Ramdeen Yadav vs State Of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. ...
2023 Latest Caselaw 23562 ALL

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
 
 


?Neutral Citation No. - 2023:AHC-LKO:57514
 
A.F.R.
 
Court No. - 15
 

 
Case :- CRIMINAL REVISION DEFECTIVE No. - 308 of 2023
 

 
Revisionist :- Ramdeen Yadav
 
Opposite Party :- State Of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Home, Lko. And Another
 
Counsel for Revisionist :- Shashank Shukla,Prachi Shukla
 
Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A.
 

 
Hon'ble Shamim Ahmed,J.

(Order on C.M. Application No.1 of 2023)

1. Heard Shri Shashank Shukla, learned counsel for revisionist, Shri S.P. Tiwari, learned A.G.A-I for the State-opposite party No.1 and perused the material placed on record. No counsel appeared on behalf of the opposite party No.2.

2. As per the report of the Stamp Reporter of this Court, this revision is barred by limitation and has been filed with delay of 1088 days.

3. Learned Counsel for the revisionist/applicant submits the present application has been filed with prayer to condone the delay in filing the present revision. He further submits that the revisionist immediately filed an objection but he became ill and was not in contact with his counsel and thereafter, when he came to know that an ex-parte order had been passed by learned court below, immediately a recall application was filed and then the Covid-19 outbreak happened, thereafter, he was informed that his case has been dismissed. He further submits that when the revisionist received a recovery certificate, then he contacted a new counsel and he came to know about the impugned order. He further submits that due to aforementioned reasons, the delay in filing this revision is not intentional or deliberate, thus, the present application may be allowed. He further submits that impugned order dated 15.06.2018 under Section 125 Cr.P.C. passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge/ Family Judge FTC New, Gonda to pay the maintenance of amount of Rs.2000/- per month from the date of application filed by the opposite party No.2 is illegal and passed without application of mind, thus, it is liable to be set aside and reversed.

4. Learned A.G.A-I has opposed the contention of learned Counsel for the revisionist/applicant and submits that there is no plausible reasons given in the affidavit filed in support of the delay condonation application for delay in filing the present revision and he further submits that the order impugned in this revision was passed in the year 2018, since, then more than five years have passed but there was no step taken by the revisionist for challenging the impugned order and now this revision has been filed only with the intention to harass the opposite party No.2 and to deny her rightful claim of maintenance as provided under Family Courts Act. The amount fixed for maintenance was Rs. 2000/- per month for the opposite party no. 2, which in the present days of high price rise cannot be said to be either excessive or disproportionate. The provisions of Section 125 of Cr.P.C are beneficial provisions which are enacted to stop the vagrancy of a destitute wife and provide some succour to her, who is entitled to get the maintenance which has been wrongly denied, thus, the present application for condonation of delay may be dismissed.

5. After considering the arguments of learned Counsels for the parties made at the Bar, it transpires that the explanation as given in the affidavit filed in support of delay condonation application in filing the present revision is neither acceptable nor trustworthy since revisionist/applicant was already in court below, therefore, it cannot be said that he was not aware of the proceedings in court below. In my view, there is no explanation what to say of satisfactory explanation as to why the matter was not taken with due earnest and reasonable expediency and the present case was filed after delay of 1088 days before this Court.

6. The expression "sufficient cause" in Section 5 of Act, 1963 has been held to receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally a delay in preferring appeal/revision may be condoned in interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fide is imputable to parties, seeking condonation of delay. In Collector, Land Acquisition Vs. Katiji, 1987(2) SCC 107, the Court said, that, when substantial justice and technical considerations are taken against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for, the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non deliberate delay. The Court further said that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.

7. In P.K. Ramachandran Vs. State of Kerala, AIR 1998 SC 2276 the Court said:

"Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribe and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds."

8. The Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy rights of parties. They virtually take away the remedy. They are meant with the objective that parties should not resort to dilatory tactics and sleep over their rights. They must seek remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The statute relating to limitation determines a life span for such legal remedy for redress of the legal injury, one has suffered. Time is precious and the wasted time would never revisit. During efflux of time, newer causes would come up, necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a life span must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The statute providing limitation is founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim Interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). It is for this reason that when an action becomes barred by time, the Court should be slow to ignore delay for the reason that once limitation expires, other party matures his rights on the subject with attainment of finality. Though it cannot be doubted that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing the suiter from putting forth his cause but simultaneously the party on the other hand is also entitled to sit and feel carefree after a particular length of time, getting relieved from persistent and continued litigation.

9. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. No person gains from deliberate delaying a matter by not resorting to take appropriate legal remedy within time but then the words "sufficient cause" show that delay, if any, occurred, should not be deliberate, negligent and due to casual approach of concerned litigant, but, it should be bona fide, and, for the reasons beyond his control, and, in any case should not lack bona fide. If the explanation does not smack of lack of bona fide, the Court should show due consideration to the suiter, but, when there is apparent casual approach on the part of suiter, the approach of Court is also bound to change. Lapse on the part of litigant in approaching Court within time is understandable but a total inaction for long period of delay without any explanation whatsoever and that too in absence of showing any sincere attempt on the part of suiter, would add to his negligence, and would be relevant factor going against him.

10. I need not to burden this judgment with a catena of decisions explaining and laying down as to what should be the approach of Court on construing "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of Act, 1963 and it would be suffice to refer a very few of them besides those already referred.

11. In Shakuntala Devi Jain Vs. Kuntal Kumari, AIR 1969 SC 575 a three Judge Bench of the Court said, that, unless want of bona fide of such inaction or negligence as would deprive a party of the protection of Section 5 is proved, the application must not be thrown out or any delay cannot be refused to be condoned.

12. The Privy Council in Brij Indar Singh Vs. Kanshi Ram ILR (1918) 45 Cal 94 observed that true guide for a court to exercise the discretion under Section 5 is whether the appellant acted with reasonable diligence in prosecuting the appeal. This principle still holds good inasmuch as the aforesaid decision of Privy Council as repeatedly been referred to, and, recently in State of Nagaland Vs. Lipok AO and others, AIR 2005 SC 2191.

13. In Vedabai @ Vaijayanatabai Baburao Vs. Shantaram Baburao Patil and others, JT 2001(5) SC 608 the Court said that under Section 5 of Act, 1963 it should adopt a pragmatic approach. A distinction must be made between a case where the delay is inordinate and a case where the delay is of a few days. In the former case consideration of prejudice to the other side will be a relevant factor so the case calls for a more cautious approach but in the latter case no such consideration may arise and such a case deserves a liberal approach. No hard and fast rule can be laid down in this regard and the basic guiding factor is advancement of substantial justice.

14. In Pundlik Jalam Patil (dead) by LRS. Vs. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project and Anr. (2008) 17 SCC 448, in para 17 of the judgment, the Court said :

"...The evidence on record suggests neglect of its own right for long time in preferring appeals. The court cannot enquire into belated and state claims on the ground of equity. Delay defeats equity. The court helps those who are vigilant and "do not slumber over their rights."

15. In Maniben Devraj Shah Vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, 2012 (5) SCC 157, in para 18 of the judgment, the Court said as under:

"What needs to be emphasized is that even though a liberal and justice oriented approach is required to be adopted in the exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other similar statutes, the Courts can neither become oblivious of the fact that the successful litigant has acquired certain rights on the basis of the judgment under challenge and a lot of time is consumed at various stages of litigation apart from the cost. What colour the expression 'sufficient cause' would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. If the Court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay. In cases involving the State and its agencies/instrumentalities, the Court can take note of the fact that sufficient time is taken in the decision making process but no premium can be given for total lethargy or utter negligence on the part of the officers of the State and / or its agencies/instrumentalities and the applications filed by them for condonation of delay cannot be allowed as a matter of course by accepting the plea that dismissal of the matter on the ground of bar of limitation will cause injury to the public interest."

16. In my view, the kind of explanation rendered herein does not satisfy the observations of Apex Court that if delay has occurred for reasons which does not smack of mala fide, the Court should be reluctant to refuse condonation. On the contrary, I find that here is a case which shows a complete careless and reckless long delay of 1088 days on the part of revisionist/applicant which has remain virtually unexplained at all and the reasons given in the affidavit is not justified and convincing. Therefore, I do not find any reason to exercise my judicial discretion exercising judiciously so as to justify condonation of delay in the present case.

17. In the result, the application for condonation of delay deserves to be dismissed.

18. Accordingly, the present application for condonation of delay is hereby dismissed.

(Order on memo of Revision)

1. The application seeking condonation of delay in filing the present revision having been dismissed vide order of date, this revision being barred by limitation, is accordingly dismissed.

2. The court below is at liberty to proceed in the matter in accordance with law.

3. The Senior Registrar of this Court is directed to send a copy of this order to the concerned court below for its compliance.

4. No order as to cost(s).

Order Date :- 28.8.2023

Piyush/-