Indrapal Singh vs The Deputy Director Of ...
2019 Latest Caselaw 1079 ALL

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
 
 

A.F.R
 
Reserved
 
Court No. - 4
 
Case :- CONSOLIDATION No. - 328 of 2012
 
Petitioner :- Indrapal Singh
 
Respondent :- The Deputy Director Of Consolidation Kheri And Another
 
Counsel for Petitioner :- Shailendra Singh Rajawat,Vijay Bahadur Verma
 
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Anil K.Mishra,Rajeev Chaturvedi,Sunendra Kumar
 

 
Hon'ble Devendra Kumar Upadhyaya,J.

Heard Shri Vijay Bahadur Verma, learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri Surendra Kumar Mishra, learned counsel representing the respondent no.2.

Under challenge in this petition is an order dated 02.05.2012 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Sitapur, Camp Lakhimpur Kheri whereby he has allowed the revision petition preferred by the respondent no.2 which was filed against the order dated 20.08.2003 passed by the Settlement Officer Consolidation in an appeal which was filed by the respondent no.2 against the order dated 21.11.2001 passed by the Consolidation Officer. By the order dated 21.11.2001 the claim put forth by the respondent no.2 on the land in question on the basis of sale deed dated 23.12.1986 said to have been executed by the original recorded tenure holder-Babu Ram in his favour was rejected. The Deputy Director of Consolidation while allowing the revision petition vide order dated 02.05.2012 has also set aside the orders dated 20.08.2003 and 21.11.2001 passed the Settlement Officer, Consolidation and the Consolidation Officer respectively.

The facts of the case, as pleaded by the learned counsel representing the respective parties, are that undisputed original recorded tenure holder of the land in question was one Babu Ram whose name was recorded in the basic year khatauni. The land in dispute comprises in khasra plot nos.17 and 18 situate in village-Sahupur, Pargana-Aurangabad, tehsil-Mohammdi, district-Kheri. It has been alleged that Babu Ram after seeking requisite permission from the officer concerned under section 5-A(2) of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") executed a sale deed in favour of respondent no.2 on 08.12.1986 in respect of both the plots. In the year 1986 itself an objection under section 9-A(2) of the Act was filed by Indrapal claiming his right and title over the land in question on the basis of adverse possession. Apart from Indrapal, four other persons had also laid their claim over the land in question on the basis of adverse possession. The Assistant Consolidation Officer on 28.09.1986 referred the matter to the Consolidation Officer. The Consolidation Officer decided the said objections vide his judgment and order dated 05.08.1988 whereby he held that Indrapal to be Bhumidhar with transferable rights and accordingly ordered that his name be recorded in the revenue records as such after expunging the name of Babu Ram, the original recorded tenure holder.

Respondent no.2 challenged the said order dated 05.08.1988 by filing an appeal before the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, who dismissed the same vide his order dated 30.03.1991. The said order dated 30.03.1991 passed by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation was challenged by the respondent no.2 by filing a revision petition under section 48 of the Act, which is said to have been withdrawn as not pressed vide order dated 25.08.2001. The respondent no.2 thereafter moved a restoration application which too was rejected by the Deputy Director of Consolidation vide an order dated 28.09.2010.

During the pendency of the proceedings instituted under section 9-A(2) of the Act by Indrapal, it appears that an application was made under section 9-A(2) by the respondent no.2-Desh Raj claiming his right on the land in question on the basis of sale deed dated 23.12.1986. The Consolidation Officer, however, rejected the claim of the respondent no.2 vide his order dated 21.02.2001 against which the respondent no.2 filed an appeal which too has been dismissed by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation on 20.08.2003.

The respondent no.2 challenged the aforesaid two orders passed by the Consolidation Officer and Settlement Officer, Consolidation by filing a revision petition under section 48 of the Act before the Deputy Director of Consolidation which has been allowed by the impugned order dated 02.05.2012. It is this order dated 02.05.2012 which is under challenge herein.

Submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that since against the earlier order passed by the Consolidation Officer on 05.08.1988 appeal, revision and restoration application have been dismissed by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation and the Deputy Director of Consolidation vide their orders dated 30.03.1991, 25.08.2001 and 28.09.2010, as such the said order between the parties had become final and accordingly in view of the said order dated 05.08.1988, the order passed by the Consolidation Officer on 21.11.2001 was lawful and thus the Settlement Officer, Consolidation had rightly dismissed the appeal vide his order dated 20.08.2003. It has also been stated by the learned counsel for the petitioner that, in fact, by the impugned order dated 02.05.2012 the Deputy Director of Consolidation has reviewed his earlier order passed on 25.08.2001 which is impermissible under law.

Learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his submissions has relied upon a judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ram Dular vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation, reported in [1994 (12) LCD page 804] wherein it has been held that the Deputy Director of Consolidation in exercise of his jurisdiction under section 48 of the Act cannot assume to itself the jurisdiction of the original authority as a fact finding authority by appreciating for itself the facts de novo.

To bring home the argument that the Deputy Director of Consolidation is not vested with any jurisdiction to review the orders passed earlier, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a Full Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Smt. Anar Kali and others vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others, reported in [1997 (15) LCD 921] wherein the question " whether it is open for the consolidation authorities to review/recall their final orders exercising inherent powers, even though the Act does not vest them in review jurisdiction?" has been answered in negative.

Thus, thrust of the arguments made by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the basis of authorities cited above, is two folds. Firstly, he has submitted that the impugned order dated 02.05.2012 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation amounts to review of his earlier orders dated 25.08.2001 and 28.9.2010 and secondly that once the appeal and revision filed by the respondent no.2 against the order dated 05.08.1988 passed by the Consolidation Officer were dismissed. The said order dated 05.08.1988 had become final between the parties and in this view of the matter, there was no illegality committed by the Consolidation Officer and Settlement Officer, Consolidation while passing the orders dated 21.11.2001 and 20.08.2003 respectively.

Per contra, Shri Surendra Kumar Mishra, learned counsel representing the respondent no.2 has vehemently argued that in fact the order dated 05.08.1988 was passed by the Consolidation Officer, though the respondent no.2 was already armed with a sale deed executed by Babu Ram in his favour on 08.12.1986, however, he was not impleaded as a party therein. He has further drawn attention of the Court to the order dated 30.03.1991 passed by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation and has submitted that keeping in view the directions given and observations made by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation in the said order dated 30.03.1991 that respondent no.2 should implead Indrapal in his objections filed under section 9-A(2) of the Act he proceeded accordingly and hence he cannot be faulted with in any manner. He has further submitted that the order passed by the Consolidation Officer on 05.08.1988 whereby the claim put forth by Indrapal on the basis of adverse possession has been accepted is completely unlawful and even if the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner may be accepted, the order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation dated 02.05.2012 does not warrant any interference by this Court in its discretionary jurisdiction vested under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. His submission is that the Consolidation Officer while accepting the claim of the petitioner vide his order dated 05.08.1988 on the basis of adverse possession has not taken into account that plea of adverse possession is to be proved by unimpeachable evidence and that on record before the Consolidation Officer, there was no such evidence which could have persuaded the Consolidation Officer to have accepted the claim put forth by Indrapal. In this view, submission is that this Court ought not to interfere in the order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, dated 02.05.2012.

I have given my anxious consideration to the competing arguments advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties and have also perused the record available on this writ petition.

The sale deed dated 08.12.1988 executed by undisputed recorded tenure holder-Babu Ram in favour of respondent no.2 has yet not been cancelled. The objections filed under section 9-A(2) by Indrapal were decided by the Consolidation Officer on 05.08.1988 and before that on the basis of the sale deed the respondent no.2 had also filed his objection under section 9-A(2) of the Act claiming his rights in the land in question on the basis of the sale deed. As a matter of fact, the most appropriate course which ought to have been resorted by the Consolidation Officer, in the facts and circumstances, was that he should have clubbed both the objections i.e. objections filed by the petitioner as also by the respondent no.2 and thereafter he should have decided the respective claims of the parties simultaneously.

It is relevant to note, at this juncture, itself that in the objections filed by Indrapal, respondent no.2 was not impleaded as a party. Though he challenged the order dated 05.08.1988 by taking recourse to appellate jurisdiction of the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, however, the said appeal was dismissed by the appellate court vide its order dated 30.03.1991.

The observations made in the order dated 30.03.1991 by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation are very relevant to be taken note of, though the appeal filed by the respondent no.2 was dismissed by the said order. The reason indicated by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation for dismissing the appeal filed by the respondent no.2 against the order dated 05.08.1988 passed by the Consolidation Officer is that the respondent no.2 should have impleaded Indrapal in his objections filed under section 9-A(2) of the Act on the basis of sale deed dated 08.12.1986. The relevant portion of the said order dated 30.03.1991 passed by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation is extracted hereinbelow:

"vihydrkZ ds fo}ku vf/koDrk dk rdZ gS fd mUgksaus fookfnr vkjkth dk cSukek ckcwjke ls djk;k gS vkSj mlds nkf[ky [kkfjt dk okn pdcUnh vf/kdkjh ds U;k;ky; esa fopkjk/khu gSA bl lecU/k esa vihydrkZ us iz'uksRrj Hkh nkf[ky fd;k gSA ijUrq vihydrkZ us bl okn esa bUnziky dks vko';d i{kdkj D;ksa ugh cuk;k ;k cukus dh dk;Zokgh dh rks mldk D;k ifj.kke gqvkA bl lecU/k esa vihydrkZ }kjk dksbZ fLFkfr Li"V ugh dh x;h gSA vihydrkZ dh orZeku vihy ds ek/;e ls pdcUnh vf/kdkjh ds ml vkns'k dks fujLr fd;s tkus dk dksbZ vkSfpR; ugha gS ftlesa og i{kdkj ughsa Fkk vkSj u gh mlus dksbZ vkifRr gh izLrqr dh Fkh vkSj u gh ml ij vkns'k ikfjr fd;k x;k A fu;ekuqlkj vihydrkZ dks pdcUnh vf/kdkjh U;k;ky; esa rFkkdfFkr nkf[ky [kkfjt ds fopkjk/khu eqdnesa esa gh bUnziky dks vko';d i{kdkj cukus dh dk;Zokgh djuh pkfg,A orZeku ds ek/;e ls vihydrkZ dks okafNr vkuqrks"k iznku ugh fd;k tk ldrk gS ;g vihy fujk/kkj gksus ds dkj.k fujLr gksus ;ksX; gS"

A perusal of the order passed by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation on 30.03.1991 reveals that the appeal was dismissed by him by recording a reason that there was no justification in setting aside the order dated 05.08.1988 for the reason in the proceedings in which the order dated 05.08.1988 was passed, the respondent no.2 was not a party, neither had he filed any objection, nor any orders were passed on any such objection. It has further been observed that by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation that the respondent no.2 should implead Indrapal in the case filed by him before the Consolidation Officer and that through the appeal filed by him, he cannot claim any relief.

Though the petitioner is said to have filed revision petition against the order dated 30.03.1991 passed by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation which is said to have been dismissed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation on 25.08.2001 as not pressed and restoration application moved by him was also rejected on 28.09.2010, however, what is noticeable is the observations made by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation in his order dated 30.03.1991. It appears that, it is on the basis of the said observations wherein the Settlement Officer, Consolidation opined that the respondent no.2 ought to implead Indrapal in his case before the Consolidation Officer that Indrapal was impleaded in the objections filed by the respondent no.2 before the Consolidation Officer. Contrary to the observations made by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation in his order dated 30.03.1991 the Consolidation Officer as also the Settlement Officer, Consolidation while passing the orders dated 21.11.2001 and 20.08.2003 have expressed their opinion that since the order dated 05.08.1988 had become final between the parties, as such in the proceedings instituted by the respondent no.2 on the basis of sale deed dated 08.12.1986 he cannot be granted any relief.

It is true that against the order dated 05.08.1988 passed by the Consolidation Officer the appeal and revision filed by the respondent no.2 have been dismissed, however, what is noticeable is the bona fide conduct of the respondent no.2, who acted in accordance with the order passed by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation on 30.03.1991 and religiously following the said order he impleaded Indrapal in the case instituted by him before the Consolidation Officer. It is relevant to observe, at this juncture, itself that when the order dated 05.08.1988 was passed by the Consolidation Officer, the case instituted by the respondent no.2 on the basis of sale deed dated 08.12.1986 was also pending and as such, as already observed above, the appropriate recourse which ought to have been resorted by the Consolidation Officer was that he ought to have clubbed both the objections and then he should have decided the same simitultaneouly. It is a case where on account of lapse on the part of the Consolidation Officer in respect of the same land in question multiplicity of the proceedings were permitted which resulted in serious prejudice to the respondent no.2 inasmuch as his claim has been denied though the same is based on a validly sale deed executed by the original recorded tenure holder on 08.12.1986 in his favour after obtaining requisite statutory permission under section 5-A(2) of the Act.

Thus the issue in this case which falls for consideration by the Court is as to whether it should refuse to exercise its discretion vested in him under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by not interfering in the order dated 02.05.2012 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation.

It is well settled principle of law that jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is discretionary in nature and in an appropriate case if the facts and circumstances so warrant this Court can refuse to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India if it finds that any interference made would perpetuate prejudice or injustice.

The jurisdiction vested in this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is to advance justice and not to thwart it. The purpose and object to exercise such a prerogative and discretionary jurisdiction is to ensure that no injustice is caused. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Roshan Deen vs. Preeti Lal, reported in [(2002) 1 SCC 100] has categorically held that "If justice becomes the byproduct of an erroneous view of law the High Court is not expected to erase such justice in the name of correcting the error of law".

Para 12 of the judgment in the case of Roshan Deen (supra) is relevant to be quoted herein, which is extracted hereunder:

"We are greatly disturbed by the insensitivity reflected in the impugned judgment rendered by the learned single Judge in a case where judicial mind would be tempted to utilize all possible legal measures to impart justice to a man mutilated so outrageously by his cruel destiny. The High Court non-suited him in exercise of a supervisory and extraordinary jurisdiction envisaged under Article 227 of the Constitution. Time and again this Court has reminded that the power conferred on the High Court under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution is to advance justice and not to thwart it [vide State of U.P. v. District Judge, Unnao, (AIR 1984 SC 1401)]. The very purpose of such constitutional powers being conferred on the High Courts is that no man should be subjected to injustice by violating the law. The look out of the High Court is, therefore, not merely to pick out any error of law through an academic angle but to see whether injustice has resulted on account of any erroneous interpretation of law. If justice became the byproduct of an erroneous view of law the High Court is not expected to erase such justice in the name of correcting the error of law."

(Emphasis supplied by the Court)

In view of the aforesaid settled legal position, the Court now proceeds to examine injustice caused to the respondent no.2 by the orders dated 20.08.2003 passed by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation and by the orders dated 21.11.2001 and dated 05.08.1988 passed by the Consolidation Officer.

As narrated above, the claim of Indrapal in this case is based on adverse possession whereas the claim of the respondent no.2 over the land in question is based on a sale deed executed by undisputed original recorded tenure holder-Babu Ram in his favour on 08.12.1986 which was executed after seeking requisite statutory permission as required by section 5-A(2) of the Act.

For coming to the conclusion as to whether the order dated 05.08.1988 causes any prejudice and injustice to the respondent no.2, the said order passed by the Consolidation Officer needs to be examined by the Court. A perusal of the order dated 05.08.1988 reveals that Indrapal in support of his claim based on adverse possession had examined himself and one other witness Malkhan Singh. This witness Malkhan Singh in his deposition has stated before the Consolidation Officer that the land in question was being ploughed by Shreepal, who is said to be uncle of petitioner-Indra Pal Singh. He has further stated that after death of Shreepal, Indrapal has been in possession over the land in question and that Shreepal had taken possession of the land by force. Indrapal also in his deposition before the Consolidation Officer stated that his uncle Shreepal Singh had taken possession over the land in question perforce and that till Shreepal was alive, the land in question was in his possession and thereafter it was he who was in possession. The Consolidation Officer has also based his order dated 05.08.1988 on a compromise dated 05.08.1988 which is said to have been entered into between Indrapal Singh and original recorded tenure holder Babu Ram.

This Court in a judgment dated 11.12.2015 rendered in Writ Petition No.174 (Consolidation) of 2015, Mata Badal Singh and others vs. District Deputy Director of Consolidation/Collector and others, relying upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes vs. Erasmo Jack De Sequeira, [(2012) 5 SCC 370] has held that possession cannot be considered in vacuum and that there is presumption that possession of a person, other than the owner, if at all it is to be called possession, is permissive on behalf of the title holder. Further observation made therein is that possession of the past is one thing, and the right to remain or continue in future is another thing. Para 9 of the said judgment passed by this Court in the case of Mata Badal Singh (supra) is quoted hereunder:

"9. Supreme Court in Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes v. Erasmo Jack de Sequeira, (2012) 5 SCC 370, held that possession is an incidence of ownership and can be transferred by the owner of an immovable property to another such as in a mortgage or lease. A licensee holds possession on behalf of the owner. Possession is important when there are no title documents and other relevant records before the court, but, once the documents and records of title come before the court, it is the title which has to be looked at first and due weightage be given to it. Possession cannot be considered in vacuum. There is a presumption that possession of a person, other than the owner, if at all it is to be called possession, is permissive on behalf of the title-holder. Further, possession of the past is one thing, and the right to remain or continue in future is another thing. It is the latter which is usually more in controversy than the former, and it is the latter which has seen much abuse and misuse before the courts. A suit can be filed by the title-holder for recovery of possession or it can be one for ejectment of an ex-lessee or for mandatory injunction requiring a person to remove himself or it can be a suit under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act to recover possession. A title suit for possession has two parts--first, adjudication of title, and second, adjudication of possession. If the title dispute is removed and the title is established in one or the other, then, in effect, it becomes a suit for ejectment where the defendant must plead and prove why he must not be ejected. In an action for recovery of possession of immovable property, or for protecting possession thereof, upon the legal title to the property being established, the possession or occupation of the property by a person other than the holder of the legal title will be presumed to have been under and in subordination to the legal title, and it will be for the person resisting a claim for recovery of possession or claiming a right to continue in possession, to establish that he has such a right. To put it differently, wherever pleadings and documents establish title to a particular property and possession is in question, it will be for the person in possession to give sufficiently detailed pleadings, particulars and documents to support his claim in order to continue in possession. Once the title is prima facie established, it is for the person who is resisting the title-holder's claim to possession to plead with sufficient particularity on the basis of his claim to remain in possession and place before the court all such documents as in the ordinary course of human affairs are expected to be there. The person averring a right to continue in possession shall, as far as possible, give a detailed particularised specific pleading along with documents to support his claim and details of subsequent conduct which establish his possession."

It has further been observed by this Court in the case of Mata Badal Singh and others (supra) that if a person relies upon column-9 entry in the khatauni, then he has to prove it by summoning PA-24.

It is well settled principle of law that a party claiming adverse possession must prove that his possession is peaceful, open and continuous. The possession must be adequate, in continuity, in publicity, overt and hostile. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Parsinni (Dead) by LRs and others vs. Sukhi and others, reported in [(1993) 4 SCC 375] in para 5 has held as under:

"We find it difficult to accept the said finding. Female heirs in pre-existing law were not co-owners. Possession is prima facie evidence of title. Party claiming adverse possession must prove that his possession mast be "nee vi nee clam nee precario" i.e. peaceful, open and continuous. The possession must be adequate, in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that their possession is adverse to the true owner. When the appellants claimed title to the suit lands it is sufficient for them to show that their possession is overt and without any attempt at concealment so that the respondent against whom time is running, ought, if to exercise due vigilance to be aware of what is happening. The possession of the appellants was adverse to the respondents inasmuch as the respondents ever since the marriage of the first appellant and her sister Chinto continued to remain in possession and enjoyment of the property in derogation of the right, title and interest hitherto held by the respondents. When they openly and to the knowledge of the respondents continuously remained in possession and enjoyment and the entries in the revenue records established that their possession and enjoyment is as owners, the consent of the respondents initially given to remain in possession till their marriage or death whichever is earlier does not prevent possession being adverse after their marriage. Without any let or hindrance they remained in possession and enjoyment excluding the respondents from sharing the usufruct from those lands. The test is whether the appellants are able to show that they held lands for themselves and if they did so the mere fact that there was acquiescence or consent at the inception on the part of the respondents make no difference.".

A party laying his claim on the basis of adverse possession in some property has to prove as to the date, time and manner in which possession is converted into open, hostile and adverse. In the case of Marwari Kumhar and others vs. Bhagwanpuri Guru Ganeshpuri and another, reported in [(2000) 6 SCC 735], Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that in absence of any proof as to the date, time and the manner in which possession gets converted into open, hostile and adverse, the claim for adverse possession can not be upheld.

Thus, Court in its latest judgment in the case of Ishwarchand vs. Board of Revenue U.P. at Allahabad and others, reported in [2019 (142) RD 676] has, in paragraph 17 observed as under:

"17. In my considered opinion, this argument cannot be accepted because possession can also be permissive. Till such time, it is proved that the Lekhpal had made the entry under Class 9 strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Land Records Manual and thereafter, a notice was sent to the recorded tenure holder in PA-10, no claim for adverse possession, could have been decreed."

Thus, from the aforequoted authorities, it is clear that to succeed in a claim based on adverse possession the parties so pleading must prove that possession was continuous, open, in the notice and knowledge of the other party against which such possession is claimed and hostile. The adverse possession thus, needs to be proved on the basis of evidence and in case of adverse possession being claim in landed property in the State of Uttar Pradesh, as has been held by this Court in the case of Mata Badal Singh and others (supra) adverse possession must be proved after producing PA-10 and after summoning PA-24.

So far as the order passed by the Consolidation Officer in this case on 05.08.1988 is concerned, except for the statement of the petitioner-Indra Pal Singh and one of his witnesses, who have stated that initially Shreepal and thereafter Indra Pal Singh forcibly took possession of the land in question, there was no other relevant documentary evidence available. PA-10 and PA-24 to prove column-9 entry, that too, in the name of Shreepal, have not been filed, neither were they summoned. It is further noticeable that the order dated 05.08.1988 passed by the Consolidation Officer also takes into account a compromise said to have been entered into between Indra Pal Singh and Babu Ram. If the claim is based on adverse possession and the original recorded tenure holder himself stated before the Consolidation Officer by way of compromise that Indra Pal Singh has been in possession, the necessary ingredients of adverse possession cannot be said to be proved. On account of procedural lapse where objection filed by the petitioner and objection filed by the respondent no.2 were not clubbed together, the claim of respondent no.2 on the basis of sale deed is being denied. The Consolidation Officer in his order dated 02.05.2012 has taken into account all the aforesaid aspects of the matter, specially the observations made by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation in his order dated 30.03.1991 and has thus allowed the revision petition by setting aside the orders dated 21.11.2001 and 20.08.2003 passed by the Consolidation Officer and Settlement Officer, Consolidation.

A Division Bench of this Court in Special Appeal No.1028 of 2013, Sushil Kumar Rai vs. State of U.P. and others decided on 21.08.2017 has clearly stated that all Courts of law are established for furtherance of interest of substantial justice and not to obstruct the same on technicalities. The relevant observations made by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Sushil Kumar Rai (supra) is extracted hereunder:

"It is settled law that all Courts of law are established for furtherance of interest of substantial justice and not to obstruct the same on technicalities. Reference: Jai Jai Ram Manohar Lal Vs. National Building Material Supply; AIR 1969 SC 1267, wherein it has been held that if substantial justice and technicalities are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice should not be defeated on technicalities. No procedure in a Court of law should be allowed to defeat the cause of substantial justice on some technicalities. Reference: Ghanshyam Dass & others Vs. Dominion of India & others (1984) 3 SCC 46. "

In view of discussions made herein above, I do not find it a case where discretion of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to interfere in the impugned order dated 02.05.2012 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, as contained in annexure-1 to the writ petition needs to be exercised. Resultantly, I am not inclined to interfere in this writ petition, which is hereby dismissed.

It is directed that relevant revenue records shall be corrected as per the order dated 02.05.2012 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation by the authorities concerned and further proceedings, which may be warranted under law may, thus, also be taken.

In the facts of the case, there will be no order as to costs.

Order Date :- 13.03.2019

akhilesh/

[D. K. Upadhyaya, J.]