Smt. Kusuma Devi And 4 Others vs Shrawan Kumar Mishra And 2 Others
2022 Latest Caselaw 3232 ALL

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
 

A.F.R.
 
Reserved
 
Court No. - 2
 

 
Case :- FIRST APPEAL FROM ORDER No. - 4097 of 2017
 
Appellant :- Smt. Kusuma Devi And 4 Others
 
Respondent :- Shrawan Kumar Mishra And 2 Others
 
Counsel for Appellant :- Vidya Kant Shukla,Shravan Kumar Pandey,Shyam Narain Pandey
 
Counsel for Respondent :- Pawan Kumar Singh
 

 
Hon'ble Dr. Kaushal Jayendra Thaker,J.

Hon'ble Ajai Tyagi,J.

(Oral Judgment by Hon'ble Ajai Tyagi, J.)

1. By way of this appeal, the claimants have challenged the judgment and award dated 05.09.2017 passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal/Additional District Judge, Court No.12, Kanpur Nagar (hereinafter referred to as ''Tribunal') in M.A.C.P. No.926 of 2014 (Smt. Kusuma Devi and Others Vs. Shrawan Kumar Mishra and Others) awarding sum of Rs.17,13,000/- as compensation to the claimants with interest at the rate of 7% per annum.

2. Heard Mr. Shyam Narain Pandey, learned counsel for the appellants and Mr. Pawan Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the respondent-Insurance Company. Perused the record.

3. The accident is not in dispute. The driver of the said vehicle was having valid and effective driving licence on the date of accident is also a decided fact. The vehicle being insured and there being no breach of policy condition is a finding, which has attained finality. The Insurance Company Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "Insurance Company") has not challenged the liability on it. In this case, learned Tribunal has fixed 45% contributory negligence of the deceased which the appellants have objected vehemently and argued this point along with quantum fixed by learned Tribunal.

4. Brief facts of the case are that claimants-appellants filed Motor Accident Claim Petition before the learned Tribunal with the averments that on 21.06.2014 at about 9:45 PM (night) the deceased Lal Bahadur Dwivedi was coming from his field to the home by his motorcycle. When he reached at village Bhinduri within the jurisdiction of police station Chaubepur, District Kanpur Nagar, a truck bearing no.H.R. 38A 5791, going ahead of the motorcycle of the deceased, the truck driver suddenly applied thebrake without any indication, due to which the motorcycle of the deceased rammed into the truck going ahead.

5. In this accident, the deceased sustained fatal injuries and he died on way to the hospital. Manoj Kumar-nephew of the deceased was also travelling in his motorcycle behind the deceased, who saw the accident and taken the deceased to the hospital.

6. The issue regarding the insurance of the offending truck and driving licence of its driver have been decided in affirmative. As far as question of negligence is concerned, Mr. Pawan Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the Insurance Company has submitted that deceased was negligent and responsible for the accident because he hit the truck going ahead. Learned counsel for the Insurance Company has relied on the decision of Apex Court in Nishan Singh and Others Vs. Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. and Others, 2018 (6) Supreme Court Cases 765.

7. It is further submitted that since the deceased was himself negligent, except grant of non pecuniary damages, no other amount would be payable to the claimants-appellants.

8. The term negligence means failure to exercise care towards others which a reasonable and prudent person would in a circumstance or taking action which such a reasonable person would not. Negligence can be both intentional or accidental which is normally accidental. More particularly, it connotes reckless driving and the injured must always prove that the either side is negligent. If the injury rather death is caused by something owned or controlled by the negligent party then he is directly liable otherwise the principle of "res ipsa loquitur" meaning thereby "the things speak for itself" would apply.

9. The principle of contributory negligence has been discussed time and again. A person who either contributes or author of the accident would be liable for his contribution to the accident having taken place.

10. The Division Bench of this Court in First Appeal From Order No. 1818 of 2012 ( Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Co.Ltd. Vs. Smt. Renu Singh And Others) decided on 19.7.2016 has held as under:

"16. Negligence means failure to exercise required degree of care and caution expected of a prudent driver. Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon the considerations, which ordinarily regulate conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. Negligence is not always a question of direct evidence. It is an inference to be drawn from proved facts. Negligence is not an absolute term, but is a relative one. It is rather a comparative term. What may be negligence in one case may not be so in another. Where there is no duty to exercise care, negligence in the popular sense has no legal consequence. Where there is a duty to exercise care, reasonable care must be taken to avoid acts or omissions which would be reasonably foreseen likely to caused physical injury to person. The degree of care required, of course, depends upon facts in each case. On these broad principles, the negligence of drivers is required to be assessed.

17. It would be seen that burden of proof for contributory negligence on the part of deceased has to be discharged by the opponents. It is the duty of driver of the offending vehicle to explain the accident. It is well settled law that at intersection where two roads cross each other, it is the duty of a fast moving vehicle to slow down and if driver did not slow down at intersection, but continued to proceed at a high speed without caring to notice that another vehicle was crossing, then the conduct of driver necessarily leads to conclusion that vehicle was being driven by him rashly as well as negligently.

18. 10th Schedule appended to Motor Vehicle Act contain statutory regulations for driving of motor vehicles which also form part of every Driving License. Clause-6 of such Regulation clearly directs that the driver of every motor vehicle to slow down vehicle at every intersection or junction of roads or at a turning of the road. It is also provided that driver of the vehicle should not enter intersection or junction of roads unless he makes sure that he would not thereby endanger any other person. Merely, because driver of the Truck was driving vehicle on the left side of road would not absolve him from his responsibility to slow down vehicle as he approaches intersection of roads, particularly when he could have easily seen, that the car over which deceased was riding, was approaching intersection.

19. In view of the fast and constantly increasing volume of traffic, motor vehicles upon roads may be regarded to some extent as coming within the principle of liability defined in Rylands V/s. Fletcher, (1868) 3 HL (LR) 330. From the point of view of pedestrian, the roads of this country have been rendered by the use of motor vehicles, highly dangerous. 'Hit and run' cases where drivers of motor vehicles who have caused accidents, are unknown. In fact such cases are increasing in number. Where a pedestrian without negligence on his part is injured or killed by a motorist, whether negligently or not, he or his legal representatives, as the case may be, should be entitled to recover damages if principle of social justice should have any meaning at all.

20. These provisions (sec.110A and sec.110B of Motor Act, 1988) are not merely procedural provisions. They substantively affect the rights of the parties. The right of action created by Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 was 'new in its species, new in its quality, new in its principles. In every way it was new. The right given to legal representatives under Act, 1988 to file an application for compensation for death due to a motor vehicle accident is an enlarged one. This right cannot be hedged in by limitations of an action under Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. New situations and new dangers require new strategies and new remedies.

21. In the light of the above discussion, we are of the view that even if courts may not by interpretation displace the principles of law which are considered to be well settled and, therefore, court cannot dispense with proof of negligence altogether in all cases of motor vehicle accidents, it is possible to develop the law further on the following lines; when a motor vehicle is being driven with reasonable care, it would ordinarily not meet with an accident and, therefore, rule of res-ipsa loquitor as a rule of evidence may be invoked in motor accident cases with greater frequency than in ordinary civil suits (per three-Judge Bench in Jacob Mathew V/s. State of Punjab, 2005 0 ACJ(SC) 1840).

22. By the above process, the burden of proof may ordinarily be cast on the defendants in a motor accident claim petition to prove that motor vehicle was being driven with reasonable care or that there is equal negligence on the part the other side."

11. Learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that learned Tribunal has held the contributory negligence of the deceased to the tune of 45% and this issue of negligence has been wrongly decided by the learned Tribunal because P.W.-2 is the eye witness of the accident and he has deposed in his testimony that the truck driver all of sudden appliedbrake which caused the accident.

12. It is also submitted by learned counsel for the appellants that truck driver did not appear before the learned Tribunal though he was the best witness. The charge sheet is also filed against the driver of the truck, hence, the deceased was not at all negligent in driving the motorcycle. P.W.-2, Manoj Kumar Dwivedi is the eye witness of the accident, who was coming behind the deceased on his own motorcycle. As per the testimony of P.W.-2, the truck driver applied the brake all of sudden, but he has also deposed that deceased could not apply the brake completely due to which the motorcycle hit the aforesaid truck going ahead of him.

13. We are even fortified in our view by the decision of the Apex Court in Archit Saini and Another Vs. Oriental Insurance Company Limited, AIR 2018 SC 1143, wherein the finding of the Tribunal was upheld by adverting to the same more particularly the Apex Court has upheld the finding in paragraph 21 to 27 in its judgment. The paragraph 5 of the said Apex Court's judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:

"5.The respondents had opposed the claim petition and denied their liability but did not lead any evidence on the relevant issue to dispel the relevant fact. The Tribunal after analysing the evidence, including the site map (Ext. P-45) produced on record along with charge-sheet filed against the driver of the Gas Tanker and the arguments of the respondents, answered Issue 1 against the respondents in the following words:

"21. Our own Hon'ble High Court in a case captioned Lakhu Singh v. Uday Singh [Lakhu Singh v. Uday Singh, 2007 SCC OnLine P&H 865 : PLR (2007) 4 P&H 507] held that while considering a claim petition, the Tribunal is required to hold an enquiry and act not as criminal court so as to find whether the claimants have established the occurrence beyond shadow of any reasonable doubt. In the enquiry, if there is prima facie evidence of the occurrence there is no reason to disbelieve such evidence. The statements coupled with the facts of registration of FIR and trial of the accused in a criminal court are sufficient to arrive at a conclusion that the accident has taken place. Likewise, in Kusum Lata v. Satbir [Kusum Lata v. Satbir, (2011) 3 SCC 646 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 37 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 18 : (2011) 2 RCR (Civil) 379] the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that in a case relating to motor accident claims, the claimants are not required to rove the case as it is required to be done in a criminal trial. The Court must keep this distinction in mind. Strict proof of an accident caused by a particular bus in a particular manner may not be possible to be done by the claimants. The claimants were merely to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probability. The standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not have been applied.

22. After considering the submissions made by both the parties, I find that PW 7 Sohan Lal eyewitness to the occurrence has specifically stated in his affidavit Ext. PW 7/A tendered in his evidence that on 15-12-2011 at about 20.30 p.m. he along with PHG Ajit Singh was present near Sanjha Chulha Dhaba on the National Highway leading to Jammu. All the traffic of road was diverted on the eastern side of the road on account of closure of road on western side due to construction work. In the meantime a Maruti car bearing No. HR 02 K 0448 came from Jammu side and struck against the back of Gas Tanker as the driver of the car could not spot the parked tanker due to the flashlights of the oncoming traffic from front side. Then they rushed towards the spot of accident and noticed that the said tanker was standing parked in the middle of the road without any indicators or parking lights.

23. The statement of this witness clearly establishes that this was the sole negligence on the part of the driver of the Gas Tanker especially when the accident was caused on 15-12-2011 that too at about 10.30 p.m. which is generally time of pitch darkness. In this way, the driver of the car cannot be held in any way negligent in this accident. Moreover, as per Rule 15 of the Road Regulations, 1989 no vehicle is to be parked on busy road.

24. The arguments of the learned counsel for the respondent that PW 7 Sohan Lal has stated in his cross-examination that there was no fog at that time and there were lights on the Dhaba and the truck was visible to him due to light of Dhaba and he was standing at the distance of 70 ft from the truck being road between him and the truck and he noticed at the car when he heard voice/sound caused by the accident so Respondent 1 is not at all negligent in this accident but these submissions will not make the car driver to be in any way negligent and cannot give clean chit to the driver of the Gas Tanker because there is a difference between the visibility of a standing vehicle from a place where the person is standing and by a person who is coming driving the vehicle because due to flashlights of vehicles coming from front side the vehicle coming from opposite side cannot generally spot the standing vehicle in the road that too in night-time when there is neither any indicator or parking lights nor blinking lights nor any other indication given on the back of the stationed vehicle, therefore, the driver of the car cannot be held to be in any way negligent rather it is the sole negligence on the part of the driver of the offending Gas Tanker as held inGinni Devi case [Ginni Devi v. Union of India, 2007 SCC OnLine P&H 126 : 2008 ACJ 1572] , Mohan Lal case [New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Mohan Lal, 2006 SCC OnLine All 459 : (2007) 1 ACC 785 (All)] . It is not the case of the respondent that the parking lights of the standing truck were on or there were any other indication on the backside of the vehicle standing on the road to enable the coming vehicle to see the standing truck. The other arguments of the learned counsel for Respondent 3 that the road was sufficient wide road and that the car driver could have avoided the accident, so the driver of the car was himself negligent in causing the accident cannot be accepted when it has already been held that the accident has been caused due to sole negligence of the driver of the offending stationed truck in the busy road. The proposition of law laid down in Harbans Kaur case [New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Harbans Kaur, 2010 SCC OnLine P&H 7441 : (2010) 4 PLR 422 (P&H)] and T.M. Chayapathi case [New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. T.M. Chayapathi, 2004 SCC OnLine AP 484 : (2005) 4 ACC 61] is not disputed at all but these authorities are not helpful to the respondents being not applicable on the facts and circumstances of the present case. Likewise, non-examination of minor children of the age of 14 and 9 years who lost their father and mother in the accident cannot be held to be in any way detrimental to the case of the claimants when eyewitness to the occurrence has proved the accident having been caused by the negligence of Respondent 1 driver of the offending vehicle.

25. Moreover, in Girdhari Lal v. Radhey Shyam [Girdhari Lal v. Radhey Shyam, 1993 SCC OnLine P&H 194 : PLR (1993) 104 P&H 109] , Sudama Devi v. Kewal Ram [Sudama Devi v.Kewal Ram, 2007 SCC OnLine P&H 1208 : PLR (2008) 149 P&H 444] andPazhaniammal case [New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Pazhaniammal, 2011 SCC OnLine Ker 1881 : 2012 ACJ 1370] our own Hon'ble High Court has held that ''it is, prima facie safe to conclude in claim cases that the accident has occurred on account of rash or negligent driving of the driver, if the driver is facing the criminal trial on account of rash or negligent driving.'

26. Moreover, Respondent 1 driver of the offending vehicle has not appeared in the witness box to deny the accident having been caused by him, therefore, I am inclined to draw an adverse inference against Respondent 1. In this context, I draw support from a judgment of the Hon'ble Punjab & Haryana High Court reported asBhagwani Devi v. Krishan Kumar Saini[Bhagwani Devi v. Krishan Kumar Saini, 1986 SCC OnLine P&H 274 : 1986 ACJ 331] . Moreover, Respondent 1 has also not filed any complaint to higher authorities about his false implication in the criminal case so it cannot be accepted that Respondent 1 has been falsely implicated in this case.

27. In view of above discussion, it is held that the claimants have proved that the accident has been caused by Respondent 1 by parking the offending vehicle bearing No. HR 02 AF 8590 in the middle of the road in a negligent manner wherein Vinod Saini and Smt Mamta Saini have died and claimants Archit Saini and Gauri Saini have received injuries on their person. Shri Vinod Saini, deceased who was driving ill-fated car on that day cannot be held to be negligent in any way. Accordingly, this issue is decided in favour of claimants."

(emphasis supplied)"

14. It is admitted fact that motorcycle hit the truck from behind, hence, we are in agreement with the finding of learned Tribunal that the deceased did not keep the safe distance from the truck. If he would have kept the safe distance, the accident could have been avoided. Hence, the deceased was also negligent in driving the motorcycle. On the other hand, the truck driver applied the brake all of sudden. The truck driver has not stepped into the witness box, who was the best witness to tell why he applied brake suddenly or whether he was in compulsion to apply the brake all of sudden. Hence, the owner and Insurance Company have not discharged their burden to prove that truck driver was not negligent. Hence, we uphold the conclusion of learned Tribunal that the deceased and truck driver both were negligent and we concur with the finding of learned Tribunal fixing the contributory negligence of truck driver to the tune of 55% and the negligence of the deceased to the tune of 45%. Hence, finding of Tribunal in this regard is maintained.

15. Now, the only issue to be decided is, the quantum of compensation, awarded by the Tribunal.

16. Learned Tribunal has computed the total compensation Rs.31,15,123/- and awarded its 55% as Rs.17,13,000/- after deducting the 45% of amount towards contributory negligence of the deceased.

17. Learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that deceased was posted as a Fitter in Indian Artificial Limbs Manufacturing Corporation, Kanpur and his salary was Rs.48,438/- per month but learned Tribunal has taken salary only at Rs.37,555/- per month, which was not in consonance with the settled law. Income tax was also deducted from the salary of the deceased and net salary of Rs.36,055/- has taken by the learned Tribunal for the purpose of computation.

18. Learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that only that part of the salary would be admissible, which was for the benefit of the family of the deceased, but learned Tribunal has committed error in computation of the salary of the deceased. Learned counsel for the appellants has relied on the judgment of Apex Court in Vimal Kanwar and Others VS. Kishore Dan and Others, 2013 0 Supreme (SC) 441.

19. It is also submitted by learned counsel for the appellants that learned Tribunal has not granted any amount under the head of non pecuniary damages and no reason is assigned for non granting the same.

20. Per contra, learned counsel for the Insurance Company has submitted that only non pecuniary damages would be grantable. We are not agreeable with the submission of learned counsel for the Insurance Company that only non pecuniary damages would be granted.

21. Perusal of record shows that last salary slip of the month of April, 2014 is on record and Form-16 is also on record. Form-16 is an authentic document for the purpose of computation of the salary of the deceased. Form-16 shows gross annual income of the deceased at Rs.5,95,175/-. It is also shown that total income tax of the year was Rs.23,622/-. Hence, after the deduction of income tax from the gross salary it comes of Rs.5,71,553/-, which should be considered for computation of compensation, hence, annual income of the deceased is taken at Rs.5,70,000/- (rounded off).

22. Learned Tribunal has added 25% for future loss of income, which needs no interference. Tribunal has deducted ¼ for personal expenses of the deceased. Keeping in view of number of dependents, we uphold the same.

23. Submission is that learned Tribunal has not awarded any sum towards non pecuniary damages and has not assigned any reason for non grant of the same.

24. Other points of contention, which are argued by learned counsel for the appellants is that learned Tribunal has applied multiplier of 8 while should have been 9 as per the judgment of the Apex Court in Sarla Verma and Others Vs. Delhi Transport Corporation and Another, 2009 LawSuit (SC) 613 to which we agree. Learned Tribunal has rightly deducted 1/4 of the income of the deceased for personal expenses. Lastly, it was contended by the appellants that learned Tribunal has awarded interest at the rate of 7% per annum which should be enhanced.

25. No other arguments were placed regarding the fixation of quantum.

26. As per the judgment of Apex Court in National Insurance Company vs. Pranay Sethi [2014 (4) TAC 637 (SC), appellants would be entitled to get Rs.15,000/- for loss of estate and Rs.15,000/- towards funeral expenses. Apart from it, the wife of the deceased shall also be entitled to get Rs.40,000/- for loss of consortium. In this way, the appellants shall be entitled to get Rs.70,000/- under non-pecuniary heads with upward revision after every three years, hence, we allow total Rs.1,00,000/- under non-pecuniary heads.

27. Hence, the total compensation payable to the appellants in view of the decisions of the Apex Court in Sarla Verma and Others (Supra) and Pranay Sethi (Supra) is computed herein below:

1.

Annual income i.e. Rs.5,70,000/-

Rs.5,70,000/- p.a.

2.

Percentage towards future prospect : 25% :

Rs.1,42,500/-

3.

Total income : Rs.5,70,000/- + Rs.1,42,500/-

Rs.7,12,500/-

4.

Income after deduction of 1/4 : Rs.7,12,500/- - Rs.1,78,125/-

Rs.5,34,375/-

5.

Multiplier applicable : 9 :- Rs. 5,34,375 X 9

Rs.48,09,375/-

6.

Amount under non pecuniary head : Rs.15,000 + Rs.15,000 + Rs.40,000/- with 10% upward revision

Rs.1,00,000/-

7.

Total compensation : Rs.48,09,375 + Rs.1,00,000/-

Rs. 49,09,375/-

8.

Amount after 45% deduction towards contributory negligence : Rs.49,09,375 - Rs.22,09,218/-

Rs. 27,00,000/- (rounded off)

28. As far as issue of rate of interest is concerned, it should be 7.5% in view of the latest decision of the Apex Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Mannat Johal and Others, 2019 (2) T.A.C. 705 (S.C.) wherein the Apex Court has held as under:

"13. The aforesaid features equally apply to the contentions urged on behalf of the claimants as regards the rate of interest. The Tribunal had awarded interest at the rate of 12% p.a. but the same had been too high a rate in comparison to what is ordinarily envisaged in these matters. The High Court, after making a substantial enhancement in the award amount, modified the interest component at a reasonable rate of 7.5% p.a. and we find no reason to allow the interest in this matter at any rate higher than that allowed by High Court."

29. Learned Tribunal has awarded rate of interest as 7% per annum but we are fixing the rate of interest as 7.5% in the light of the above judgment.

30. In view of the above, the appeal stands partly allowed. Judgment and award passed by the Tribunal shall stand modified to the aforesaid extent. The respondent- Insurance Company shall deposit the amount within a period of 08 weeks from today with interest at the rate of 7.5% from the date of filing of the claim petition till the amount is deposited. The amount already deposited be deducted from the amount to be deposited. Statutory amount be remitted to the Tribunal.

31. In view of the ratio laid down by Hon'ble Gujarat High Court, in the case of Smt. Hansagori P. Ladhani v/s The Oriental Insurance Company Ltd., reported in 2007(2) GLH 291 and this High Court in total amount of interest, accrued on the principal amount of compensation is to be apportioned on financial year to financial year basis and if the interest payable to claimant for any financial year exceeds Rs.50,000/-, insurance company/owner is/are entitled to deduct appropriate amount under the head of 'Tax Deducted at Source' as provided u/s 194A (3) (ix) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and if the amount of interest does not exceeds Rs.50,000/- in any financial year, registry of this Tribunal is directed to allow the claimants to withdraw the amount without producing the certificate from the concerned Income- Tax Authority. The aforesaid view has been reiterated by this High Court in Review Application No.1 of 2020 in First Appeal From Order No.23 of 2001 (Smt. Sudesna and others Vs. Hari Singh and another) and in First Appeal From Order No.2871 of 2016 (Tej Kumari Sharma v. Chola Mandlam M.S. General Insurance Co. Ltd.) decided on 19.3.2021 while disbursing the amount.

32. The Tribunal shall follow the guidelines issued by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Company Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India and Others, vide order dated 27.01.2022, as the purpose of keeping compensation is to safeguard the interest of the claimants. Since long time has elapsed, the amount be deposited in the Saving Bank Account of claimant(s) in a nationalized Bank without F.D.R.

33. Recently, this Bench has come across the high handed action taken by the tribunal immediately post declaration of the award by issuing recovery warrant against the Insurance Company even before expiry of period of appeal. As under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and Uttar Pradesh Motor Vehicles (Eleventh Amendment) Rules, 2011, the period of limitation should be permitted to expire and, thereafter, the said claim application/petition itself would be considered to be an execution petition/application for execution of the award, but for a period of 90 days or as described in future till the period of appeal is not over, no coercive action shall be taken ex party in pursuance of the execution proceedings, if initiated. The claimants would not be required to file execution petition, an application in the disposed of matter itself would suffice.

34. It goes without saying that the tribunal shall wait for 90 days, namely, the period of limitation for preferring appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The order of this Court in F.A.F.O. No.998 of 2022, United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Dipesh Rai and others decided on 21.4.2022, wherein also this Bench has requested the Hon'ble the Chief Justice to circulate amongst the trial judicial/MACT tribunal in the State. These new directions will apply in all the matters where the awards are passed and/or to be passed and no coercive action shall be taken for 90 days except issuance of summon/notice and an advance copy to the counsel for the Insurance company or the tortfessor who is judgment debtor be served.

Order Date :- 18.05.2022

P.S.Parihar

(Ajai Tyagi, J.) (Dr. Kaushal Jayendra Thaker, J.)