Indra Pal Singh vs State
2018 Latest Caselaw 1846 ALL

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
 

A.F.R.
 
Judgment reserved on :  24.07.2018
 
          		      	Judgment delivered on : 06.08.2018               
 

 
            
 
Case :- JAIL APPEAL No. - 5582 of 2005
 

 
Appellant :- Indra Pal Singh
 
Respondent :- State
 
Counsel for Appellant :- From Jail,Amit Tripathi,Gaurav Kakkar[A.C.]
 
Counsel for Respondent :- A.G.A.
 

 

 
Hon'ble Sudhir Agarwal,J.

Hon'ble Om Prakash-VII,J.

(Delivered by Om Prakash-VII, J.)

1. This jail appeal has been preferred by appellant Indra Pal Singh against the judgment and order dated 15.06.2005 passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Court No.4, Kanpur Dehat in Sessions Trial No.126 of 2003 (case crime no. 294 of 2002), State Versus Indra Pal Singh whereby appellant was convicted and sentenced for offence under section 302 IPC to imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs.5000/-. In default of payment of fine, one month additional imprisonment was awarded against the appellant.

2. Vide impugned judgment and order, appellant was acquitted in Sessions Trial No.127 of 2003 under section 25 Arms Act, but no appeal was filed by the State. Thus, details of facts and evidence of Sessions Trial No. 127 of 2003 are not incorporated in this appeal.

3. The prosecution story in brief is that informant Maya Devi (P.W.1) moved a written report (Ex.Ka.1) at Police Station concerned on 02.12.2002 mentioning therein that her husband Lalla Singh, who retired from the post of police constable in the year 1999 was living with family in village. Last night, deceased Lalla Singh, husband of the informant was sleeping after taking meal on his cot in outer veranda of the house. Informant and her sons Raju and Kaju and their wives were also sleeping inside the house in their rooms. Neelam, daughter of the informant was also sleeping with her who had to go to her in-laws' house in the morning. Due to that reason informant woke up in the morning at 4:00 A.M. When she tried to wake her husband, he did not wake. Then she called her sons and daughter-in-laws, who also tried to wake him. When the deceased did not wake, informant, her sons and daughter-in-laws saw firearm injury on the back of the deceased in the light of lantern. Blood was lying on the cot. Deceased died due to firearm injury. Expressing suspicion that deceased was done to death in the night, she came to police station concerned to lodge the F.I.R. leaving the dead body at the place of occurrence.

4. On the basis of written report (Ex.Ka.1), first information report (Ex.Ka.6) was lodged on 01/02.12.2002 at 9:30 A.M. at police station concerned which was registered at crime no.294 of 2002 against unknown persons. G.D. Entry (Ex.Ka.8) was made. Police reached at the place of occurrence, took blood stained clothes, blood stained and simple soil from the place of occurrence and prepared recovery memo / fard (Ex.Ka.15 & 16). Police also prepared inquest report (Ex.Ka.9) and other police papers (Ex.Ka.10 to 14) keeping the dead body in sealed cloth. Dead body was carried by Constable Arun Kumar Rai and Virendra Singh for postmortem.

5. Postmortem was conducted on the body of the deceased on 03.12.2002 at 12:30 p.m. On external examination, time of death of the deceased is shown 1½ day old. Deceased was of average built body. Eyes and mouth both were closed. Postmortem staining was present over whole buttock, back and thigh. Rigor mortis had passed from upper side, but was present over lower side.

On examination of dead body, following ante mortem injury was found on the body of the deceased :

Firearm wound of entry left side back 2 cm. x 2 cm. at angle of scapula (just below). Margin inverted, blackening, tattooing, collar of abrasion present. Charring also present.

Cause of death was shown in the postmortem report as hemorrhage and shock due to ante mortem injuries. Doctor conducting postmortem prepared postmortem report, which is Ex.Ka.7.

6. Articles taken from the place of occurrence and clothes taken from the body of the deceased were sent to Forensic Science Laboratory. Report submitted by Forensic Science Laboratory is available on record (Ex.Ka.-6). Investigating officer also inspected the spot and prepared site plan (Ex.Ka.2).

7. During course of investigation, accused-appellant was arrested on 07.12.2002 and recovery of country made pistol on his pointing out was also made and a separate crime was registered against that recovery. Since appellant was acquitted for the charge under section 25 Arms Act, facts and evidence adduced in that trial are not reproduced.

8. Investigating officer after completing the investigation submitted charge-sheet against the accused-appellant for the offence under section 302 IPC, which is Ex.Ka.5.

9. Case being exclusively triable by the Sessions Judge was committed for trial to Sessions Court. Accused appeared and charge for the offence under section 302 IPC was framed against him to which he denied and claimed his trial.

10. In order to prove its case, prosecution examined P.W.1 Maya Devi, informant, who is the wife of deceased, P.W.2 Raju Singh alias Kunwar Pal Singh, son of deceased, P.W.3 S.S.I. Jai Karan Singh, first investigating officer, P.W.4 Dr. Ajay Kumar Gupta, Medical Officer, who prepared the postmortem report, P.W.5 H.C.P. Veer Pratap Singh, chik writer, P.W.6 S.I. Ram Avtar Verma, who prepared the inquest report, fard and other police papers and P.W.7 Smt. Siya Dulari witness of circumstantial evidence.

11. On conclusion of the prosecution evidence, statement of accused-appellant was recorded under section 313 Cr.P.C. on two dates i.e. 20.04.2005 and 28.05.2005. Accused-appellant in the statement under section 313 Cr.P.C. has denied the prosecution case and stated that F.I.R. was lodged on the basis of false facts. Charge-sheet was submitted on insufficient evidence. All the witnesses examined by the prosecution have made false statements. He is innocent and has been falsely implicated in this case due to enmity. P.W. 7 has also made false statement. No defence evidence was adduced by the accused-appellant.

12. Learned court below after hearing the parties vide impugned judgment and order acquitted the appellant for the offence under section 25 Arms Act, but convicted him for offence under section 302 IPC as above. Hence, this Appeal.

13. Heard Sri Amit Tripathi, learned counsel for appellant and Sri Syed Ali Murtaza, learned A.G.A. for State.

14. Submission of learned counsel for the appellant is that appellant is innocent and has not committed present offence; he is son of deceased; First information report was lodged against unknown persons; had appellant committed present offence, F.I.R. would have been lodged against him. Thus, referring to the entire evidence it was argued that there is no eyewitness account in this case. Prosecution case rests wholly on circumstantial evidence and hearsay evidence. Only circumstance against the appellant is shown that he was seen by P.W.1 leaving the place of occurrence and by P.W.7 in front of her house armed with country made pistol. Referring to this fact, it was also argued that statement of P.W.1, P.W.2 and P.W.7 are not reliable. If they were aware that accused-appellant had committed the present offence, this fact must have been disclosed at the first instance in the first informant report itself. There are major contradictions in the statement of witnesses regarding presence of accused-appellant near the place of occurrence. Source of light in which accused is said to be recognized is also not disclosed. Recovery is also found false. If the entire prosecution evidence, excluding the recovery, are taken into consideration, then also none of the witnesses, examined in the matter, had seen the accused-appellant at the place of occurrence at the time of said firing. Entire prosecution case is based on suspicion. Motive is also not proved and is not believable. Chain of circumstantial evidence is not linked or connected with each other to form an irresistible presumption against the appellant regarding commission of murder of deceased. F.I.R. was lodged belatedly, but no plausible explanation has been given. Torch, said to have been used by the witnesses, was also not produced before the Court. Findings recorded by the trial court regarding the guilt of the appellant for the offence under section 302 IPC are perverse.

15. Per contra, learned A.G.A. argued that although F.I.R. was lodged against unknown persons yet circumstantial evidence collected by the investigating officer during investigation and deposed by the prosecution witnesses during trial clearly indicate the involvement of the accused-appellant in committing present offence. As soon as P.W.1 came to know this fact that accused was seen going armed with firearm at the time of occurrence from the place of incident in front of the house of P.W.7, this fact was informed by P.W.1 to the investigating officer. Date, time and place of occurrence have also been proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. Motive established by the prosecution is also sufficient against appellant. Findings recorded by the trial court regarding guilt of the accused-appellant for offence under section 302 IPC are in accordance with law and evidence.

16. We have considered the rival submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the entire record carefully.

17. In this matter, as is evident from record, incident is said to have taken place in the intervening night of 01/02.12.2002. F.I.R. was lodged on the next day i.e. 02.12.2002 at 9:30 A.M. against unknown persons. Distance between the place of occurrence and police station is 13 Kms. It is the case of prosecution that P.W.1 Maya Devi proceeded to lodge the F.I.R. in the morning at about 6:00 A.M. by jeep. Submission of learned counsel for appellant is that F.I.R. was lodged belatedly and no plausible explanation has been given regarding delay. If the submission advanced by learned counsel for appellant on this point is compared with the facts of present matter, though F.I.R. was lodged after 3½ hours, yet keeping in view this fact that F.I.R. was lodged against unknown persons, had there been any ill motive of the informant against the accused-appellant in lodging the F.I.R., she would have named the appellant in the present offence. Merely, on the basis of delay in lodging the F.I.R., entire prosecution case or the statement of prosecution witnesses cannot be disbelieved if their statement inspires confidence and are supported by other materials. So other issue raised on behalf of appellant have to be analyzed.

18. So far as medical evidence is concerned, P.W. 4 Dr. Ajay Kumar Gupta has clearly stated in his statement made before Court that deceased died due to ante mortem injury which could be caused in intervening night of 01/02.12.2002. If the symptoms found on the body of the deceased at the time of postmortem are also taken into consideration in light of the submissions raised by learned counsel for appellant, time of death of the deceased cannot be doubted. Time of death of deceased is fully established in the matter from the prosecution evidence.

19. As far as place of occurrence is concerned, deceased was sleeping in outer veranda of his house after taking meals. P.W.1 woke up at 4:00 p.m. When she tried to wake the deceased, she saw that deceased had died. From the site plan and other evidence adduced by the prosecution to establish the place of occurrence, it clearly demonstrate that deceased was done to death in his veranda where he was sleeping in the intervening night of 01/02.12.2002.

20. No evidence has been adduced by accused-appellant to refute the evidence of prosecution adduced on this point, therefore, we are of the view that from the prosecution evidence, date, time and place of occurrence are fully established beyond reasonable doubt. Cause of death is also established from the prosecution evidence. Medical evidence fully supports the prosecution case.

21. As far as the involvement of present appellant in committing the present offence is concerned, recovery of country made pistol on pointing out of the accused-appellant was found false and he has been acquitted for the offence under section 25 Arms Act. Thus, there remains only circumstantial evidence of P.W.1, P.W.2 and P.W.7.

22. Motive is a double edged weapon, it may be a ground to commit offence and at the same time may also be a ground for false implication. In the present case, there are contradictory statements of prosecution witnesses in regard to motive. P.W.2 and his brother Kaju were step brothers of accused-appellant. On death of deceased, his property was to be inherited by accused-appellant, P.W.1, P.W.2 and Kaju, therefore, motive assigned in present case is not so strong against the appellant to commit present offence and is a very weak motive. Nothing was mentioned in the F.I.R. about firing said to have been made in the night at about 12:00 - 12:30 hours. If P.W.1 heard the firing, this fact must have come in the first information report itself. On minutely analyzing statement of P.W.1 Maya Devi, it emerges that she woke up hearing the noise of firing. She also opened the door and saw deceased sleeping and thereafter she closed the door. It appears improbable and unbelievable that when adult male persons were sleeping in the house, this witness did not disclose this fact to them at that time itself. If this fact is also not taken into consideration, then also what was the reason for not disclosing the fact that she had seen the accused going from veranda when she opened the door in the night, has not been made clear. Had she seen the accused going from the place of occurrence, she must have disclosed this fact in the F.I.R. itself. It is an admitted case of prosecution that accused-appellant was not present in the house in the night of incident. Other circumstances shown by this witness is that P.W. 7 Siya Dulari informed P.W.1 that she had seen the accused coming out armed with weapon in front of her house. Thus, the statement of P.W.1 does not reflect any light about the involvement of the accused-appellant in this matter. Her statement is based on hearsay evidence. None has seen the accused-appellant committing the present offence.

23. As far as the statement of P.W.2 Raju Singh is concerned, he has also not seen the accused-appellant at the place of occurrence. He was informed by one Manoj Kumar, but prosecution did not examine Manoj Kumar. Thus, the statement of P.W.2 is also hearsay statement and cannot be relied on.

24. As far as the statement of P.W.7 Smt. Siya Dulari is concerned, there is contradiction in her statement on point of weapon possessed by the accused-appellant. At one point of time, she has only stated that accused-appellant was possessing weapon, but in the cross-examination, two contradictory statements were made by this witness explaining that accused was armed with country made pistol. This witness also claimed that she woke up when she heard the noise of firing. When she came out from her house, she saw accused-appellant leaving the place of occurrence. Incident is said to have taken place in the month of December in midnight. Torch said to have been used by this witness has not been produced before the court so prosecution has also not proved the source of light in which accused-appellant was recognized by P.W.7 Smt. Siya Dulari. If prosecution case as a whole is taken into consideration, then also accused-appellant was seen by P.W.1 and P.W.7 only leaving the place of occurrence and in front of the house of P.W.7. There is no other evidence to support the prosecution case on point of involvement of the accused-appellant.

25. Now, we have to consider whether the judgment of conviction passed by the trial court can be sustained in law. As noticed above, the conviction is based on circumstantial evidence as no one has seen the accused committing murder of the deceased. While dealing with the said conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances from which the conclusion of the guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established, and all the facts so established should also be consistent with only one hypothesis i.e. the guilt of the accused, which would mean that the onus lies on the prosecution to prove that the chain of event is complete and not to leave any doubt in the mind of the Court.

26. For ready reference, paragraphs no.17 to 23 of Majenderan Langeswaran Versus State (NCT of Delhi) and Another, (2013) 7 Supreme Court Cases 1992 are quoted below.

"17. In Hanumant Govind Nargundkar vs. State of M.P., AIR 1952 SC 343, this Court observed as under:

"10. It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established, and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused."

18. In Padala Veera Reddy vs. State of A.P., 1989 Supp (2) SCC 706, this Court opined as under:

"10. Before adverting to the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel, we shall at the threshold point out that in the present case there is no direct evidence to connect the accused with the offence in question and the prosecution rests its case solely on circumstantial evidence. This Court in a series of decisions has consistently held that

when a case rests upon circumstantial evidence such evidence must satisfy the following tests:

(1) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly established;

(2) those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused;

(3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else; and

(4) the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused and such evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence. (See Gambhir v. State of Maharashtra, (1982) 2 SCC 351)

19. In C. Chenga Reddy & Ors. vs. State of A.P., (1996) 10 SCC 193, this Court while considering a case of conviction based on the circumstantial evidence, held as under:

"21. In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the settled law is that the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is drawn should be fully proved and such circumstances must be conclusive in nature. Moreover, all the circumstances should be complete and there should be no gap left in the chain of evidence. Further, the proved circumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with his innocence. In the present case the courts below have overlooked these settled principles and allowed suspicion to take the place of proof besides relying upon some inadmissible evidence."

20. In Ramreddy Rajesh Khanna Reddy vs. State of A.P., (2006) 10 SCC 172, this Court again considered the case of conviction based on circumstantial evidence and held as under:

"26. It is now well settled that with a view to base a conviction on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must establish all the pieces of incriminating circumstances by reliable and clinching evidence and the circumstances so proved must form such a chain of events as would permit no conclusion other than one of guilt of the accused. The circumstances cannot be on any other hypothesis. It is also well settled that suspicion, however grave it may be, cannot be a substitute for a proof and the courts shall take utmost precaution in finding an accused guilty only on the basis of the circumstantial evidence. (See Anil Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, (2003) 9 SCC 67 and Reddy Sampath Kumar v. State of A.P., (2005) 7 SCC 603)."

21. In the case of Sattatiya vs. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 3 SCC 210, this Court held as under:

10. We have thoughtfully considered the entire matter. It is settled law that an offence can be proved not only by direct evidence but also by circumstantial evidence where there is no direct evidence. The court can draw an inference of guilt when all the incriminating facts and circumstances are found to be totally incompatible with the innocence of the accused. Of course, the circumstances from which an inference as to the guilt is drawn have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and have to be shown to be closely connected with the principal fact sought to be inferred from those circumstances.

This Court further observed in the aforesaid decision that:

17. At this stage, we also deem it proper to observe that in exercise of power under Article 136 of the Constitution, this Court will be extremely loath to upset the judgment of conviction which is confirmed in appeal. However, if it is found that the appreciation of evidence in a case, which is entirely based on circumstantial evidence, is vitiated by serious errors and on that account miscarriage of justice has been occasioned, then the Court will certainly interfere even with the concurrent findings recorded by the trial court and the High Court - Bharat v. State of M.P., (2003) 3 SCC. In the light of the above, we shall now consider whether in the present case the prosecution succeeded in establishing the chain of circumstances leading to an inescapable conclusion that the appellant had committed the crime.

22. In the case of State of Goa vs. Pandurang Mohite, (2008) 16 SCC 714, this Court reiterated the settled law that where a conviction rests squarely on circumstantial evidence, the inference of guilt can be justified only when all the incriminating facts and circumstances are found to be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or the guilt of any person. The circumstances from which an inference as to the guilt of the accused is drawn have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and have to be shown to be closely connected with the principal fact sought to be inferred from those circumstances.

23. It would be appropriate to consider some of the recent decisions of this Court in cases where conviction was based on the circumstantial evidence. In the case of G. Parshwanath vs. State of Karnataka, (2010) 8 SCC 593, this Court elaborately dealt with the subject and held as under:

23. In cases where evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should, in the first instance, be fully established. Each fact sought to be relied upon must be proved individually. However, in applying this principle a distinction must be made between facts called primary or basic on the one hand and inference of facts to be drawn from them on the other. In regard to proof of primary facts, the court has to judge the evidence and decide whether that evidence proves a particular fact and if that fact is proved, the question whether that fact leads to an inference of guilt of the accused person should be considered. In dealing with this aspect of the problem, the doctrine of benefit of doubt applies. Although there should not be any missing links in the case, yet it is not essential that each of the links must appear on the surface of the evidence adduced and some of these links may have to be inferred from the proved facts. In drawing these inferences, the court must have regard to the common course of natural events and to human conduct and their relations to the facts of the particular case. The court thereafter has to consider the effect of proved facts.

24. In deciding the sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence for the purpose of conviction, the court has to consider the total cumulative effect of all the proved facts, each one of which reinforces the conclusion of guilt and if the combined effect of all these facts taken together is conclusive in establishing the guilt of the accused, the conviction would be justified even though it may be that one or more of these facts by itself or themselves is/are not decisive. The facts established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and should exclude every hypothesis except the one sought to be proved. But this does not mean that before the prosecution can succeed in a case resting upon circumstantial evidence alone, it must exclude each and every hypothesis suggested by the accused, howsoever, extravagant and fanciful it might be. There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused, where various links in chain are in themselves complete, then the false plea or false defence may be called into aid only to lend assurance to the court."

27. Similar view has also been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rajendra Pralhadrao Wasnik vs. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 4 SCC 37 as well as in Brajendrasingh vs. State of M.P., (2012) 4 SCC 289.

28. Thus, on the basis of law laid down in aforementioned cases it may be mentioned that the rule which needs to be observed by the court while dealing with the cases of circumstantial evidence is that the best evidence must be adduced which the nature of the case admits. The circumstances have to be examined cumulatively. The court has to examine the complete chain of events and then see whether all the material facts sought to be established by the prosecution to bring home the guilt of the accused, have been proved beyond reasonable doubt. It has to be kept in mind that all these principles are based upon one basic cannon of our criminal jurisprudence that the accused is innocent till proven guilty and that the accused is entitled to a just and fair trial.

29. As discussed here-in-above, there is no dispute with regard to the legal proposition that conviction can be based solely on circumstantial evidence but it should be tested on the touchstone of law relating to circumstantial evidence as laid down in above mentioned cases. In such a case, all circumstances must lead to the conclusion that the accused is the only one who has committed the crime and none else.

30. In the instant case, circumstances, if summarized from the evidence adduced by the prosecution, are that

(i) Deceased was sleeping all alone in the veranda on the date and time of incident.

(ii) Accused-appellant was neither present inside the house nor in the veranda.

(iii) First information report is lodged against unknown persons.

(iv) Nothing is mentioned in the F.I.R. about the firing said to have been made in the night at 12:00 - 12:30 hours.

(v) Nothing is also mentioned in the F.I.R. that P.W.1 saw the accused appellant leaving the place of occurrence when she opened the door in the night.

(vi) For the first time, in the morning, P.W.7 Smt. Siya Dulari informed P.W.1 that she saw the accused in the midnight going elsewhere in front of her house.

(vii) Source of light i.e. torch said to have been used by P.W.7 was not produced before Court.

(viii) Recovery of firearm was found false by the trial court and accused appellant was acquitted of the offence under section 25 Arms Act.

(ix) Motive is not a strong motive.

If circumstances detailed hereinabove are taken into consideration cumulatively in the light of settled legal proposition of law, same are not of definite tendency unerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused.

The circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else.

31. Circumstantial evidence led by the prosecution is a very weak piece of evidence. Omission and suppression of material facts on part of P.W.1 create doubt about the truthfulness of her statement. Statement of P.W.7 can also not be taken to hold the accused appellant guilty as she only saw the accused appellant going in the night. This fact is not sufficient to draw an irresistible presumption regarding the guilt of the accused and also to draw conclusion that accused appellant only has committed the death of deceased. Circumstances are not of definite nature. Contradictions occurred in the statement of P.W.1, P.W.2 and P.W.7 also make these witnesses unreliable. Prosecution case is not supported by any other evidence. There is no other evidence to connect the accused appellant with this matter. Thus, it may safely be held that accused appellant was implicated in this matter only on the basis of suspicion. It is also pertinent to mention here that suspicion howsoever strong, cannot take place of proof or evidence.

32. Thus, on the basis of above discussion, we are of the view that prosecution has not been able to bring home the guilt of the appellant for committing the murder of deceased Lalla Singh on the date, time and place mentioned in the F.I.R. Findings recorded by the trial court in the impugned judgment and order regarding guilt of accused appellant for the offence under section 302 IPC are perverse. Conviction and sentence imposed vide impugned judgment and order is not sustainable. Jail appeal, therefore, deserves to be allowed and appellant is liable to be acquitted.

33. Accordingly, Jail Appeal is allowed. Conviction and sentence of appellant through impugned judgment and order dated 15.06.2005 passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Court No.4, Kanpur Dehat in Sessions Trial No.126 of 2003 (State Versus Indra Pal Singh) under section 302 IPC are hereby set aside. Appellant Indra Pal Singh is acquitted of the charge under section 302 IPC. Appellant is in jail. He shall be released forthwith, if not wanted in any other case.

34. Let a copy of this judgment along with lower court record be sent forthwith to the court concerned for compliance.

35. Copy of the judgment be also sent to the appellant through concerned jail Superintendent.

Dated : 06.08.2018

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