The Oriental Insurance Company ... vs Smt. Usha Devi And Others
2023 Latest Caselaw 8308 ALL

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
 

Court No. - 6
 
Case :- FIRST APPEAL FROM ORDER No. - 1352 of 2008
 
Appellant :- The Oriental Insurance Company Ltd.
 
Respondent :- Smt. Usha Devi and others
 
Counsel for Appellant :- V.C. Dixit, Ashok Kumar Jaiswal
 
Counsel for Respondent :- B.P. Varma, Bhanu Prakash Verma, Pankaj Dwivedi
 

 
Hon'ble J.J. Munir,J.

This is an appeal by the Insurance Company against the judgment and award dated February the 19th, 2008 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal/Additional District Judge, Mathura, allowing the claim petition and awarding a sum of Rs.7,29,500/- to the claimants. The claimants-respondents, who are also before the Court, say (though they have not filed any cross-objection) that they are entitled to an enhancement of the award on the principle that the Court notwithstanding the absence of a cross-objection, must pass a just award.

2. The facts giving rise to this appeal are these:

On June the 3rd, 2005 at 10 o'clock in the morning hours, while one Ajay Kumar was standing outside the Refinery Nagar, Mathura waiting to board a bus. A truck (dumper) bearing Registration No. HR 38 L 9611 approached from the Mathura end of the road and hit Ajay Kumar, causing him grievous injuries. In consequence of the injuries, Ajay Kumar died on the spot. It is the claimant's case that the accident happened on account of negligence of the driver of the offending vehicle. It is their case that the driver was moving at a very high speed, driving his vehicle negligently. The deceased had a sweetmeat shop and a restaurant at the Damodarpura Chungi. He would cook food and make all wares at his sweetmeat shop himself. In addition to the daily sale of food and sweets, it is the claimants' case that the deceased's shop-restaurant would cater to the requirements of trainees at the Gram Vikas Training Centre, besides the students and employees of the Veterinary College. The deceased would earn from his business a sum of Rs.10,000/- per month. The deceased also owned a three-wheeler, which he would ply for hire under his supervision. It yielded him a net income of Rs.5000/- per month. At the time of his demise, the deceased was 29 years old. The first information report regarding the accident was registered as Crime No. 104 of 2005 with Police Station Refinery, Mathura. It is on these allegations that the claim petition was instituted.

3. Opposite party no. 1 to the claim petition, Kalyan Prasad Mangal is respondent no. 7 to this appeal. He is the owner of the offending vehicle. He has filed a written statement, denying the claimants' case. He has stated that the offending vehicle is insured with the Oriental Insurance Company Limited, Mahatma Gandhi Marg, Agra represented by its Regional Manager-I, and, was driven by a driver holding a valid driving licence. In case, any liability is found on account of the accident, the burden would go to the aforesaid Insurance Company, which is hereinafter referred to as ''the Insurers.' Opposite party no. 2 to the claim petition and the appellant here are the Insurers. The Insurers had denied the assertion in the claim petition generally and stated that in the absence of any document to prove the offending vehicle's insurance with them, the Insurers are not liable. It is also pleaded that a copy of the first information report, charge-sheet, site plan and technical report have not been filed along with the claim petition. It is also the Insurers' case that the driver of the offending vehicle did not hold a valid driving licence.

4. Upon pleadings of parties, following issues were framed (translated into English from Hindi):

1. Whether on 03.06.2005 at about 10 o'Clock in the morning, when the deceased was standing at the bus stop in front of the Refinery Nagar, truck bearing Registration No. HR 38 L 9611 driven negligently and at a high speed by its driver, hit him causing injuries, leading to his death on the spot?

2. Whether Truck No. HR38L9611 was insured with the opposite party no. 2-Insurance Company?

3. Whether on the date of accident, the driver, driving the truck bearing Registration No. HR 39 L 9611 (sic) HR 38 L 9611 held a valid driving license?

4. Whether the claimants are entitled to receive compensation? If yes, how much and from which opposite party?

5. In support of the claimants' case, Usha Devi was examined as PW-1 and Surendra Singh as PW-2. In their documentary evidence, the claimants' filed receipts of registration certificate, a copy of the driving license, the insurance cover, photocopy of the register of accounts, a carbon copy of the first information report, the charge-sheet submitted in Court, site plan and the electricity bill in original, besides a photocopy of a passbook from the Syndicate Bank.

6. Heard Mr. Siddharth Jaiswal, Advocate holding brief of Mr. Ashok Kumar Jaiswal, learned counsel for the Insurers and Mr. B.P. Verma, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the claimants. No one appears on behalf of the owner.

7. Mr. Siddharth Jaiswal has argued that the Insurance Company could not be fastened with liability to satisfy the award, unless the driving license of the driver of the offending vehicle was filed in original. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance upon a decision of the Supreme Court in United India Insurance Company Limited vs. Anbari and others, (2000) 10 SCC 523.

8. The driving license is a xerox copy issued by the Licensing Authority, Motor Vehicles Department, Mathura. It is valid from 18.09.2003 to 17.09.2006. The xerox copy on record has been marked as Paper No. 6ग/9. On a perusal of the record, this Court finds that there is no endorsement either admitting or denying the said document. The question whether a xerox copy of a driving license can be accepted as good evidence by the Tribunal, in view of the holding of the Supreme Court in Anbari (supra) came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mahfooza Begum and others, 2001 (4) A.W.C. 2727, where it was held :

"Learned counsel for the appellant relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Anbari and Ors. 2000 (2) TAC 789. We have perused the aforesaid Judgment of the Supreme Court and we are of the opinion that the same is distinguishable. We may mention that a Tribunal is not a regular civil court and hence the strict Rules of C.P.C. or the Evidence Act do not apply to a Tribunal. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision has mentioned that when the fact of the validity of the photocopy of the licence was challenged, then the Tribunal should not have accepted it. In our opinion, the way of challenging the validity of the photocopy of the driving licence which was filed before the Tribunal is to approach the authority who is alleged to have issued that licence and to enquire from that transport authority whether the licence was genuine or fake.

9. The principle in Anbari, no doubt, a precedent which unfailingly binds this Court, has to be understood in the context of the facts obtaining there. In Anbari, the contention about the validity of the driving license, that was not produced in original, but in the shape of a photostat copy, was not at all examined by the Tribunal. In the present case, it appears that though an issue about the validity of the driving license was raised, but to dispute it, in view of the decision of the Division Bench in Mahfooza Begum (supra), it was the liability of the Insurers to have verified the veracity of the driving license with reference to its number by approaching the Licensing Authority which had issued it. This was admittedly not done. Therefore, there seems to be no force in this contention advanced by Mr. Jaiswal that the Insurers are not liable, because a photostat copy of the license was filed on behalf of the claimants, and not the original.

10. The next submission advanced by learned Counsel for the Insurers is that in working out the compensation to be awarded, the multiplier of ''18' has been adopted, which is incorrect. The deceased in this case was aged 29 years. According to the table set forth in Paragraph No. 42 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sarla Verma (Smt) v. Delhi Transport Corporation and another, (2009) 6 SCC 121, for the age bracket of 26-30 years, the appropriate multiplier applicable is ''17', and not ''18'. Accordingly the appropriate multiplier applicable in this case, where the deceased was aged 29 years is ''17'. To the above extent, the Tribunal's judgment is, indeed, flawed. The impact of the appropriate multiplier shall be dealt with a little later in this judgment, while considering the claimants' oral cross objections to enhance the award. The other findings of the Tribunal have not been assailed on behalf of the Insurers.

11. Since this Court does not find any merit in the objections raised and vociferously pressed about the validity of the impugned judgment passed by the Tribunal, accepting a photostat copy of the driving licence, there is no force in the appeal, as far as the liability of the Insurers is concerned. However, the contention of the Insurers that an incorrect multiplier was applied, as indicated hereinabove, is accepted, and to that extent, the Insurers' appeal, limited to the question of quantum, deserves to be allowed.

12. Now, the claimant has come up with objections regarding the compensation awarded by the Tribunal, which is a sum of Rs.7,29,500/- with interest at the rate of 6% per annum payable from the date of institution of the claim petition. This Court finds that the monthly income of the deceased has been determined by the Tribunal on the basis of evidence about three sources, to be a sum of Rs.5,000/- i.e. Rs.60,000/- annually. This income of the deceased is not disputed by the Insurers.

13. The deceased left behind six dependents. They are Smt. Usha Devi (widow), Sriman Singh Yadav (father), Smt. Rajo Devi (mother), Master Vivek Yadav, Master Vikas Yadav and Master Nikhil Yadav (minor sons). The holding in Sarla Verma (Smt) v. Delhi Transport Corporation and another, (2009) 6 SCC 121, lays down the principle that where the number of dependent family members is 4-6, one-fourth should be deducted towards personal expenses. Here, out of the six claimants, the widow and the three minor children are certainly amongst the deceased's dependents. The mother and the father, at their given ages, have to be regarded as dependents of the deceased. Considering the minor as a half unit in the count of dependents, this Court proceeds on the basis that the deceased had a family of four dependent family members. This would entitle the claimants to deduct one-fourth towards personal and living expenses of the deceased out of his total income, in order to work out the dependency. The Tribunal has erred in directing a deduction of one-third, of course doing so by excluding the dependent parents.

14. Likewise, the Tribunal has erred in applying a multiplier of '18'. The reason is that the deceased, according to his age disclosed in the claim petition, was 29 years old and in the postmortem report, he was shown to be 28 years. In any case, the deceased was in the age bracket of 26-30 years, as contemplated in Paragraph No.40 of the report in Sarla Verma (supra). Going by the schedule there, the applicable multiplier would be '17'. The Tribunal was, therefore, in error in adopting the multiplier of '18'.

15. The next question to be considered is about the future prospects, to which the claimants would be entitled. The question of future prospects has been pronounced upon in the Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court in National Insurance Company v. Pranay Sethi and others, (2017) 16 SCC 680. Pranay Sethi (supra) has extended the benefit of future prospects to the self-employed or persons working on a fixed salary. In Pranay Sethi, it has been held:

"56. The seminal issue is the fixation of future prospects in cases of deceased who are self-employed or on a fixed salary. Sarla Verma [Sarla Verma v. DTC, (2009) 6 SCC 121 : (2009) 2 SCC (Civ) 770 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1002] has carved out an exception permitting the claimants to bring materials on record to get the benefit of addition of future prospects. It has not, per se, allowed any future prospects in respect of the said category.

57. Having bestowed our anxious consideration, we are disposed to think when we accept the principle of standardisation, there is really no rationale not to apply the said principle to the self-employed or a person who is on a fixed salary. To follow the doctrine of actual income at the time of death and not to add any amount with regard to future prospects to the income for the purpose of determination of multiplicand would be unjust. The determination of income while computing compensation has to include future prospects so that the method will come within the ambit and sweep of just compensation as postulated under Section 168 of the Act. In case of a deceased who had held a permanent job with inbuilt grant of annual increment, there is an acceptable certainty. But to state that the legal representatives of a deceased who was on a fixed salary would not be entitled to the benefit of future prospects for the purpose of computation of compensation would be inapposite. It is because the criterion of distinction between the two in that event would be certainty on the one hand and staticness on the other. One may perceive that the comparative measure is certainty on the one hand and uncertainty on the other but such a perception is fallacious. It is because the price rise does affect a self-employed person; and that apart there is always an incessant effort to enhance one's income for sustenance. The purchasing capacity of a salaried person on permanent job when increases because of grant of increments and pay revision or for some other change in service conditions, there is always a competing attitude in the private sector to enhance the salary to get better efficiency from the employees. Similarly, a person who is self-employed is bound to garner his resources and raise his charges/fees so that he can live with same facilities. To have the perception that he is likely to remain static and his income to remain stagnant is contrary to the fundamental concept of human attitude which always intends to live with dynamism and move and change with the time. Though it may seem appropriate that there cannot be certainty in addition of future prospects to the existing income unlike in the case of a person having a permanent job, yet the said perception does not really deserve acceptance. We are inclined to think that there can be some degree of difference as regards the percentage that is meant for or applied to in respect of the legal representatives who claim on behalf of the deceased who had a permanent job than a person who is self-employed or on a fixed salary. But not to apply the principle of standardisation on the foundation of perceived lack of certainty would tantamount to remaining oblivious to the marrows of ground reality. And, therefore, degree-test is imperative. Unless the degree-test is applied and left to the parties to adduce evidence to establish, it would be unfair and inequitable. The degree-test has to have the inbuilt concept of percentage. Taking into consideration the cumulative factors, namely, passage of time, the changing society, escalation of price, the change in price index, the human attitude to follow a particular pattern of life, etc., an addition of 40% of the established income of the deceased towards future prospects and where the deceased was below 40 years an addition of 25% where the deceased was between the age of 40 to 50 years would be reasonable.

58. The controversy does not end here. The question still remains whether there should be no addition where the age of the deceased is more than 50 years. Sarla Verma [Sarla Verma v. DTC, (2009) 6 SCC 121 : (2009) 2 SCC (Civ) 770 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1002] thinks it appropriate not to add any amount and the same has been approved inReshma Kumari [Reshma Kumari v. Madan Mohan, (2013) 9 SCC 65 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 191 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 826] . Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that salary does not remain the same. When a person is in a permanent job, there is always an enhancement due to one reason or the other. To lay down as a thumb rule that there will be no addition after 50 years will be an unacceptable concept. We are disposed to think, there should be an addition of 15% if the deceased is between the age of 50 to 60 years and there should be no addition thereafter. Similarly, in case of self-employed or person on fixed salary, the addition should be 10% between the age of 50 to 60 years. The aforesaid yardstick has been fixed so that there can be consistency in the approach by the tribunals and the courts."

16. The other issue that arises for consideration is whether future prospects are to be awarded according to the principle laid down in Pranay Sethi (supra) or Rule 220-A(3) of the U.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1998 (for short the ''Rules of 1998'). In New India Assurance Co. Ltd v. Urmila Shukla and others, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 822, it has been held:

"9. It is to be noted that the validity of the Rules was not, in any way, questioned in the instant matter and thus the only question that we are called upon to consider is whether in its application, sub-Rule 3(iii) of Rule 220A of the Rules must be given restricted scope or it must be allowed to operate fully.

10. The discussion on the point in Pranay Sethi was from the standpoint of arriving at "just compensation" in terms of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

11. If an indicia is made available in the form of a statutory instrument which affords a favourable treatment, the decision in Pranay Sethi cannot be taken to have limited the operation of such statutory provision specially when the validity of the Rules was not put under any challenge. The prescription of 15% in cases where the deceased was in the age bracket of 50-60 years as stated in Pranay Sethicannot be taken as maxima. In the absence of any governing principle available in the statutory regime, it was only in the form of an indication. If a statutory instrument has devised a formula which affords better or greater benefit, such statutory instrument must be allowed to operate unless the statutory instrument is otherwise found to be invalid.

12. We, therefore, reject the submission advanced on behalf of the appellant and affirm the view taken by the Tribunal as well as the High Court and dismiss this appeal without any order as to costs."

17. In the opinion of this Court, Rule 220-A(3) of the Rules of 1998 would govern the fate of this case and future prospects have to be determined for the claimants here not according to the principle in Pranay Sethi.

18. The question that still remains to be considered is whether Rule 220-A(3) of the Rules of 1998, which came into force by virtue of Notification No. 777/XXX4-2011-4(3)-2010 dated 26 September, 2011 i.e. The Uttar Pradesh Motor Vehicles (Eleventh Amendment) Rules, 2011, can be held to apply retrospectively to an accident which happened much before the amended Rule 220-A of the Rules of 1998. This question fell for consideration of a Division Bench of this Court in Sushil Kumar and others v. M/s. Sampark Lojastic Private Limited and others, 2017 (35) LCD 1311. In Sushil Kumar (supra), it has been held:

"31. Rule 220-A was inserted in the Uttar Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1998 in view of the various decisions of the law courts for providing benefit on account of future prospects of the injured/deceased. It provides for addition of certain percentage of the income of the injured/deceased in his actual income depending upon the age of the injured/deceased for the purposes of determination of the compensation. The aforesaid Rule came into effect on 26.09.2011 after the decision of the claim petition but before filing of the appeal though the accident took place on 08.05.2010 much before the enforcement of the above Rule.

32. It is in view of the above that an argument is being raised that Rule 220-A of the Rules which came into effect on 26.09.2011 would not apply to the accident which had taken place on 08.05.2010.

33. In Ram Sarup Vs. Munshi AIR 1963 SC 553 it was laid down that a change in law during the pendency of an appeal has to be taken into account and will cover the rights of the parties.

34. The view expressed above was followed by the Supreme Court in Mula Vs. Godhu AIR 1971 SC 89.

35. In Dayawati Vs. Inderjit AIR 1966 SC 1423 the court had observed as under:-If the new law speaks in language, which expressly or by clear intendment, takes in even pending matters, the court of trial as well as the court of appeal must have regard to an intention so expressed, and the court of appeal may give effect to such a law even after the judgment of the court of first instance.

36. In Amarjit Kaur Vs. Pritam Singh AIR 1974 SC 2068 effect was given to the change in law during the pendency of an appeal as the hearing of an appeal under the procedural law of this country is in the nature of rehearing of the suit by superior court.

37. It was in the light of the above decisions that in Lakshmi Narayan Guin and others Vs. Niranjan Modak AIR 1985 SC 111 it was held that a change in law during the pendency of an appeal has to be taken into account and will cover the right of the parties.

38. The aforesaid decision was followed by a Division Bench of this court in U.P. State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Smt. Madhu Sharma and others, 2003 (4) AWC 2620 which was a case in relation to the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and it was observed that it is apparent that the change in law during the pendency of the original proceedings has to be taken into account so as to cover the rights of the parties.

39. In view of above decision the view expressed by the Division Bench of this court in ICICI Lombard (Supra) is not of good law as it does not takes into account the decisions referred to above in holding that the Rule 220-A of the Rules which came into effect on 26.09.2011 would not apply to the accident that took place prior to the said date only for the reason that the Rule was not specifically stated to be retrospective in nature."

19. In the opinion of this Court, the law laid down by the Division Bench in Sushil Kumar (supra) binds this Court. The award of future prospects is required to be made in accordance with the Rule 220-A(3) of Rules, 1998. Here, the deceased was aged less than 40 years and going by Rule 220-A(3), there has to be an addition of 50% to his income towards future prospects.

20. Now, the question of award of compensation under the conventional heads requires to be addressed. In this regard, the decision in Pranay Sethi (supra) is again illuminating, where it is observed:

"48. This aspect needs to be clarified and appositely stated. The conventional sum has been provided in the Second Schedule to the Act. The said Schedule has been found to be defective as stated by the Court in Trilok Chandra [UP SRTC v. Trilok Chandra, (1996) 4 SCC 362] . Recently, in Puttamma v. K.L. Narayana Reddy [Puttamma v.K.L. Narayana Reddy, (2013) 15 SCC 45 : (2014) 4 SCC (Civ) 384 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 574] it has been reiterated by stating : (SCC p. 80, para 54)

"54. ... we hold that the Second Schedule as was enacted in 1994 has now become redundant, irrational and unworkable due to changed scenario including the present cost of living and current rate of inflation and increased life expectancy."

49. As far as multiplier or multiplicand is concerned, the same has been put to rest by the judgments of this Court. Para 3 of the Second Schedule also provides for general damages in case of death. It is as follows:

"3. General damages (in case of death):

The following general damages shall be payable in addition to compensation outlined above:

(i)

Funeral expenses

Rs 2000

(ii)

Loss of consortium, if beneficiary is the spouse

Rs 5000

(iii)

Loss of estate

Rs 2500

(iv)

Medical expenses -- actual expenses incurred before death supported by bills/vouchers but not exceeding

Rs 15,000"

50. On a perusal of various decisions of this Court, it is manifest that the Second Schedule has not been followed starting from the decision in Trilok Chandra [UP SRTC v.Trilok Chandra, (1996) 4 SCC 362] and there has been no amendment to the same. The conventional damage amount needs to be appositely determined. As we notice, in different cases different amounts have been granted. A sum of Rs 1,00,000 was granted towards consortium inRajesh [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149] . The justification for grant of consortium, as we find fromRajesh [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149] , is founded on the observation as we have reproduced hereinbefore.

51. On the aforesaid basis, the Court has revisited the practice of awarding compensation under conventional heads.

52. As far as the conventional heads are concerned, we find it difficult to agree with the view expressed in Rajesh[Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149] . It has granted Rs 25,000 towards funeral expenses, Rs 1,00,000 towards loss of consortium and Rs 1,00,000 towards loss of care and guidance for minor children. The head relating to loss of care and minor children does not exist. ThoughRajesh [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149] refers to Santosh Devi [Santosh Devi v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., (2012) 6 SCC 421 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 726 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 160 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 167] , it does not seem to follow the same. The conventional and traditional heads, needless to say, cannot be determined on percentage basis because that would not be an acceptable criterion. Unlike determination of income, the said heads have to be quantified. Any quantification must have a reasonable foundation. There can be no dispute over the fact that price index, fall in bank interest, escalation of rates in many a field have to be noticed. The court cannot remain oblivious to the same. There has been a thumb rule in this aspect. Otherwise, there will be extreme difficulty in determination of the same and unless the thumb rule is applied, there will be immense variation lacking any kind of consistency as a consequence of which, the orders passed by the tribunals and courts are likely to be unguided. Therefore, we think it seemly to fix reasonable sums. It seems to us that reasonable figures on conventional heads, namely, loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses should be Rs 15,000, Rs 40,000 and Rs 15,000 respectively. The principle of revisiting the said heads is an acceptable principle. But the revisit should not be fact-centric or quantum-centric. We think that it would be condign that the amount that we have quantified should be enhanced on percentage basis in every three years and the enhancement should be at the rate of 10% in a span of three years. We are disposed to hold so because that will bring in consistency in respect of those heads."

(emphasis by Court)

21. Concerning the award of compensation for loss of consortium, the issue was considered by the Supreme Court in Magma General Insurance Company Ltd. v. Nanu Ram alias Chuhru Ram and others, (2018) 18 SCC 130, where it was held:

"21. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Pranay Sethi[National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680 : (2018) 3 SCC (Civ) 248 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 205] dealt with the various heads under which compensation is to be awarded in a death case. One of these heads is loss of consortium. In legal parlance, "consortium" is a compendious term which encompasses "spousal consortium", "parental consortium", and "filial consortium". The right to consortium would include the company, care, help, comfort, guidance, solace and affection of the deceased, which is a loss to his family. With respect to a spouse, it would include sexual relations with the deceased spouse : [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149]

21.1. Spousal consortium is generally defined as rights pertaining to the relationship of a husband-wife which allows compensation to the surviving spouse for loss of "company, society, cooperation, affection, and aid of the other in every conjugal relation". [Black's Law Dictionary(5th Edn., 1979).]

21.2. Parental consortium is granted to the child upon the premature death of a parent, for loss of "parental aid, protection, affection, society, discipline, guidance and training".

21.3. Filial consortium is the right of the parents to compensation in the case of an accidental death of a child. An accident leading to the death of a child causes great shock and agony to the parents and family of the deceased. The greatest agony for a parent is to lose their child during their lifetime. Children are valued for their love, affection, companionship and their role in the family unit.

(emphasis by Court)

22. In view of what has been discussed above, there is no force in the appeal, as as far the liability of the Insurers is concerned. However, so far as the multiplier is concerned, the appeal is accepted. Accordingly, the award stands revised and redetermined as follows:

(i)

Monthly Income (of the deceased)

=

(ii)

Annual Income (of the deceased) = 5000x12

=

60000

(iii)

Annual Income+Future Prospects (annual income x 50%) = 60000+30000

=

90000

(iv)

Annual Dependency = Annual Income - one-fourth deduction towards personal expenses of the deceased

= 90000-22500

=

67500

(v)

Total Dependency = Annual Dependency x Applied Multiplier

= 67500 x 17

=

1147500

(vi)

Claimant's entitlement towards conventional heads = Loss of Estate + Funeral Expenses + dependents' Consortium =15000+15000+40000x6

=

270000

The total compensation would therefore, work out to a figure of Rs. 1147500+ Rs. 270000

=

1417500

23. Accordingly, the impugned award passed by the Tribunal is modified and the compensation awarded enhanced to a total sum of Rs.14,17,500/-. The compensation would carry simple interest at the rate of 7% per annum from the date of institution of the claim petition, until realisation. However, the sum of money already deposited (paid or invested in terms of the impugned award or interim orders of this Court) shall be adjusted. The other directions of the Tribunal in the impugned award shall remain intact.

24. This appeal is disposed of in terms of the above orders.

Order Date :- March 22, 2023

I. Batabyal/Deepak/ Anoop

(J.J. Munir, J.)