Rajat Agrawal And Another vs M/S Shyam Lal Om Prakash And 2 Ors.
2014 Latest Caselaw 41 ALL

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
 

Court No. - 5								AFR
 

 
Case :- S.C.C. REVISION DEFECTIVE No. - 48 of 2014
 

 
Revisionist :- Rajat Agrawal And Another
 
Opposite Party :- M/S Shyam Lal Om Prakash And 2 Ors.
 
Counsel for Revisionist :- Pankaj Agarwal
 

 
Hon'ble Het Singh Yadav,J.

This revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 (in short 'the Act')is directed against the judgement and decree dated 25.11.2013 passed by the Additional District Judge, Court No. 7, Saharanpur exercising jurisdiction of Judge, Small Causes.

The registry however,pointed out that the revision is barred by limitation.

Defying the report of the stamp reporter Sri Pankaj Agarwal, learned counsel for the revisionist vociferously submitted that original section 25 of the Act does not provide for a period of limitation for filing a revision to the High Court. Therefore, the limitation for filing a revision to the High Court against any decree or order of the Small Causes Court would be governed by Article 131 of the Limitation Act,1963 which provides a period 90 days commencing from the date of impugned decree/order.

Sri Agarwal, laid much emphasis that the period of 30 days for filing S.C.C. Revision as envisaged under Section 25 of the Act is applicable only in the case where the revision is preferred in the court of the District Judge against the decree or order made in any case decided by the court of Small Causes. The proviso added to Section 25 of the Act, as applicable to the State of U .P., no period of limitation for filing a revision to the High Court in relation to any case decided by a District Judge/Add.Distt.Judge exercising the jurisdiction of a judge of Small Causes has been provided.

Shri Agarwal concluded his arguments with the submission that in the instant case, the S.C.C. suit has been decided by the Add. Distt. Judge exercising jurisdiction of a Judge Small Causes and therefore,the revision is maintainable in this court only. The court billow decreed the suit on Nov.25,2013 and this revision was filed on Feb.26,2014,thus excluding the time requisite for obtaining the certified copy of the decree sought to be revised, is well within the period of limitation i.e. 90 days. The objection raised by the Stamp Reporter regarding delay in filing the revision is beyond the scope and authority of the Stamp Reporter.

Sri Agarwal strenuously urged to reject the report of the stamp reporter and to direct the office to register the revision in regular side.

To bolster his arguments, Sri Agarwal placed reliance on Uday Bhan Gupta VS. Hari Shankar Bansal and others; AIR 1984 SC 1469 and the order of this Court dated 3.2.2014 passed in SSC Revision Defective No. 25 of 2014 (Ravindra Kumar Jain Vs. Multani Mal Modi Degree College Society).

Before delving into the controversy involved, it would be expedient to have a look on Section 25 of the Act as applicable to the State of U.P., which reads thus:-

"25. Revision of decrees and orders of Courts of Small Causes.-- The District Judge, for the purposes of satisfying himself that a decree or order made in any case decided by a Court of Small Causes was according to law, may of his own motion, or on the application of an aggrieved party made within thirty days from the date of such decree or order, call for the case and pass such order with respect thereto as he thinks fit.

Provided that in relation to any case decided by a District Judge or Additional District Judge exercising the jurisdiction of a Judge of Small Causes, the power of revision under this Section shall vest in the High Court."

On bare reading of the above section, it is manifested that the power of revision conferred on the District Judge for the purpose of satisfying himself that a decree or order made in any case decided by a court of small causes, was according to law, aggrieved party may make an application within a period of thirty days from the date of such decree or order. However,as per the proviso to this Section inserted vide U.P. Act 37 of 1972 where the case is decided by a District Judge or Additional District Judge exercising the jurisdiction of Judge Small Causes, the power of revision shall vest in the High Court. Thus, on over all analysis of this section, it emerges out that by inserting proviso, the revisional power conferred upon the District Judge, has been extended to the High Court in the eventuality where the case is decided by a District Judge or Additional District Judge exercising jurisdiction of a Judge Small Causes. There is no mention about the period of limitation in case the revision is preferred in this Court.

A proviso does not travel beyond the provisions to which it is a proviso. It is fundamental rule of construction that a proviso must be considered with relation to the principal matter to which it stands as proviso. Therefore it is to be construed harmoniously with the main enactment.

In Ram Narain Sons Limited Vs. Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax, 1955 (2) SCR 483 the apex court held:-

"It is cardinal rule of interpretation that a proviso to a particular provision of a statute only embraces the field which is covered by the main provision. It carves out an exception to the main provision to which it has been enacted as a proviso and to no other."

The ratio laid down as above has been affirmed and reiterated by Larger Bench of Supreme Court in DWARKA PRASAD Vs. DWARKA DAS SARAF 1976 (1) SCC 128. The apex court held as under:

"We may mention fairness to counsel that the following, among other decisions, were cited at the bar bearing on the uses of provisos in statutes: Commissioner of Income-tax v. Indo-Mercantile Bank Ltd.(1); M/s. Ram Narain Sons Ltd. v. Asst. Commissioner of Sales Tax(2); Thompson v. Dibdin (8); Rex v. Dibdin (4) and Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P.(5). The law is trite. A proviso must be limited to the subject matter of the enacting clause. It is a settled rule of construction that a proviso must prima facie be read and considered in relation to the principal matter to which it is a proviso. It is not a separate or independent enactment. 'Words are dependent on the principal enacting words, to which they are tacked as a proviso. They cannot be read as divorced from their context' (1912 A.C. 544). If the rule of construction is that prima facie a proviso should be limited in its operation to the subject matter of the enacting clause, the stand we have taken is sound. To expand the enacting clause, inflated by the proviso, sins against the fundamental rule of construction that a proviso must be considered in relation to the principal matter to which it stands as a proviso. A proviso ordinarily is but a proviso, although the golden rule is to read the whole section, inclusive of the proviso, in such manner that they mutually throw light on each other and result in a harmonious construction."

"The proper course is to apply the broad general rule of construction which is that a section or enactment must be construed as a whole each portion throwing light if need be on the rest.

The true principle undoubtedly is, that the sound interpretation and meaning of the statute, on a view of the enacting clause, saving clause, and proviso, taken and construed together is to prevail." (Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes 10th Edn. P. 162)

In the main provision of Section 25 of the Act as applicable to the State of Uttar Pradesh the period of limitation for filing the revision to the court of District Judge is 30 days. There is even not a whisper about the period of limitation in the proviso and, therefore as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above cited cases the proviso must be considered with relation to the main provision and accordingly, the period of limitation for filing the revision to the High Court under the proviso would be 30 days as mentioned in the main section.

In Uday Bhan Gupta's case (Supra) the facts were that a revision filed by the tenant before this Court was dismissed on preliminary objection taken by the respondent that the revision was barred by limitation as period of limitation under Section 25 of the Act, is thirty days. In that case the Registry did not point out the defect of limitation, which would have prompted the revisionist to seek condonation of delay and this Court at the time of hearing of the revision straight-way proceed to entertain the preliminary objection of limitation. The apex court, however, observed as under:- "we are therefore, not expressed any view taken by the High Court but we are not impressed by the view taken by the High Court, but we leave the point to be considered on an appropriate occasion."

Thus, obviously,in Uday Bhan Gupta's case (Supra) the apex court did not decide the controversy of period of limitation for filing of SCC revision in the High Court under Section 25 of the Act as to whether it is thirty days or ninety days.

In Ravindra Kumar Jain's case (Supra) this Court was of the view that the period of limitation for filing SCC revision in High Court Court in relation to any case decided by a District Judge/Additional District Judge in the exercise of jurisdiction of a Judge Small Causes, would be 90 days as held by the apex court in Uday Bhan Gupta's case (Supra). As aforementioned, the apex court left the point to be considered on an appropriate occasion. This controversy obviously, was not decided by the apex court in the said case.

In Civil Revision No. 97 of 2013 (Lucknow Bench) (The Pioneer Urban Cooperative Bank Ltd., Vs. Ishwar Nath Kapoor & Anr) this Court held that period of limitation for filing SCC Revision under Section 25 of the Act to the High Court shall be 30 days.

In District Manager, Food Corporation of India Vs. Yans Prasad Jain and another, 1983 (9) ALR 630; Division Bench of this Court, in a reference made by a learned Single Judge as to whether the period of limitation for filing a revision under Section 25 of the Act by an aggrieved party before the High Court is 30 days or 90 days, after considering so many judgements of this Court including a Full Bench Decision, has clearly observed as under:

"In our opinion, an aggrieved party can file a revision before the High Court by an application made within 30 days of the date of the order. If, it is filed beyond this period, an application for condonation of delay under Section 5 Limitation Act will lie irrespective of the stage at which the fact of delay comes to light. If the delay is in a particular case, not condoned application in revision will have to be dismissed even where the record has been summoned at the instance of such party. The Full Bench decision in Rama Kant Singh (supra) is distinguishable. There Section 48 of Consolidation of Holdings Act did not confer any right on a party. It provided power of revision to the Director. Section 25 S.C.C. Act confers a right of revision on a party. Of course, this does not affect the suo motu power of the Court. But for the invocation, a party has no right to be heard."

Thus, having considered submissions made by learned counsel for the revisionist and taking in view the legal propositions laid down in District Manager, FCI's Case (Supra), it is held that the revision is barred by period of limitation as pointed out by the Stamp Reporter. However, taking in view the facts and circumstances of the case, revisionist is permitted to move an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay within a week from today. The objections against the report of the Stamp Reporter are, accordingly disposed of.

Put up with delay condonation application.

Order Date :- 21 .3.2014

Naresh/A.Pt.Singh