Allahabad High Court
Braj Mohan Shukla vs U.O.I.Thru.Secy.Finance Ministry Of ... on 4 March, 2025
Author: Abdul Moin
Bench: Abdul Moin
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC-LKO:13153
Reserved on: 13.02.2025
Delivered on :04.03.2025
Case :- WRIT - A No. - 24877 of 2020
Petitioner :- Braj Mohan Shukla
Respondent :- U.O.I.Thru.Secy.Finance Ministry Of Finance And Banking And Ors.
Counsel for Petitioner :- Sushil Kumar Singh,Alok Mishra,Bal Keshwar Srivastava,Chhote Lal Yadav,Som Dutt Bajpai,Sushil Kumar Singh,Yashvardhan Srivastava
Counsel for Respondent :- A.S.G.,Abul Fazal Jaffrey,Anurag Srivastava,Pankaj Kumar Awasthi,Uma Shankar Lal
Hon'ble Abdul Moin,J.
1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner as well as Sri Abul Fazal Jaffrey and Uma Shankar Lal, learned counsels appearing for the respondent-Bank.
2. Instant writ petition has been filed praying for the following main reliefs:-
"(i) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of Certiorari thereby quashing the impugned removal from service order dated 15.12.2018, passed by respondent no.2 (as contained in Annexure No.1 to this writ petition).
(ii) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of Certiorari thereby quashing the order dated 26.06.2019, passed by the respondent no.3 whereby dismissing the departmental appeal (as contained in Annexure No.2 to this writ petition).
(iii) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of Certiorari thereby quashing the order dated 20.07.2020, passed by the Appeal and Review Committee of the Corporate Office at Mumbai, whereby dismissing the review of the petitioner (as contained in Annexure No.3 to this writ petition)."
3. Bereft of unnecessary details, the facts of the case are that while the petitioner was working in the respondent Bank, he was issued a charge sheet dated 05.09.2016, a copy of which is Annexure-8 to the petition. Various serious irregularities were indicated in the said charge sheet in Pre sanction Survey, appraisal assessment, Sanction, Documentation and Post sanction follow up of the loans and advances at the branch; slippage of probable capital NPA accounts to NPA category prevented by him by adopting unethical means and due to the aforesaid acts or omissions/commission on his part the bank having been saddled with a loss of Rs.4 crores and odd. The charge sheet also detailed the allegations on which the aforesaid three charges were based.
4. The petitioner submitted his reply on 14.09.2016 and after being given a personal hearing and on the basis of inquiry report and the charges having been found proved the petitioner was dismissed from service vide order dated 15.12.2018, a copy of which is Annexure-1 to the writ petition. The appeal filed against the same was rejected vide order dated 26.06.2019, a copy of which is Annexure-2 to the writ petition, and the review of the petitioner was also rejected vide order dated 20.07.2020, a copy of which is Annexure-3 to the writ petition.
5. Raising a challenge to the aforesaid orders instant writ petition has been filed.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has raised the following grounds in order to challenge the orders impugned namely-
(a) that there has been violation of Rule 68(6) of the State Bank of India Officers Service Rules, 1992 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Rules, 1992') which provide that where two or more officers are concerned in a case, the authority competent to impose a major penalty on all such officers may make an order directing that disciplinary proceedings against all of them may be taken in common proceedings. The argument is that the petitioner as well as Mohd. Hussain, who was posted as Branch Manager at Rudauli Branch of the Bank at the time of the posting of the petitioner was also charged with the same charges and out of 68 allegations pertaining to charge 1, so far as it pertains to the petitioner, 54 allegations were one and the same and consequently once the charges were framed the competent authority should have adhered to Rule 68(6) of the Rules, 1992 for common disciplinary proceedings and the same not having been held, have vitiated the disciplinary proceedings held against the petitioner which thus vitiates the impugned punishment order.
(b) the originals of the documents over which reliance had been placed by the Inquiry Officer and were also considered while holding the charges as proved against the petitioner and while imposing the punishment against the petitioner, were never shown to him. The respondents took the signatures of the petitioner on a blank paper and signed it subsequently in order to indicate that the petitioner had seen the original documents as per certificate dated 27.03.2017, a copy of which has been filed as Annexure SA-3 to the Supplementary Affidavit dated 04.11.2024 which would be apparent from the fact that the said certificate indicates that the petitioner has seen the prosecution documents on 29.03.2017 even though the certificate itself is dated 27.03.2017. Accordingly, in the absence of the original documents having been shown to the petitioner the inquiry proceedings and the impugned punishment order based upon the same are vitiated in the eyes of law.
(c) the original documents not having been shown to the petitioner has prejudiced the case of the petitioner inasmuch as one of the charges in the charge sheet was that a loan had been given to Ms Naaz Bano but the same was bearing the forged signatures of the petitioner. This had been raised by the petitioner in his appeal and his review but none of the authorities took consideration of the same and the said fact could clearly have been proved had the petitioner been shown the original documents which again vitiates the inquiry proceedings against the petitioner.
7. No other ground has been urged during the course of the arguments.
8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the following judgments:-
(i) Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited and others vs. Brojo Nath Ganguli-AIR 1986 SC 1571 (Paras 78, 86 & 92);
(ii) Moni Shankar vs. Union of India and others - (2008) 3 SCC 484 (Paras 21 & 27);
(iii) State of Uttar Pradesh and others vs. Saroj Kumar Sinha - (2010) 2 SCC 772 (Para 28);
(iv) Roop Singh Negi vs. Punjab National Bank and others - (2009) 2 SCC 570, and
(v) Narendra Kumar Pandey vs. State Bank of India - MANU/UP/2212/2011 (Paras 23, 58, 69, 77 & 79).
9. On the other hand, Sri Abul Fazal Jaffrey, learned counsel for the respondent-Bank has argued that the inquiry proceedings against the petitioner were held in accordance with law under relevant rules. It is also contended that the petitioner neither in his writ petition nor during the course of the arguments has failed to point out any error on the point of jurisdiction of the competent authority to impose punishment or any procedural error in the inquiry and there being a clear difference in criminal proceedings and the departmental proceedings where in criminal proceedings the charges are to be proved on basis of strict proof while in the departmental proceedings the charges are only to be proved on the basis of preponderance of probability consequently the inquiry officer having concluded after due proceedings that the petitioner was guilty of the charges as leveled against him as such the writ petition deserves to be dismissed.
10. Other argument of Sri Abul Fazal Jaffrey, learned counsel for the respondents is that the petitioner has failed to point out any procedural error during the course of inquiry and he having been fully satisfied with the procedure as had been adopted in the inquiry consequently he cannot be allowed to turn around and challenge the procedure as adopted in the inquiry.
11. Elaborating the same the argument of learned counsel for the respondents is that the petitioner is alleging violation of Rule 68(6) of the Rules, 1992. A perusal of the rule would itself indicate that a discretion has been given to the competent authority to hold common proceedings but no where does the said rule mandates that where two officers have been charged commonly, only one enquiry should be held. Thus, there is no procedural violation.
12. As regards the argument on behalf of the petitioner that the certificate is dated 27.03.2017 pertaining to the petitioner having seen the original document on 29.03.2017, Sri Abul Fazal Jaffrey, learned counsel for the respondents contends that the same is only a typographical error and nothing more can be read in the said certificate. Elaborating the same, learned counsel for the respondents has invited the attention of this Court towards the preliminary hearing of the case which was held on 29.03.2017 in which the inquiring authority, presenting officer, charged officer i.e. the petitioner as well as his defence representative were present in which the petitioner has categorically stated that he has perused originals of all prosecution/defence documents himself on 28.03.2017 and by his defence representative on 29.03.2017 and that he accepts the authenticity and genuineness of the documents perused. The aforesaid proceedings have also been signed by the petitioner as well as his defence representative, copy of which has been filed as Annexure-1 to the counter affidavit dated 09.02.2021 which also indicates about the error in the date in the certificate over which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner.
13. Learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance on the following judgments:-
(i) Chairman and M.D. V.S.P. and others vs. Goparaju Sri Prabhakara Hari Babu-(2008) 5 SCC 569 (Paras 15 & 16);
(ii) The General Manager (P) Punjab and Sind Bank and others vs. Daya Singh-(2010) 11 SCC 233 (Paras 18 & 19);
(iii) Deputy General Manager (Appellate Authority) and others vs. Ajai Kumar Srivastava-MANU/SC/0005/2021 (Paras 23, 25, 26, 28, 29 & 43);
(iv) State Bank of India vs. Bela Bagchi and others - MANU/SC/0525/2005 (Para 11), and
(v) Jamatraj Kewalji Govani vs. State of Maharashtra-AIR 1968 SC 178 (Para 10).
14. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records.
15. From perusal of records it emerges that while the petitioner was working in the respondent-Bank, he was issued a charge-sheet dated 05.09.2016 indicating various serious irregularities having been committed by him while functioning as a bank officer which had caused a loss of approximately 4 crores and odd to the Bank. The charge-sheet also details the allegations on which the charges were based. After due inquiry the petitioner has been dismissed from service and the appeal and review against the said order have also been rejected vide orders dated 26.06.2019 and 20.07.2020 respectively. Being aggrieved instant petition has been filed.
16. Three grounds have been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner while challenging the order impugned which the Court now proceeds to consider and discuss.
17. The first ground raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that there has been violation of Rule 68(6) of the Rules, 1992 which provides that where two or more officers are concerned in a case, the authority competent to impose a major penalty on all such officers may direct that the disciplinary proceedings against all of them be taken in a common proceeding.
18. For the sake of convenience Rule 68(6) of the Rule, 1992 is reproduced below:-
"68(6) Where two or more officers are concerned in a case, the authority competent to impose a major penalty on all such officers may make an order directing that disciplinary proceedings against all of them may be taken in a common proceeding."
19. A perusal of the aforesaid rule would indicate that no doubt the said rule provides that where two or more officers are concerned in a case the authority competent to impose major penalty may make an order directing that the disciplinary proceedings be taken in a common proceedings.
20. Perusal of the said rule would itself indicate that a discretion has been given to the disciplinary authority but nowhere does it mandate that where two or more officers are involved in a case then common proceedings are to be held mandatorily. Thus, once a discretion has been cast on the disciplinary authority and the petitioner has failed to indicate as to the prejudice that might have been caused to him on account of non holding of common proceedings consequently mere violation of the said rules which, as already indicated above, only gives a discretion to the disciplinary authority will not vitiate the disciplinary proceedings and accordingly the said ground is rejected.
21. Suffice to state that in this regard, the Court may consider the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Canara Bank and others vs. Debasis Das and others - 2003 (4) SCC 557 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:-
"24. Additionally, there was no material placed by the employee to show as to how he has been prejudiced. Though in all cases the post-decisional hearing cannot be a substitute for pre-decisional hearing, in the case at hand the position is different. The position was illuminatingly stated by this Court in Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar [Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar, (1993) 4 SCC 727 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184 : (1993) 25 ATC 704] (SCC at p. 758, para 31) which reads as follows:
"31. Hence, in all cases where the enquiry officer's report is not furnished to the delinquent employee in the disciplinary proceedings, the courts and tribunals should cause the copy of the report to be furnished to the aggrieved employee if he has not already secured it before coming to the court/tribunal and give the employee an opportunity to show how his or her case was prejudiced because of the non-supply of the report. "
(Emphasis supplied)
22. On perusal of the judgment in the case of Debasis Das (supra), it emerges that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has propounded on the aspect of 'prejudice' that may be caused to an employee where he/she alleges some violation but in this case, the petitioner has clearly failed to point out any prejudice caused to him.
23. So far as the grounds that the originals of the documents over which the reliance had been placed by the Inquiry Officer were never shown to the petitioner and his signatures were taken on a blank paper which prejudiced the case of the petitioner as one of the charges in the charge sheet that a loan had been given to Ms. Naz Bano but the same was bearing the forged signature of the petitioner and perusal of the original documents would have supported the stand of the petitioner, the said ground will have to been seen in the light of the certificate which had been given by the petitioner vis-a-vis the statement that had been given by the petitioner before the Inquiry Officer.
24. A perusal of the certificate of the petitioner having seen the original documents would indicate that the certificate is bearing the date of 27.03.2017 and it has been indicated that the petitioner has seen the original documents on 29.03.2017 when seen in the context of the statement which has been given by the petitioner before the Inquiry Officer on 29.03.2017 would indicate that the petitioner has categorically admitted of he having seen the original documents on 28.03.2017 and his defence representative having seen the original documents on 29.03.2017. The said statement of the petitioner is duly countersigned by the petitioner and his defence representative as per disciplinary proceedings dated 29.03.2017. Thus, it is apparent that the said ground taken by the petitioner is patently misconceived and the petitioner is trying to derive an advantage on the basis of a wrong date mentioned in the said certificate. Thus the said ground is also rejected. Moreover, once the petitioner admits of having seen the original documents consequently the plea being taken with respect to the loan documents of Ms. Naz Bano and the same bearing forged signatures of the petitioner also cannot also be accepted.
25. Now the Court proceeds to consider the judgments over which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner.
26. So far as the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Brojo Nath Ganguli (supra) is concerned, the same would have no applicability to the facts of the instant case inasmuch as the same pertains to an unconscionable bargain. In the instant case the petitioner and his defence witness have themselves indicated about having seen the original documents and consequently it cannot be said that there was any unconscionable bargain extended to the petitioner.
27. So far as the judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Moni Shankar (supra) and Narendra Kumar Pandey (supra) are concerned, the same pertain to the proceedings becoming vitiated on account of non-compliance of the rules.
28. The only non-compliance as has been indicated by the petitioner of the rules is Rule 68(6) of the Rules, 1992, which has been discussed by this Court above and it has been held that the said rule only gives a discretion to the competent authority to hold common proceeding but nowhere does the said rule mandate that a common enquiry should mandatorily be held. Thus, the aforesaid judgments would have no applicability in the facts of the instant case.
29. As regards the judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Saroj Kumar Sinha (supra) and Roop Singh Negi (supra), the same pertain to the documents not being proved and the said documents could not have been taken into consideration to conclude that the charges have been proved.
30. None of the grounds which have been taken by the petitioner pertain to the documents not having been proved and thus the said judgments would have no applicability in the facts of the instant case.
31. Accordingly, it is apparent that none of the judgments over which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner have any applicability in the facts of the instant case and as per the arguments as raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner and the grounds as indicated by him.
32. Now the Court proceeds to consider the judgments over which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the respondents.
33. In the case of Daya Singh (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:-
18. As held in T.N. C.S. Corporation Ltd. v. K. Meerabai MANU/SC/8046/2006 : (2006) 2 SCC 255 the scope of judicial review for the High Court in departmental disciplinary matter is limited. The observation of this Court in Bank of India v. Degala Sriramulu (1999) 5 SCC 768 are quite instructive:
Strict rules of evidence are not applicable to departmental enquiry proceedings. The only requirement of law is that the allegation against the delinquent officer must be established by such evidence acting upon which a reasonable person acting reasonably and with objectivity may arrive at a finding upholding the gravamen of the charge against the delinquent officer. Mere conjecture or surmises cannot sustain the finding of guilt even in departmental enquiry proceedings. The court exercising the jurisdiction of judicial review would not interfere with the findings of fact arrived at in the departmental enquiry proceedings excepting in a case of mala fides or perversity i.e where there is no evidence to support a finding or where a finding is such that no man acting reasonably and with objectivity could have arrived at that finding. The court cannot embark upon reappreciating the evidence or weighing the same like an appellate authority. So long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the departmental authority, the same has to be sustained. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel MANU/SC/0271/1963 : AIR 1964 SC 364 : MANU/SC/0271/1963 : (1964) 4 SCR 718, the Constitution Bench has held:
a. The High Court can and must enquire whether there is any evidence at all in support of the impugned conclusion. In other words, if the whole of the evidence led in the enquiry is accepted as true, does the conclusion follow that the charge in question is proved against the respondent? This approach will avoid weighing the evidence. It will take the evidence as it stands and only examine whether on that evidence legally the impugned conclusion follows or not.
19. In a number of cases including State Bank of India v. Bela Bagchi (supra) this Court has held that a bank employee has to exercise a higher degree of honesty and integrity. He is concerned with the deposits of the customers of the Bank and he cannot permit the deposits to be tinkered with in any manner. In Damoh Panna Sagar Rural Regional Bank's case (supra) the Manager of a Bank who had indulged in unauthorized withdrawals, subsequently returned the amount with interest. Yet this Court has held that this conduct of unauthorized withdrawals amounted to a serious misconduct. Same is the case in the present matter. There was a clear documentary evidence on record in the handwriting of the respondent which established his role in the withdrawal of huge amounts for fictitious persons. The ledger entries clearly showed that whereas the FDRs were in one name, the withdrawals were shown in the name of altogether different persons and they were far in excess over the amounts of FDRs. The respondent had no explanation and, therefore, it had to be held that the respondent had misappropriated the amount. Inspite of a well reasoned order by the Inquiry Officer, the High Court has interfered therein by calling the same as sketchy. The High Court has completely overlooked the role of the bank manager as expected by this Court in the aforesaid judgments.
34. In the instant case also the petitioner has failed to exercise a higher degree of honesty and integrity as was required from him in the capacity of being a bank employee.
35. In the case of Ajai Kumar Srivastava (supra) Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:-
"23. The power of judicial review in the matters of disciplinary inquiries, exercised by the departmental/appellate authorities discharged by constitutional Courts Under Article 226 or Article 32 or Article 136 of the Constitution of India is circumscribed by limits of correcting errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice and it is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an appellate authority which has been earlier examined by this Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. T.V. Venugopalan MANU/SC/0855/1994 : 1994(6) SCC 302 and later in Government of T.N. and Anr. v. A. Rajapandian MANU/SC/0113/1995 : 1995(1) SCC 216 and further examined by the three Judge Bench of this Court in B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and Ors. MANU/SC/0118/1996 : 1995(6) SCC 749 wherein it has been held as under:
13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary enquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel [ MANU/SC/0271/1963 : (1964) 4 SCR 718] this Court held at p. 728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued.
25. It is thus settled that the power of judicial review, of the Constitutional Courts, is an evaluation of the decision-making process and not the merits of the decision itself. It is to ensure fairness in treatment and not to ensure fairness of conclusion. The Court/Tribunal may interfere in the proceedings held against the delinquent if it is, in any manner, inconsistent with the Rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory Rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority if based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached or where the conclusions upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued. To sum up, the scope of judicial review cannot be extended to the examination of correctness or reasonableness of a decision of authority as a matter of fact.
26. When the disciplinary enquiry is conducted for the alleged misconduct against the public servant, the Court is to examine and determine: (i) whether the enquiry was held by the competent authority; (ii) whether Rules of natural justice are complied with; (iii) whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence and authority has power and jurisdiction to reach finding of fact or conclusion.
28. It is true that strict Rules of evidence are not applicable to departmental enquiry proceedings. However, the only requirement of law is that the allegation against the delinquent must be established by such evidence acting upon which a reasonable person acting reasonably and with objectivity may arrive at a finding upholding the gravity of the charge against the delinquent employee. It is true that mere conjecture or surmises cannot sustain the finding of guilt even in the departmental enquiry proceedings.
29. The Constitutional Court while exercising its jurisdiction of judicial review Under Article 226 or Article 136 of the Constitution would not interfere with the findings of fact arrived at in the departmental enquiry proceedings except in a case of malafides or perversity, i.e., where there is no evidence to support a finding or where a finding is such that no man acting reasonably and with objectivity could have arrived at that findings and so long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the departmental authority, the same has to be sustained.
43. Before we conclude, we need to emphasize that in banking business absolute devotion, integrity and honesty is a sine qua non for every bank employee. It requires the employee to maintain good conduct and discipline and he deals with money of the depositors and the customers and if it is not observed, the confidence of the public/depositors would be impaired. It is for this additional reason, we are of the opinion that the High Court has committed an apparent error in setting aside the order of dismissal of the Respondent dated 24th July, 1999 confirmed in departmental appeal by order dated 15th November, 1999."
36. From perusal of the aforesaid judgment it emerges that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the power of judicial review in the matter of disciplinary inquiries exercised by the departmental authorities when seen by the Constitutional Courts would be circumscribed by limits of correcting errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice and would not be akin to adjudication of the case on merits.
37. This Court has already examined the alleged procedural errors as have been pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner but the Court has found that there has been no procedural errors in the inquiry conducted against the petitioner. Obviously this Court is not required to adjudicate and go into the merits of the charges and as laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Daya Singh (supra), the petitioner in the capacity of being a bank employee should have shown greater honesty and integrity which he clearly failed to do.
38. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bela Bagchi (supra) has again held in the case of a bank employee as under:-
"A Bank officer is required to exercise higher standards of honesty and integrity. He deals with money of the depositors and the customers. Every officer/employee of the Bank is required to take all possible steps to protect the interests of the Bank and to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and to do nothing which is unbecoming of a Bank officer. Good conduct and discipline are inseparable from the functioning of every officer/employee of the Bank. As was observed by this Court in Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager v. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik MANU/SC/1578/1996 : (1996)IILLJ379SC, it is no defence available to say that there was no loss or profit resulted in case, when the officer/employee acted without authority. The very discipline of an organization more particularly a Bank is dependent upon each of its officers and officers acting and operating within their allotted sphere. Acting beyond one's authority is by itself a breach of discipline and is a misconduct. The charges against the employee were not casual in nature and were serious. That being so, the plea about absence of loss is also sans substance."
39. From the aforesaid judgment it is apparent that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has again reiterated that the petitioner in the capacity of being a bank employee is required to show greater honesty and integrity which he clearly failed to do.
40. Keeping in view the aforesaid discussion no case for interference is made out. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed.
Order Date :- 04.03.2025
A. Katiyar (Abdul Moin, J.)
