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M/S R.K. Road Lines Private Ltd. vs Uttar Pradesh Cooperative ...
2021 Latest Caselaw 6060 ALL

Citation : 2021 Latest Caselaw 6060 ALL
Judgement Date : 8 June, 2021

Allahabad High Court
M/S R.K. Road Lines Private Ltd. vs Uttar Pradesh Cooperative ... on 8 June, 2021
Bench: Sanjay Yadav, Acting Chief Justice, Prakash Padia



HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
 

Court No. - 9
 

 
Case :- WRIT - C No. - 7652 of 2021
 

 
Petitioner :- M/S R.K. Road Lines Private Ltd.
 
Respondent :- Uttar Pradesh Cooperative Federation Ltd. And 3 Others
 
Counsel for Petitioner :- Bipin Lal Srivastava,Liaqat Ali Siddiqui
 
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Liaqat Ali Siddiqui
 

 
Hon'ble Sanjay Yadav,Acting Chief Justice
 
Hon'ble Prakash Padia,J.

Per Hon'ble Prakash Padia,J.

1. The matter is taken up through video conferencing.

2. Heard Sri S.K. Verma, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Bipin Lal Srivastava and Sri Vinayak Verma, learned counsel for petitioner. Learned Standing Counsel accepted notice on behalf of respondent Nos.2 & 4 and Sri Liaqat Ali Siddiqui, learned counsel for respondent Nos.1 & 3.

3. The petitioner has preferred the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India with the following prayers:-

"A. issue a suitable writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondent No.2 to pay the amount of Rs.15,96,674.75/- with an interest at the rate of 12% calculated from 01.12.2018 an also may be pleased to direct to return of the security money to the petitioner forthwith.

B. issue any other suitable order or direction, which this Hon'ble Court may deem just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case and in the interest of justice."

4. Facts in brief as contained in the petition are that the petitioner was awarded a contract for carrying and handling fertilizers for the period between 01.04.2017 to 31.03.2018. After completion of the aforesaid work, on 30.03.2018 the petitioner gave application for payment and on 22.12.2018 he also gave an application submitting detail bills. When no payment was made, the petitioner submitted a reminder on 08.01.2019. On 10.01.2019, Executive Director (Fertilizer) wrote a letter to District Manager PCF, Budaun for stop payment due to an inquiry pending against the petitioner. Thereafter on 26.02.2019 the petitioner moved an application to the Managing Director, Uttar Pradesh Cooperative Federation Lucknow for relase of amount mentioned in the Bill and also with regard to the security money, he stated that it may be returned after inquiry. On 29.11.2019 the petitioner filed application before the District Manager PCF Badaun stating therein that S.S.P. Badaun had given report in his favour and prayed for payment of the bill amount. On 03.12.2019, District Magistrate, Baduan wrote a letter to the Regional Manager, Uttar Pradesh, State Warehouse Corporation, Regional Office Bareilly regarding non-involvement of the petitioner in any crime. The petitioner also submitted an application to the District Manager PCF informing him regarding his innocence and payment of bills and also informed the Managing Director PCF Lucknow. On this, Deputy General Manager (Fertilizer) sought information from District Manager PCF Badaun regarding his innocence. Thereafter on 06.05.2020, the District Manager P.C.F. Badaun informed the Deputy General Manager (Fertilizer)that the petitioner is exonerated from all the accusations and the petitioner was entitled for payment but till date no payment has been made. Hence the present writ petition.

5. It is argued by Sri S.K. Verma, learned Senior Advocate that the petitioner is entitled for the amount of contract namely 15,96,674.75/- along with interest @ 12% as well as the security money deposited by him. He relied upon a letter dated 06.05.2020 written by District Manager, P.C.F. Budanun to Deputy General Manager (Fertlizer) U.P. Co-operative Federation Ltd. Lucknow, copy of which is appended as Annexure 12 to the petition. In view of the same, it is argued that since the claim set up by the him has been admitted by the District Manager P.C.F. Budanun, therefore, he is entitled for reimbursement of the amount as claimed by him. The aforesaid letter dated 06.05.2020 is reproduced below:-

यू०पी०कोऑपरेटिव फेडरेशन लि०,जिला कार्यालय बदायूँ

पत्रांकः- पी०सी०एफ०/उर्व०/लेखा/2020-21 दिनांक- 06.05.2020

सेवा में,

श्रीमान उप महा प्रबन्धक (उर्वरक)

उ०प्र० कोऑपरेटिव फेडरेशन लि०

स्टेशन रोड, लखनऊ

विषयः- मैसर्स- आर०के० रोडलाइन्स इंन्द्रा चौक बदायूँ के लम्बित बिलों का भुगतान करने के संबंध में।

महोदय,

आप अपने पत्रांक पी०सी०एफ०/2019-20/14734 दिनांक 24.02.2020 का संदर्भ ग्रहण करने का कष्ट करें, जो मैसर्स आर०के० रोडलाइन्स परिवहन ठेकेदार द्वारा फरवरी 18 से नवंबर 2018 तक किए गए परिवहन एवं हैडलिंग कार्य के चौदह बिलों की धनराशि 1596674.75के लम्बित भुगतान के विषयक है। बदायूं उर्वरक अनियमितता प्रकरण में भंडार नायक जगतपाल एवं परिवहन ठेकेदारों के विरूद्ध थाना सिविल लाइन्स में FIR NO-003 दि० 02.01.2019 को दर्ज कराई गयी थी, तदउपरान्त श्री मान कार्यकारी निदेशक उर्वरक ने अपने पत्र संख्या- पी०सी०एफ०/उर्वरक/2018-19/17574-75 दि० 10.01.2019 के द्वारा ठेकेदारो के भुगतान पर रोक लगा दी थी।

उक्त प्रकरण में आपको अवगत कराना है कि वरिष्ठ पुलिस अधीक्षक बदायूं ने जिलाधिकारी बदायूं को भेजी अपनी अाख्या दि० 30.11.2019 को अवगत कराया है कि विवेचना से परिवहन ठेकेदार मैसर्स-आर०के०रोडलाइन्स 14- कदीर मार्केट इन्द्रा चौक बदायूं के विरूद्ध कोई साक्ष्य नहीं है। आख्या उर्वरक गवन प्रकरण में उक्त फर्म का नाम नहीं है। उक्त फर्म द्वारा किए गए कार्य अवधि में फर्म पर कोई चालान पेंडिंग या अन्य बकाया नहीं है। साक्ष्य हेतु बरिष्ठ पुलिस अधीक्षक महोदय बदायूं के पत्र दि० 30.11.2019 की छायाप्रति साथ में संलग्न है।

अतः आप से अनुरोध है कि मैसर्स आर०के० रोडलाइन्स, इन्द्रा चौक,बदायूं द्वारा किए गए परिवहन एवं हैडलिंग कार्य के अवशेष बिलों के भुगतान के संबंध में मुख्यालय स्तर से आवश्यक दिशा निर्देश देने का कष्ट करें।

भवदीय

जिला प्रबन्धक

पी०सी०एफ०

बदायूँ

प्रतिलिपि सूचनार्थ एवं आवश्यक कार्यवाही हेतु प्रेषित

1. क्षेत्रीय प्रबन्धक, पी०सी०एफ०, बरेली को इस निवेदन के साथ कि उक्त भुगतान हेतु अपनी संस्तुति आख्या मुख्यालय प्रेषित करने हेतु।

जिला प्रबन्धक"

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his case relied upon following judgments :-

1. Writ C No.13388 of 2020 (Ms. Biotech System Vs. State of U.P. and 4 others)

2. M/s Satish Chandra Vs. State of U.P. and two others reported in 2006 (2) ALJ 122 (DB)

3. The Chairman Railway Board & others Vs. Mrs. Chadrima Das and others reported in JT 2000 (1) SC 426.

7. The principle relief sought is with regard to payment of contractual amounts in terms of agreements said to have been executed between the parties. Learned counsel appearing for respondents has raised objections with regard to the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that the petitioner seeks to enforce certain contractual rights and obligations for which the appropriate remedy is to approach the civil court.

8. Insofar as the preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the writ petition is concerned, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that there is no absolute bar to the maintainability of the writ petition even in contractual matters where there are disputed question of fact or even where monetary claim are sought to be raised.

9. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

10. The pleadings in the writ petition and the material on record clearly indicate that the petitioner had executed agreement with the respondents for completion of certain civil works. The petitioner claims to have completed the work as per the terms of the agreement and submitted his bills as per specification for which his claims have not been paid to him. The law with regard to the maintainability of a writ petition in contractual matters is fairly well settled, and it has been consistently held that although there is no absolute bar to the maintainability of a writ petition in such matters, the discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, may be refused in case of money claims arising out of purely contractual obligations where there are serious disputed questions of fact with regard to the claims sought to be raised.

11. The remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, has been held, to be available in a limited sphere only when the contracting party is able to demonstrate that the remedy it seeks to invoke is a public law remedy, in contradistinction to a private law remedy under a contract.

12. The legal position in this regard is that where the rights, which are sought to be agitated, are purely of a private character, no mandamus can be claimed, and even if the relief is sought against the State or any of its instrumentality the pre-condition for the issuance of a writ of mandamus is a public duty. In a dispute, which is purely contractual in nature, there being no public duty element, to issue a writ of mandamus.

13. The question as to whether jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution would be open to resolve disputes arising out of the contracts between the State and the citizen was considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Radhakrishna Agarwal and others vs. State of Bihar and others reported in (1977) 3 SCC 457 and drawing a distinction with the case of a contract entered into by the State in exercise of a statutory power, it was held that in cases where the contract entered into between a State and the person aggrieved is non-statutory and purely contractual and the rights and liabilities of the parties are governed by the terms of the contract, and the petitioner complains about breach of such contract, the remedy of Article 226 would not be open for such complaints and no writ or order can be issued under Article 226 in such cases to compel the authorities to remedy the breach of contract by the State. The Supreme Court took note of the three types of cases pertaining to breach of alleged obligation by the State or its agents, as referred to in the judgment of the High Court against which the appeals were before it. The three types were stated as follows :-

"(i) Where a petitioner makes a grievance of breach of promise on the part of the State in cases where on assurance or promise made by the State he has acted to his prejudice and predicament, but the agreement is short of a contract within the meaning of Article 299 of the Constitution;

(ii) Where the contract entered into between the person aggrieved and the State is in exercise of a statutory power under certain Act or Rules framed thereunder and the petitioner alleges a breach on the part of the State; and

(iii) Where the contract entered into between the State, and the person aggrieved is non-statutory and purely contractual and the rights and liabilities of the parties are governed by the terms of the contract, and the petitioner complains about breach of such contract by the State."

14. In respect of cases of the third category where questions purely of alleged breach of contract were involved, it was observed by the Apex Court as under :-

"15. It then, very rightly, held that the cases now before us should be placed in the third category where questions of pure alleged breaches of contract are involved. It held, upon the strength of Umakant Saran v. The State of Bihar and Lekhraj Satramdas v. Deputy Custodian-cum-Managing Officer and B.K.Sinha v. State of Bihar that no writ or order can issue under Article 226 of the Constitution in such cases "to compel the authorities to remedy a breach of contract pure and simple".

17. Learned counsel contends that in the cases before us breaches of public duty are involved. The submission made before us is that, whenever a State or its agents or officers deal with the citizen, either when making a transaction or, after making it, acting in exercise of powers under the terms of a contract between the parties, there is a dealing between the State and the citizen which involves performance of "certain legal and public duties." If we were to accept this very wide proposition every case of a breach of contract by the State or its agents or its officers would call for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution. We do not consider this to be a sound proposition at all."

15. The question of maintainability of a writ petition under Article 226 in the case of a money claim again came up for consideration in the case of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited and others Vs. Dolly Das reported in (1999) 4 SCC 450 and it was held that for invoking the writ jurisdiction, involvement of any constitutional or statutory right was essential and in the absence of a statutory right, the remedy under Article 226 could not be availed to claim any money in respect of breach of contract, tort or otherwise. It was reiterated that in absence of any constitutional or statutory rights being involved, a writ proceeding would not lie to enforce a contractual obligation even if it is sought to be enforced against the State or its authorities.

16. The maintainability of writ petition under Article 226 in disputes relating to terms of contract with a statutory body fell for consideration in the case of Kerala State Electricity Board and other Vs. Kurien E. Kalathil and others reported in (2000) 6 SCC 293 and it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the writ court would not ordinarily be the proper forum for resolution of disputes relating to terms of contract with a statutory body and disputes arising from contractual or commercial activities must be settled according to ordinary principles of law of contract. The observations made in the judgement in this regard are as follows :-

"10...The interpretation and implementation of a clause in a contract cannot be the subject matter of a writ petition. Whether the contract envisages actual payment or not is a question of construction of contract? If a term of a contract is violated, ordinarily the remedy is not the writ petition under Article 226. We are also unable to agree with the observations of the High Court that the contractor was seeking enforcement of a statutory contract. A contract would not become statutory simply because it is for construction of a public utility and it has been awarded by a statutory body. We are also unable to agree with the observation of the High Court that since the obligations imposed by the contract on the contracting parties come within the purview of the Contract Act, that would not make the contract statutory. Clearly, the High Court fell into an error in coming to the conclusion that the contract in question was statutory in nature.

11. A statute may expressly or impliedly confer power on a statutory body to enter into contracts in order to enable it to discharge its functions. Dispute arising out of the terms of such contracts or alleged breaches have to be settled by the ordinary principles of law of contract. The fact that one of the parties to the agreement is a statutory or public body will not of itself affect the principles to be applied. The disputes about the meaning of a covenant in a contract or its enforceability have to be determined according to the usual principles of the Contract Act. Every act of a statutory body need not necessarily involve an exercise of statutory power. Statutory bodies, like private parties, have power to contract or deal with property. Such activities may not raise any issue of public law. In the present case, it has not been shown how the contract is statutory. The contract between the parties is the realm of private law. It is not a statutory contract. The disputes relating to interpretation of the terms and conditions of such a contract could not have been agitated in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. That is a matter for adjudication by a civil court or in arbitration if provided for in the contract. Whether any amount is due and if so, how much and refusal of the appellant to pay it is justified or not, are not the matters which could have been agitated and decided in a writ petition."

17. The nature of the prerogative remedy of a mandatory order as the normal means for enforcing performance of public duties by public authorities has been considered in Administrative Law by H.W.R. Wade & C.F. Forsyth (Administrative Law, Tenth Edition, H.W.R. Wade & C.F. Forsyth), and a distinction has been drawn between public duties enforceable by a mandatory order, which are usually statutory, and duties arising merely from contract. It has been stated thus :-

"A distinction which needs to be clarified is that between public duties enforceable by a mandatory order, which are usually statutory, and duties arising merely from contract. Contractual duties are enforceable as matters of private law by the ordinary contractual remedies, such as damages, injunction, specific performance and declaration. They are not enforceable by a mandatory order, which in the first place is confined to public duties and secondly is not granted where there are other adequate remedies."

18. We may also gainfully refer to the judgment in the case of Joshi Technologies International Inc. vs. Union of India and others (2015) 7 SCC 728 wherein the legal position in this regard has been taken note of and summarized in the following terms :-

"69. The position thus summarised in the aforesaid principles has to be understood in the context of discussion that preceded which we have pointed out above. As per this, no doubt, there is no absolute bar to the maintainability of the writ petition even in contractual matters or where there are disputed questions of fact or even when monetary claim is raised. At the same time, discretion lies with the High Court which under certain circumstances, it can refuse to exercise. It also follows that under the following circumstances, "normally", the Court would not exercise such a discretion:

69.1. The Court may not examine the issue unless the action has some public law character attached to it.

69.2. Whenever a particular mode of settlement of dispute is provided in the contract, the High Court would refuse to exercise its discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution and relegate the party to the said mode of settlement, particularly when settlement of disputes is to be resorted to through the means of arbitration.

69.3. If there are very serious disputed questions of fact which are of complex nature and require oral evidence for their determination.

69.4. Money claims per se particularly arising out of contractual obligations are normally not to be entertained except in exceptional circumstances.

70. Further, the legal position which emerges from various judgments of this Court dealing with different situations/aspects relating to contracts entered into by the State/public authority with private parties, can be summarised as under:

70.1. At the stage of entering into a contract, the State acts purely in its executive capacity and is bound by the obligations of fairness.

70.2. State in its executive capacity, even in the contractual field, is under obligation to act fairly and cannot practise some discriminations.

70.3. Even in cases where question is of choice or consideration of competing claims before entering into the field of contract, facts have to be investigated and found before the question of a violation of Article 14 of the Constitution could arise. If those facts are disputed and require assessment of evidence the correctness of which can only be tested satisfactorily by taking detailed evidence, involving examination and cross-examination of witnesses, the case could not be conveniently or satisfactorily decided in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. In such cases the Court can direct the aggrieved party to resort to alternate remedy of civil suit, etc.

70.4. Writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution was not intended to facilitate avoidance of obligation voluntarily incurred.

70.5. Writ petition was not maintainable to avoid contractual obligation. Occurrence of commercial difficulty, inconvenience or hardship in performance of the conditions agreed to in the contract can provide no justification in not complying with the terms of contract which the parties had accepted with open eyes. It cannot ever be that a licensee can work out the licence if he finds it profitable to do so: and he can challenge the conditions under which he agreed to take the licence, if he finds it commercially inexpedient to conduct his business.

70.6. Ordinarily, where a breach of contract is complained of, the party complaining of such breach may sue for specific performance of the contract, if contract is capable of being specifically performed. Otherwise, the party may sue for damages.

70.7. Writ can be issued where there is executive action unsupported by law or even in respect of a corporation there is denial of equality before law or equal protection of law or if it can be shown that action of the public authorities was without giving any hearing and violation of principles of natural justice after holding that action could not have been taken without observing principles of natural justice.

70.8. If the contract between private party and the State/instrumentality and/or agency of the State is under the realm of a private law and there is no element of public law, the normal course for the aggrieved party, is to invoke the remedies provided under ordinary civil law rather than approaching the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and invoking its extraordinary jurisdiction.

70.9. The distinction between public law and private law element in the contract with the State is getting blurred. However, it has not been totally obliterated and where the matter falls purely in private field of contract, this Court has maintained the position that writ petition is not maintainable. The dichotomy between public law and private law rights and remedies would depend on the factual matrix of each case and the distinction between the public law remedies and private law field, cannot be demarcated with precision. In fact, each case has to be examined, on its facts whether the contractual relations between the parties bear insignia of public element. Once on the facts of a particular case it is found that nature of the activity or controversy involves public law element, then the matter can be examined by the High Court in writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to see whether action of the State and/or instrumentality or agency of the State is fair, just and equitable or that relevant factors are taken into consideration and irrelevant factors have not gone into the decision-making process or that the decision is not arbitrary.

70.10. Mere reasonable or legitimate expectation of a citizen, in such a situation, may not by itself be a distinct enforceable right, but failure to consider and give due weight to it may render the decision arbitrary, and this is how the requirements of due consideration of a legitimate expectation forms part of the principle of non-arbitrariness.

70.11. The scope of judicial review in respect of disputes falling within the domain of contractual obligations may be more limited and in doubtful cases the parties may be relegated to adjudication of their rights by resort to remedies provided for adjudication of purely contractual disputes."

19. The question of maintainability of the writ petition under Article 226 for enforcement of a contractual right again came up again in the case of Life Insurance Corporation of India and others vs. Asha Goel (Smt.) and another reported in (2001) 2 SCC 160, and it was held that pros and cons of fact-situation should be carefully weighed and the determination of the question as to when a claim can be enforced in writ jurisdiction would depend on consideration of several factors like, whether the writ petitioner is merely attempting to enforce his contractual rights or the case raises important questions of law and constitutional issues, the nature of dispute raised; the nature of enquiry necessary for determination of the dispute etc. It was held that the matter would be required to be considered in the facts and circumstances of each case. The observations made in the judgement in this regard are as follows :-

"10. Article 226 of the Constitution confers extraordinary jurisdiction on the High Court to issue high prerogative writs for enforcement of the fundamental rights or for any other purpose. It is wide and expansive. The Constitution does not place any fetter on exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction. It is left to the discretion of the High Court. Therefore, it cannot be laid down as a general proposition of law that in no case the High Court can entertain a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution to enforce a claim under a life insurance policy. It is neither possible nor proper to enumerate exhaustively the circumstances in which such a claim can or cannot be enforced by filing a writ petition. The determination of the question depends on consideration of several factors like, whether a writ petitioner is merely attempting to enforce his/her contractual rights or the case raises important questions of law and constitutional issues, the nature of the dispute raised; the nature of inquiry necessary for determination of the dispute etc. The matter is to be considered in the facts and circumstances of each case. While the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be denied altogether, courts must bear in mind the self-imposed restriction consistently followed by High Courts all these years after the constitutional power came into existence in not entertaining writ petitions filed for enforcement of purely contractual rights and obligations which involve disputed questions of facts. The courts have consistently taken the view that in a case where for determination of the dispute raised, it is necessary to inquire into facts for determination of which it may become necessary to record oral evidence a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution, is not the appropriate forum. The position is also well settled that if the contract entered between the parties provide an alternate forum for resolution of disputes arising from the contract, then the parties should approach the forum agreed by them and the High Court in writ jurisdiction should not permit them to by pass the agreed forum of dispute resolution. At the cost of repetition it may be stated that in the above discussions we have only indicated some of the circumstances in which the High Court have declined to entertain petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution for enforcement of contractual rights and obligation; the discussions are not intended to be exhaustive. This Court from time to time disapproved of a High Court entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in matters of enforcement of contractual rights and obligation particularly where the claim by one party is contested by the other and adjudication of the dispute requires inquiry into facts. We may notice a few such cases: Mohd. Hanif v. State of Assam (1969) 2 SCC 782; Banchhanidhi Rath v. State of Orissa (1972) 4 SCC 781; Rukmanibai Gupta v. Collector, Jabalpur (1980) 4 SCC 556; Food Corpn. of India v. Jagannath Dutta 1993 Supp (3) SCC 635 and State of H.P. v. Raja Mahendra Pal (1999) 4 SCC 43."

20. Taking a similar view where a contractual right was sought to be enforced by filing a writ petition, this Court in the case M/s Lalloo Ji Rajiv Chandra And Sons vs. Meladhikari Prayagraj Mela Authority and others reported in 2019 ADJ Online 0081, reiterated the legal position that in a case of non statutory contract, the remedy available to the contractor, if he is aggrieved by non-payment, would be either to file a civil suit or if there is an arbitration agreement between the parties, to invoke the terms of the agreement. The writ petition was dismissed with the following observations :-

"10. In the present case there is nothing to held that the contract is a statutory contract. The remedy of the contractor, if he is aggrieved by non-payment, would be to either file an ordinary civil suit or if there is an arbitration agreement between the parties, to invoke the terms of the agreement.

11. In our view, it will not either be appropriate or proper for the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to entertain a petition of this nature. The grant of relief of this nature would virtually amount to a money decree. The petitioner is at liberty to take recourse to the remedies available by raising such a claim either invoking an arbitration clause (if it exists in the contract between the parties) or if there is no provision for arbitration, to move the competent civil court with a money claim."

21. The general principles which may be culled out from the aforementioned judgments is that in a case where the contract entered into between the State and the person aggrieved is of a non-statutory character and the relationship is governed purely in terms of a contract between the parties, in such situations the contractual obligations are matters of private law and a writ would not lie to enforce a civil liability arising purely out of a contract. The proper remedy in such cases would be to file a civil suit for claiming damages, injunctions or specific performance or such appropriate reliefs in a civil court. Pure contractual obligation in the absence of any statutory complexion would not be enforceable through a writ.

22. The remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution being an extraordinary remedy, it is not intended to be used for the purpose of declaring private rights of the parties. In the case of enforcement of contractual rights and liabilities the normal remedy of filing a civil suit being available to the aggrieved party, this Court may not exercise its prerogative writ jurisdiction to enforce such contractual obligations.

23. Insofar as the cases cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner is concerned in the case of The Chairman Railway Board (supra) is concerned, in the aforesaid case a Bangladeshi woman was subjected to rape in Railway Yatri Niwas Howrah. A writ petition was filed before the High Court for compensation by an advocate. The question raised before the Hon'ble Supreme Court that whether an advocate has locus standi to file petition or not. It was held by the Apex Court that the petition fled by the Advocate in the facts and circumstances of the case is maintainable. Insofar as the case of Satish Chandra (supra) is concerned, in this case, amount payable towards work done was admitted by the concerned authority. In the aforesaid circumstances, it was held by a Division Bench of this Court that the directions for payment can be issued in the writ jurisdiction. In the present case, the ratio of this judgement will also not help the petitioner, since in the present case amount payable towards work done by the petitioner was not admitted by the authorities. Insofar as the judgment in the case of Ms. Biotech System (supra) is concerned, after adjudicating the issue in great detail, the Division Bench of this Court was pleased to decline to exercise extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as not maintainable in the matter.

24. We may, therefore, add that it cannot be held in absolute terms that a writ petition is not maintainable in all contractual matters seeking enforcement of obligations on part of the State or its authorities. The limitation in exercising powers under Article 226 in contractual matters is essentially a self-imposed restriction. A case where the amount is admitted and there is no disputed question of fact requiring adjudication of detailed evidence and interpretation of the terms of the contract, may be an exception to the aforementioned general principle.

25. In the present case, the claims sought to be set up by the petitioner has been strongly disputed. The payments in respect of which the petitioner have raised their claims pertain to contractual and commercial obligations, and the pleadings and the material which are on record, do not in any manner indicate that it is a public law remedy which the petitioners are seeking to invoke so as to persuade this Court to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction.

26. In view of the foregoing discussions, and keeping in view the facts of the case at hand, we are not inclined to exercise our extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.

27. The writ petitions is accordingly dismissed.

Order Date :- 08.06.2021

saqlain

(Prakash Padia, J.) (Sanjay Yadav, A.C.J.)

 

 

 
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