Allahabad High Court
M/S Hakim Egg Store Through ... vs State Of U.P. And Another on 2 August, 2022
Bench: Shree Prakash Singh
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
?Court No. - 86
Case :- APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 17648 of 2022
Applicant :- M/S Hakim Egg Store Through Proprietor Mohammad Hakim
Opposite Party :- State of U.P. and Another
Counsel for Applicant :- Abhishek Gupta
Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A.
Hon'ble Shree Prakash Singh,J.
Heard learned counsel for the applicant and learned AGA for the State.
The present 482 Cr.P.C. application has been filed to quash the entire proceeding of Complaint Case No.2854 of 2020, Tej Prakas Vs. M/s Hakim Egg Store through Proprietor Mohammad Hakim and another under Section 138 N.I. Act Police Station Phase-II, District Gautam Budh Nagar, against the applicant and further to set aside the impugned summoning order dated dated 15.2.2021 along with Bailable Warrant dated 22.3.2021 passed by Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-III, District Gautam Budh Nagar against the applicant in Complaint Case No.2854 of 2020 (Tej Prakas Vs. M/s Hakim Egg Store through Proprietor Mohammad Hakim and another, under Section 138 N.I. Act, Police Station Phase-II, District Gautam Budh Nagar, pending in the court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-III, District Gautam Budh Nagar against the applicants.
Learned counsel for the applicant submits that there was compromise to give certain goods and in lieu thereof, present applicant had given five cheques to the opposite party no.2. He submits that goods were not given to the present applicant and a complaint was lodged. There is no criminal intent of the applicant, not to pay the aforesaid amount and it had happened as the goods were not given as per the contract.
After some arguments, learned counsel for the applicant lastly submits that present applicant is not involved in committing any kind of offence whatsoever has been submitted in the compliant. Matter, if any, raised by opposite party no. 2 is of a civil dispute and that can very well be settled by way of filing a civil suit. He submits that offence under Section 138 of N.I. Act is compoundable offence and it seems that under certain misconception, the aforesaid criminal case has been lodged by the opposite party no. 2 and therefore, an opportunity may be granted to the present applicant to sit together and amicably settle the dispute between the parties.
I have considered the submission made by the counsel in the light of the observation made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Damodar S. Prabhu Vs. Sayed Babalal H., 2010(5) SCC 663 which read as follows :-
"17. In a recently published commentary, the following observations have been made with regard to the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act [Cited from: Arun Mohan, Some thoughts towards law reforms on the topic of Section 138, Negotiable Instruments Act-Tackling an avalanche of cases (New Delhi: Universal Law Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., 2009) at p. 5] :
"... Unlike that for other forms of crime, the punishment here (in so far as the complainant is concerned) is not a means of seeking retribution, but is more a means to ensure payment of money. The complainant's interest lies primarily in recovering the money rather than seeing the drawer of the cheque in jail. The threat of jail is only a mode to ensure recovery. As against the accused who is willing to undergo a jail term, there is little available as remedy for the holder of the cheque.
If we were to examine the number of complaints filed which were `compromised' or `settled' before the final judgment on one side and the cases which proceeded to judgment and conviction on the other, we will find that the bulk was settled and only a miniscule number continued."
18. It is quite obvious that with respect to the offence of dishonour of cheques, it is the compensatory aspect of the remedy which should be given priority over the punitive aspect. There is also some support for the apprehensions raised by the learned Attorney General that a majority of cheque bounce cases are indeed being compromised or settled by way of compounding, albeit during the later stages of litigation thereby contributing to undue delay in justice delivery. The problem herein is with the tendency of litigants to belatedly choose compounding as a means to resolve their dispute. ?
19. As mentioned earlier, the learned Attorney General's submission is that in the absence of statutory guidance, parties are choosing compounding as a method of last resort instead of opting for it as soon as the Magistrates take cognizance of the complaints. One explanation for such behaviour could be that the accused persons are willing to take the chance of progressing through the various stages of litigation and then choose the route of settlement only when no other route remains. While such behaviour may be viewed as rational from the viewpoint of litigants, the hard facts are that the undue delay in opting for compounding contributes to the arrears pending before the courts at various levels. If the accused is willing to settle or compromise by way of compounding of the offence at a later stage of litigation, it is generally indicative of some merit in the complainant's case. In such cases it would be desirable if parties choose compounding during the earlier stages of litigation. If however, the accused has a valid defence such as a mistake, forgery or coercion among other grounds, then the matter can be litigated through the specified forums."
In view of the aforesaid, the submission made by the counsel is well founded.
It is thus directed that the accused may appear before the court below within a period of one month from today through the representing counsel and move an application seeking compounding of offence, through compromise. On such application being moved the concerned court may take adequate steps in accordance with law in this regard and shall provide further opportunity to the accused which shall not exceed a maximum period of four months from today to make an endeavour in this direction. Thereafter, the court shall pass necessary orders specifically keeping in view the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Damodar S. Prabhu (supra) within a period of three months from today.
If the decision of the Court given in the light of the application does not conclude the proceedings against the accused and he is further required to appear and face the trial, the court shall be at liberty to proceed in accordance with law against the accused and take all necessary steps and measures to procure their attendance as the law permits.
In the aforesaid period of three months or till the decision given in the light of the application, whichever is earlier, no coercive measures shall be adopted against the accused.
It is made clear that no application for extension of time shall be entertained if this order is not availed by the accused in the stipulated period of time.
It is further clarified that the order is only with respect to the accused on behalf of whom this application u/s 482 Cr.P.C. has been moved in this Court.
With the aforesaid observations this application is disposed off.
Order Date :- 2.8.2022
Ram Murti
