Munesh vs State Of U.P.
2019 Latest Caselaw 3344 ALL

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
 

Court No.7
 
Criminal Appeal No. 691 of 2007
 

 
Munesh		 			                            Appellant
 
Vs 
 
    State of U.P. 						   	Respondent 
 

 
    	For Appellant	  :  	  Sri Mohit Singh, Advocate
 
	For Respondent       :	  Sri Amit Sinha, AGA
 

 
Hon'ble Pritinker Diwaker, J.

Hon'ble Raj Beer Singh, J.

Per: Pritinker Diwaker, J

(23.4.2019)

1. The present appeal arises out of impugned judgement and order dated 24.01.2007 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Court No.2, Budaun in Sessions Trial Nos. 635 of 2005 and 636 of 2005, convicting the appellant under Sections 302 of IPC and 4/25 of the Arms Act and sentencing him to undergo imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs. 10,000/-, in default thereof, six months simple imprisonment; and one year rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 500/-, in default thereof, one month simple imprisonment respectively, with a direction that both the sentences to run concurrently.

2. As per prosecution case, on 9.7.2005, accused appellant teased one Sharmila, D/o Chhotey Lal, closely related to Dal Chandra (PW-3). A complaint was made by Dal Chandra (PW-3) to the family members of the appellant, which was not liked by the appellant. Out of anger, on 10.7.2005, at about 7:00 am, appellant had gone to the house of Dal Chandra, made some altercation and started abusing the deceased Man Singh, s/o Dal Chandra. Man Singh objected to the abusive language of the appellant and it is said that the appellant gave a single blow of knife on the chest of the deceased. On the basis of written report Ex.Ka.1 dated 10.07.2005 lodged by Dal Chandra (PW-3), FIR Ex.Ka.3 was registered on 10.7.2005 at 8:15 am under Section 307 of IPC against the appellant and thereafter on 11.7.2005, another FIR Ex.Ka.11 under Section 4/25 of the Arms Act was registered. While injured Man Singh was being shifted to Hospital, on the way, he expired and, therefore, offence under Section 302 of IPC was also added in the FIR. Inquest on the dead body of deceased was conducted vide Ex.Ka.13 on 10.7.2005 and the body was sent for post-mortem, which was conducted on the same day vide Ex.Ka.7 by Dr. Jitendra Verma. However, during pendency of trial, Autopsy Surgeon has expired and the post-mortem report has been proved by one Vijay Raj (PW-8), Junior Clerk of District Hospital, Budaun.

3. As per post-mortem report, following injury was noticed on the body of the deceased:

"1. A penetrating wound 2cm x 1cm in abdominal cavity deep on front of left lateral part of chest cage 12cm below the left nipple at 5 O' clock position. On cut open peritoneum, spleen. Small intestine and liver. About one liter fluid Blood found in the abdominal cavity.

2. L/W 1.5cm x 0.5cm x muscle deep on left side of the back four (4) cm the midline and (5) five cm below the scapula"

According to autopsy surgeon, cause of death of the deceased was due to haemorrhage and shock, as a result of ante-mortem injury.

4. On pointing out of the appellant, vide Ex.Ka.2, one knife has been seized from his house, however, as per FSL report Ex.Ka.9, blood on the knife was found to be disintegrated.

5. While framing charge, the trial judge has framed charge against the accused appellant under Section 302 of IPC.

6. So as to hold accused appellant guilty, prosecution has examined ten witnesses, whereas one defence witness has also been examined. Statement of the accused appellant was recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. in which he pleaded his innocence and false implication.

7. By the impugned judgment, the trial Judge has convicted the appellant under Sections 302 of IPC and 4/25 of the Arms Act and sentenced him, as mentioned in paragraph no. 1 of this judgment. Hence, this appeal.

8. Learned counsel for the appellant submits:

(i) that even if the entire case of the prosecution is taken as it is, offence would not travel beyond under Section 304 Part-I or Part-II of IPC. He submits that the appellant had no intention to commit the murder of the deceased and all of a sudden, the incident appears to have taken place.

(ii) that appellant is in jail since 11.7.2005, i.e. since last about fourteen years and, therefore, after converting his conviction into lesser offence, his sentence be reduced for the period already undergone by him.

(iii) that though appellant is poor, he can compensate the family of the victim by paying a reasonable compensation.

9. On the other hand supporting the impugned judgment, it has been argued by the State counsel that conviction of the appellant is in accordance with law and there is no infirmity in the same.

10. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

11. Ramphal (PW-1) and Ganga Ram (PW-2) are the eyewitnesses to the incident, have not supported the prosecution case and have been declared hostile.

12. Dal Chandra (PW-3) is a father of the deceased, informant and eye-witness to the incident. While supporting the prosecution case, has stated that on 9.7.2005, accused appellant teased the daughter of his brother-in-law and upon coming to know the said fact, a complaint was made to the parents of the appellant, as a result of which, he got annoyed and on the next day, i.e. on 10.7.2005, he came to his house and started hurling filthy language. This act of the appellant was objected by his son Man Singh (deceased) and being annoyed with him, the appellant gave a single blow of knife on his chest. He states that after causing knife injury, appellant fled away from the spot. After lodging of the report, when injured was being shifted to Hospital, on the way, he expired. In para 6 of his cross-examination, he has reiterated that the incident began when appellant started using abusive language, which was objected by the deceased. He states that a single blow of knife was made on the chest of the deceased and thereafter he fled away from the spot. In the cross-examination, this witness remained firm.

13. Chandan (PW-4) is a witness of recovery of knife.

14. Sharmila (PW-5) is a girl who was teased by the appellant. She has duly supported the prosecution case.

15. Bhola Singh (PW-6), head constable, registered the FIR; Om Prakash Mishra (PW-7) is the first Investigating Officer. He states that during investigation, he recorded the statement of injured Man Singh, wherein while describing the incident, he had stated that it was the accused appellant, who gave a blow of knife on his chest.

16. Vijay Raj (PW-8) is a clerk in the office of District Hospital, Budaun, has proved the handwriting of Autopsy Surgeon. It is relevant to note that Autopsy Surgeon, Dr. Jitendra Verma could not be examined as during pendency of trial, he expired.

17. Sushil Kumar (PW-9) is a Investigating Officer, has duly supported the prosecution case and Krishna Yadav (PW-10) is a Investigating Officer of the case under the Arms Act.

18. Shiv Shanker (DW-1) has stated that some unknown person entered the house of deceased and caused him injury.

19. True it is that Ramphal (PW-1) and Ganga Ram (PW-2), two independent eyewitnesses to the incident have not supported the prosecution case, however, Dal Chandra (PW-3), father of the deceased, has duly supported the prosecution case and has categorically stated as to the manner in which his son was done to death by the appellant.

We have no reason to doubt the statement of Dal Chandra (PW-3), who appears to be trustworthy and his statement inspires the confidence of the Court. The statement of (PW-3) also finds support of post-mortem report of the deceased. His testimony cannot be discarded simply on the ground that he being the father of deceased, is an interested witness. Law in this respect is well settled.

It is well settled principle of law that the evidence of an interested witness should not be equated with that of a tainted evidence or that of an approver so as to require corroboration as a matter of necessity. All that the Courts required as a rule of prudence, not as a rule of law, was that the evidence of such witness should be scrutinized with a little care. It has to be realized that related and interested witness would be the last persons to screen the real culprits and falsely substitute innocent ones in their places. Indeed there may be circumstances where only interested evidence may be available and no other, e.g. when an occurrence takes place at midnight in the house when the only witnesses who could see the occurrence may be the family members. In such cases, it would not be proper to insist that the evidence of the family members should be disbelieved merely because of their interestedness. But once such witness was scrutinized with a little care and the Court was satisfied that the evidence of the interested witness have a ring of truth such evidence could be relied upon even without corroboration. Thus, the evidence cannot be disbelieved merely on the ground that the witnesses are related to each other or to the deceased. In case the evidence has a ring of truth to it, is cogent, credible and trustworthy, it can, and certainly should, be relied upon. (See Anil Rai vs. State of Bihar (2001) 7 SCC 318; State of U.P. vs. Jagdeo Singh (2003) 1 SCC 456; Bhagalool Lodh & Anr. vs. State of U.P. (2011) 13 SCC 206; Dahari & Ors. vs. State of U.P. (2012) 10 SCC 256; Raju @ Balachandran & Ors. vs. State of Tamil Nadu (2012) 12 SCC 701; Gangabhavani vs. Rayapati Venkat Reddy & Ors. (2013) 15 SCC 298; Jodhan vs. State of M.P. (2015) 11 SCC 52).

The Supreme Court in the matter of Bur Singh and Anr. vs. State of Punjab, (2008) 16 SCC 65 has held that merely because the eyewitnesses are family members their evidence cannot per se be discarded. When there is allegation of interestedness, the same has to be established. Mere statement that being relatives of the deceased they are likely to falsely implicate the accused cannot be a ground to discard the evidence which is otherwise cogent and credible. Further, the Supreme Court in the matter of Sudhakar vs. State, AIR 2018 SC 1372 and Ganapathi vs. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2018 SC 1635 relying in its earlier judgments held as under:

"18. Then, next comes the question 'what is the difference between a related witness and an interested witness?. The plea of "interested witness", "related witness" has been succinctly explained by this Court that "related" is not equivalent to "interested". The witness may be called "interested" only when he or she derives some benefit from the result of a litigation in the decree in a civil case, or in seeing an accused person punished. In this case at hand PW 1 and 5 were not only related witness, but also 'interested witness' as they had pecuniary interest in getting the accused petitioner punished. [refer State of U.P. v. Kishanpal and Ors., (2008) 16 SCC 73] : (2008 AIR SCW 6322). As the prosecution has relied upon the evidence of interested witnesses, it would be prudent in the facts and circumstances of this case to be cautious while analyzing such evidence. It may be noted that other than these witnesses, there are no independent witnesses available to support the case of the prosecution."

Relationship is not a factor to affect credibility of a witness. There is no proposition in law that relatives are to be treated as untruthful witnesses. On the contrary, reason has to be shown when a plea of partiality is raised to show that the witnesses had reason to shield the actual culprit and falsely implicate the accused. A witness who is a relative of deceased or victim of the crime cannot be characterized as 'interested'. The term 'interested' postulates that the witness has some direct or indirect 'interest' in having the accused somehow or other convicted due to animus or for some other oblique motive. A close relative cannot be characterized as an 'interested' witness. He is a 'natural' witness. His evidence, however, must be scrutinized carefully. If on such scrutiny his evidence is found to be intrinsically reliable, inherently probable and wholly trustworthy, conviction can be based on the 'sole testimony of such witness. (See- Harbans Kaur and another vs. State of Haryana, 2005 AIR SCW 2074; Namdeo vs. State of Maharashtra, 2007 AIR SCW 1835; Sonelal vs. State of M.P., 2008 AIR SCW 7988; and Dharnidhar vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others & other connected appeals, (2010) 7 SCC 759).

20. Considering the statement of Dal Chandra (PW-3) and the post-mortem report of the deceased, complicity of the accused appellant in commission of offence has been duly proved by the prosecution case.

21. The question, which arises for consideration of this Court is as to whether the act of accused appellant would fall within the definition of 'murder' or it would be 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder'.

22. Before proceeding further, it is relevant to refer to the provisions of Section 300 of IPC, which read as under:

"300. Murder. - Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or-

Secondly. - If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused, or -

Thirdly. - If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or -

Fourthly. - If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.

Exception 1. - When culpable homicide is not murder. - Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, whilst deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of the person who gave the provocation or causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident.

The above Exception is subject to the following provisos:-

First. - That the provocation is not sought or voluntarily provoked by the offender as an excuse for killing or doing harm to any person.

Secondly. - That the provocation is not given by anything done in obedience to the law, or by a public servant in the lawful exercise of the powers of such public servant.

Thirdly. - That the provocation is not given by anything done in the lawful exercise of the right of private defence.

Explanation. - Whether the provocation was grave and sudden enough to prevent the offence from amounting to murder is a question of fact.

Exception 2. - Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, in the exercise in good faith of the right of private defence of person or property, exceeds the power given to him by law and causes the death of the person against whom he is exercising such right of defence without premeditation, and without any intention of doing more harm than is necessary for the purpose of such defence.

Exception 3. - Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, being a public servant or aiding a public servant acting for the advancement of public justice, exceeds the powers given to him by law, and causes death by doing an act which he, in good faith, believes to be lawful and necessary for the due discharge of his duty as such public servant and without ill-will towards the person whose death is caused.

Exception 4. - Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.

Explanation. - It is immaterial in such cases which party offers the provocation or commits the first assault.

Exception 5. - Culpable homicide is not murder when the person whose death is caused, being above the age of eighteen years, suffers death or takes the risk of death with his own consent."

Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC applies in the absence of any premeditation. This is very clear from the wordings of the Exception itself. The exception contemplates that the sudden fight shall start upon the heat of passion on a sudden quarrel. The fourth exception to Section 300 IPC covers acts done in a sudden fight. The said Exception deals with a case of provocation not covered by the first exception, after which its place would have been more appropriate. The Exception is founded upon the same principle, for in both there is absence of premeditation. But, while in the case of Exception 1 there is total deprivation of self-control, in case of Exception 4, there is only that heat of passion which clouds men's sober reason and urges them to deeds which they would not otherwise do. There is provocation in Exception 4 as in Exception 1, but the injury done is not the direct consequence of that provocation. In fact, Exception 4 deals with cases in which notwithstanding that a blow may have been struck, or some provocation given in the origin of the dispute or in whatever way the quarrel may have originated, yet the subsequent conduct of both parties puts them in respect of guilt upon an equal footing. A "sudden fight" implies mutual provocation and blows on each side. The homicide committed is then clearly not traceable to unilateral provocation, nor could in such cases the whole blame be placed on one side. For if it were so, the Exception more appropriately applicable would be Exception 1. There is no previous deliberation or determination to fight. A fight suddenly takes place, for which both parties are more or less to be blamed. It may be that one of them starts it, but if the other had not aggravated it by his own conduct it would not have taken the serious turn it did. There is then mutual provocation and aggravation, and it is difficult to apportion the share of blame which attaches to each fighter. The help of Exception 4 can be invoked if death is caused (a) without premeditation, (b) in a sudden fight, (c) without the offenders having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner, and (d) the fight must have been with the person killed. To bring a case within Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned in it must be found. It is to be noted that the "fight" occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC is not defined in IPC. It takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion requires that there must be no time for the passions to cool down and in this case, the parties had worked themselves into a fury on account of the verbal altercation in the beginning. A fight is a combat between two and more persons whether with or without weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case. For the application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there was a sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown that the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. The expression "undue advantage" as used in the provision means "unfair advantage".

23. The Apex Court in State of A.P. vs. Rayavarapu Punnayya and Another1 while drawing a distinction between Section 302 and Section 304 of IPC held as under:

"12. In the scheme of the Penal Code, "culpable homicide" is genus and "murder" its specie. All "murder" is "culpable homicide" but not vice-versa. Speaking generally, "culpable homicide" sans "special characteristics of murder", is "culpable homicide not amounting to murder". For the purpose of fixing punishment, proportionate to the gravity of this generic offence, the Code practically recognises three degrees of culpable homicide. The first is, what may be called, "culpable homicide of the first degree". This is the greatest form of culpable homicide, which is defined in Section 300 as "murder". The second may be termed as "culpable homicide of the second degree". This is punishable under the first part of Section 304. Then, there is "culpable homicide of the third degree". This is the lowest type of culpable homicide and the punishment provided for it is, also, the lowest among the punishments provided for the three grades. Culpable homicide of this degree is punishable under the second part of Section 304.

21. From the above conspectus, it emerges that whenever a court is confronted with the question whether the offence is "murder" or "culpable homicide not amounting to murder", on the facts of a case, it will be convenient for it to approach the problem in three stages. The question to be considered at the first stage would be, whether the accused has done an act by doing which he has caused the death of another. Proof of such causal connection between the act of the accused and the death, leads to the second stage for considering whether that act of the accused amounts to "culpable homicide" as defined in Section 299. If the answer to this question is prima facie found in the affirmative, the stage for considering the operation of Section 300 of the Penal Code, is reached. This is the stage at which the court should determine whether the facts proved by the prosecution bring the case within the ambit of any of the four clauses of the definition of "murder" contained in Section 300. If the answer to this question is in the negative the offence would be "culpable homicide not amounting to murder", punishable under the first or the second part of Section 304, depending, respectively, on whether the second or the third clause of Section 299 is applicable. If this question is found in the positive, but the case comes within any of the exceptions enumerated in Section 300, the offence would still be "culpable homicide not amounting to murder", punishable under the first part of Section 304, of the Penal Code."

24. In Budhi Singh vs. State of Himachal Pradesh2, the Supreme Court held as under:

18. The doctrine of sudden and grave provocation is incapable of rigid construction leading to or stating any principle of universal application. This will always have to depend on the facts of a given case. While applying this principle, the primary obligation of the court is to examine from the point of view of a person of reasonable prudence if there was such grave and sudden provocation so as to reasonably conclude that it was possible to commit the offence of culpable homicide, and as per the facts, was not a culpable homicide amounting to murder. An offence resulting from grave and sudden provocation would normally mean that a person placed in such circumstances could lose self-control but only temporarily and that too, in proximity to the time of provocation. The provocation could be an act or series of acts done by the deceased to the accused resulting in inflicting of injury.

19. Another test that is applied more often than not is that the behaviour of the assailant was that of a reasonable person. A fine distinction has to be kept in mind between sudden and grave provocation resulting in sudden and temporary loss of self-control and the one which inspires an actual intention to kill. Such act should have been done during the continuation of the state of mind and the time for such person to kill and reasons to regain the dominion over the mind. Once there is premeditated act with the intention to kill, it will obviously fall beyond the scope of culpable homicide not amounting to murder....."

25. In Kikar Singh vs. State of Rajasthan3 the Apex Court held as under:

"8. The counsel attempted to bring the case within Exception 4. For its application all the conditions enumerated therein must be satisfied. The act must be committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion; (2) upon a sudden quarrel; (3) without the offender's having taken undue advantage; (4) and the accused had not acted in a cruel or unusual manner. Therefore, there must be a mutual combat or exchanging blows on each other. And however slight the first blow, or provocation, every fresh blow becomes a fresh provocation. The blood is already heated or warms up at every subsequent stroke. The voice of reason is heard on neither side in the heat of passion. Therefore, it is difficult to apportion between them respective degrees of blame with reference to the state of things at the commencement of the fray but it must occur as a consequence of a sudden fight i.e. mutual combat and not one side track. It matters not what the cause of the quarrel is, whether real or imaginary, or who draws or strikes first. The strike of the blow must be without any intention to kill or seriously injure the other. If two men start fighting and one of them is unarmed while the other uses a deadly weapon, the one who uses such weapon must be held to have taken an undue advantage denying him the entitlement to Exception 4. True the number of wounds is not the criterion, but the position of the accused and the deceased with regard to their arms used, the manner of combat must be kept in mind when applying Exception 4. When the deceased was not armed but the accused was and caused injuries to the deceased with fatal results, the Exception 4 engrafted to Section 300 is excepted and the offences committed would be one of murder.

9. The occasion for sudden quarrel must not only be sudden but the party assaulted must be on an equal footing in point of defence, at least at the onset. This is specially so where the attack is made with dangerous weapons. Where the deceased was unarmed and did not cause any injury to the accused even following a sudden quarrel if the accused has inflicted fatal blows on the deceased, Exception 4 is not attracted and commission must be one of murder punishable under Section 302. Equally for attracting Exception 4 it is necessary that blows should be exchanged even if they do not all find their target. Even if the fight is unpremeditated and sudden, yet if the instrument or manner of retaliation be greatly disproportionate to the offence given, and cruel and dangerous in its nature, the accused cannot be protected under Exception 4...."

26. All the above three cases were considered by the Apex Court in Surain Singh v The State of Punjab4 and ultimately, it has been held by the Apex Court in that particular case, that the accused was liable to be convicted under Section 304 Part II of IPC and not under Section 302 of IPC.

27. If we apply the above principle of law in the present case, what emerges from the evidence, is that the incident occurred on a trivial issue, where a complaint was made by the father of the deceased to the parents of the appellant in respect of teasing of a girl by the appellant. It appears that the appellant did not like the complaint made against him and out of anger, he had gone to the house of deceased; there was verbal exchange between him and the deceased; the appellant gave a solitary blow of knife on the chest of deceased, resulting his death. Though, as per post-mortem report, one more injury is there near the shoulder, but it has not been proved by the prosecution that the said injury has also been caused by the appellant with knife, which he was carrying. The appellant could not get any opportunity to cross-examine the Autopsy Surgeon, as unfortunately he expired during trial and could not be produced as witness in the court. Even otherwise, if the size of both the injuries are considered, it appears that the size was not as such where it can be said that the assault was made with full force.

In the case of Atul Thakur vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors.5, it has been held by the Apex Court as under:

"As aforesaid, the High Court overturned this finding of the trial court on the question of nature of offence, by mainly observing that the appellant had caused repeated blows with a weapon like knife, causing six serious injuries to Hitesh Thakur to which he succumbed. We are of the opinion that neither the factum of use of knife by the appellant during the assault nor the multiple blows (six) given by the appellant can be the sole basis to deny the appellant of the benefit available under Exception 4 to Section 300 of IPC. The Court is obliged to take an overall view of the matter on the basis of the established facts. This principle is restated in Sarain Singh case6 Surain Singh's case (supra)."

In view of above, according to us, case of the appellant would thus fall under Exception 4 of Section 300 of IPC and it can be safely held that the appellant is liable to be convicted for committing 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder'.

28. The next question is whether the appellant is liable to be convicted under Section 304 Part I or Part II of IPC. Considering the nature of injuries caused by him to the deceased, we are of the view that the appellant is liable to be convicted under Section 304 Part I of IPC and not under Section 304 Part II of IPC. So far as conviction of the appellant under Section 4/25 of the Arms Act is concerned, the same is in accordance with law and there is no infirmity in the same. Accordingly the same is affirmed.

29. So far as the sentence part is concerned, as the appellant is in Jail since last about 14 years, ends of justice would be served if his Jail sentence is reduced to the period already undergone by him. Order accordingly.

30. Considering the provisions of Section 357 of Cr.PC and the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad v State of Maharashtra7, it is directed that the appellant shall also be liable to pay a compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- (one lakh) to Dal Chandra (PW-3), father of the deceased. He is directed to deposit the said amount within eight months after being released from Jail. In the eventuality of depositing the said amount by the appellant before the trial Court, it would be the duty of the trial Court to disburse the said amount in favour of (PW-3). In case, the appellant fails to deposit the said amount, he shall further undergo Jail sentence of three years and even after serving the sentence of default, the amount of compensation shall be recoverable in view of the judgement of the Supreme Court in the case of Kumaran vs. State of Karala and Anr,8.

31. The appellant is in Jail. He be set free forthwith to comply further direction of the Court, if not required in any other case.

32. The appeal succeeds and is partly allowed.

 
Date: 23.4.2019
 
RK/A.Tripathi
 
  (Raj Beer Singh, J)       (Pritinker Diwaker, J)