Opg Securities Pvt. Ltd. And ... vs New Okhla Industrial Development ...
2023 Latest Caselaw 26049 ALL

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
 


Neutral Citation No. - 2023:AHC:184863-DB
 
      Judgment Reserved on: 24.5.2023                       
 
   Judgement Delivered on: 25.9.2023
 
             
 
Chief Justice's Court
 

 
Case :- PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION (PIL) No. - 10714 of 2015
 

 
Petitioner :- Opg Securities Pvt. Ltd. And Another
 
Respondent :- New Okhla Industrial Development Authority Noida And 4 Ors.
 
Counsel for Petitioner :- Kshitij Shailendra,Deeba Siddiqui,H.N. Singh (Amicus Curiae),Priyanka Midha,Ram M. Kaushik,Ravi Kiran Jain,Sanjay Kumar Mishra
 
Counsel for Respondent :- Shivam Yadav,Aditya Sharma,Aditya Yadav,Anand Kumar Yadav,Ashish Kumar Singh,Bidhan Chandra Rai,D.K. Rathore,Kartikeya Saran,Kashif Zaidi,Manish Goyal,Nirvikar Gupta,Nisheeth Yadav,Priyanka Midha,Ram M. Kaushik,Ramendra Pal Singh,S.C.,Saurabh Yadav,Shadab Alam,Shashi Prakash Rai,Subir Lal,Sudhanshu Kumar,Sudhir Dixit,Sujeet Kumar,Swapnil Kumar,Swetashwa Agarwal,Utkarsh Dixit,Veerendra Kumar Shukla,Virendra Singh,Yash Tandon
 

 
Hon'ble Pritinker Diwaker,Chief Justice
 
Hon'ble Saumitra Dayal Singh,J.

1. Heard Sri H.N. Singh, Senior Advocate, the amicus curiae, Sri Vikas Singh (in person) along with Shri Ram Kaushik for Sri Vikas Singh, a private respondent; Sri Manish Goyal, learned Additional Advocate General assisted by Sri A.K. Goyal, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the State; Sri Navin Sinha, learned Senior Advocate, Sri Swapnil Kumar, Sri V.K. Shukla, Sri Sudhir Dixit, Sri Aditya Yadav, Sri Udai Bhatia, Sri Swetashwa Agarwal, Sri Subir Lal, Sri Ashish Kumar Singh, Sri Kartikeya Saran for other/private respondents, M.C. Chaturvedi, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Sri Shivam Yadav and Sri Kaushalendra Nath Singh for the New Okhla Industrial Development Authority (NOIDA in short).

2. The present proceeding was registered as a Public Interest Litigation (PIL, in short), in view of the earlier order of a coordinate bench of this Court dated 29.05.2017, passed in M/s OPG Securities Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. Vs. NOIDA & 4 Ors., Writ - C No. 10714 of 2015.

3. M/s OPG Securities Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as OPG), along with another, had approached this Court, under its writ jurisdiction. That proceeding was registered as Writ-C No. 10714 of 2015 (hereinafter referred to as the writ proceedings). By means of the writ proceedings and upon its amendment, OPG sought the following final relief:

"(i) issue a writ or direction or pass an order in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned order/letter dated 19.11.2014 issued by the Desk Officer (Institutions) i.e. the respondent no.5 (Annexure No. 33 to the writ petition).

(ii) issue a writ or direction or pass an order in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to allot a plot ad measuring about 10,000 Sq. Mts. situated at Block/Sectors 162/164/165, NOIDA covered by "OPEN - ENDED SCHEME FOR DEVELOPMENT ON FARM HOUSE OF AGRICULTURE LAND (2010-2011)" pertaining to the petitioners' application Form No. 445 dated 08.10.2010, submitted on 11.10.2010 and bearing registration no. 27 in the list of applicants at the rate prevailing at the time of submission of the said form or at such other rate which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.

(ii-a) issue an appropriate writ or direction or pass an appropriate order cancelling/nullifying the allotments made in favour of the respondent nos. 6 to 10 and further direct the respondent nos. 1 to 5 to allot the petitioners anyone of the said 5 plots measuring about 10,000 Sq. Mts. or any other plot under the scheme namely "AN OPEN - ENDED SCHEME FOR DEVELOPMENT OF FARM HOUSE ON AGRICULTURE LAND (2010-2011)" or carv out a plot under the said scheme and allot the same to the petitioners; otherwise they shall suffer irreparably.

(iii) issue any other suitable writ or direction or pass an order as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit or proper in the facts and circumstances of the case; and

(iv) award costs of the writ petition to the petitioners.

4. No other relief had been sought in the writ proceedings. Originally, five respondents had been impleaded therein. Thus, the New Okhla Industrial Development Authority through its General Manager (Institutions), Administrative Building, Sector-6 NOIDA, District - Gautam Budh Nagar; Chairman, New Okhla Industrial Development Authority "NOIDA", Administrative Building, Sector-6 NOIDA, District - Gautam Budh Nagar; Assistant General Manager (Institutions), New Okhla Industrial Development Authority "NOIDA", Administrative Building, Sector-6 NOIDA, District - Gautam Budh Nagar; Desk Officer (Institutions), New Okhla Industrial Development Authority "NOIDA", Administrative Building, Sector-6 NOIDA, District - Gautam Budh Nagar, were impleaded as the original party respondents, in the writ petition. Later, consequent to the order dated 09.03.2015, passed during the pendency of that writ petition, six other respondents came to be impleaded, namely, Om Prakash Wadhwa, Krishna Kumar Wadhwa, Vijay Kumar Wadhwa, Suresh Kumar Wadhwa, and M/s Krona Builders Pvt. Ltd and State of U.P. through the Principal Secretary, Industrial Development, Government of U.P., as respondents nos. 6 to 11 respectively.

5. After the exchange of affidavits, the writ proceedings came to be heard and decided finally, vide order dated 29.05.2017. The facts of the case - found relevant to that adjudication, were noted (by the coordinate bench that dealt with the same), in paragraphs nos. 1 to 10 of that order. For ready reference, those are quoted herein below:

"1. Writ petition No.10714 of 2015 had been filed by the petitioner No. 1 through its Director O.P. Gupta, petitioner No. 2 initially praying for a writ in the nature of Certiorari for quashing the impugned order/letter dated 19.11.2014 issued by the Desk Officer (Institutions) on behalf of opposite party No. 1 and praying for issuance of writ in the nature of Mandamus commanding the respondents to allot a plot admeasuring 10,000 Sq. Meters situated at Sectors - 162/164/165, NOIDA covered by the Open-Ended Scheme for Development of Farm House on Agricultural Land 2010-11 (hereinafter to referred as OES 2010) with relation to the petitioner's application dated 08.10.2010 bearing registration No. 27, at the rate prevalent at the time of submission of the form or at such rate which this Court may deem fit and proper.

2. The reliefs claimed by the petitioners are on the ground that it had applied for allotment of a plot having size of 10,000 sq. meters in the OES 2010 within time and submitted all documents necessary and non- refundable processing fee and earnest money of 10 per cent of the estimated cost of the plot applied for. The petitioner No. 2 appeared before the Plot Allotment Committee (hereinafter to referred as the "PAC") on 08.03.2011 and the members interviewed him and all the queries were answered to the full satisfaction of the Committee and it was orally assured to the petitioner No. 2 that he would soon be informed about further Formalities to be carried out with respect to the deposit of balance amount and execution of a sale deed etc.

3. When nothing was heard for about a month from the respondent no. 1, the petitioner no. 1 through one of its executives sent an RTI application. The said RTI application was regarding total number of the applications received, the total number of plots available, the complete details with names, addresses and plot size applied for by all applicants along with the date of receipt of such applications and the date of allotment , if any, made to the applicants etc. In between April to December, 2011 the petitioner No. 1 through its other executives and the petitioner No. 2 filed as many as three RTI applications and sent three letters to the respondent no. 1 seeking information about the criteria for allotment and other matters.

4. Only on 15.02.2012 the Public Information Officer of the respondent No. 1 gave an information to the effect that 115 applications were received and rest of the questions put under the RTI Act still remained unanswered. The petitioners thereafter preferred an Appeal under the RTI Act.

5. Thereafter, the OSD (Y), issued a letter on 03.07.2012 containing two charts. The first chart contained description and details of 115 applicants along with respective form number, dates of registration, names of the applicants, registration money deposited by them and the respective sizes of the plots applied for. The second Chart contained details and description of 54 allottees with reference to their applications. The name of petitioners did not find mention in the second chart containing details of allottees.

6. On 04.06.2014 the petitioner received a letter from PAC to appear before it on 09.06.2014 and for the first time through this letter the petitioner came to know that PAC had made certain recommendations in its meeting held on 08.03.2011 with respect to some people and with respect to the petitioner had granted time to submit additional information. This additional information (Vanchhit Prapatra) was not specified but the petitioner no. 2 appeared before the Committee and personally handed over all documents requested for by the office, details of which have been given in the writ petition. The financial status of the petitioner was certified by the Bank which revealed that the petitioner had Fixed Deposit of Rs.11.06 crores as on 06.06.2014 and detailed chart was also furnished regarding the investment in equity shares having worth more than Rs. 25 crores which could be easily liquidated within two days. The net-worth of the petitioner no. 1 as on 31.03.2011 was shown as Rs.38.43 crores.

7. On 19.06.2014 the petitioners received a letter that as per the decision taken by the Board instead of earlier rate fixed of Rs.3,500/- per sq. meters the same has been revised to Rs.5,525/- per sq. meters plus location charges etc. for plot applied for in OES 2010. In the letter dated 19.06.2014 it was also stated that in case requisite documents as desired by the PAC earlier are not received within fifteen days, then, the registration amount deposited along with the application form shall be returned to the petitioners.

8. The petitioners submitted additional documents on 04.07.2014 including consent for payment of revised rates for allotment of the plot applied for and again disclosed the net-worth to show that they had surplus capital for investment to see the proposed project to its completion. The petitioner no. 2 appeared before the PAC on 10.07.2014 and again before the Selection Committee to resubmit statements showing the net-worth as on 31.03.2010 and on 31.03.2014. Documents required were resubmitted for the third time in July, 2014 and when no information was received the petitioner no. 2 sent a letter dated 29.10.2014 detailing all the previous proceedings and making a request for allotment.

9. All of a sudden, on 19.11.2014 the petitioners received a letter indicating that some order had been passed for return of registration amount relating to the application dated 11.10.2010 through cheque dated 12.11.2014 of Rs.35 lacs. Again, petitioner on 28.11.2014 sent a letter seeking reasons for return of registration amount/earnest money and on 16.12.2014 and 19.01.2015 submitted application/representation seeking information with regard to the criteria/basis for allotment and reasons recorded by the Selection Committee/PAC for rejection of petitioner's application and refund of their earnest money. When no information was received the petitioners filed this writ petition claiming the reliefs as aforesaid.

10. It is the case of the petitioners that despite repeated correspondences and repeated submissions of all documents as desired by the PAC at various points of time, the "Vanchhit Prapatra" or required document were never disclosed in writing and only on personal meeting in the office certain additional information were asked for which additional information/documents were made available to the respondent no. 1 within time."

6. That recital clearly indicates, the cause of action giving rise to the writ proceedings and the facts placed before the coordinate bench, by the parties to the dispute, were limited to the claim for allotment of farmland (made by the petitioner OPG) and its denial by the NOIDA, under its then existing schemes. At no stage, neither at the instance of any party to the dispute, nor otherwise, it came to be questioned (through any source), either in those or any other/separate proceeding - that the entire scheme for allotment of farmland was either unconstitutional or otherwise illegal.

7. After taking note of the facts on record, in paragraph nos. 55 to 64 of the said order, the coordinate bench took note of the submissions advanced before it. Those are reproduced below:

"55. This case was heard by us on several occasions and Sri Ravi Kiran Jain, the learned senior counsel assisted by Sri Kshitij Shailendra, Advocate pointed out in detail and very meticulously, the requirements for a valid application as mentioned in brochure of OES 2010, and from the annexures to the writ petition, the application for allotment made by the petitioners. It is the case of the counsel for the petitioners that despite completing all formalities and submitting and re-submitting papers and documents and even personally contacting the authorities of the respondent No.1 and being interviewed by PAC, the petitioners were not informed exactly what was expected of them. Due to extraneous consideration the application was kept pending whereas, other applications were expedited and allotments made ignoring the claim of the petitioners.

56. The learned senior counsel has pointed out the various orders passed by this Court in various writ petitions of the respondent Nos.6 to 10 and has emphasized that this Court had never made any positive direction with regard to considering the case of the respondent Nos.6 to 10 favorably. This Court had only issued directions that opportunity of hearing be given to the respondent Nos.6 to 10 while deciding their case and the respondent Nos.8 and 9 be considered as old applicants in the left over plots of OES 2008 only. Yet the respondent Nos.8 and 9 were allotted plots in OES 2010 and now NOIDA was pleading that no plots were left for petitioners after allotment being made illegally in favour of the respondent Nos.6 to 10.

57. From the minutes of the meetings allegedly held on 08.03.2011, 22.03.2011 and 28.03.2011, the learned senior counsel has pointed out that the observations therein are vague and inconclusive. Exactly what was wrong or incomplete in the application for allotment made by the petitioners was never disclosed. The criteria for allotment being mentioned in the brochure of OES 2010, was fulfilled to the letter by the petitioners' company. Yet repeatedly representatives were summoned and the petitioner No.2 himself was interviewed thrice on 08.03.2011, 19.06.2014 and 10.07.2014. Each time he was asked to re-submit documents regarding net worth of the company, firstly as on 31.03.2010 i.e. the last date of making of application under OES 2010 and thereafter, as on 31.03.2014. All details as required were furnished regarding financial status of the company and the capacity of the petitioners to see the project to its completion.

58. It was also emphasized by the learned senior counsel that despite mention being made in the Brochure of OES 2010 that the number of plots and their location in the various sectors will be displayed on the Notice Board and published on the website of NOIDA, no such disclosure was made at any point of time. The petitioners were kept in the dark all throughout with regard to number of plots available. It is the case of the petitioners that there were still a number of plots on which the petitioners could be accommodated. Initially when the Brochure were issued for OES 2010 it required same form and documents to be given by all applicants irrespective of their status as individuals or as companies or trusts or societies. The respondent No.6 to 9 had made applications in their individual capacity and respondent No.10 had made application as a company. The net worth of each of the private respondents in term of financial status was much below that of the petitioners. It is not clear as to how the NOIDA had come to the conclusion that the respondent Nos.6 to 10 as well as other successful allottees in OES 2010 were better capable than the petitioners and hence, eligible for allotment of plots.

59. Sri Ravi Kant, senior counsel appearing for NOIDA assisted by Sri Shivam Yadav had submitted before this Court that in the OES 2008 and 2010 inviting applications from willing and capable individuals and companies in terms of conditions mentioned in the brochure of OES 2010 was only "an invitation to offer". The applications made by the petitioners and several others could only be said to be "offers". No statutory right of such applicants could be said to have been violated as their case was considered as the only statutory right these applicants had was that of being considered in accordance with the norms laid down in the Scheme itself. Such norms were never violated. Repeated opportunities were given to the petitioners to substantiate their claim of capacity to fulfill the Farm House Project and see it to its completion. The petitioners failed to avail the opportunity or to satisfy the requisite conditions and therefore, they were refunded their money on 19.11.2014.

60. It has been argued by Sri Ravi Kant, learned Senior Advocate that there were limited plots available with NOIDA under OES 2010. With regard to private respondents, it has been submitted that their case was reconsidered only because of writ petitions being filed by them and directions being issued by this Court to consider their case. It has also been submitted by Sri Ravi Kant that the relief claimed in the writ petition was to quash "order" dated 19.11.2014 which is only a letter informing the petitioners that after due consideration their registration amount/earnest money was being refunded. The order rejecting their claim has not been challenged by the petitioners at all.

61. Sri Shivam Yadav, on a specific query being made by us, has informed this Court that 101 plots were initially set aside for allotment OES 2008 and 56 plots in OES 2010. It has also been informed that the relevant considerations for allotment not only related to financial status or net worth of individuals and companies which were applicants, but also the capacity to see the project to its completion. There were not only the financial parameters that were to be met by the applicants. The case of the petitioners was rejected because the petitioner No.2 was unable to provide specific details regarding sufficiency and financial viability of the proposed project and there was a perceived lack of desired commitment to execute the scheme. The petitioners and the respondent No.10 were considered in the category of companies and the respondent Nos.6 to 9 and some other applicants were considered in the individuals category.

62. Sri Nirvikar Gupta, appearing for their private respondents Nos.6 to 9 has placed before this Court an affidavit sworn in February, 2017 by K.K. Wadhwa respondent No.7. It has brought on record the last judgment passed by this Court on 19.12.2014 in writ petitions filed by the respondent No.6 to 9 individually. The petitioners O.P. Wadhwa, K.K. Wadhwa, Suresh Kumar Wadhwa and V.K. Wadhwa had challenged the enhanced rate of Rs.5,525/- per square meter being charged by NOIDA as cost of land. The Court had considered the arguments made by the respondent Nos.6 to 9 that they had been discriminated in allotment from the Year 2009 to 2011 as 148 persons had been allotted plots in OES 2008 at the old rate of Rs.3100/- per square meter. The delay on the part of the NOIDA was deliberate as a result of which, the respondent No.6 to 9 suffered. This writ petition was dismissed on 19.12.2014 and thereafter, the respondent Nos.6 to 9 had deposited the cost of land at the enhanced rates and had even been given No Dues Certificate in December, 2014.

63. In the affidavit placed before us it has been mentioned that there are several plots which are still vacant and which could be allotted by the NOIDA. A list of such plots along with true copy of the map of Sector 149 has been filed as Annexure-2 to this affidavit. On the basis of this affidavit, Sri Nirvikar Gupta has pointed out that farm house plots were available in OES 2008 and OES 2010 in Sectors 126, 127, 128, 131, 133, 149A, 162, 164, 165 and 167 in NOIDA. Some plots were still vacant, for example Plot Nos.FH-24 in Sector 165, and Plot Nos.FH-4, FH-5 and FH-6 in Sector 167, on which the petitioners could be considered and the allotments made in favour of the respondent Nos.6 and 9 may not be disturbed.

64. Sri Shivam Yadav, however, categorically refused such a claim made by the counsel for the respondent Nos.6 to 9 and it has been stated that no plots are available as of now with NOIDA for allotment to the petitioners. It has been pointed out that the plots mentioned in Sector 167 have a stay order operating on them but it has not been disclosed as to which Court has granted this order in which case. With regard to FH-24 in Sector 165 shown as vacant, Sri Shivam Yadav has expressed his inability to respond as no instruction have been made available by NOIDA with respect to these plots, despite affidavit being filed by the private respondents in February, 2017 itself and sufficient time being available to rebut this claim made by the respondent Nos.6 to 9".

8. Perusal of the submissions advanced in the writ proceedings, as recorded by the coordinate bench, clearly indicate - none took a stand before the coordinate bench and, consequently, no challenge arose, to the scheme OES 2008 and/or OES 2010, introduced by the NOIDA- to allot the farmland to any person, either as unconstitutional or otherwise contrary to the law.

9. In such state of the writ proceedings and in the context of a very limited dispute before the coordinate bench - as to denial of allotment to OPG, by way of adjudication offered, instead of allowing or rejecting the writ petition or passing any other order to remit the matter to any authority, the coordinate bench chose to act on the offer made before it, by the NOIDA- to allot a vacant farmland plot to the petitioners/OPG, at Sector 149-A NOIDA, Gautam Budh Nagar. Consequent to the acceptance of that offer, by the petitioner/OPG, the writ proceeding was disposed of.

10. In view of that outcome of the writ proceedings and, on the strength of the order sheet entries preceding that, it must be said - prima facie, the coordinate bench found merit in the claim of the petitioner/OPG, to allotment of farmland, in its favour. After allowing the parties time (vide earlier order dated 29.05.2017), thereafter, the coordinate bench specifically recorded the statements made by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for NOIDA that the dispute between the petitioners/OPG and NOIDA would stand settled and that the "plot in question" would be handed over to the petitioner, after fulfilment of all requirements. "Final decision", in that regard was left in the hands of the NOIDA, to be made within a period of two months. There is no dispute as to the fulfilment of those/such conditions, by the petitioner/OPG. After recording such a statement, the writ petition was disposed of, in terms of the same. While the coordinate bench may not have itself specifically ruled in favour of OPG and held it to be entitled in law - to the allotment claimed, it did offer its stamp of approval to the settlement that arose between the parties, during the pendency of the writ proceedings. It did not find that settlement (proposed and accepted), to be either unconstitutional or otherwise illegal or unconscionable. It only left the final decision to be made by the NOIDA, as to allotment of particular farmland to OPG.

11. Having done that, instead of choosing to terminate the writ proceedings, and in the absence of any other surviving dispute before it, the coordinate bench, further chose to continue that order - to exercise the suo motu jurisdiction of this Court. It thus made the instant reference and directed the Registry of the Court, to register the same as a Public Interest Litigation. In that regard, the coordinate bench observed as under:

"69. While dealing with this matter that relates to OES 2008 and OES 2010 dealing with (Development of Farm Houses on Agricultural Land), we have our own reservations for the reason that land of poor farmers has been acquired under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act for public purpose and the said land in question on one hand has been taken away from the farmers depriving them of their livelihood by conferring upon them nominal compensation amount and on the other hand the NOIDA has evolved a novel device in the name of OES 2008 and OES 2010. Under the aforementioned Schemes NOIDA has proceeded to give liberty to build a dream Farm House on agricultural land and in the said Plan the sizes of plot has been mentioned as 10000 square meter and above with the rate of allotment described as Rs. 3500/- per square meter or Rs.5,525/- per sq. meter with location charges as applicable for the Scheme. The allotment of the said land, as mentioned above, is to be made in favour of an individual Indian Citizen/Trust/Charitable Trust/Society/Charitable Society/duly registered partnership Firm or Company constituted and incorporated in India and registered with the competent authority, as such, the said Scheme in question is made for only the affluent class. As is reflected from the Scheme in question the incumbent should have positive net worth/surplus investable funds then only Screening Committee would screen the matter and conduct interview for examining the viability of the proposed project. The plot sizes are from 10000 square meter, 10001 to 20000 square meter, 20001 to 100000 square meter, 100001 to 200000 square meter, 200001 to 400000 square meter and above 400000 square meter would be considered for allotment. The writ petition points out that for a plot size of 10,000 sq. meters the minimum amount required to build a Farm-house would be nine and a half crores.

70. We tried to understand the logic of creating Farm Houses after taking land of poor farmers from Sri Shivam Yadav, Advocate, but he simply came forward with the response that it was a policy decision and could submit nothing beyond the same.

71. In pith and substance, on its face value, the aforementioned scheme is for the rich and affluent persons. This much is also reflected from the record in question that large scale complaints have been made before the Lokayukta but at no point of time anything concrete came out of them and it appears that everything has been swept under the carpet so that the capricious manner in which the land of poor farmers, that has been taken away and handed over to rich and affluent persons, is not at all exposed. The fact of the matter is that once the land in question was belonging to poor farmers and it was acquired for the public purpose, then in our considered opinion building of Farm Houses for a particular class, prima facie, cannot be treated to be a public purpose.

72. Under the U.P. Industrial Area Development Act, 1976 functions of the Authority is as follows;

"6. Functions of the Authority- (1) The object of the Authority shall be to secure the planned development of the industrial development areas.

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the objects of the Authority, the Authority shall perform the following functions-

(a) to acquire land in the industrial development area, by agreement or through proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for the purpose of this Act;

(b) to prepare a plan for the development of the industrial development area;

(c) to demarcate and develop sites for industrial, commercial and residential purpose according to the plan;

(d) to provide infra-structure for industrial, commercial and residential purposes;

(e) to provide amenities;

(f) to allocate and transfer either by way of sale or lease or otherwise plots of land for industrial, commercial or residential purposes;

(g) to regulate the erection of buildings and setting up of industries; and

(h) to lay down the purpose for which a particular site or plot of land shall be used, namely for industrial or commercial or residential purpose or any other specified purpose in such area."

73. A bare perusal of the functions of the Authority would go to show that principal function of the Authority is to demarcate and develop sites for industrial, commercial and residential purpose according to the plan and to provide infrastructure for industrial, commercial and residential purposes and nowhere from the scheme of things it is reflected that the land of the poor farmers is to be acquired and then handed over to rich and affluent people for developing Farm Houses.

74. NOIDA is always in a cover up mode, inasmuch as, whenever any illegality is pointed out, their attempt and endeavour is to cover up and in the present case also initially a stand was being taken by them that there is no plot available but at the end of day they have come up with the offer that there is a plot that could be offered and this Court has clearly noted in detail at the point of time when it proceeded to pass an order after calling for the record on 9.3.2015 that allotments made by the respondent nos. 1 to 5 to the private respondent nos. 6 to 10 were due to deliberate and undue favouritism and collusion and the respondent nos. 6 to 9 had applied for allotment of farm house plots in their individual capacity and respondent no. 10 had applied in its capacity as a company and petitioners have been left out. Once such has been the position that Noida authority has been trying to sweep all such issues under the carpet, then in our considered opinion it is true that Writ-C No. 10714 of 2015 has been disposed of but we are of the view that we cannot ignore the issues that are coming forward before this Court that in the present case land of the poor farmers have been taken away and in a designed manner given to the rich and influential people in the name of developing of Farm Houses.

75. In our considered opinion, this could have never been intent of the 1976 Act that the Authority shall behave and proceed in such a fashion. In such a situation and in this background, we are of the considered opinion that present matter pertaining to allotment of land for developing of Farm House in Noida in particular requires a judicial scrutiny in public interest litigation as prima facie it is a colourable exercise of power and is an issue of considerable public importance and, in view of this, we proceed to direct the Registry of this Court to register the matter as Public Interest Litigation and place the papers of present writ petition before Hon'ble the Chief Justice for placing the matter before a Larger Bench so that following questions are answered;

I. Whether land of farmers acquired for public purpose can be handed over to the rich and affluent persons for construction of Farm Houses?

II. Whether, in the facts of the case, in designed manner, and in colourable exercise of power of acquisition, land in question has been acquired and then used for the purpose for which it was never ever acquired?

III. Whether, in the facts of the case, under the scheme of allotment of Farm Houses, transparency, if any, has been maintained or allotments have been made in an unfair manner, extending undue benefit to particular individuals and their family members?

IV. Whether, in the facts of the case, land in question can be resumed back and utilised for the purpose for which it was acquired, once it is substantiated that the allotment was in violation of public trust doctrine?

76. Let needful be done in the matter, accordingly."

12. In turn, instead of registering the reference thus made, afresh - by way of a separate proceeding, the Registry of this Court appears to have re-categorised the writ proceeding itself (brought by the petitioner/OPG) - as a PIL proceeding, retaining the original number of the writ proceeding. For the sake of clarity, there never existed any Public Interest Litigation in this regard, prior to the order dated 29.05.2017.

13. Thereafter, the NOIDA appears to have first filed application IA No. 2 of 2018, seeking review of the order dated 29.05.2017. It was accompanied with a delay condonation application being IA No.1 of 2018. Subsequently, the NOIDA filed IA No. 4 of 2018 along with a delay condonation application (IA No. 3 of 2018), seeking recall of the contents of paragraph nos. 65 to 68 of the order dated 29.05.2017.

14. On such applications, the order dated 25.5.2018 was passed. Therein, it was recorded- the parties agreed that the recall application and the PIL be heard and decided together. Further, all - the original allottees of the NOIDA, under OES 2008/OES 2010, who were not even a party to the writ proceedings, were now required to be impleaded as party respondents. The relevant extract of that order reads as below:

"It appears that in view of the observations made in paragraph 75 of the order dated 29.5.2017 passed in Writ-C No. 10714 of 2015, the very same writ petition has now been registered as public interest litigation. Counsel appearing for the NOIDA submits that the recall application filed by the Authority is confined to the observations made only in paragraphs 65, 66, 67 and 68 of the order dated 29.5.2017. We have perused the observations made in these paragraphs and also the questions framed by the Division Bench in paragraph 75 to be referred to the larger Bench. If the questions are answered by the larger Bench, and in particular, if Question No. IV is answered in the affirmative, it will have a bearing on the observations made in these paragraphs. In this backdrop, counsel for the parties have agreed for hearing of recall application and the public interest litigation together and till then, we accordingly direct the Registrar (Listing) to take appropriate orders on the Administrative side for placing the PIL alongwith recall/review application before the larger Bench for hearing after the ensuing summer vacation, preferably in the third week of July, 2018. Till then, the parties are directed to maintain status quo. Insofar as Plot No. FH 06-06, Sector 149A NOIDA, we observe that it would be a responsibility of the NOIDA Authority, who is in possession of the said plot, to protect the plot from being encroached."

15. The matter was then placed before a larger bench (of three judges), on 3.8.2018. That order also records that the parties may maintain status quo.

16. At that stage, a Modification Application came to be filed (with respect to that order), to implead all 157 allottees who had been allotted land for farmhouses, by the NOIDA. It was allowed vide order dated 3.8.2018. Though no order came to be passed on the Correction Application No. 8 of 2018, in view of the order dated 3.8.2018, that application (8/2018) must be treated to have been disposed of, by necessary implication.

17. Most of the newly added respondents have been served. They have also filed their appearance in these proceedings. Many have filed counter affidavits along with separate stay vacation applications (to vacate the stay order dated 25.5.2018). Those applications have remained pending. Details of such affidavits filed and stay vacation applications filed are as below:

S.N

Application No.

Application Name

Date of Filing

Name of Counsel

Status

67033/2017

Miscellaneous Application

15.02.2017

Nirvikar Gupta

Pending

230352/2015

Amendment Application

16.07.2015

Kshitij Shailendra

Pending

362811/2015

Amendment Application

14.10.2015

Manish Goyal

Nirvikar Gupta

Pending

362807/2015

Amendment Application

14.10.2015

Manish Goyal

Pending

362806/2015

Amendment Application

14.10.2015

Manish Goyal

Pending

362814/2015

Amendment Application

14.10.2015

Manish Goyal

Pending

6/2018

Intervention Application

20.07.2018

Nisheeth Yadav

Pending

130528/2015

Stay Vacation with Counter Affidavit

30.03.2015

Manish Goyal (Respondnent no. 7 only)

Pending

130529/2015

Stay Vacation with Counter Affidavit

30.03.2015

Manish Goyal (Respondnent no. 6 only)

Pending

130525/2015

Stay Vacation with Counter Affidavit

30.03.2015

Manish Goyal (Respondnent no. 8 only)

Pending

168914/2015

Miscellaneous Application

11.05.2015

Kshitij Shailendra (Petitioner)

Pending

182200/2015

Stay Vacation Application

14.05.2015

D.K.S. Rathore (Respondent. No.11)

Pending

59/2020

Stay Vacation Application

07.07.2020

Ashish Mishra

Pending

54/2019

Stay Vacation Application

11.04.2019

Ram Kaushik

Priyanka Midha

Pending

62/2020

Stay Vacation Application

08.12.2020

Ram Kaushik

Pending

63/2020

Stay Vacation Application

08.12.2020

Swetashwa Agarwal

Pending

90/2023

Stay Vacation Application

10.02.2023

Swetashwa Agarwal

Pending

95/2023

Stay Vacation Application

20.04.2023

Virendra Singh

Pending

96/2023

Stay Vacation Application

24.04.2023

Ashish Kumar Singh

Pending

97/2023

Stay Vacation Application

24.04.2023

Swetashwa Agarwal (Resp. No. 157)

Pending

98/2023

Stay Vacation Application

24.04.2023

Swetashwa Agarwal (Resp. No. 137)

Pending

99/2023

Stay Vacation Application

24.04.2023

Swetashwa Agarwal (Resp. No. 68)

Pending

18. Arising from the order of the coordinate bench dated 25.5.2018 and the further order passed upon registration of the instant PIL, vide order dated 3.8.2018, one of the newly added respondents, Dr. Vinay Sabharwal along with others approached the Supreme Court in Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No(s). 22338 of 2020, Dr. Vinay Sabharwal and others Vs. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority and others. Those proceedings were disposed of by the following order dated 4.12.2020:

"Delay condoned.

Permission to file SLP is granted.

Heard Mr. Maninder Singh and Mr. Sajan Poovayya, learned Senior Advocates in support of the petition.

It was submitted that by order dated 31.08.2018, 157 allottees were added as party-respondents in the Public Interest Litigation and by the very same order, interim order granted earlier was made operative till the next date of hearing.

It is submitted that soon thereafter, an application was filed to vacate the ad interim order granted earlier and that though it was preferred on 11.04.2019, it has not yet been taken up for disposal. It was further submitted that at least on four occasions, the application mentioned to be listed before the Bench.

Reliance has been placed on the order dated 12.12.1996 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court in Jhun Jhunwala Oil Mills Ltd. vs. State of U.P. and Others [1996 SCC Online All 741].

Considering the fact that the application preferred by petitioner No.3 and similar other applications, if any, preferred by other petitioners have not yet been listed, we request the Chief Justice of the High Court to constitute an appropriate Bench and have the application(s) listed before the Bench as early as possible and preferably within three months from today.

The Special Leave Petitions are disposed of.

Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of."

19. Thereafter, the larger bench was reconstituted vide order dated 19.1.2021, passed by Hon'ble the Chief Justice. Later, by further order, the matter was required to be placed before Hon'ble the Chief Justice, to reconsider the issue of placing the reference made, to the regular bench dealing with Public Interest Litigation. Accordingly, the matter came to and has remained pending before a division bench. In that, vide order dated 17.1.2023, Sri H.N. Singh, learned Senior Advocate was requested to assist the Court, as an amicus curiae.

20. At the stage of the hearing, Sri Vikas Singh in person (and through his counsel Sri Ram Kaushik) has first pressed his Stay Vacation Application No. 54/2019. It has been contended, the Master Plan for NOIDA, 2001 was approved at the 20th meeting of NOIDA, on 22.02.1983. Referring to the same (annexed to the Supplementary Affidavit filed by him), it has been emphasized, amongst others, one of the permitted user 'Zone' was agriculture. The list of activities permitted in that 'Zone', included farmhouses etc. The relevant extract of that Master Plan reads as below:

"USE ZONE : AGRICULTURAL

Uses permitted: Agriculture which includes horticulture.

Uses permissible if allowed by NOIDA :

Places of worship, Govt. and Semi-Govt, Education & Health buildings, servicing and repair of farm machinery, excavation of clay, gravel, top soil, other earths and materials upto 2.5 meters depth; stone quarrying, us and railway passenger and freight stations, landing fields for defence purposes, wireless transmitting and weather stations, dairy and poultry farming, chilling centres, farm houses and their accessories outside the village abadi (Laldora) areas as defined in the revenue records from time to time."

21. Further, referring to Master Plan for NOIDA, 2021 as approved in the 132nd Board Meeting, it has been shown, farmhouses were again included as one of the permitted use of agricultural land, in NOIDA. Relying on that, the NOIDA at its 157th Board Meeting is described to have passed a further resolution on 23.12.2008, to provide for a scheme to develop farmhouses on 'agricultural' land. Pursuant thereto, a scheme for allotment of land to maintain farmhouses, popularly described as the Open-Ended Scheme for Development of Farmhouses on Agricultural Land, 2008 (hereinafter referred to as 'OES 2008'), was floated by the NOIDA.

22. While proceedings for allotment of land to maintain farmhouses, raising construction, etc. remained pending, on 29.1.2010, a Notification was issued under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, to acquire the lands at village Gulawali, Pargana Dankaur, Tehsil Sadar, District Gautam Budh Nagar. Declaration under Section 6(1) of that Act was also published, with respect to that land (above described), on 17.02.2011. Upon completion of all legal formalities and procedures, possession of that land was also taken over by the State Government and an award was framed as required by law. Consequently, compensation, as determined under that award, is also disclosed to have been paid out.

23. Again, in March 2011, the NOIDA approved the draft of the NOIDA Master Plan, 2031. As before, one of the user of law approved therein was agriculture, and the permitted activities therein included, amongst others, maintaining farmhouses. Also, in the meanwhile, another Open-Ended Scheme for the Development of Farmhouses on Agricultural Land, 2010 (hereinafter referred to as 'OES 2010') was introduced, by the NOIDA.

24. Undisputedly, on 30.03.2011, Shri. Vikas Singh was allotted Farmhouse No.7, Sector 162, Village Gulawali, District Gautam Budh Nagar. At that stage he claimed the allotment made was unfair, that farmland being amongst the farthest away from Delhi. At the same time, two other persons Dr. Harsh Mahajan and Dr. Vinay Sabharwal claimed, they had been unfairly deprived of similar allotment.

25. Accordingly, those three persons approached this Court by means of Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 21663 of 2011, to assail the allotment procedure, adopted by the NOIDA. They sought cancellation of the earlier allotment and prayed for a fresh allotment to be offered by the NOIDA. That writ petition came to be dismissed vide order dated 16.04.2011, by another coordinate bench of this Court. While the Court refused to entertain the challenge raised, it offered the following reasons to dismiss that petition:

"In totality, we are of the view that the writ petition is misconceived in nature and cannot be admitted for any of the grounds discussed above. Therefore, on contest, we are of the firm view that the writ petition cannot be admitted. Hence, it is dismissed at the stage of admission, however, without imposing any cost.

With a caution, we are of the view that if the petitioners are really serious about the charges, as levelled against some of the important authorities of the State without making them party respondents herein, it is open for them to make specific complaint with materials before the appropriate agency for the purpose of enquiry or Investigation."

26. That order was never challenged. It has long attained finality.

27. In the meanwhile, arising from the land acquisition proceedings noted above, many petitions were filed before this Court, to challenge the land acquisition in 48 villages of Greater NOIDA and 24 villages of falling under the NOIDA. That matter came to be referred to the full bench of this Court. It was decided on 21.10.2011, Gajraj & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors. Suffice it to note, the original tenure holders of the land in dispute (in these proceedings), were not parties thereto.

28. Then, on 16.12.2011, the NOIDA appears to have made the final allotment in favour of Dr. Vinay Sabharwal, whereas on 22.03.2012, it executed a lease deed in favour of the applicant Shri Vikas Singh. At that stage, certain other complaints appear to have been made to the State Government, by others, alleging malpractice in the allotment of the farmland in favour of Shri Vikas Singh and others. Consequently, those complaints came to be referred to the Lokayukt, Uttar Pradesh - to conduct an enquiry, to examine the allotments made in favour of various allottees. On 11.11.2013, the Lokayukt submitted his final report, upholding the fairness of the procedure adopted in the allotment of farmlands by the NOIDA. Accordingly, the enquiry that was opened by the State Government and on which the report of the Lokayukt had been invited, was also closed on 27.11.2014. There is no challenge laid to that conclusion reached by the Lokayukt and/or to that fate met to those proceedings.

29. In that fact background, and at that stage, the petitioner/OPG filed Writ - C No. 17014 of 2015, claiming a better right to be allotted farmland, over some of the other successful allottees, on the strength of its better financial standing. Since OPG claimed a better financial standing than respondents nos. 6 to 10, the Court, vide order dated 09.03.2015 (as noted above) required the OPG to implead those respondents. Also, an order of status quo was passed with respect to the plots allotted to those respondents (newly added).

30. In the meanwhile, the Special Leave Petition filed against the full bench decision of this Court in Gajraj (supra), was dismissed on 14.05.2015, in Savitri Devi vs State of U.P. & Ors, (2015) 7 SCC 21. It is also a fact, a lease deed in favour of Dr. Vinay Sabharwal was executed on 01.03.2017.

31. In such facts, the suo motu exercise made by the writ court - to draw a reference and to register it as a Public Interest Litigation has been assailed, as wholly unwarranted, unjustified, and impermissible in law. It has been submitted, having disposed of the writ petition involving the individual rights of O.P.G., on the concession made by the NOIDA, there neither survived any lis between the parties nor there survived jurisdiction with the Court nor there survived any unadjudicated cause of action or even occasion to make a reference, that too suo moto, in public interest. Once the individual dispute brought to the Court by O.P.G. stood directly concluded - upon the concession made by one and accepted by the other party to the dispute, that was acknowledged and acted upon by the writ Court, no dispute survived before it, to be referred to adjudication. The reference made is purely academic.

32. Moreover, in the absence of any fact pleaded by any party to the dispute or by any party that may have claimed any right in the proceedings - even by way of an intervener, and without any material fact otherwise existing on record, the questions referred for consideration in the exercise of Public Interest Litigation jurisdiction, never arose. Therefore, such questions are stated to be hypothetical or purely academic. Unless hard facts had been first brought before the Court, either by the parties to the dispute or through other means and unless the Court had felt satisfied as to the prima facie existence of such facts, it may never have been open to the Court to exercise its suo motu jurisdiction, to encourage a fishing and roving enquiry, to say.

33. Then, it has been submitted, having made the decision to dispose of the writ petition after recording the concession of the NOIDA-to allot farmland to the petitioner/OPG, the writ Court may never have passed any order thereafter, as may potentially have the effect of reviewing its own positive order (to dispose of the writ petition). In short, it has been submitted, the writ Court may never first issue a writ and thereafter pass a further order, as may potentially recall or even dilute the writ issued, with the same hand, at the same time. The writ once issued must remain certain, absolute, and unconditional.

34. As to the merits of the questions referred, it has been strenuously urged, questions nos. 1 and 2 (as noted above) must be answered in the negative, in view of the decisions of the full bench of this Court in Gajraj (supra) as affirmed by the Supreme Court in Savitri Devi (supra). As to question no.3, it has been submitted, in view of the earlier pronouncement of a coordinate bench of this Court in Vikas Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Anr (Writ Petition No. 21663 of 2011), i.e. in the case of Shri Vikas Singh himself and in view of the final report submitted by the Lokayukt accepted by the State Government, on 27.11.2014, there exists no material or objective basis, to doubt the transparency or legality of the allotment/s made. To allow such an enquiry to now arise would not only be dangerous but, also impermissible in law. If allowed, that enquiry would have arisen not on any new or objective material but by way of review of the earlier decision of a coordinate bench, on no tangible material or evidence on record. That action may be described as whimsical, an act to which no Court may ever commit.

35. The correctness or otherwise of the earlier decisions of the Court apart, those orders having attained finality, a coordinate bench of the Court could not have referred for reconsideration the same issue, that too in the absence of new or other material on record. In any case, no different conclusion may be drawn, now.

36. As to the fourth question referred, it has been submitted, the same does not arise, since the successive Master Plans of the NOIDA, for the years 2001, 2021, and 2030, consistently included agriculture as a permitted zonal activity and further included maintenance of farmhouses as a permissible agricultural use, therein. In the absence of any direct challenge raised before this Court - to the legality or validity of any of those Master Plans, no reference may have arisen, in any case.

37. It has then been submitted, the reference may never have arisen if the facts as have now been pleaded and placed before the Court were on the record, earlier. In the first place, the applicants were not parties to the litigation brought by O.P.G. and second, no notice was ever issued to them, to question their right to allotment or their allotment. Hence, the correct facts could not have been stated, when the reference was made. In any case, since such facts are now on record, the reference may not proceed, rather, it may either be answered in favour of the allottees or be left unanswered. As to the absence of any surviving issue with respect to compensation claimed, reference has been made to the dismissal of Writ - C No. 8342 of 2018 (Dharamveer & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.) decided on 05.03.2018.

38. Sri Manish Goyal learned Additional Advocate General, has unequivocally supported the case of the private respondents seeking recall/review of the reference order and vacation of the interim order passed in the PIL proceedings. Besides adopting those submissions, Sri Goyal has further referred to the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Area Development Act, 1976, to submit:

(i) That that Act does not prohibit agriculture as an activity within the area notified under the U.P. Industrial Area Development Act, 1976.

(ii) The State Government had approved all Master Plans submitted by the NOIDA. That approval forms the basis for the allotment of the farmland, both under OES-2008 and OES-2010. To that extent, it has been submitted, the State Government may never oppose the action taken by the N.O.I.D.A., in conformity to such Master Plans.

39. He has also relied on CIT vs Nitya Nand Devkinandan, (1997) 6 SCC 429 (paragraph 2 of the report), to submit, an academic question is not required to be answered by the Court even upon any reference made to it. That decision arose with respect to a reference made under Section 256 of the Income Tax Act 1961. Further, reliance has been placed on a seven-judge bench decision of the Supreme Court on special reference in Re The Special Courts Bill 1978, (1979) 1 SCC 380 to submit, no reference may be made that may pose hypothetical or speculative questions. Unless the terms of reference are specific and arise from an existing and live dispute brought to the Court, such references may not be entertained as may result in disputes being created upon the reference being answered rather than an existing dispute being resolved. Further, reliance has been placed on another full bench decision of this Court in Commissioner of Income Tax vs Geeta Ram Kali Ram, (1980) 121 ITR 708 to submit, the Court may never answer a question not arising from a dispute before it. Relying on another decision of this Court in A.S. Bindra vs Senior Superintendent of Police, Dehradun & Ors., (1997) SCC OnLine All 987 and a decision of the Bombay High Court in Commissioner of Income Tax vs Pooja Archa Trust Fund, (1998) SCC OnLine Bom 900, it has been submitted, a hypothetical question may never be answered in absence of sufficient material facts available to the Court, to answer any question referred to it.

40. Last, referring to another decision of the Bombay High Court in Farhan Nasir Khan vs State of Maharashtra, (2019) SCC OnLine Bom 1777, it has been submitted, unless a clear dispute arises in law- before the Court (while hearing any matter), and unless such dispute is seen to exist, no reference may be made.

41. Sri H.N. Singh, the learned amicus curiae, urged the Court to entertain the present PIL proceedings - to annul all the allotments made by the NOIDA to establish farmhouses. On facts, he has laid great emphasis on the terms and conditions of OES-2008 and 2010, to impress upon the Court, instead of pursuing its avowed object of developing industrial areas, the NOIDA invited applications from the public at large, to build 'Dream Farmhouses", with minimum area 10,000 square meters. Thus, total area equivalent to 680294 square meters i.e., about 680 hectares was put up for allotment for such "Dream Farmhouses", that too in excess of the statutory limits for agricultural holdings, prescribed under the U.P.Z.A.&L.R. Act, 1950 and the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960. At the same time, upon query made by the Court, the learned amicus curiae fairly stated, at present, there exists no case of allotment made by the NOIDA (either under OES-2008 or OES-2010), to allot farmland more than the statutory limits prescribed by the State Legislature, under any law.

42. Based on such facts, relying on a full bench decision of this Court in Smt. Chawali Vs. State of U.P. and others (2015) 1 UPLBEC 531, it has been submitted, there is no error in the registration of the present PIL proceedings. According to him, Article 226 of the Constitution of India enables this Court to pass appropriate orders to secure the public interest even while dealing with private/individual disputes. Equally, while dealing with the private dispute, the writ-Court may issue directions in the public interest and pass such orders or issue such directions as may secure the public interest.

43. Then, invoking the public trust doctrine and relying on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Noida Entrepreneurs Association Vs. Noida and others (2011) 6 SCC 508, Natural Resources Allocation, In Re, Special Reference No. 1 of 2012 (2012) 10 SCC 1 and Association of Unified Tele Services Providers and others Vs. Union of India and others (2014) 6 SCC 110, it has been strenuously urged, the NOIDA could not have offered or allotted any part of agricultural land acquired by it, for agricultural purposes. Referring to Sections 3, 4, and 6 of the U.P. Industrial Area Development Act, 1976 as also Section 2, it has been urged, agriculture is not a purpose for which the provisions of the said Act may ever be invoked. Neither land may have been acquired for that purpose nor it may have been open to the NOIDA to utilize the acquired land for agricultural purposes. In view of the above, in the present case, the land of the poor farmers had been acquired at minimal prices and it has been made over to the affluent of the society, who are not agriculturists by vocation. Insofar as the land ceiling limits were also allowed to be breached (in law) while inviting such applications for allotment of farmland, it has been urged, clearly, the inherent public trust on which the NOIDA draws validation of its actions, has been knowingly destroyed. In view of the above, learned amicus curiae would submit, no rights may ever have vested in any of the allottees/newly added respondents. They may never claim any benefit from the same. Elaborating his submission, he has further relied on Chapter-5, Clause 26 of the New Okhla Industrial Development Area Building Regulations, 2010, to submit, though it may be permissible to the NOIDA to regulate the activity on agricultural lands falling within the limits of its notified area and for that purpose, it may regulate the constructions that may be made by existing farmers over such land, it could not, in the garb of that power, acquire agricultural land from the original tenure holders, to allot it for agricultural use, to other persons.

44. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the record, we have given our anxious consideration to various aspects of the case including the concern of the Court itself (as voiced in the reference order). Yet, we find it difficult to proceed on the merits of the reference made. In the first place, we must recognize and remain ever cognizant - a Court of law, must look to adjudicate the exact dispute brought before it, nothing less yet nothing more.

45. In the discharge of that primary adjudicatory function, first, the Court must be quick to recognize the exact cause of action that may have arisen within its jurisdiction, by identifying the material facts that may constitute the cause of action giving rise to the dispute and ensure that the parties to that dispute, whose vital rights are involved (by the adjudication sought), are noticed and heard upon pleadings and evidence brought by them.

46. Thereafter, by way of discharge of the essential adjudicatory function, the Court may pronounce its order - as may resolve that pre-identified and thus defined and limited dispute, in accordance with the law. It is the discharge of that primary function that settles the otherwise disputed rights between the parties to the dispute. The adjudicatory function ends there, at that stage, at that moment.

47. Before that, if the Court may find at any stage - that there does not exist any cause of action or legal injury, it would refuse to adjudicate such an academic dispute. If, however, the Court chooses to exercise its adjudicatory function in the context of a real and live dispute before it, it must retain its focus to deal with it. In that, it would address the stand of the respective parties to the dispute and reach its conclusion on the strength of its independent reasoning. That process itself, would naturally lead the Court to the discovery, if the party (who may have brought the dispute to it), is entitled to the relief claimed. The grant of relief or its denial determines and announces the fair end of the proceeding, both, to the parties to the dispute, in particular, to the world in general and, to the Court itself. The record that was live turns to be decided, at that moment.

48. The Court itself may never stray from this strict path. Little deviations from this path may distract the parties and the Court itself to a destination other than the desired ends of justice. On its own, the Court may never make any such deviation, consciously. To us, that appears to be the only prism through which we may look at the development of the proceedings in the present case.

49. Thus, we note, in the writ proceedings, the Court was dealing with the prayer for Mandamus made by O.P.G. - seeking allotment of a plot of farmland, for the purpose of development of its farmhouse. According to O.P.G., it was wholly, and in fact better entitled to that allotment than respondent nos. 6 to 11, who had been wrongly granted such allotment, by the NOIDA.

50. Thus, O.P.G. contended before this Court - within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, the NOIDA was bound to act fairly and reasonably. Therefore, neither under its policy, OES-2008/ OES 2010, the NOIDA may have practiced hostile discrimination, to exclude O.P.G. from that allotment process and to arbitrarily award farmland to other/less eligible entities and applicants.

51. On such dispute being brought to this Court, it not only issued notices to the NOIDA and called for its reply, but it also provided to implead other allottees qua whom grounds of discrimination and arbitrary action were set up, by O.P.G. They were also noticed by the Court. Yet, neither any pleadings were made by O.P.G. against allotment made in favour of respondent nos. 7 to 168, nor they were impleaded as party respondents or heard up to the date of disposal of the writ petition.

52. Obviously, there were no pleadings made by OPG to doubt the legality or validity of the OES 2008/OES 2010. In turn, neither the NOIDA nor the State authorities (through their counter affidavits filed in the writ proceedings), asserted before the writ court any fact - to cast any doubt as to the legality and/or validity of the OES 2008 or OES 2010.

53. While considering such dispute, in the status of pleadings and array of parties, as it existed, the Court (through the coordinate bench), chose not to adjudicate, either the grounds of hostile discrimination or arbitrariness set up by OPG nor it negated the existence of the right claimed by OPG, to the allotment claimed. In fact, the Court had provided as below:

"65. After all these arguments were advanced with claim and counter claim the matter was got adjourned by Sri Shivam Yadav, Advocate, to seek further instructions in the matter and the matter was adjourned for further hearing on 24.5.2017. On 24.5.2017 Sri Ravi Kant, Senior Advocate, informed us that exercise is on and in effect a plot which is vacant has been located at Sector 149-A, Noida, Gautam Budh Nagar and modalities for allotment requires approval and, accordingly, the matter be adjourned for 29.5.2017 to be taken up at 2 PM.

66. On the matter being taken up on 29.05.2017 Sri Kshitij Shailendra, Advocate, informed us that a plot in question has been offered but a temple is standing thereon.

67. To this, Sri Ravi Kant, Senior Advocate, contended that whatever are the issues inter-se petitioners and Noida authorities, the same would be settled and the plot in question would be handed over to the petitioners after all requisite formalities are fulfilled and in this background request has been made that present writ petition be disposed of by giving liberty to the NOIDA to take a final call on the request of petitioners preferably within next two months from today.

68. In view of such request coming forward, we dispose of present writ petition by directing the NOIDA to take a final call in the matter, in accordance with law, as submitted before this Court and with this direction the writ petition is disposed of."

54. Thus, the Court chose (in the first place), to take on record the offer made by the NOIDA, to allot a farmland plot to OPG. It then adjourned the proceeding to allow the parties to ascertain the correct facts. Thereafter, on the adjourned date, upon further stand taken by the parties to the dispute, the coordinate bench further recorded that the NOIDA would ensure that the then identified plot would be allotted to OPG, after completing all requisite formalities. Having done that, the Court disposed of the writ petition with liberty to the NOIDA, to take a final decision, within a period of two months.

55. Though such an order may not be described as a classic Mandamus issued, to allot a farmland plot to OPG, at the same time, it is a decision of the Court in the nature of Mandamus issued to the NOIDA, to take a final decision in terms of the settlement reached before the Court. It was not an empty letter of the law. Once the coordinate bench recognized the offer made by the NOIDA and granted its approval thereto (necessarily implied), to allot a plot to the petitioner before it, namely, O.P.G., and thus chose to dispose of the proceeding before it, i.e. the lis that gave rise to the writ proceedings, it not only stamped its authority on the settlement reached between the parties before it, but it left no manner of doubt that the lis or the dispute brought to the Court stood decided/settled in terms of the consented order passed by the Court. A formal 'decision making' requirement was thrust on the NOIDA, in that regard. For that purpose, a positive direction was issued, commanding the NOIDA to make that decision within two months. Such an order has to be described as a Mandamus issued arising from the consent that had arisen before the coordinate bench as to the entitlement of O.P.G., to allotment of farmland under OES 2008 or OES 2010.

56. Neither in the pleadings that were exchanged before that consented order came to be passed nor through any other means, either by a third party or arising from the terms of the settlement offered, the Court was in any doubt as to the visible rights being claimed by OPG, or the basis on which those rights were being claimed. In fact, the consented order explicitly recognized the right of OPG, to be allotted farmland by the NOIDA. It paved the way and provided for such allotment to be made by the NOIDA, within a period of two months from the date of that order. To that extent, visibly as also at its core, that order is a final adjudication made by the Court.

57. Therefore, in that explicit declaration of the rights of OPG, made by the Court, inhered inseparably (at that stage and in those facts), the recognition made by it, as to the validity and legality of the scheme for allotment of farmland to individuals and other entities. Unless such inherent recognition to the validity and legality of the allotment schemes is read in the order dated 29.5.2017, it can never be reconciled, even on the surface of things, how the writ Court may have ever issued a direction to the NOIDA to allow for allotment of any farmland plot, to OPG. Fresh rights had been created in O.P.G., under the order of the writ Court, in terms of the relief claimed by O.P.G., under the OES 2008/OES 2010.

58. Also, by way of necessary and an unavoidable consequence of the same, there did not survive for consideration, before the Court, any other or further dispute or lis brought to it. No party before the Court had made any other pleading and no party before the Court, sought any further or other adjudication/relief. Thus, we are constrained to observe - upon the observation made by the coordinate bench that the writ petition would stand disposed of in terms of the (consented) order passed by it, it never survived for any further consideration, in those writ proceedings, if the Allotment Schemes OES-2008/OES-2010 were legally untenable, in public interest.

59. We may clarify, at first, we are not seeking to examine the issue - whether the schemes - OES-2008 and/or OES-2010 were legal and valid. We are concerned if that question had arisen and if that may have been considered suo moto, after the Court had made its decision in the writ proceeding, clearly indicating that OPG should have been granted allotment under the said scheme OES-2008/OES-2010.

60. Having first disposed of the writ petition creating allotment of farmland plot in favour of O.P.G. under scheme OES-2008 and/or OES-2010, to thereafter allow for a reference to arise in public interest, to examine if that very scheme was valid, would be to pass an inherently conflicted and unreconciled order whereunder in the first place the Court chose to adjudicate the dispute in favour of the petitioner by issuing a writ or a positive command and then by the same hand chose to doubt its propriety and correctness. To allow for that conflict to arise at the end of any adjudicatory function, would be antithetical to the basic tenet of any jurisprudence. Therefore, in principle, it may not only be doubtful, but improper.

61. It may have been another situation completely, if after the order disposing of the writ petition had been passed in one case, by one bench, a doubt had arisen about its correctness, before another bench or in a subsequent proceeding before the same bench, in another case or proceeding, later in time and/or if the validity of the scheme OES-2008 and/or OES-2010 had come to be directly tested, in the case filed later. In that event, the bench hearing the second matter (if facts had been so pleaded and pressed), may have felt inclined to take a different view. In that, there would be no difficulty to the bench hearing the second/later case, to allow for such reference to arise - on a perceived difference of opinion. However, that principle though common in the day-to-day running of Courts, applies to a completely different set of fact situations.

62. That principle and the underlying reasoning may never be available to the present facts. Here, the bench dealing with the first matter, chose to dispose of the writ petition, effectively issuing a writ of Mandamus. Thereafter, in the same matter, by means of the same order, at the same point in time, and obviously without recalling its earlier order, it chose to doubt the correctness of its own decision. That could never be done. Once, the writ proceeding was disposed of, the coordinate bench could not have itself sought a review of that order, in a suo moto exercise of its jurisdiction. Clearly, no party before the Court had sought that review.

63. Then, while passing a final order, a Court is also not bound by its interim orders and it is not required to (by way of principle), to deal with that reasoning (if any), while pronouncing its final verdict. To that extent, any inconsistency in the two orders (interim and final), create no difficulty in the administration of justice by Courts. Yet, the order disposing of the writ proceeding is not an interim order. Having disposed of the writ proceeding, the Court retained no jurisdiction to entertain any doubt as to the correctness or otherwise, of its order to allot a farmland to OPG, by NOIDA. For that reasons also, the Court could not have made a reference to itself, to test the correctness of its order providing for allotment of a farmland to OPG.

64. Also, under our jurisprudence, sometimes Courts and Tribunals acting under certain statutes, may make a reference to a higher Court, after pronouncing their final verdict. That jurisdiction arises, specifically in the context of statutes, be it the Civil Procedure Code, or other enactments. That is not the case here. The power exercised by the coordinate bench was the most sacrosanct and extraordinary power of the Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It did not permit the Court to itself doubt its positive act, of issue of a writ. If it was in doubt as to the legality of the allotment sought, it may not have allowed for the allotment to arise in favour of O.P.G. and it could not have disposed of the writ petition.

65. In that context, it may have been yet another situation, if the coordinate bench had earlier received on record, necessary facts, and if on such facts it had felt inclined to dismiss the writ petition brought by OPG, amongst others because it may not have found existing, any legal duty that could be pressed upon the NOIDA, to make any allotment of farmland to the petitioner-OPG. Upon that tentative conclusion or in the process of that reasoning, if a further doubt had arisen to the coordinate bench, as to the legality and the validity of the Scheme OES 2008 and/or OES 2010, the reference may have been made by it, to examine if all/any such allotments may survive. Such a reference may also have been valid whether it may have been made before or after dismissing the writ proceedings brought by O.P.G. In that event, a Public Interest Litigation may have arisen to test if all or any other persons (to whom allotments had been made) along with OPG, were entitled to the same, in law.

66. Also, at that stage, if the coordinate bench had been faced with a propriety issue or a procedural difficulty, to itself deal with the matter - arising from its peculiar roster fixation, it may have drawn the reference that may have given rise to the Public Interest Litigation and thereafter required the matter to be placed before the appropriate bench, keeping the writ proceedings, pending.

67. The principle referred to by Shri Manish Goyal with respect to making of reference are equally applicable to facts situation as existed before the coordinate bench. For the facts and reason noted above, the four questions referred by it, are purely academic, hypothetical and speculative. They may have given rise to an enquiry to ascertain true facts but not to adjudicate any existing conflict of rights, visible in the limited context of the dispute in the writ proceedings. Therefore, as reasoned in Re : The Special Courts Bill, 1978 (supra), the reference may not be entertained as may itself give rise the disputes for the first time, independent of the facts on record, before the Court.

68. Also, we have a more fundamental issue before us - whether after disposing of the writ petition providing for allotment of farmland to the petitioner i.e. OPG, any reference to entertain a public interest litigation (to examine the validity of the scheme whereunder such allotment had arisen in favour of OPG), could be made. In State of U.P. & Anr. Vs. State of Satya Narain Kapoor (Dead) by Lrs. & Ors. (2004) 8 SCC 630, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals arising before it from an order dated 15.10.1997 of a division bench of this Court, in Writ Petition Nos. 32605 of 1991, 20430 of 1992 and 16325 of 1994. In that case, the original petitioner namely Satya Narain Kapoor alleged, he had been inducted into tenancy of the shop in dispute, by one Wahidan Bibi in whose favour that shop had been allotted by the Nagar Mahapalika. Upon the death of Wahidan Bibi, the original petitioner Satya Narain Kapoor claimed a right to allotment. Similar claims were involved in two other petitions. Those were resisted by certain other persons claiming under Wahidan Bibi. While that controversy was pending before the Court, the State Government came out with a policy of it's own, to grant free-hold rights over the land over which the disputed shops were existing.

69. In that case as well, none of the parties before the Court challenged the validity of that policy of the State Government - to grant free-hold rights. Thus, it was true that the disputed shops stood over Nazul land which land had become subject matter of the policy decision of the State Government - to confer free-hold rights, under the these newly framed free-hold policy of the State Government.

70. In that fact controversy, a division bench of this Court took suo moto cognizance as to the validity and legality of the free-hold policy thus introduced by the State Government, in the writ proceedings arising at the instance of Satya Narain Kapoor and others, claiming tenancy rights. Yet, the Court went on to effectively nullify the Government Orders issued to give effect to the free-hold policy. Consequently, upon challenge raised by the State Government, the Supreme Court posed to itself, the following question:

"Could this all have been done and that too in the manner in which the High Court has done?"

71. As contested by the private respondents in the instant PIL proceedings (which stand has been supported by the State Government and the NOIDA), in that case as well, it was contended as below:

"The principal submission made by Shri Dinesh Dwivedi, the learned Senior Advocate for the State of U.P., has been that the issue arising for decision in the writ petitions before the Court was confined to two shops only and within the scope of hearing of the writ petitions it was open for the High Court to uphold or not to uphold the allotment of shops and then to decide that in the event of allotment being upheld, which of the three writ petitioners was entitled to which of the shops. Instead, the High Court has proceeded to nullify several government orders, eight in number, without giving notice to the Government of what the High Court proposed to do. As a consequence of the judgment delivered by the High Court, the property of the Government in nazul itself has been put in jeopardy and the right of the State to deal with it consistently with its policy decision and the law enacted in accordance therewith has been taken away as the State has been declared only a trustee of the nazul land."

72. Thereupon, the Supreme Court opined as under:

"We find merit in the submission made by Shri Dwivedi, the learned Senior Counsel for the State. The private parties represented before us in several civil appeals have also found it difficult to support the impugned judgment. We are not doubting the jurisdiction of the High Court to take cognizance of an issue wherein the element of public interest is involved and to take up and entertain the same as public interest litigation and pronounce upon such issues exercising the jurisdiction which the Constitution does vest in the High Court but that has to be done by following the established rules of practice and procedure consistently with the rules of natural justice. The High Court, if convinced, should have framed specific issues with which it proposed to deal with in public interest and then should have put the State on specific notice inviting its pleadings and documents. Any other party likely to be adversely affected and interested in being heard may have been allowed the opportunity of doing so. A larger issue involving public interest and far-reaching implications should not have been dealt with so lightly, casually and hurriedly as the High Court has done. So far as the dispute raised by the private parties as writ petitioners in the High Court is concerned, the High Court could have postponed the decision in such individual writ petitions until the larger issue of public interest was decided; or else the High Court could have adjudicated upon the limited dispute as to the right of allotment over the two shops and then taken up the larger public interest issue for adjudication as a separate writ petition, the decision wherein would have become applicable even to Shops Nos. 195 and 196 as they being similarly situated as other shops, would have been liable to be treated equally."

73. It is that ratio that we are bound to apply. If the coordinate bench was convinced to entertain a PIL to test the legality of the OES 2008/OES 2010, it ought to have postponed the decision in the individual writ petition brought before it by OPG until the larger issue of public interest litigation referred by it, was decided first. The later part of the reasoning of the Supreme Court (in Satya Narain Kapoor), that contemplates allowing the larger public interest to be contested after adjudication of the individual rights of the petitioners before the Court, does not apply to the present facts. In that case, the dispute brought before the Court was only with respect to allotment of tenancy/lease rights whereas the larger issue contemplated to be examined by way of public interest litigation was to test the legality of conversion of lease-hold rights into free-hold rights by the State, over the land (over which the rented shop existed). Thus, the rights that were in contest in the individual litigation brought to the Court and the rights proposed to be examined in exercise of public interest litigation, were entirely distinct and different. They were not overlapping or common or conflicted. Decision with respect to one, would have no effect over the other.

74. A tenant's right to be granted allotment etc. over the shop as was contested by the heirs of the original lessee did not involve adjudication of any rights of title over the land or its conversion to freehold. At the same time, adjudication of the right to obtain free-hold rights, if any qua the leased land did not conflict with the lessee's/tenant's pre-existing rights to continue to occupy and enjoy the shop property constructed over it, under the pre-existing rent deed. Therefore, in that case, there was no difficulty in allowing the individual dispute to be adjudicated finally, by this Court and to thereafter allow the public interest litigation to arise over a separate issue. Decision thereon would never conflict with the earlier final decision made by the Court. Therefore, in that case, the Court may have made the reference to adjudicate the larger public interest, after dealing with the exact dispute before it.

75. However, in the present case, there were no two different rights involved. OPG approached this Court for its right to allotment of farm-land under OES 2008 and/or OES 2010 on leasehold basis whereas the referral order to entertain the Public Interest Litigation, potentially, seeks to destroy that very right, at least by way of a possible direct result of the final decision in the Public Interest Litigation. To admit that possibility to arise or to be explored any further, would be to make the Mandamus issued earlier, while disposing of the writ petition, conditional to the further order to be passed in a separate proceeding, as may arise in the Public Interest Litigation. To that, we have no doubt. It may never be done. While an interim order may remain subject to final outcome a legal proceedings, a final order of adjudication may not have been made subject to another proceeding instituted by the Court itself under the same order, specifically, to doubt the correctness of that own final decision, first taken. That would be to give to the Court itself jurisdiction, in the nature of appeal jurisdiction against its own order. In negation to and in complete absence of any legislative intent, to create such an intra-Court jurisdiction against an order made by a division bench of the Court, that may never be done.

76. Seen in that light, the full bench decision of this Court in Smt. Chawali Vs. State of U.P. and others (supra) does not stand to support the referral order. Though undisputedly, while deciding a private dispute, this Court could require registration of the Public Interest Litigation, that decision is only to the point that a Public Interest Litigation, if it arises validly, may remain to be considered by the appropriate bench assigned that jurisdiction by the master of the roaster i.e., Hon'ble the Chief Justice of the Court.

77. Then, as noted above, the doubts and questions expressed by the coordinate Bench in its order dated 29.5.2017, had not arisen from the facts brought before the Court. Though the writ proceeding had remained pending for a long time and pleadings had been exchanged between the parties, it is striking to note, no party to the dispute pleaded any fact as may have given rise to the issues referred to by the coordinate bench. As an adjudicator of disputes and that too as a writ Court, the coordinate bench was not faced with any issue of fact as may have allowed it to examine the legal question - if existence and implementation of the two schemes OES-2008 and OES-2010 was constitutional or otherwise legal, valid and just or in public interest.

78. Therefore, the reference order has sprung, purely from the self-generated doubts of the co-ordinate bench as to its own decision - disposing of the writ proceedings in favour of O.P.G./petitioner. To us, it is dangerous and impermissible for the Court to invoke its suo moto jurisdiction to create a reference in public interest, only to negate a positive adjudication made by it that too by the same order. If genuine doubts arise and exist with the judges as to the entitlement of the relief claimed, they must, without exception decline that relief, before they pronounce and sign their orders. By way of corollary, if a genuine doubt arises after a judgement has been pronounced and signed, the judge may only live to regret his mistake. In absence of any power to make a reference thereafter, the course adopted was impermissible. In absence of express statutory/constitutional mandate to allow for the same, we are not inclined to draw on the source of our inherent jurisdiction, to rule otherwise.

79. What the coordinate bench may not have done directly, the same consequence may not be recognised to arise, because of the perceived concern for public interest, expressed in the same order. In absence of jurisdiction, the existence of a perceived concern may not impel the Court to draw on its inherent power more than it may, without itself destroying, the final order that it makes, in discharge of its adjudicatory function, thereby itself diluting its pure source of power. We find no legal basis to recognise the existence of such a power or its exercise, in the present facts. If permitted, it would militate not only against the finality of orders but also frustrate the consequence of a concluded legal proceeding and dilute beyond recognition, the inherent powers of the Court. Potentially, such a power may destroy the soul and credibility of judicial institutions and their functioning.

80. Even then, when we consider the material that existed before the Court to exercise its suo moto power, we find, there was nothing but a pure thought that the coordinate bench was visited upon, while hearing the writ petition claiming individual rights, by OPG i.e., whether, it was permissible to forcibly take away the agricultural land of the poor farmers, by adopting the mode of acquisition for industrial development and to thereafter, allot and transfer the same to the affluent in the society, who were not agriculturists.

81. All such thoughts that may visit a judge while hearing a matter may create myriad shades of perspectives that a judge may work with. That vibrance when arises, does light up an otherwise dull daily routine of a judge who like the unerring ground staff on a cricket field remains a non-player, in the perpetual quest of drawing and maintaining the correct line of the law. In the game/interactions played out between citizens or the citizen and the state continually, such intense human activity, performed in diverse fields, demands the line of law to be redrawn, as by its own force, that intense human activity sometimes first appears to blur it.

82. Being humans exposed to limited circumstances that we encounter in the small bubble of morality within which we are born and grow, different facts brought by different citizens and entities in an infinite number of circumstances that arise in their lives, sometimes individual judges are faced with that which may be described as interesting or new or different or strange or odd, depending upon the individual moral perspective of the judge who may not have either himself experienced, seen or heard of the same. Yet, it is not that morality of an individual judge that he sets out to enforce. Therefore, that interest may never dictate the fate of the adjudication to be made by the Court that any judge may ever man.

83. The morality of the judge may give rise to nothing more than an unavoidable bias. Though it may naturally lend its colour or shade to the portrait that the judge happens to paint, it may never be his muse itself. The picture changes with facts of each case and gets defined by the controlled brush of reason held by the judge. Reasons must be to the conclusions - that which help bring a fair end to the adjudication sought. Though, logic or legal reasoning as may come naturally to those trained in law may tempt a judge to make his morality his muse, he must forever remain immune to that temptation.

84. The Court through its judges looks to do only that as may be enough for the litigant before it. Generally, it does not look to think up and then solve issues in advance, by laying down the law. It also does not enter the task of adjudication to lay down any particular law rather, it looks to adjudicate the lis brought to it, in accordance with the law and in that process, sometimes, lays down the law as well.

85. Looked in that light, we are not inclined to examine the correctness or otherwise of the thoughts that may have arisen to the coordinate bench while hearing the writ petition. Suffice to note, that may never have given rise to any existing dispute before the Court as may have led to the instant reference. Those thoughts and doubts ever remained beyond the pale of adjudication sought by OPG. Once the coordinate bench disposed of the proceedings by means of the consented order passed by it, the thoughts, and doubts, if any, howsoever rational and sound they may appear, faded into insignificance as the proceedings brought before the Court stood disposed of and thus terminated.

86. Last, by way of prima facie observations, we find strong merit in the objections being raised by Shri Vikas Singh, that questions nos. 1 & 2, referred to by the coordinate bench do not require to be answered in view of the decisions of the full bench of this Court in Gajraj (supra) as affirmed by the Supreme Court in Savitri Devi (supra). Also, prima facie, we find, once the earlier petition filed by Shri Vikas Singh being - Writ Petition No. 21663 of 2011 (Vikas Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Anr) stood dismissed and the allegations levelled against the allotments made under the Scheme were found baseless, by the Lokayukt, and that report was accepted by the State Government, no objective or other material came into existence thereafter, as may have allowed for any fresh enquiry to arise, at present.

87. As to question no.4, we find the same to be purely academic, both in the context of the absence of facts before the Court and also in the absence of specific challenge having arisen and also in the context of the fair statement by Shri H.N. Singh that the land ceiling limited has not been breached, and also in the context of undisputed facts, it is seen, the Uttar Pradesh, Industrial Area Development Act, 1976 does not mandate or require the NOIDA to develop every inch of the land acquired by it to set up an industry or residence or commercial facility. Rather, it appears to provide for a planned development of the industrial area. Generally, how an industrial area is to be developed does not fall within the expertise of the Court. Specifically, that was not the dispute brought before it. Insofar as the law permits and regulates various activities including agriculture and further insofar as there were no facts before the Court to reason that the development planned by allowing farmhouse to exist/arise would defeat the industrial development, we do not propose to allow a wholly avoidable or needless or vague enquiry to arise, in that regard. As an adjudicating Court, we prefer to remain confined to identify the exact dispute before us and to decide the same on due appreciation of the exact facts and evidence as may be material to decide such disputes.

88. As to the line of reasoning explored by the learned amicus curiae invoking the public trust doctrine, we are not inclined to apply the said doctrine in the present uncertain facts. Necessary facts have not been pleaded. As an adjudicatory Court, we are not inclined to adjudicate such reference on a mere hypothetical possibility as to existence of illegality of the entire scheme. Insofar as prima facie we find that the agricultural use was permitted under the Master Plan of the NOIDA and that has never been made subject matter of challenge rather, it has been approved by the State Government and further inasmuch as we find, prima facie maintenance of farm-houses is a permitted activity under that Master Plan, we do not consider the facts of the case to have matured to the level as may require any adjudication by the Court, at this belated (in time) yet, premature (on facts) stage.

89. Whichever way we look at the issue, unfortunately, we are unable to allow the reference to proceed any further. Therefore, without making any final adjudication on any of the four questions referred for adjudication, we chose to terminate the Public Interest Litigation that has sprung on the order of the coordinate bench of this Court, dated 29.5.2017, as purely academic and inconsistent to the prior adjudication made by that co-ordinate bench, in the earlier part of the same order, that is referable to the rights of O.P.G. Thus, we chose, not to answer any of the questions referred to us. They are left unanswered.

90. The delay condonation applications filed to I.A. no. 1 of 2018 and I.A. no. 3 of 2018 are allowed. Both I.A. nos. 1 of 2018 and 3 of 2018 along with the pending stay vacation applications are to be dealt with and treated, allowed as also remaining pending Miscellaneous/Intervention/Amendment/applications are accordingly disposed of.

91. Let this Public Interest Litigation be consigned to record, without prejudice to any other proceeding that may have been registered at the instance of any person to question the validity and legality of OES 2008 and/or OES 2010.

Order Date :- 25.09.2023

Abhilash/Prakhar/Salman

(S. D. Singh, J.) (Pritinker Diwaker, C.J.)