Allahabad High Court
Shailendra Pratap Singh vs State Of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Home Lko. ... on 6 August, 2025
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
?Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC-LKO:45758
Court No. - 14
Case :- APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 6331 of 2025
Applicant :- Shailendra Pratap Singh
Opposite Party :- State Of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Home Lko. And Another
Counsel for Applicant :- Naved Ali,Pawan Bhaskar,Sandeep Yadav
Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A.
Hon'ble Shree Prakash Singh,J.
1. Heard learned counsel for the applicant, learned A.G.A. for the State and perused the record.
2. Instant application under Section 482 Cr.P.C./ 528 B.N.S.S. has been filed with the following prayer:-
"I. Set aside and quash the Impugned Summoning Order Dated 01.02.2020 (annexure no. 1) in Case no. 186 of 2020, arising from FIR no. 29 of 2020, under sections 406, 420, 427, 504, 506 IPC, P.S. Purkalandar, Faizabad/Ayodhya pending in the Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-Ist, Faizabad/Ayodhya against the applicant.
II. It is also prayed that the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash the Charge sheet Dated 20.01.2020 (annexure-2) filed in FIR no. 29 of 2020, under sections 406, 420, 427, 504, 506 IPC, P.S. Purkalandar, Faizabad/Ayodhya pending in the Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-Ist, Faizabad/Ayodhya against the applicant."
3. The argument put forth by learned counsel for the applicant is of two-fold: one, that the summoning order is passed on a printed proforma; and further, the process is issued for offences under Sections 406 and 420 of the IPC along with the other offences in the same breath as the same could not have been as those would go against the settled proposition of law.
4. Contention of learned counsel for the applicant is that the learned trial court has passed the summoning order dated 26.02.2020 on a printed proforma, which is apparent from the order itself and thus it goes against the law rendered in the case of Ankit versus State of U.P. and another reported in 2009 (9) ADJ 778, and has referred the paragraph 10, which reads as under:-
"10. Below aforesaid sentence, the seal of the Court containing name of Sri Talevar Singh, the then Judicial Magistrate-III, has been affixed and the learned Magistrate has put his short signature (initial) over his name. The manner in which the impugned order has been prepared shows that the learned Magistrate did not at all apply his judicial mind at the time of passing this order and after the blanks were filled up by some employee of the Court, he has put his initial on the seal of the Court. This method of passing judicial order is wholly illegal. If for the shake of argument, it is assumed that the blanks on the printed proforma were filled up in the handwriting of learned Magistrate, even then the impugned order would be illegal and invalid, because order of taking cognizance or any other judicial order cannot be passed by filling up blanks on the printed proforma. Although as held by this Court in the case of Megh Nath Gupta v. State of U.P., [2008 (62) ACC 826.] in which reference has been made to the cases of Deputy Chief Controller Import and Export v. Roshan Lal Agrawal, [2003 (46) ACC 686 (SC).] U.P. Pollution Control Board v. Mohan Meakins, [(2000) 3 SCC 745 : AIR 2000 SC 1456.] and Kanti Bhadra v. State of West Bengal, [2000 (40) ACC 441 (SC).] the Magistrate is not required to pass detailed reasoned order at the time of taking cognizance on the charge-sheet, but it does not mean that order of taking cognizance can be passed by filling up the blanks on printed proforma. At the time of passing any judicial order including the order taking cognizance on the charge-sheet, the Court is required to apply judicial mind and even the order of taking cognizance cannot be passed in mechanical manner. Therefore, the impugned order is liable to be quashed and the matter has to be sent back to the Court below for passing fresh order on the charge-sheet after applying judicial mind."
5. Further submission is that the process is issued under Sections 406 and 420 alongwith the other offences of IPC, which also goes against the settled law, as rendered in the case of Delhi Race Club (1940) Limited and others versus State of Uttar Pradesh and another reported in (2024) 10 SCC 690.
6. Referring to paragraph 40 of the aforesaid judgment, he submits that the ingredients of Section 406 would attract in the event if any act is done against the terms of any contract and so far as the present matter is concerned, there were no term of contract in between the parties, and therefore no question arises with respect to the offence committed under Section 406 of IPC. Concluding his argument, he submits that the summoning order passed by the learned trial court vitiates in the eyes of the law, and thus, the same may be set aside.
7. On the other hand, learned A.G.A. appearing for the State has opposed the contention aforesaid but he could not dispute the legal position as rendered in the case of Delhi Race Club (1940) Limited (supra) and in Ankit (supra), passed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court.
8. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and after perusal of the record, it is apparent that the summoning order has been passed on a printed proforma and the law is very clear on this point as is rendered in Ankit (supra) that the order while issuing the process cannot be passed on a printed proforma, as such an order requires the application of judicial mind, and therefore, this amounts to an order passed in a cavalier and mechanical manner.
9. The second question which emerges for consideration is whether the ingredients of Section 406 would attract in the present matter.
10. The law settled is that the breach of trust would only arise when there are certain terms and conditions of a contract and those were preached and apparently from the reading of the narrative of the FIR, there was no any contract between the parties.
11. This Court has also taken note of the fact that the law enunciated in Delhi Race Club (1940) Limited (supra) also covers the field in the present case as of summon are issued for offence under Section 406 and 420, simultaneously that Sections 406 and 420 cannot be invoked in a same breath.
12. In view of the foregoing submissions and reasons, this Court finds merit in the instant application; resultantly, the impugned summoning order dated 26.02.2020 is hereby set aside.
13. The matter is remitted back to the learned trial court concerned to decide the matter afresh within a period of 60 days from the date this order, in light of the judgment and orders in Delhi Race Club (1940) Limited (supra) and in Ankit (supra).
14. The application is allowed accordingly.
Order Date :- 6.8.2025
Mohd. Sharif
