Kamla Kant Shukla vs State Of U.P.Thorugh Prin. Secy. ...
2013 Latest Caselaw 5165 ALL

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
 
 

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AFR
 
Court No. - 14
 
Case :- SERVICE SINGLE No. - 2556 of 2008
 
Petitioner :- Kamla Kant Shukla
 
Respondent :- State Of U.P.Thorugh Prin. Secy. Basic Education Lko.And 5.
 
Counsel for Petitioner :- Abdul Moin,Abhinav N.Trivedi,Ravi Shankar Tiwari,Saurabh Lavania
 
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Anupam Singh,Jagdish Prasad Maurya,Jitendra K.Pandey,Manish Kumar
 
along with
 
Case :- SERVICE SINGLE No. - 692 of 2008
 

 
Petitioner :- Ramesh Chandra Maurya
 
Respondent :- State Of U.P. Thru Prin. Secy. Basic Education & 5 Ors.
 
Counsel for Petitioner :- Abhinav N. Trivedi,Abdul Moin
 
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Dipak Srivastava,J.P. Maurya,Manish Kumar
 

 
Hon'ble Saeed-Uz-Zaman Siddiqi,J.

Both these writ petitions relate to the same dispute.  Hence, I proceed on to decide both these writ petitions together.

One Ramesh Chandra Maurya filed W.P. No. 692 (SS) of 2008 with a prayer to issue writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned order dated 23.01.2008 as contained in Annexure no. 1 to the writ petition and writ in the nature of mandamus commanding opposite parties to allow the petitioner to work on the post of Scout Master and pay him regular salary for the said post with all consequential benefits.  This writ petition was filed on 06.02.2008.

One Kamla Kant Shukla filed W.P. No. 2556 (SS) of 2008 with a prayer to issue writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the order dated 26.07.2007 and writ in the nature of mandamus commanding the opposite parties to allow the petitioner to work on the post of Scout Master and pay him regular salary.

Brief facts relating to both the writ petitions are that in compliance of Government order dated 21.07.2007 under the provisions contained in Section 13 of U.P. Basic Education Act, 1972, The Uttar Pradesh State created post of Scout Master with a provision that it shall be filled only by those teachers who are working in a Junior High School and opposite party no. 6 who was working as Teacher in the Primary School was appointed as Scout Master on 08.03.2002, which was brought to the knowledge of the District Basic Education Officer when opposite party No. 6  was repatriated to his parent post of Assistant Teacher, Primary School.  The opposite  party No. 5 (District Basic Education Officer) concluded the Screening Committee, in pursuance of the letter issued by the Chief Development Officer and challenged the recommendation of the Screening Committee dated 05.07.2007.  The petitioner was appointed on the post of Scout Master.  The petitioner was initially appointed as Assistant Teacher and then promoted as Assistant Teacher in Primary School and thereafter promoted in the Junior High School and, as such, the petitioner is fully eligible.  In compliance of the order passed by Secretary, U.P. Basic Shiksha Parishad, Allahabad, the District Basic Education Officer submitted a detailed report on 23.11.2007.  But, unfortunately, Opposite party No. 6 put some political pressure.  The petitioner was removed from the post vide legal order dated 29.01.2003.  While passing the order dated 23.01.2008, no opportunity of being heard was provided  to the petitioner which is violative of principles of natural justice and, as such, the order passed by District Basic Education Officer is violative of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.  Hence, this writ petition has been filed by Ramesh Chandra Maurya.

On the similar facts the writ petition was filed by Kamla Kant Shukla. Pleadings have been exchanged in both the writ petitions.  It is undisputed fact that the  post of Scout Master was created.

It is also undisputed  that Akhtar Ahmad Khan, Anupam Singh and Shiv Karan Singh were appointed to the post after due regular selection by duly Constituted Committee, vide order passed by District Basic Education Officer dated 15.05.2007, which was stayed by the same District Education Officer, vide order dated 22.05.2007.  The same District Basic Education Officer, Brij Bhushan Chaudhary appointed the petitioners in both the writ petitions as Scout Master, vide order dated 09.07.2007.  But, it is mentioned in the order contained in Annexure No. 3 that the petitioners have been selected on the basis of report of the Screening committee, dated 07.07.2007.  The matter was reported to Assistant  District Education Director (Basic) vide letter dated 23.11.2007.  The Joint Director (Basic) has issued a circular letter dated 07.04.1988 relating to the appointment and functioning of Scout Masters.  Another letter was sent by Secretary (Basic Education Officer, U.P.) dated 29.01.2003. It is evident from the order dated 23.01.2008 that the appointment of the petitioner was not approved and the appointment of the Private opposite parties were approved by the authorities.  The same District Basic Education Officer Brij Bhushan Chaudhary has admitted in his order dated 13.07.2007 that the appointment of the petitioners in both the writ petitions has been cancelled because it was not found in accordance with the rules.

The claim of the petitioners is falsified by a perusal of annexure as contained in CA-2 dated 26.07.2007 issued by Secretary U.P Basic Education that the State Government has taken a decision that the qualification of being a teacher in Junior High School has been abolished by the State of U.P. in the year 2002 and it was directed that the  Scout Master can be appointed from the Teachers of Primary School.  It was further directed by the Circular letter that the appointment issued to the petitioners is being put in abeyance and this order has never been challenged by the petitioners.  The opposite party no. 6 has filed all the documents, a perusal of which shows that the then Basic Education Officer namely Brij Bhushan Chaudhary is the ring master of all the dispute between the parties, who has compelled the petitioner to approach to this court and the legally selected candidates have been dragged into this controversy, including the State machinery. 

In W.P. No. 692 (SS) of 2008, opposite party No. 6 had specifically deposed in para no. 2D which is as follows:

".....the appointment of the petitioner was made without following any procedure of publishing the advertisement and inviting applications and no meeting of the Screening Committee has held whereas in the present case, the appointment of the petitioner was made first on 09.07.2007 and thereafter the advertisement was published in the newspaper on 17.07.2007, which is made in the affidavit which clearly shows that the appointment of the petitioner is illegal and dehorse the rules and it is a settled law that an illegal appointment dehorse the rules is liable to be set aside at any stage and giving opportunity is not needed in such cases."

Opposite party No. 6 has also filed the copy of circular dated 26.07.2007 C.A.-11.   The annexures as contained in CA-15 and 16 are very relevant which go on to show that resident Magistrate/District Magistrate had to pass an order regarding payment of salary to the opposite party no. 6 in both the petitions and the third person vide order dated 06.11.2007, in consequence of which, the then Basic Education Officer had to issue letter on 22.10.2007 that the Assistant District Basic Education officer ha to enquire and report the matter to District Basic Education Officer on 13.11.2007 as contained in annexure CA 8.  Not only this, the Assistant Education Director (Basic) had to issue a Government order on 23.11.2007 as contained in CA- 19, 20 and 21.

A perusal of the file shows that the petitioners were illegally selected and the opposite party no.6 was legally selected but the then District Basic Education Officer namely Brij Bhushan Chaudhary disobeyed the orders of his superiors and functioned in a dictatorial and autocratic way to defy the orders of the superiors in an obstinate manner thereby violated the administrative decency and rules of hierarchy as observed in administrative mechanism of the State which is the basic feature of running the State as enshrined in the Constitution of India. It was argued by learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioners have been removed without affording opportunity of being heard and in violation of the rules of natural justice. This argument is not tenable at law on the ground that the petitioners were never legally selected on the post, therefore the benefit of Article 311 of the Constitution of India cannot be extended to the petitioners. The Constitutional Bench of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka and Ors. v. Umadevi and Ors. (2006) 4 SCC 1 has held that persons given appointment dehorse the rules are having no legal right to continue in service and while ousting them from the services, the question of opportunity of hearing and the principles of natural justice will not come into play. In the above mentioned case the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:-

"But, sometimes this process is not adhered to and the Constitutional scheme of public employment is by-passed. The Union, the States, their departments and instrumentalities have resorted to irregular appointments, especially in the lower rungs of the service, without reference to the duty to ensure a proper appointment procedure through the Public Service Commission or otherwise as per the rules adopted and to permit these irregular appointees or those appointed on contract or on daily wages, to continue year after year, thus, keeping out those who are qualified to apply for the post concerned and depriving them of an opportunity to compete for the post. It has also led to persons who get employed, without the following of a regular procedure or even through the backdoor or on daily wages, approaching Courts, seeking directions to make them permanent in their posts and to prevent regular recruitment to the concerned posts. Courts have not always kept the legal aspects in mind and have occasionally even stayed the regular process of employment being set in motion and in some cases, even directed that these illegal, irregular or improper entrants be absorbed into service. A class of employment which can only be called 'litigious employment', has risen like a phoenix seriously impairing the constitutional scheme. Such orders are passed apparently in exercise of the wide powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Whether the wide powers under Article 226 of the Constitution is intended to be used for a purpose certain to defeat the concept of social justice and equal opportunity for all, subject to affirmative action in the matter of public employment as recognized by our Constitution, has to be seriously pondered over. It is time, that Courts desist from issuing orders preventing regular selection or recruitment at the instance of such persons and from issuing directions for continuance of those who have not secured regular appointments as per procedure established. The passing of orders for continuance, tends to defeat the very Constitutional scheme of public employment. It has to be emphasized that this is not the role envisaged for High Courts in the scheme of things and their wide powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are not intended to be used for the purpose of perpetuating illegalities, irregularities or improprieties or for scuttling the whole scheme of public employment. Its role as the sentinel and as the guardian of equal rights protection should not be forgotten.

This Court has also on occasions issued directions which could not be said to be consistent with the Constitutional scheme of public employment. Such directions are issued presumably on the basis of equitable considerations or individualization of justice. The question arises, equity to whom? Equity for the handful of people who have approached the Court with a claim, or equity for the teeming millions of this country seeking employment and seeking a fair opportunity for competing for employment? When one side of the coin is considered, the other side of the coin, has also to be considered and the way open to any court of law or justice, is to adhere to the law as laid down by the Constitution and not to make directions, which at times, even if do not run counter to the Constitutional scheme, certainly tend to water down the Constitutional requirements. It is this conflict that is reflected in these cases referred to the Constitution Bench.

The power of a State as an employer is more limited than that of a private employer inasmuch as it is subjected to constitutional limitations and cannot be exercised arbitrarily (See Basu's Shorter Constitution of India). Article 309 of the Constitution gives the Government the power to frame rules for the purpose of laying down the conditions of service and recruitment of persons to be appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or any of the States. That Article contemplates the drawing up of a procedure and rules to regulate the recruitment and regulate the service conditions of appointees appointed to public posts. It is well acknowledged that because of this, the entire process of recruitment for services is controlled by detailed procedure which specify the necessary qualifications, the mode of appointment etc. If rules have been made under Article 309 of the Constitution, then the Government can make appointments only in accordance with the rules. The State is meant to be a model employer. The Employment Exchanges (Compulsory Notification of Vacancies) Act, 1959 was enacted to ensure equal opportunity for employment seekers. Though this Act may not oblige an employer to employ only those persons who have been sponsored by employment exchanges, it places an obligation on the employer to notify the vacancies that may arise in the various departments and for filling up of those vacancies, based on a procedure. Normally, statutory rules are framed under the authority of law governing employment. It is recognized that no government order, notification or circular can be substituted for the statutory rules framed under the authority of law. This is because, following any other course could be disastrous inasmuch as it will deprive the security of tenure and the right of equality conferred on civil servants under the Constitutional scheme. It may even amount to negating the accepted service jurisprudence. Therefore, when statutory rules are framed under Article 309 of the Constitution which are exhaustive, the only fair means to adopt is to make appointments based on the rules so framed."

The Hon'ble Apex Court further observed as under:-

"We have already indicated the constitutional scheme of public employment in this country, and the executive, or for that matter the Court, in appropriate cases, would have only the right to regularize an appointment made after following the due procedure, even though a non-fundamental element of that process or procedure has not been followed. This right of the executive and that of the court, would not extend to the executive or the court being in a position to direct that an appointment made in clear violation of the constitutional scheme, and the statutory rules made in that behalf, can be treated as permanent or can be directed to be treated as permanent."

In the above mentioned case the Hon'ble Apex Court has further observed as under:-

"We are alive to the position that the scheme which we have finalized is not the ideal one but as we have already stated, it is the obligation of the court to individualize justice to suit a given situation in a set of facts that are placed before it...."

".....With respect, why should the State be allowed to depart from the normal rule and indulge in temporary employment in permanent posts? This Court, in our view, is bound to insist on the State making regular and proper recruitments and is bound not to encourage or shut its eyes to the persistent transgression of the rules of regular recruitment. The direction to make permanent -- the distinction between regularization and making permanent, was not emphasized here -- can only encourage the State, the model employer, to flout its own rules and would confer undue benefits on a few at the cost of many waiting to compete. With respect, the direction made in paragraph 50 of Piara Singh (supra) are to some extent inconsistent with the conclusion in paragraph 45 therein. With great respect, it appears to us that the last of the directions clearly runs counter to the constitutional scheme of employment recognized in the earlier part of the decision. Really, it cannot be said that this decision has laid down the law that all ad hoc, temporary or casual employees engaged without following the regular recruitment procedure should be made permanent."

The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by L.R's. v. Jagannath (dead) by L.R's. 1994 AIR 853, has held as under:-

".....The principle of "finality of litigation" cannot be pressed to the extent of such an absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants. The courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the court, must come with clean hands. We are constrained to say that more often than not, process of the court is being abused. Property-grabbers, tax-evaders, bank-loan-dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the court-process a convenient lever to retain the illegal-gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person, who's case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation."

In Mohd. Sartaj & anr. v. State of U.P. & ors. AIR 2006 SC 3492, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:-

"Regarding the non-compliance of natural justice, the Court opined that in the present case there was no procedural illegality and relied upon the State of M.P. vs. Shyama Pardhi, 1996 (7) S.C.C. 118 where it was observed that question of violation of natural justice did not arise in a case where the pre-requisite minimum qualification for the appointment was not fulfilled and resulted in the cancellation of the appointment. The Court also opined that the action of cancellation was taken swiftly within a short interval and merely because appellants were allowed to continue on the post in pursuance of the interim order, would not entitle them to the posts on which they were illegally appointed."

The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Sate of Manipur & ors. v. Y.Token Singh & ors. (2007) 5 SCC 65 has held as under:-

"If the offers of appointments issued in favour of the respondents herein were forged documents, the State could not have been compelled to pay salaries to them from the State exchequer. Any action, which had not been taken by an authority competent therefor and in complete violation of the constitutional and legal framework, would not be binding on the State. In any event, having regard to the fact that the said authority himself had denied to have issued a letter, there was no reason for the State not to act pursuant thereto or in furtherance thereof. The action of the State did not, thus, lack bona fide.

Moreover, it was for the respondents who had filed the writ petitions to prove existence of legal right in their favour. They had inter alia prayed for issuance of a writ of or in the nature of mandamus. It was, thus, for them to establish existence of a legal right in their favour and a corresponding legal duty in the respondents to continue to be employed. With a view to establish their legal rights to enable the High Court to issue a writ of mandamus, the respondents were obligated to establish that the appointments had been made upon following the constitutional mandate adumbrated in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. They have not been able to show that any advertisement had been issued inviting applications from eligible candidates to fill up the said posts. It has also not been shown that the vacancies had been notified to the employment exchange.

The Commissioner furthermore was not the appointing authority. He was only a cadre controlling authority. He was merely put a Chairman of the DPC for non-ministerial post of the Revenue Department."

While holding this the Hon'ble Apex Court has relied upon its earlier decision and held as under:-

"In M.C. Mehta v. Union of India and Others [(1999) 6 SCC 237], this Court developed the "useless formality" theory stating:

"More recently Lord Bingham has deprecated the useless formality theory in R. v. Chief Constable of the Thames Valley Police Forces, ex p Cotton by giving six reasons. (See also his article Should Public Law Remedies be Discretionary? 1991 PL, p. 64.) A detailed and emphatic criticism of the useless formality theory has been made much earlier in Natural Justice, Substance or Shadow by Prof. D.H. Clark of Canada (see 1975 PL, pp. 27- 63) contending that Malloch and Glynn were wrongly decided. Foulkes (Administrative Law, 8th Edn., 1996, p. 323), Craig (Administrative Law, 3rd Edn., p. 596) and others say that the court cannot prejudge what is to be decided by the decision-making authority. de Smith (5th Edn., 1994, paras 10.031 to 10.036) says courts have not yet committed themselves to any one view though discretion is always with the court. Wade (Administrative Law, 5th Edn., 1994, pp. 526-30) says that while futile writs may not be issued, a distinction has to be made according to the nature of the decision. Thus, in relation to cases other than those relating to admitted or indisputable facts, there is a considerable divergence of opinion whether the applicant can be compelled to prove that the outcome will be in his favour or he has to prove a case of substance or if he can prove a real likelihood of success or if he is entitled to relief even if there is some remote chance of success. We may, however, point out that even in cases where the facts are not all admitted or beyond dispute, there is a considerable unanimity that the courts can, in exercise of their discretion, refuse certiorari, prohibition, mandamus or injunction even though natural justice is not followed. We may also state that there is yet another line of cases as in State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma, Rajendra Singh v. State of M.P. that even in relation to statutory provisions requiring notice, a distinction is to be made between cases where the provision is intended for individual benefit and where a provision is intended to protect public interest. In the former case, it can be waived while in the case of the latter, it cannot be waived."

In an earlier decision the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ashok Kumar Sonkar v. Union of India, (2007) 4 SCC 54 has held as under:-

"This bring us to the question as to whether the principles of natural justice were required to be complied with. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the audi alteram partem is one of the basic pillar of natural justice which means no one should be condemned unheard. However, whenever possible the principle of natural justice should be followed. Ordinarily in a case of this nature the same should be complied with. Visitor may in a given situation issue notice to the employee who would be effected by the ultimate order that may be passed. He may not be given an oral hearing, but may be allowed to make a representation in writing.

It is also, however, well-settled that it cannot be put any straight jacket formula. It may not be in a given case applied unless a prejudice is shown. It is not necessary where it would be a futile exercise.

A court of law does not insist on compliance of useless formality. It will not issue any such direction where the result would remain the same, in view of the fact situation prevailing or in terms of the legal consequences. Furthermore in this case, the selection of the appellant was illegal. He was not qualified on the cut off date. Being ineligible to be considered for appointment, it would have been a futile exercise to give him an opportunity of being heard.

....In Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation and Another v. S.G. Kotturappa and Another [(2005) 3 SCC 409], this Court held :

"The question as to what extent, principles of natural justice are required to be complied with would depend upon the fact situation obtaining in each case. The principles of natural justice cannot be applied in vacuum. They cannot be put in any straitjacket formula. The principles of natural justice are furthermore not required to be complied with when it will lead to an empty formality. What is needed for the employer in a case of this nature is to apply the objective criteria for arriving at the subjective satisfaction. If the criteria required for arriving at an objective satisfaction stands fulfilled, the principles of natural justice may not have to be complied with, in view of the fact that the same stood complied with before imposing punishments upon the respondents on each occasion and, thus, the respondents, therefore, could not have improved their stand even if a further opportunity was given."

In Punjab National Bank and Others v. Manjeet Singh and Another [(2006) 8 SCC 647], this Court opined :

"The principles of natural justice were also not required to be complied with as the same would have been an empty formality. The court will not insist on compliance with the principles of natural justice in view of the binding nature of the award. Their application would be limited to a situation where the factual position or legal implication arising thereunder is disputed and not where it is not in dispute or cannot be disputed. If only one conclusion is possible, a writ would not issue only because there was a violation of the principle of natural justice."

" .....In Maruti Udyog Ltd. v. Ram Lal & Others [(2005) 2 SCC 638], a Division Bench of this Court, wherein one of us was a member, noticing some decisions, observed :

"44. While construing a statute, sympathy has no role to play. This Court cannot interpret the provisions of the said Act ignoring the binding decisions of the Constitution Bench of this Court only by way of sympathy to the workmen concerned.

45. In A.Umarani v. Registrar, Coop. Societies this Court rejected a similar contention upon noticing the following judgments: (SCC pp. 131-32, paras 68-70)

68. In a case of this nature this Court should not even exercise its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India on misplaced sympathy.

69. In Teri Oat Estates (P) Ltd. v. U.T., Chandigarh, it is stated: (SCC p. 144, paras 36-37)

36. We have no doubt in our mind that sympathy or sentiment by itself cannot be a ground for passing an order in relation whereto the appellants miserably fail to establish a legal right. It is further trite that despite an extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction contained in Article 142 of the Constitution of India, this Court ordinarily would not pass an order which would be in contravention of a statutory provision.

37. As early as in 1911, Farewell, L.J. in Latham v. Richard Johnson & Nephew Ltd. observed: (All ER p. 123 E)

We must be very careful not to allow our sympathy with the infant plaintiff to affect our judgment. Sentiment is a dangerous will o the wisp to take as a guide in the search for legal principles.

70. Yet again, recently in Ramakrishna Kamat v. State of Karnataka this Court rejected a similar plea for regularisation of services stating: (SCC pp. 377-78, para 7) We repeatedly asked the learned counsel for the appellants on what basis or foundation in law the appellants made their claim for regularisation and under what rules their recruitment was made so as to govern their service conditions. They were not in a position to answer except saying that the appellants have been working for quite some time in various schools started pursuant to resolutions passed by Zila Parishads in view of the government orders and that their cases need to be considered sympathetically. It is clear from the order of the learned Single Judge and looking to the very directions given, a very sympathetic view was taken. We do not find it either just or proper to show any further sympathy in the given facts and circumstances of the case. While being sympathetic to the persons who come before the court the courts cannot at the same time be unsympathetic to the large number of eligible persons waiting for a long time in a long queue seeking employment."

It is not a case where appointment was irregular. If an appointment is irregular, the same can be regularized. The court may not take serious note of an irregularity within the meaning of the provisions of the Act. But if an appointment is illegal, it is non est in the eye of law, which renders the appointment to be a nullity.

We have noticed hereinbefore that in making appointment of the appellant, the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and statutory rules were not complied with. The appointment, therefore, was illegal and in that view of the matter, it would be wholly improper for us to invoke our equity jurisdiction."

The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Mukesh Kumar Badoni v. State of Punjab & ors. (2008) 4 SCC 446 has observed as under:-

"In his writ petition, however, the appellant did not state that he possessed the said qualification. Even in the special leave petition he did not make any statement that he holds the requisite qualification. If he does not possess the requisite qualification, this Court and also for that matter the High Court, could not issue a writ, which would be futile in nature.

It may be that the respondents had taken different stands at different stages but the fact remains that his services have not been approved by the Director of Public Instructions. He does not possess the requisite qualification. Unless an express approval of the competent authority is granted, he cannot be permitted to continue in services with the College.

For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that it is not a fit case where this Court could exercise its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. The appeals fails and is accordingly dismissed. In he facts and circumstances of the case, however, there shall be no order as to costs."

The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Mohinder Singh Gill v. The Chief Election Commissioner, AIR 1978 SC 851 has held as under:-

".....When a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise..."

A very startling fact is that the petitioners have altogether suppressed letter dated 26.07.2007, issued by The Secretary, U.P. Basic Education, wherein it has been mentioned that the  State Government has abolished the condition of being a Teacher in the Junior High School for selection as Scout Master.  The said Circular letter has been brought to the knowledge of this Court by the Opposite party no. 6 through Annexure contained in CA-11.  On this score, the petitioner cannot get any equitable relief from this Court for suppression of facts and not coming to the Court with clean hands.

In view of the law as discussed above, the petitioners have got no grievance which can be rectified by this Court. Both the writ petitions are accordingly dismissed.

Order Date :- 22.8.2013

Nitesh