported exercise of its inherent powers. To fortify the aforesaid conclusion, we may gainfully refer to the observations made by this Court in the case of Simrikhia v. Dolley Mukherjee and Chhabi Mukherjee, the relevant portions whereof are quoted below for ease of reference:

?6. In Superintendent & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v. Mohan Singh, (1975) 3 SCC 706, this Court held that Section 561A preserves the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as it deems fit to prevent abuse of the process of the Court or to secure the ends of justice and the High Court must therefore exercise its inherent powers having regard to the situation prevailing at the particular point of time when its inherent jurisdiction is sought to be invoked. In that case the facts and circumstances obtaining at the time of the subsequent application were clearly different from what they were at the time of the earlier application. The question as to the scope and ambit of the inherent power of the High Court vis-a-vis an earlier order made by it was, therefore, not concluded by this decision.

7. The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be invoked to override bar of review u/s 362. It is clearly stated in Sooraj Devi v. Pyare Lal, (1981) 1 SCC 500 that the inherent power of the Court cannot be exercised for doing that which is specifically prohibited by the Code. The law is therefore clear that the inherent power cannot be exercised for doing that which cannot be done on account of the bar under other provisions of the Code. The court is not empowered to review its own decision under the purported exercise of inherent power. We find that the impugned order in this case is in effect one reviewing the earlier order on a reconsideration of the same materials. The High Court has grievously erred in doing so. Even on merits, we do not find any compelling reasons to quash the proceedings at that stage.?

(Emphasis supplied)"

8. From perusal of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M.C. Ravikumar (supra) it emerges that the Hon'ble Supreme Court was seized of the matter in which earlier the accused had filed a quashing petition before the High Court seeking quashing of the aforesaid complaint. Said petition came to be dismissed by the High Court. The accused after waiting for 6 months preferred a second petition before the High Court seeking quashing of the very same complaint. The said petition was allowed by the High Court, which quashed the entire proceedings of the said criminal complaint filed by the complainant. The complainant being aggrieved with the order passed by the High Court approached Hon'ble Supreme Court in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court after examining the aforesaid facts was of the view that although there cannot be any blanket rule that a second petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. would not lie which would depend upon the facts and circumstances of the individual case, but it is not open to a person aggrieved to raise one plea after the other, by invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, though all such pleas were very much available.

9. In the instant case, the earlier petition filed raising a challenge to the same FIR was withdrawn with liberty to pursue other remedies meaning thereby that the petitioners on their own accord were of the view that the remedy that was being availed by them before this Court, which was for quashing of the impugned FIR, was not the appropriate remedy.

10. Once the petitioners on their own accord having withdrawn the writ petition in order to pursue other remedies, consequently there cannot be any occasion for the petitioners to file a second petition raising a challenge to the said first FIR by means of the instant petition.

11. There is another aspect of the matter. As already indicated above, the earlier writ petition was withdrawn by the petitioners in order to avail appropriate remedies and not in order to file afresh. At that stretch of time, the Court was exercising jurisdiction of quashing FIRs under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. At that stretch of time, despite the petitioners having appropriate remedy of filing a petition for anticipatory bail, they chose to file a petition for quashing of the FIR and thereafter withdrew the said petition in order to pursue other remedies meaning thereby that the petitioners themselves did not find remedy that had been availed by them in earlier writ petition for quashing of the impugned FIR as efficacious remedy and thus the liberty to avail other remedies that was sought by them would relate to approaching the court for anticipatory bail or any other remedy but not approaching this court again for quashing of the FIR inasmuch as nothing prevented the petitioners from withdrawing the earlier petition in order to file afresh. Thus, there is a clear distinction between taking liberty for filing afresh and taking liberty for availing any other remedy.

12. Considering the aforesaid, the preliminary objection as raised by the learned counsel for respondent No.4 is upheld. The writ petition is dismissed again leaving it open to the petitioners to pursue other remedies that may be available to them under law

(Mrs. Babita Rani,J.) (Abdul Moin,J.)

November 13, 2025

prateek